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ABSTRACT  
When Old Age Changed: Inventing the "Senior State," 1945-1975 
by 
Benjamin Hellwege 
Advisor: Gerald Markowitz 
This dissertation asks why public assistance at the federal level in the United States has become 
significantly oriented towards the needs of older Americans since the New Deal era. It argues that in 
effect the United States has developed an old age welfare state – a “senior state,” in other words, 
which has sought primarily to protect the economic status of older Americans, and that the creation 
of this “senior state” represents the end-point of a long-term project by social reformers, organized 
labor, and old age advocacy organizations over the course of the second half of the 20th century to 
institutionalize federal responsibility for the elderly. Unlike the controversies which surrounded 
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), contributory programs such as 
Social Security and Medicare as well as noncontributory initiatives funded by the federal 
government to assist older Americans enjoyed far more social and political legitimacy. My research 
argues that this acceptance of programs to help older Americans was the product of a unique 
alliance between government officials, organized labor, and civic organizations which ensured that 
both adequate public funding and social legitimacy would be reserved to protect programs for older 
Americans.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The sun dawned bright and clearly over Washington, D.C. on Wednesday, July 14, 1965, a 
perfectly ordinary day in the nation’s capital. Cars, buses, and trucks caught in morning rush hour 
traffic sat snarled at traffic lights on the city’s great wide boulevards, filling the air with the sounds 
of honking vehicles, occasionally interspersed here and there with the static-riddled cackle of radios 
and the chatter of construction workers and pedestrians. Even though it was not yet afternoon, 
Washington’s traditionally sweaty, sticky, and generally miserable summer humidity had already 
begun to suffocate the city’s gleaming white marble buildings in a merciless, stifling embrace. 
On Capitol Hill, Congress had convened to consider a wide variety of major and minor 
legislative proposals. For months, the 89th Congress had been debating and passing bills at a 
breakneck speed that had not been seen in a generation. Already, the Congress had considered more 
measures in the first six months of 1965 than had been on the docket during FDR’s celebrated 
Hundred Days in 1933, and several major pieces of legislation, such as the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, the Voting Rights Act, Medicare and Medicaid (more properly, the Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1965), the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 had either 
been enacted or soon would be. If, as Robert Caro has observed, the United States Senate’s chief 
function in the past had been to dam and hold back legislative proposals designed to deal with the 
pressing social and political issues of the day, then the chamber’s busy, humming activity 
throughout 1965 probably stands out as the exception which proves the rule.1 
The Senate’s busy schedule owed much to Lyndon Johnson – one of its former members – 
who now sat in the Oval Office. Fresh off of a successful spring legislative session, Johnson signed 
the Older Americans Act into law after a short ceremony in the Rose Garden. In many of the next 
          
1 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, Volume 3 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 
pgs. 3-78, see esp. 33-46. 
 2 
 
day’s newspapers, coverage of the event attracted mildly interested but perfunctory attention. The 
New York Times relegated the story to its middle pages, buried near advertisements for Pan 
American Airlines’ new routes to Europe and cheap men’s clothing stores.2 The press’s lack of 
interest in the story was understandable. The real legislative battle, everyone knew, was still over 
the fate of the proposed Medicare and Medicaid legislation (to say nothing of the Voting Rights 
Act). In the specific case of Medicare and Medicaid, liberals had been fighting for these measures 
since the twilight days of the Eisenhower administration, and it had been at times a bitter conflict in 
which they had tasted far more defeats than victories. 
In contrast to the muted coverage of the Older Americans Act’s enactment, when the 
Medicare legislation was finally signed by President Johnson on July 30, 1965 at the Harry S. 
Truman Presidential Library, newspaper coverage was lavish, generous, and practically fawning. 
Photographs of President Johnson signing the legislation next to a beaming but frail President Harry 
Truman could be found on the front page of major newspapers throughout the country, and grateful 
letters and telegrams from older Americans to President Johnson soon began to pour into the White 
House at a feverish pace. Though Medicare would not actually go into operation until 1966, liberals 
savored this victory over the fierce opposition led by the much-loathed and feared American 
Medical Association, and confidently looked forward to the day when national health insurance for 
all Americans – not just the elderly or the indigent – would become a reality rather than a fantasy.3 
Yet something happened on the way to achieving that goal. As we now know, the enactment 
of Medicare and much of the other Great Society legislation – like the Older Americans Act – that 
the Johnson administration had managed to steer through Congress during the brief window of 
          
2 Robert B. Semple, Jr. “President Signs Bill on Elderly: Hails Its Goal of Providing Training for the Aging,” The New 
York Times, 13. 
3 See Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), esp. 107-108. 
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opportunity provided by the 1964 landslide election would prove to be a false dawn for liberals in 
the United States. For a variety of reasons – including but not limited to the disastrous war in 
Vietnam, the explosion of racial unrest in many American cities, and the resurgence of the powerful 
“conservative coalition” of southern Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill – the Great Society 
would prove to be a high water mark for major social reform until well into the twentieth-first 
century, when the hard-won enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (popularly 
known as “Obamacare”) would resume some of the long-paused work of major national reform 
dating back to at least the Progressive Era. 
In the meantime, though, major programs like Social Security and Medicare which did get 
enacted during the major moments of social reform in the twentieth century would develop in ways 
that had not been entirely foreseen by their architects. Social Security, for example, was never 
intended solely to be a program primarily oriented towards older Americans, though that is the path 
it has taken, and that is the way we generally understand it when it is used today in our political and 
social nomenclature.4 Instead, it was designed to act in concert with other never-enacted laws to 
ensure that the promise of economic security would extend to as many members of the American 
family as possible, rather than just its elders. As the political scientist Margaret Weir has shown, 
attempts to enact guarantees of full employment – with the federal government as the employer of 
last resort – repeatedly failed in 1945 and again in 1978, and this failure has ensured that the goal of 
full employment has remained more distant and aspirational than anything else.5 It has also meant 
that debates over the meaning of “Social Security” would be far more separated from debates about 
employment and the “right to work” than might have otherwise been the case. The policy world in 
          
4 Here I rely upon Martha Derthick’s Policymaking for Social Security, which is still the finest in-depth examination of 
Social Security’s origins and development. See Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1979). 
5  See Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. 3-26. 
 4 
 
which we live in is one shaped not just by the successes but also by the failures and “might-have-
beens” which did not come to pass. 
Main Argument of the Dissertation 
What did happen – and this is the major argument that I shall make in this dissertation – is 
that the half-finished efforts to enact a broad, well-developed social welfare state in the United 
States resulted instead in the creation of a “senior state,” which was increasingly designed and 
driven over time by the concerns and demands of the nation’s eldest citizens and not necessarily by 
its neediest.6 This dissertation tells the story of the creation of a senior state between 1935 and 1975, 
starting from the time of its origins in the 1930s and 1940s, extending into its expansion between the 
1950s and the mid-1970s, and ends by offering some concluding thoughts on its development since 
then. The construction of this state took place primarily during a time of self-assured economic 
growth and expansion in the United States and well before the advent of protracted economic crisis 
and stagnation which began in the mid-1970s. Yet even in the decades since the end of the 
seemingly miraculous economic prosperity which blessed the United States and much of the 
industrialized world after World War II, the senior state has continued to thrive, despite the rise of a 
committed anti-statist conservative movement that found its greatest political champion in Ronald 
Reagan, a bona fide “senior citizen” who had launched his national political career campaigning 
against the enactment of Medicare in 1964. 
          
6 A usual explanation for this development is the voting power of the elderly. While I do not disagree that the ability of 
older people to participate in the political process has influenced the development of policy, I believe that this 
explanation oversimplifies a more complex relationship between policymaking and the elderly, and that while it may 
explain how some policies favoring the elderly have become more thoroughly entrenched, it does not necessarily 
explain how they came into existence in the first place. For example, the Townsend Movement – perhaps the most 
important national old-age advocacy group before the formation of the AARP – did not seek the enactment of Social 
Security and in fact actively crusaded against it; likewise, the AARP did not seek the enactment of Medicare and also 
actively fought attempts to enact that legislation. For a full examination of this question, see Andrea Louise Campbell, 
How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005).  
 5 
 
A few qualifiers are in order, though, starting with how I understand and define terminology 
in this dissertation. In using the term the “senior state,” I mean the collective apparatus of federal 
programs, agencies, laws, and initiatives – some of them famous and well known, like Social 
Security and Medicare, but the majority of them largely anonymous and half-forgotten, like the 
Older Americans Act – which have been gradually erected over time to protect the economic and 
social security of older Americans, who I define as people at and above the age of 65.7 This is a 
crude cut-off numerical measurement, to be sure, but it is the one which more often than not the 
federal policy makers, academic experts, and other interested parties who I examine in this 
dissertation used when deciding whether or not to undertake a particular action or advocate for a 
certain measure, even as they themselves at times recognized the sheer arbitrariness of that number. 
I have therefore adopted it in order to more closely track how policymakers debated the issues and 
questions surrounding how to best use the federal government’s resources to raise and keep older 
Americans above the official poverty line. 
Additionally, I have deliberately placed the actions of the network of public and private 
social welfare policymakers responsible for the creation of the senior state at the center of this 
dissertation rather than the elderly themselves. I have done so not because the elderly are 
unimportant or because they were powerless bystanders in the development of the senior state. 
Rather, my decision has been guided by two factors: first, the intermittent role played by elderly 
          
7 For an overview of the different American “states” identified by political scientists, see Desmond King and Marc 
Stears, "How the U.S. State Works: A Theory of Standardization,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 3 (September 2011): 
505-518. As King and Stears observe, “the American state has long perplexed both scholars and the politically-engaged 
public. It is, indisputably, a paradoxical state. It is strong and weak, centralized and decentralized, democratic and elitist, 
liberal and exclusive.” (Ibid., 515). See also Michael K. Brown, Race, Money, and the American Welfare State (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999); Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in 
the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible 
Government Policies Undermine American Democracy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). For a discussion 
of similar themes, see the roundtable articles written by John Fabian Witt, Gary Gerstle, and Julia Adams collected in 
response to William J. Novak’s article “The Myth of the “Weak” American State”, originally published in The 
American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 752-772 in “AHR Exchange: On the “Myth” of the “Weak” American 
State”, The American Historical Review 115, no. 3 (2010): 766-800. 
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people and the organizations which claimed to speak on their behalf in driving the development of 
the senior state during the four decades between 1935 and 1975, and secondly by the more critical if 
low-profile role played by elected and unelected policymakers in translating the recurrent episodes 
of political activism and mobilization by older people into government policy. While the elderly did 
play an important role in the development of the senior state – particularly during the 1930s before 
and after the enactment of Social Security and again during the late 1950s and into the 1960s before 
and after the enactment of Medicare, when organized political and social activism amongst older 
people helped propel the issues of old-age economic security and health care to the forefront of the 
nation’s domestic policy agenda, these two programs were not the sum total of the senior state.  
Instead, policymakers in states and localities with a high population of resident older people 
slowly constructed an infrastructure of programs and agencies to deal with a wide range of 
economic, social, and health issues faced by older Americans. These programs and agencies owed 
much to the sociological research undertaken by academic experts during the late 1940s and beyond 
into the actual living conditions of older Americans in various communities throughout the nation, 
and to the propagation of this research via state and national conferences, professional journals, and 
published studies. Gradually, a small but distinctive network of public and private sector individuals 
and organizations emerged that was dedicated to formulating proposed solutions to the problems 
faced by older Americans, and the implementation of these solutions – especially during the War on 
Poverty and thereafter – helped to justify permanent new roles for the state to play in the lives of 
older Americans. My dissertation therefore emphasizes how this conjunction of state power and 
policy formulation developed during the period between 1935 and 1975 rather than the role played 
by old-age social and political movements.8 
          
8 Important studies of old-age movements during the 1935-1975 period include but are not limited to Edwin Amenta, 
When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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Historiography of the American State 
In positing that the United States has a “senior state,” I am building upon a recent revival in 
investigating the role of the state in American history as well as a long-standing interest in the 
politics of public relief and social reform during what Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle famously 
termed “the New Deal Order.” 9  As Brian Balogh, William Novak, and James Sparrow have 
forcefully argued, although the United States did indeed govern differently than its industrialized 
counterparts in Western Europe and elsewhere, it did not necessarily govern less. Thirty years ago 
in his inaugural address as President of the Organization of American Historians, the eminent 
political historian William E. Leuchtenburg surveyed the landscape of American historiography and 
bemoaned the unhappy fate which had apparently befallen political history.10 If political history had 
reigned dominant in the profession during the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed by the 1980s to have 
fallen on hard times as social and later cultural history came to the forefront. To a large extent, this 
was a necessary corrective to historical scholarship which seemed to focus far too much on the role 
          
2008); Jill S. Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and James Sylvester O’Leary, “Old people's social movement 
organizations: Why they succeed, how they fail.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994. 
9 Fraser, Steve and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989). For the recent revival of scholarly interest in the state’s role in American history, see James T. 
Sparrow, William J. Novak, Stephen W. Sawyer, eds., Boundaries of the State in US History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015); Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and his more recent The Associational State: 
American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). See also 
William J. Novak’s article “The Myth of the “Weak” American State” in The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 
(2008): 752-772, and his recently edited (along with James Sparrow and Stephen W. Sawyer) Boundaries of the State in 
US History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).  
10  William E. Leuchtenburg, “The Pertinence of Political History: Reflections on the Significance of the State in 
America” The Journal of American History 73, no. 3 (1986): 585-600. Not long after Leuchtenburg bemoaned the fate 
of historical scholarship concerning the American state, Theda Skocpol helped to relaunch it as a vital area of interest in 
historical sociology. See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Political scientists like Stephen Skowronek, Richard Franklin Bensel, 
and Elizabeth Sanders also devoted significant attention to the development and evolution of the American state, with a 
decided emphasis on the period in between the end of the Civil War and the conclusion of the Progressive Era. See 
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the 
American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). In more recent times, Leuchtenburg has 
conceded that he may have overstated his case. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South: Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 11-15, esp. 
11-12. 
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of world-historical figures like Franklin Roosevelt. By the mid-to late 1990s, though, there was a 
growing sense that the pendulum had swung too far away from political history, and that while 
politics was not the only causative factor in explaining the recent and more distant past, it could not 
be entirely discounted.  
In its search for a new way forward that blends the best of newer approaches centered on 
social and cultural history, as well as more traditional approaches concerned with political and 
diplomatic history, the field has seen the emergence of hybrid fields like political culture which try 
to examine political history outside of the traditional confines of elite actors and pivotal elections in 
the history of the United States. Thanks to this turn (or is it return?) to politics in the last decade, 
political historians have enjoyed a modest renaissance within the profession, and perhaps no school 
of political historians has flourished as have historians of the American state. 11  The return of 
political history as a force to be reckoned with was announced by the publication of The Democratic 
Experiment in 2003.12 Recent works by scholars such as Margot Canaday, Michelle Dauber, James 
Sparrow, Brian Balogh and William Novak have done much to emphasize the importance of the 
American state in twentieth century American history and to reveal just how multifaceted that state 
could and continues to be.13 
          
11 For a concise overview of how political history has returned to the larger fold of American history in recent years, see 
Romain Huret,“All in the Family Again? Political Historians and the Challenge of Social History,” Journal of Policy 
History 21, no. 3 (2009): 239-263; Romain Huret, and Pauline Peretz. “Political History Today on Both Sides of the 
Atlantic” Journal of Policy History 21, no. 3 (2009): 298-307. Another good summary of developments in the 
historiography of the American state is provided by Brian Balogh, “The State of the State among Historians,” Social 
Science History 27, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 455-463. 
12 Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American 
Political History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). To be fair, it is not clear if political history or historians 
of the state ever truly disappeared from the field; see Ira Katznelson, “The State to the Rescue? Political Science and 
History Reconnect” Social Research 59, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 719-737. 
13 See, for example, Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American 
Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Margot Canaday, The 
Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); 
James Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the 
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Perhaps nowhere was this proposition more apparent than in the programs, agencies, and 
other measures which were created during the post-World War II era to control and eradicate 
poverty among older Americans. Unlike the controversies which surrounded other programs such as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), both contributory programs, such as Social 
Security and Medicare, as well as noncontributory initiatives funded by the federal government to 
assist older Americans enjoyed far more purchase and social legitimacy. I argue that this widespread 
acceptance of programs to help older Americans was the product of a long-term public and private 
alliance between government officials and voluntary civic organizations such as the National 
Association of Social Workers and the American Public Welfare Association which ensured that 
both adequate funding and manpower would be dedicated to maintaining programs for older 
Americans, and to further insulate such programs from the troubles which bedeviled the architects 
of the Great Society’s War on Poverty and other efforts to reform welfare in the United States. 
While recent scholarship has emphasized the ways in which the American state penetrated 
and permeated the lives of everyday Americans – aside from more immediately obvious ways, like 
military service – it would be a mistake to overstate or mischaracterize the relationship between the 
American state and its citizens during the twentieth century.14 Decades ago, the late Barry Karl 
cautioned students of twentieth-century U.S. political and social history about the fundamental 
ambivalence with which many Americans have viewed the American state, and the abiding distrust 
          
American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of 
Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). The recent revival of “state” scholarship in American history owes much to the work done by practitioners 
in the political science subfield of American Political Development; for two key monographs in this field, see Richard 
Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); and Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social 
Benefits in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
14 For a good overview of this subject, see Suzanne Mettler and Andrew Milstein, “American Political Development 
from Citizens’ Perspective: Tracking Federal Government’s Presence in Individual Lives over Time,” Studies in 
American Political Development 21 (Spring 2007): 110-130, esp. 124-125. Mettler and Milstein argue that “Americans 
likely gained a powerful “sense of the state” in their lives over the course of the mid-twentieth century. Compared to the 
years between the Civil War and the 1920s, the U.S. federal government’s role had shifted tremendously in scope, form, 
and character” during the era of the New Deal and up through the mid-1970s. 
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of centralized power and corresponding veneration of local autonomy which has characterized 
American society throughout much of the existence of the modern United States. Recent events 
such as the struggle to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the furious political 
blowback that followed in its wake have only confirmed the power of Karl’s warning.15  
Even with these qualifications, the “state” remains a useful tool of analysis (to borrow Joan 
Scott’s instantly classic turn of phrase). 16  In particular, Brian Balogh has offered in his The 
Associative State a new model for students of twentieth-century American political history to 
employ in their examinations of the vexed story of progress and pitfall. Balogh argues that much of 
the scholarly literature in American political history remains trapped in an outdated model inherited 
from Progressive Era scholars like Charles and Mary Beard in which liberals do endless battle with 
conservatives. Instead, Balogh urges students of political history to focus instead on “the ways in 
which Americans have braided public and private actions, state and voluntary-sector institutions, to 
achieve collective goals without undermining citizens’ essential belief in individual freedom.”17 In 
this dissertation, I take up Balogh’s suggestion, in order to offer a new interpretation of the political 
history of the American welfare state during the postwar era that integrates more traditional 
          
15 Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983): 
1-6. In particular, Karl observes that “what it is essential to understand is that local government and community control 
remain at the heart of our most intuitive conceptions of American democracy, even though they may also represent 
bastions of political corruption and locally condoned injustice” (Ibid., 236). Karl’s words of caution have also been 
recently echoed by the late Michael Katz, who in 2009 emphasized the need for historians to deconstruct the very 
definition of “government” and to “pay close attention to the role of federalism in the history of American social policy” 
because “government, as a singular noun, is a misleading term in the American context, and state, which connotes a 
unitary national government, is equally diversionary. The reality is that the United States has many governments. 
Federalism structures every aspect of American social policy.” As a result, Katz observed that “identifying the role of 
government becomes even more confusing when levels of government disagree.” See Michael B. Katz, “Was 
Government the solution or the problem? The role of the state in the history of American social policy,” Theory and 
Society 39 (3-4):487-502 (2010), esp. 493. See also Julian E. Zelizer, “Introduction: New Directions in Policy History,” 
Journal of Policy History 17, no. 1 (2005): 1-11. 
16 Scott, Joan W. “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.” The American Historical Review 91, no. 5 
(1986): 1053-1075. 
17 Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 3. 
 11 
 
presidential-centered histories with the activities of the voluntary sector as well as state and local 
level actors. 
Next, I do not claim in this dissertation to try and explain the life experiences of all older 
Americans during the period under examination (broadly defined as 1935 through 1975); rather, my 
focus is on how the senior state tried to ameliorate and remedy the poverty which afflicted many 
older Americans. Factors like race, gender, and class have ensured that there have always been (and 
likely will always be) some elderly people who live in destitution while others enjoy luxury in old 
age.  My focus in this dissertation, though, is upon the halting and not always linear actions taken 
primarily at the state and federal levels to improve the economic and social conditions of the 
impoverished elderly.  
Yet the struggles necessary to bring them into existence were not a foregone conclusion, and 
nor was it preordained that the United States would, as a matter of policy preference, end up 
favoring its impoverished elderly population over other presumably deserving impoverished groups. 
While previous generations of scholarship have rightly emphasized the roles which race and gender 
played in shaping the American welfare state, at times it has lost sight of the seemingly obvious 
elephant in the room: the role age has played in shaping the American welfare state.  Consider, for 
example, that Medicare, which provides universal publicly subsidized health care insurance for 
Americans age 65 and over, had existed for nearly two generations before efforts to expand health 
insurance coverage to impoverished children succeeded in the form of the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997. As well-informed commentators like Paul Starr have noted, the 
United States is the only industrialized nation which chiefly subsidizes health care overwhelmingly 
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for its elderly population, though of course the benefits which older Americans receive are nowhere 
near as generous as those of their western European counterparts.18 
In addition, I focus primarily on the activities of the executive branch, specifically the 
numerous presidential administrations which took hold in Washington during this time period. 
While I am aware of the risks of reviving what Julian Zelizer has termed the “presidential 
synthesis,” whereby American history is reduced simply to the story of its Presidents, I believe that 
this particular realm of domestic policy making is worth further scholarly exploration for several 
reasons. 19 First, while the Constitution has traditionally afforded the President a freer hand in 
foreign rather than domestic policy, during the course of the twentieth century, the executive branch 
became more deeply and permanently involved in social welfare policymaking than it had ever been 
before, and that shift is reflected in part by the long-term, bipartisan consensus which gradually 
developed around the senior state. As it becomes clearer that we are living in a hyper-partisan 
period in which policymaking has become increasingly centered in the Executive Branch due to the 
dysfunctionality of the legislative branch, it seems worthwhile to consider the past track record of 
presidential administrations in this vital if sometimes overlooked area of policy reform. 
Secondly, because I have been able to gain access to papers and archival sources that were 
previously unavailable due to donor or classified national security restrictions, this dissertation can 
add to the sum total of knowledge available to other scholars who may wish to tackle this subject 
and to make new arguments. Thirdly, I believe that there is more to the story of presidential 
administrations as historical actors than the actions of the presidents themselves, and therefore that 
          
18 See Paul Starr, “The Health Care Legacy of the Great Society,” Chapter 8 in Norman J. Glickman, Laurence E. Lynn 
and Robert H. Wilson, eds., LBJ's Neglected Legacy: The Policy and Management Legacies of the Johnson Years 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015): 235-259. 
19 For more on the “presidential synthesis,” see Julian Zelizer, “Beyond the Presidential Synthesis,” Chapter 1, pgs. 11-
40, in Julian E. Zelizer, Governing America: The Revival of Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
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the presidency as an institution is worthy of study as an actor in domestic policymaking.20 As I will 
detail in this dissertation, the actions of administration officials, advisors, and aides helped to set the 
course of the federal domestic policymaking, and focusing on them thereby has the potential to offer 
considerable insight into the development of the senior state. 
Finally, I have undertaken this dissertation because of the unique demographic moment 
which the United States is currently passing through at the present time. As a 2012 U.S. Census 
Report has noted: 
Between 2012 and 2050, the United States will experience 
considerable growth in its older population. In 2050, the population 
aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost double its 
estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012. The baby boomers are 
largely responsible for this increase in the older population, as they 
began turning 65 in 2011…The projected growth of the older 
population in the United States will present challenges to policy 
makers and programs, such as Social Security and Medicare. It will 
also affect families, businesses, and health care providers.21  
 
As federal policymakers now and in the future wrestle with the numerous, intertwined issues 
involved with how to best deal with the largest elderly population in the history of the United States, 
an examination of the actions undertaken by their predecessors may offer some guidance or caution. 
While it is true that the aging of the population will have wide-ranging implications for the country, 
this is not the first time that Americans or their government have had to confront the question of 
how best to care for aging, frequently economically insecure people. During both the New Deal and 
the Great Society, policymakers wrestled with many of the same problems that continue to bedevil 
their successors.  
          
20 Of course, this is not to say that the Presidents themselves are unworthy of detailed attention. For a recent, excellent 
study of the presidency in the 20th century, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The American President: From Teddy 
Roosevelt to Bill Clinton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
21 U.S. Bureau of the Census, An Aging Nation: The Older Population in the United States Population Estimates and 
Projections, by Jennifer M. Ortman, Victoria A. Velkoff, and Howard Hogan. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2014, https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf (accessed September 23, 2016). Italics 
mine. 
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However, focusing primarily on the activities of the federal government has other significant 
limitations. What we understand as the “federal government” is in reality a mishmash of numerous 
agencies, commissions, departments, subgroups, and very nearly every other kind of organization 
split across three different branches of government, some of which not infrequently operate at cross-
purposes with each other. Additionally, the United States is governed not just at the federal level, 
but also by fifty different and distinct state governments, to say nothing of the innumerable 
territorial, local, and special governmental bodies which also exercise jurisdiction within the United 
States. By necessity, then, this study is a selective one. 
Review of Relevant Literature in the field of U.S. Social Welfare History 
Recent scholarship has suggested that it is possible to study the presidency as an institution 
without necessarily focusing solely on individual presidents. As Brian Balogh writes in Recapturing 
the Oval Office: New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency, “now is a propitious time 
to integrate the presidency into cutting-edge historical scholarship because we know so much more 
about the context in which presidents operate and the structures that guide, and often limit, their 
actions and beliefs.” 22  Of course, this is not the first study that tackles the issue of how the 
presidency or the federal government more broadly defined has wrestled with the momentous issue 
of poverty in the twentieth century. James Patterson’s America's Struggle Against Poverty in the 
Twentieth Century examines this subject from the onset of the Progressive Era at the turn of the 
twentieth century through the end of the 1990s.23 Patterson’s scope in his study, though, is broader 
than the one I have set in this dissertation. For example, while Patterson considers a wider range of 
time and encompasses far more groups in his work than this dissertation does, both our studies share 
          
22Brian Balogh and Bruce J. Schulman, Recapturing the Oval Office: New Historical Approaches to the American 
Presidency (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 4. 
23 James T. Patterson, America's Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000).  
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an emphasis on the federal government’s efforts during the War on Poverty and its aftermath. By 
defining a narrower focus in this dissertation, I hope to offer other scholars a new way through 
which to view federal efforts to ameliorate poverty, and to thereby draw attention to facets of those 
efforts which have not hitherto received in-depth study. 
Likewise, my work is also in conversation with Alice O’Connor’s Poverty Knowledge: 
Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History.24 O’Connor traces 
the development of poverty as a subject of intense academic study at institutions such as the 
University of Chicago to its integration as a tool of federal policymaking during the War on Poverty 
and the Great Society. As O’Connor writes, “the idea that scientific knowledge holds the key to 
solving social problems has long been an article of faith in American liberalism. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than when it comes to solving the “poverty problem.” For well over a century, liberal 
social investigators have scrutinized poor people in the hopes of creating a knowledge base for 
informed social action.”25 Despite this faith in scientific knowledge, though, the application of 
“poverty knowledge” has not only failed to eradicate poverty in the United States, in the specific 
instance of the War on Poverty, it inadvertently made things worse by placing the onus of poverty as 
a personal moral failure on the individual poor rather than on broader, more deep-seated social 
problems like discrimination in the workplace and upward income redistribution through constant 
revisions to the nation’s tax code. In O’Connor’s powerful telling, there is a fairly straight line from 
the War on Poverty to the political and social counter-reaction to the War on Poverty during the 
1970s and into the 1980s, as political conservatives seized upon the failures of the individual poor to 
in effect blame them (or more abstractly, fault “culture”) for the persistence of poverty. 
          
24 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). For related studies, see Gwendoline Alphonso, “From Need to Hope: The 
American Family in Partisan Discourse, 1900-2012,” Journal of Policy History 27, no. 4 (2015): 592-635. 
25 O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, 1. 
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 Finally, during the 1970s and into the 1980s, there was a pronounced rise in the scholarly 
literature of studies which dealt with the role of special interest groups in influencing the 
development of social policy, especially at the federal level. In the particular case of the federal 
government’s approach to matters concerning the elderly, the most influential study was Henry J. 
Pratt’s The Gray Lobby, which emphasized the rise and power of organizations like the AARP in 
the federal policymaking process.26 According to Pratt, a coherent nexus of lobbying groups had 
emerged during the post-World War II era, and that the outpouring of federal legislation concerned 
with the elderly during this period was the result of much more effective organized lobbying by the 
AARP and other like-minded organizations. While I agree with Pratt that the AARP and other old-
age advocacy groups played an important role in pushing for federal legislation on behalf of the 
elderly, I believe he under-emphasizes the role played by state and local officials as well as private 
philanthropies in building the political consensus necessary for such federal legislation. Pratt is right 
to argue that the AARP was better organized and has lasted longer than the Townsend Movement of 
the 1930s, but it also benefitted from a favorable political and social climate in which voluntary 
organizations once more took the lead in setting the parameters of action, a role that they had 
temporarily lost due to the Great Depression. Furthermore, while some old age advocacy groups – 
especially the National Council of Senior Citizens during the early 1960s – played a crucial role in 
getting legislation like Medicare enacted by generating significant grassroots support among the 
elderly for the measure, the AARP spent much of its early years fighting against the enactment of 
such legislation. 
          
26  Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lobby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). For a more recent update, see 
Frederick R. Lynch, One Nation Under AARP: The Fight Over Medicare, Social Security, and America’s Future 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). For other arguments similar to Pratt’s, see Robert H. Binstock, 
“Interest-Group Liberalism and the Politics of Aging,” Gerontologist 12 (Autumn 1972): 265-280.  
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While historical scholarship explicitly focused on the general American state has gone 
through cycles, the literature on social welfare policy in America has flourished over the course of 
the last thirty years, and has been greatly enriched by the searching examinations of scholars attuned 
to issues of race, class, and gender, as well by the interdisciplinary contributions from economists, 
political scientists, and sociologists.27 The work of political scientists Frances Fox Piven and the late 
Richard Cloward critiqued the American welfare state from a New Left perspective; in their telling, 
public welfare provision in the United States was motivated chiefly by the desire by political and 
economic elites to maintain social control by ensuring that a sufficient amount of public support was 
made available in order to mollify social discontent.28  
Scholarship in the field of social welfare really took on a more pressing urgency, though, 
during the increasingly racialized political struggles over the place of “welfare” in American life 
which took place during the 1980s and 1990s.29 In contrast to the rhetoric of politicians like Ronald 
Reagan about purported welfare fraud, the late historian Michael Katz and others emphasized the 
stinginess of the American welfare state as a constancy dating back to the institutionalization and 
          
27 See, for example, Dora L. Costa, The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998; Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1979; James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years. (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1968); Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2000); 
Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lobby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See also See Michael B. Katz, “Was 
Government the solution or the problem? The role of the state in the history of American social policy,” Theory and 
Society 39 (3-4):487-502 (2010), esp. pg. 495, in which Katz observes “in recent years, scholars of the history of the 
American welfare state – an interdisciplinary group with more sociologists and political scientists than card-carrying 
historian – have produced a rich and sophisticated literature embedding social policy in American government and 
politics. Their work is central to the reconceptualization of American political history, a project of an exciting, mainly 
younger network of scholars associated with the new subfields of American Political Development and policy history.” 
28 See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1971) and Frances Fox Piven, and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, 
How They Fail (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 
29 See, for example, Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1990); Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Michael B. Katz and Lorrin R. Thomas, “The Invention of ‘Welfare’ in 
America,” Journal of Policy History 10, no. 4 (October 1998): 399-418. For additional pushback from scholars of 
American social welfare against the Reagan administration’s efforts to cut welfare programs, see Mimi Abramovitz, 
“Everyone Is on Welfare: 'The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy”." Social Work 28, no. 6 (1983): 440-445 and 
Mimi Abramovitz, “Everyone is Still on Welfare: The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy Revisited,” Social Work 
46, no. 4 (October 2001): 297-307. 
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persistence of the English “poor law” system in first colonial and later early national America.30 
Soon, Katz’s voice was joined by those of Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, 
who in their edited collection of essays in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States situated 
the then ferocious debates over welfare in the 1980s within a larger historical context dating back to 
the New Deal era.31  
Subsequent scholarship has amplified many of their key arguments, including the 
disproportionate role of undemocratic “southern economic and social elites to affect national 
polices” at a time of mass disenfranchisement of African-Americans in much of the American 
South, with fateful consequences for the reach of programs like Social Security and the GI Bill.32 
Skocpol’s work, in particular, blended history and sociology, and helped to redefine the 
periodization of the American welfare state by arguing that the United States had developed a de 
facto welfare state long before the coming of the New Deal, and that the shape of American welfare 
was determined not simply by the New Deal and the Great Depression but also by the lingering 
aftereffects of the struggles by turn of the twentieth century Progressive reformers to purge 
corruption from the American body politic.33 
          
30 Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America. New York: Basic Books, 
1986. See also Michael B. Katz, “The American Welfare State and Social Contract in Hard Times,” Journal of Policy 
History 22, no. 4 (2010): 508-529, and Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare 
State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 2008. 
31 Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Besides Skocpol, more influential sociological scholarship on the 
historical development of social welfare in the United States during this period can be found in the work of Jill S. 
Quadagno. See, for example, Jill S. Quadagno, “Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935,” American 
Sociological Review 49, no. 5 (October 1984): 632-647, and Jill S. Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: 
Class and Politics in the American Welfare State. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1988, and Ann Shola Orloff, 
The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada and the United States, 1880s-1940 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). 
32 See Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-
Century America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004); Jill S. Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism 
Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in 
the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
33 I am referring here to Skocpol’s arguments in Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins 
of Social Policy in the United States. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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After the sociological turn in social welfare history, the field began to be influenced more 
and more by the path-breaking work of Linda Gordon and Alice Kessler-Harris during the early and 
mid-1990s. In particular, both Gordon and Kessler-Harris put gender front and center in their 
examination of American social welfare policy. In her work, Gordon posited that gender 
considerations had led the architects of the Social Security Act to favor white men under the rubric 
of social insurance, a category of social programs which enjoyed broad social respectability and 
acceptance.34 By contrast, programs which largely favored women and racial minorities fell under 
the category of public assistance, and the recipients of aid under these programs (which included the 
now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children program) were stigmatized on the whole by 
society, and their programs were and remain under near-constant political siege.35 While Gordon 
was not the first student of social welfare to argue that the United States had developed a two tiered 
welfare state, her work focused more on the network of welfare advocates (chiefly college-educated 
white men and white women) who helped devise and influence public social welfare in the United 
States between the Gilded Age and the New Deal era, and by her own admission, largely excluded 
          
34  As Gordon writes, “one of the attractions of social insurance schemes was their rejection of this tradition of 
identifying the ‘deserving,’ thus insulating their recipients from stigma. Yet many social insurance advocates understood 
the distinction between insurance and public assistance as ideological and political, and considered “insurance” a 
metaphor. All tax-funded public provision is in a sense insurance, to which all contribute in order to provide for those 
who happen to need help…social insurance was called “contributory” (although all tax monies are in fact contributions) 
and could therefore be made to seem “earned” in a way that the dole was not.” (Linda Gordon, “Social Insurance and 
Public Assistance: The Influence of Gender in Welfare Thought in the United States, 1890-1935,” The American 
Historical Review 97, no. 1 (Feb., 1992): 19-54 (esp. 45). 
35 Linda Gordon, “Social Insurance and Public Assistance: The Influence of Gender in Welfare Thought in the United 
States, 1890-1935,” The American Historical Review 97, no. 1 (Feb., 1992): 19-54, esp. 19-21. See also Nancy Fraser 
and Linda Gordon, “A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing A Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” Signs 19, no. 2 
(Winter, 1994): 309-336. For a response to Fraser and Gordon, see Yvonne Zylan, “Comment on Fraser and Gordon’s 
‘A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” Signs 21, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 515-530; 
Linda Gordon, “Who Deserves Help? Who Must Provide?,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 577, Reforming Welfare, Redefining Poverty (Sep. 2001): 12-25; Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single 
Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: Free Press, 1994). 
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persons “whose primary contributions to the cause [of welfare reform] were made as elected 
officials or as philanthropists.”36  
While I agree with Gordon that gendered notions of family and work influenced the 
development of the public American welfare state before, during, and after the enactment of the 
Social Security Act, my study questions the extent to which Social Security’s social insurance 
program truly enjoyed a privileged, first-tier status. For most of its first two decades of existence, 
Social Security did not succeed especially well at its task of preventing economic insecurity; indeed, 
the failures and limitations of the program helped to spur a colossal struggle between organized 
labor and corporate management during the late 1940s over retirement security.  
The inadequacy of Social Security also, as I argue, helped make possible the resurgence of 
old-age pension movements at the state and local levels of governance, and created a growing social 
and political vacuum which private welfare policymakers and elected public officials tried to fill, 
with varying amounts of success. The limits of Social Security – and the concerted efforts by 
organized labor, elected officials, and social reformers to expand it – also helped to feed into the 
emergent anti-statist critique made by the proponents of American conservatism during the postwar 
period, most of whom publicly alternated between gritted tolerance and outright hostility towards 
Social Security and other attempts to expand the American welfare state’s public provisions.37 Had 
it not been for the persistent fear of pension movements and organized labor gaining a permanent 
upper hand in collective bargaining agreements, though, it was just as possible in the late 1940s that 
Social Security would have been largely relegated to irrelevance due to its limited number of 
enrollees and scope of benefits. 
          
36 Ibid., 22. 
37 For a concise but crucial examination of the role that anti-statist ideology has played in the development of the 
American welfare state, see Jill Quadagno and Debra Street. “Ideology and Public Policy: Anti-statism in American 
Welfare State Transformation.” Journal of Policy History 17, no. 1 (January, 2005): 52–71. 
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Complementing Gordon’s scholarship, Alice Kessler-Harris in her landmark work In Pursuit 
of Equity: How Gender Shaped American Economic Citizenship examined how “policies that appear 
neutral on their face emerge from deeply embedded belief systems that accentuate particular 
politics,” and like Gordon, traces how a “gendered imagination” on the part of both male and female 
policymakers (Kessler-Harris’s words) influenced the course of social welfare policy development 
by effectively institutionalizing shared assumptions about the connections between gender, family, 
and work (to wit: that men should be the primary breadwinner for the family, while women’s work 
should be treated – at best – as an adjunct to the male breadwinner role).38 Unlike sociologists such 
as Theda Skocpol who emphasized “differences in administrative and political structures” to explain 
the unique development of the American welfare state, Kessler-Harris argued that culture more 
“effectively predicts the outcomes of social legislation across national borders.”39  
While I agree with Kessler-Harris that “gendered imaginations” shaped how federal 
policymakers, I err more on the side of Skocpol’s emphasis on administrative and political 
structures. While the efforts by policymakers in the postwar era to address old age dependency 
certainly drew upon ideas of gender, the unexpected growth and popularity of Social Security’s old 
age assistance program as well as state level pensions between 1935 and well into the 1950s spurred 
deep fears among elected officials, corporate leaders, and policymakers that the social discontent 
which had powered the Townsend Movement to national prominence, and which had seemed so 
threatening to American democracy during the 1930s, might reappear. Consequently, these groups 
forged an uneasy alliance to develop a hybrid public-private infrastructure capable of not only 
offering strengthened economic support to older Americans, but also one which sought to help 
          
38 Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: How Gender Shaped American Economic Citizenship. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 14. See also Alice Kessler-Harris, “In the Nation's Image: The Gendered Limits of Social 
Citizenship in the Depression Era.” The Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 1251-1279. 
39 Alice Kessler-Harris, “In the Nation's Image: The Gendered Limits of Social Citizenship in the Depression Era.” The 
Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 1251-1279. 
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define a new, positive role for older people to play in American society. These efforts, though, were 
limited by past policy choices, especially those made by the architects of the 1935 Social Security 
Act. 
The analyses of the American welfare state’s development produced by Gordon and Kessler-
Harris were soon amplified in two important ways, beginning in the late 1990s: first, by growing 
attempts to place the development of the American welfare state in a comparative, transnational 
context, and secondly by a more expansive definition of the “welfare state” to include the massive 
private welfare state largely constructed after World War II, a scholarly development made possible 
by the awakening of the long dormant field of business history.  
Perhaps the most important scholarly work which places the development of the American 
welfare state in a transnational perspective is Daniel Rodgers’ Atlantic Crossings, in which Rodgers 
argued that Progressive Era reformers in the United States learned from the examples of their 
counterparts in Western Europe, and that many of the agenda items on the Progressive Era policy 
wish list were shaped by this transmission of ideas across the Atlantic.40 While Rodgers was not 
solely focused on the development of the American welfare state, his signature contribution was to 
show how many of the ideas and assumptions which American reformers relied upon when devising 
public provision programs were not demarcated solely by the boundaries of the American nation-
state; rather, many of these reformers looked to Europe (and especially to Great Britain and 
Germany before World War I) for inspiration and examples worthy of imitation. The New Deal, in 
Rodgers’ telling, represented the fullest flowering of the transatlantic transfer of ideas about social 
reform, an argument which sharply differentiated Atlantic Crossings from other accounts such as 
          
40 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2001), esp. 143. For another example of scholarly attempts to put American social and 
political reform in a global context, see Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). For an important recent addition to transnational scholarship on the American 
welfare state, see Kiran Klaus Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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Elizabeth Sanders’ Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, which focused 
exclusively on endogenous sources of American reform efforts.41 
Along with the growing scholarly interest in placing American history in a transnational 
context, students of the American welfare state began to shift their examinations of this subject 
away from discussions and arguments about the nature of “welfare” and back towards closer 
examinations of “the state.” The two most important works which mark the emergence of this new 
subfield are Jacob Hacker’s The Divided Welfare State and his Yale colleague Jennifer Klein’s For 
All These Rights.42 Hacker’s work demonstrated that prior discussions of the American welfare state 
were, quite simply, inadequate if they failed to take account of America’s private welfare state, a 
curious creature unique among industrialized nations. Instead of looking solely at major laws like 
the Social Security Act of 1935 or Medicare in 1965, Hacker explored how the use of taxation and 
regulatory policy helped usher in the private welfare state, in which an employment-centered model 
of social provision took root and which remains (much as the struggle over the Affordable Care Act 
in 2009-2012 revealed) very much at the center of present-day discussions and fights about how to 
provide adequate and equitable social provision.  
While Hacker is a political scientist and not a historian, his methodology in The Divided 
Welfare State was at heart historical: by relying upon “path dependence” (a model of policy 
developed first formulated by Paul Pierson), Hacker showed how the American welfare state – at 
least insofar as health insurance and old age social insurance are concerned – took a winding, 
          
41 Elizabeth M. Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999). The classic search for the sources of social reform solely within the American nation-state 
during the Progressive Era is Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1960; New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995). 
42 Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press), 2002, and Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor and the 
Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also Jennifer 
Klein, “The Politics of Economic Security” Employee Benefits and the Privatization of New Deal Liberalism,” Journal 
of Policy History 16, no. 1 (2004): 34-65. 
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frequently unpredictable path in which public provision either stood at the center or at the periphery 
of subsequent private social welfare provision.  
Unlike Hacker, my focus in this dissertation is upon old-age assistance rather than old-age 
insurance programs, which Hacker mostly skips in favor of Social Security’s social insurance 
program. I focus on old-age assistance because – at least for the first two decades of Social 
Security’s existence – old age assistance remained the larger and more popular of the two programs. 
The choice to emphasize Social Security’s old-age insurance program over its old-age assistance 
program came about in large part because of the inability of state and local officials to adequately 
support a growing population of older Americans during the late 1940s. As the number of older 
Americans receiving public relief rose during the late 1940s, policymakers turned once more to 
Social Security’s old age insurance program and expanded it after it became clear that Social 
Security’s old age assistance program was encouraging fiscally unsustainable economic 
“dependency” by older Americans. 
While Hacker tackled the development of health insurance and old age social insurance 
between the era of the New Deal and up through the 1990s, Jennifer Klein’s For All These Rights 
reached back further to the Progressive Era and extended through the late 1950s, with a decided 
emphasis on the New Deal and immediate post-war (and post-New Deal) period.43 For All These 
Rights explored the attempts by unions, fraternal organizations, and other voluntary groups to 
construct an economic security system separate from employment. These attempts, while enjoying 
some limited success in the 1930s and 1940s, were ultimately subsumed by the employment-
          
43 In addition to Klein, other important studies of the clash between business and labor in American political economy 
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centered model of social provision during and after World War II, when private employers regained 
the upper hand in such policy developments. 44  In effect, Klein shows how private employers 
(especially private commercial insurers) were able to seize the New Deal’s language of security and 
make it their own, and in so doing were able to begin the process of rolling back the interruption 
into traditional managerial prerogatives which the New Deal’s labor reforms had brought about in 
the 1930s.45  
My dissertation builds on Klein’s work and adds private voluntary organizations as well as 
state and local officials to the mix. Klein’s study puts these two groups largely to the side in her 
depiction of the struggle over political economy in the postwar United States. While discussions and 
conflicts about political economy and the character of the American welfare state in the postwar era 
were undoubtedly influenced and shaped by the struggle between labor and capital as well as the 
legacy of the New Deal in national politics, they were also informed by the careful observation of 
state and local level developments, especially in places like California and New York City, both 
traditional hotbeds of social unrest and reform movements. 
Finally, in recent years, the vibrant new scholarship produced by students in the fields of the 
American state and American social welfare has begun to overlap more frequently. In 2005, 
political scientist Jacob Hacker, following the lead of Theda Skocpol a generation earlier, called for 
          
44  In Jennifer Klein’s words, “the politics of security involved a political struggle between business and labor; 
commercial insurers and nonprofit, community- or labor-controlled means of social provision; the state; and private 
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analysis, Jefferson Cowie’s recent The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics (Princeton: 
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scholars to “[bring] the welfare state back in.”46 While happily surveying the tremendous increase in 
scholarly attention paid to the American welfare state, Hacker also drew attention to an increasing 
fragmentation in such studies; in his words, “a notable absence of explanatory integration” 
characterized many recent scholarly studies of the American welfare state. In order to remedy this 
scholarly fragmentation, Hacker proposed that future studies pay more attention to long-term 
processes of social policy development.47 In essence, Hacker pleaded for renewed efforts to build a 
new, comprehensive and coherent narrative about the development of the American welfare state 
that could incorporate studies about the influence of race, gender, business, and indirect methods 
such as taxation on the American state’s efforts to promote social policy goals without merely 
starting from the premise that the United States has had a “weak” state and trying to work 
backwards through time to explain why the American welfare state paled in comparison to those of 
Western Europe and Japan. 
As of yet, no one has taken up the intimidating gauntlet demanding a more synthetic 
approach that Hacker threw down more than a decade ago. Instead, there has continued to be a 
fruitful cross-pollination between students of the American state and American social welfare. 
Perhaps spurred by the acrimonious debate surrounding the enactment of the Affordable Care Act in 
2010, recent scholarship has revisited how earlier generations of reformers confronted a hostile 
array of opponents determined to undo attempts to restructure the American welfare state.48 In this 
line of inquiry, Michele Landis Dauber’s The Sympathetic State, like Theda Skocpol’s Protecting 
Mothers and Soldiers, extends the chronology of the American welfare state backwards into the 
nineteenth century. Unlike Skocpol, though, Dauber’s narrative shows how New Deal lawyers and 
          
46 Jacob S. Hacker, “Bringing the Welfare State Back In: The Promise (and Perils) of the New Social Welfare History” 
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47 Ibid., 128. 
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proponents marshalled a wealth of legal precedent and case law to defend the Social Security Act 
and other important pieces of New Deal legislation rather than emphasizing how the institutional 
legacy of largely forgotten programs like the Civil War veterans’ pension system hampered later 
efforts at social and political reform. 
In sum, over the past fifteen years, there has been a remarkable revival of scholarly interest 
in both the American state as a subject worthy of study in its own right as well as the origins and 
development of the American welfare state, both public and private. I have tried to borrow and learn 
from the best insights and models that previous scholarship in these two fields has produced. 
Consequently, this dissertation is not a comprehensive history of any one particular government 
program like Social Security or Medicare, or historical profile of any single voluntary group like the 
American Association of Retired Persons, or biography of a single influential government official 
like former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Wilbur Cohen.49 Instead, 
I have tried to meld together different elements in order to tell a necessarily selective story about 
how the attempts to create and later to reform public and private provision for old age economic 
security evolved from the 1930s to the 1970s. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
I have endeavored to organize When Old Age Changed: Inventing the Senior State, 1935-
1975 largely along chronological lines, though I have not always been rigidly dogmatic in doing so. 
In Chapter 1, entitled “Social Insecurities, 1925-1939,” I trace how the efforts of old-age pension 
advocates remained largely stalled until the onset of the Great Depression, when protracted 
economic crisis thrust the issue of old age economic insecurity into the center of American politics. 
For a variety of reasons, unlike in western European nations like Germany and the United Kingdom, 
          
49 See Edward Berkowitz, Mr. Social Security: The Life of Wilbur J. Cohen (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1995). 
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the old-age pension movement remained peripheral to the concerns of most social reformers in the 
United States during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Consequently, no movement 
for a permanent universal old-age pension system at the national level emerged, and the few U.S. 
states which did develop old age pension systems were few in number and largely happy to leave 
such systems small and (usually) underfunded. In many U.S. states, the system of poorhouse relief 
which originally descended from Elizabethan-era Poor Laws in Tudor England remained more or 
less in effect, and the advocates who sought to reform this state of affairs found that their calls for 
change were met largely with indifference or opposition. 
Instead, due to the historical weakness of the national American state in the realm of social 
welfare, the private sector emerged as the primary staging ground for debates, with private 
corporations largely taking the lead in formulating a distinctive welfare capitalism during the 
Progressive Era and into the 1920s, which sought to provide workers with benefits like old-age 
pensions as a gesture of paternalistic concern and obligation and to sap the appeal of labor unions to 
industrial workers. These efforts were more successful in some industries and in some individual 
companies than in others, but overall they were far from universal, especially for the millions of 
Americans who were not industrial workers. In much of the United States, old-age relief remained 
largely the province of local governments, mutual-aid societies, and in-kind family assistance. The 
relatively small and widely dispersed distribution of older Americans in the United States also 
helped to militate against the emergence of a national old-age pension movement. 
The Great Depression entirely upended this state of affairs. Suddenly, individual states, 
which had previously shown marginal interest in devising old-age pension systems, now rushed to 
enact them as older Americans began to crowd and overburden the limited infrastructure of public 
poorhouses and rural county poor farms. In many instances, old-age pensions were justified as a 
way to preserve the “dignity” of older Americans and to update the social welfare infrastructure of 
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the United States to the standards that had become prevalent in much of the rest of the industrialized 
world. Reformers skillfully argued that pensions represented a more “modern” way to support older 
Americans, and that American society had progressed beyond the need for such punitive and 
retrograde institutions as the poorhouse. Such arguments proved to be persuasive in the context of 
the Great Depression.  Strikingly, more individual states enacted old-age pension laws between 
1929 and 1932 than had during the preceding thirty years, though many of these laws remained 
more declarations of sentiment rather than practicable steps to the actual eradication of the 
poorhouse as the primary public bulwark for destitute elderly and unemployed people. 
Meanwhile, at the national level, efforts to create a new old-age pension system faltered. 
While proposals like the Dill-Connery bill, which was designed to help individual states defray the 
costs of old-age assistance, were debated on Capitol Hill, the Roosevelt administration chose a more 
restrained approach which would ensure that it, rather than Congress, would ultimately be in charge 
of the legislative process. Instead of using its considerable political capital to back proposals already 
circulating on Capitol Hill, the Roosevelt administration deferred the matter for further study and 
planning to the Committee on Economic Security, a presidentially-appointed board whose 
membership primarily consisted of academic experts who did not answer directly to Congress or 
other potential political rivals to the Roosevelt administration. 
The delayed reaction of the Roosevelt administration to the growing social discontent among 
many older Americans, though, encouraged the emergence of popular alternative movements, the 
most prominent of which was the Townsend Movement in California, to seize the initiative and to 
press for an agenda (the Townsend Plan) centered on the enactment of a national system of 
universal, exceptionally generous, and non-contributory pensions for all older Americans. The 
Townsend Movement drew its strength from a core membership which largely consisted of native-
born, white, Protestant middle-class citizens, and its appeal ran strongest and deepest in those parts 
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of the United States such as the rural Midwest and southern California where this group 
predominated in raw numbers (its appeal was decidedly lessened among white Southerners due to 
fears that the Townsend Plan would offer support to African-Americans).50  
Despite these racial, ethnic, and geographic limitations, the supporters of the Townsend Plan 
(or “Townsendites”) frequently presented themselves as the true herald of all older Americans. This 
claim was not actually true, given the fact that the Townsend Movement’s core membership largely 
consisted of native-born, white, Christian, middle-class Americans residing in the Midwest and 
throughout the western United States, but as the sociologist Edwin Amenta has argued, the 
Townsend Movement “helped the elderly to see themselves as a national political group with 
legitimate needs and demands.” 51  Despite widespread condemnation of the Townsend Plan as 
fiscally unviable, the Townsend Movement enjoyed significant and growing support in much of the 
nation, though its promise of universal eligibility regardless of race or gender stymied its popular 
appeal in much of the American South. The grassroots pressure from the Townsend Movement and 
other old-age advocacy groups helped to create the conditions necessary for the enactment of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, but the Townsend Movement’s ham-handed tactics allowed the 
Roosevelt administration to outmaneuver it and prevent the enactment of the Townsend Plan. The 
establishment of the Social Security system, though, did not immediately resolve the issue of 
providing economic security in old age, and the Townsend Movement continued to soldier on at the 
state and local level, hoping to regroup and wait for the right opportunity to press its agenda once 
more.  
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This opportunity never came, though, due to America’s entry into World War II and the 
return of a governing legislative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill 
which steadfastly hostile to both the Townsend Plan and the Social Security program. Consequently, 
the fight over how to provide economic security in old age remained at an impasse, and would 
remain largely fixed in that position for the duration of the war. The return of full employment 
during the war and the end of Depression-era economic conditions temporarily dampened the appeal 
and strength of old-age pension advocacy groups, but the resumption of peace and the failure of 
Social Security at the national level to adequately accommodate the economic needs of older 
Americans began to reignite contentious fights at the state and local level over old age pensions. 
These fights were most pronounced in western states like California, Colorado, and Washington, 
where the Townsend Movement’s most important legacy had been to demonstrate that older people 
could be organized and mobilized behind the cause of publicly-supported, non-contributory old age 
pensions. While the Townsend Movement continued to exist in a loosely organized form after the 
end of World War II, its prewar example helped to motivate successor organizations like George 
McLain’s League of Senior Citizens in California to organize older Americans and to educate them 
to see themselves as a distinctive group in American society that merited special attention and 
assistance from the state.52  
In Chapter 2, “In Townsend’s Shadow: Reconstructing Old Age Security, 1939-1950,” I 
explore how this multifaceted struggle in a widening variety of different arenas – including but not 
limited to collective bargaining agreements, conflict between organized lobbying groups like the 
American Medical Association and federal officials produced a stalemate at the federal level, which 
increasingly led state and local officials, as well as private voluntary organizations, to explore and 
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develop solutions at the subnational level of government. In particular, welfare officials in New 
York City and the state of California proved to be among the most innovative in their approach to 
the issue of providing sufficient economic security to older Americans. State and local level fights 
over old-age pensions, as well as the mounting problems associated with the Social Security system 
catapulted the issue of old-age economic security to the forefront of the nation’s political life once 
more. Attempts to broaden the Social Security system made by organized labor did not succeed, and 
while unions like the United Auto Workers remained publicly committed to the expansion of Social 
Security to include all workers, they focused more energy on securing the benefits that would have 
come from an improved Social Security system via collective bargaining agreements.  
For its part, corporate America acceded to the demands for improved pension and benefits in 
the belief that lightly regulated private pension systems would remain much more firmly under the 
sway of managerial prerogative than the public Social Security system, and also because corporate 
interest groups like the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce successfully persuaded individual employers that private benefits and pensions could be 
used as a tool to educate workers and gradually persuade them to be more sympathetic to corporate 
rather than organized labor’s side in collective bargaining disputes. Additionally, after the battle at 
the federal level in the late 1940s over the question of national health insurance resulted in a defeat 
for the advocates of a universal national health insurance program, these advocates adjusted their 
strategy and sought to enact universal national health insurance program solely for older Americans 
in the hope that such a program might one day be extended to all Americans.   
In Chapter 3, “Adding Life to Years, 1950-1961,” I examine the tension between advocates 
of national health insurance for the elderly and officials within the Eisenhower administration who 
sought to erect an alternative framework for dealing with the economic problems of older 
Americans. This period witnessed the emergence of an uneasy alliance between advocates for 
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national health insurance and the coalition of local officials, social workers, and academic experts 
who argued in favor of expanded government services on behalf of the elderly. While efforts to 
enact national health insurance for the elderly became an increasingly prominent issue at the 
national level due to rising health costs and the paucity of affordable health insurance options for 
older people, other problems such as unaffordable housing, growing social isolation, and diminished 
employment opportunity became part of an expanding social agenda pursued at the state and local 
level by public officials and their partners in the private social welfare community. A new alliance 
which emphasized cooperative efforts between the public and private sector to address the problems 
of older people, with private philanthropies providing funding at the local level in New York City 
and elsewhere as local officials devised experimental programs to assist their elderly residents. 
These programs would later form the basis of future federal, state, and local state-building efforts 
once the federal government began to fund existing programs and promote the creation of new local 
programs after 1965. This development owed much to the gradual expansion of the Social Security 
system during the 1940s, which prevented Social Security from becoming a more fully-fledged 
social welfare system capable of solely providing economic security to older  people.  
As a result, older people turned to other existing sources of public assistance, a development 
which upended political affairs in numerous states and cities and helped highlight the inadequacy of 
old-age relief in the United States. The growing financial costs of supporting older people helped to 
build public support for new government programs to subsidize the financial risks and costs of old-
age, with Medicare emerging as the preferred solution due to the relatively high costs associated 
with medical care in old age. Eventually, rising costs forged an alliance between academic and 
government experts and newly created old-age interest groups which sought to organize the elderly 
and apply sufficient pressure on the Congress and the Eisenhower administration to support the 
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enactment of Medicare, a policy solution which enjoyed substantial support because it promised to 
address rising health costs for America’s growing older population. 
In Chapter 4, “The War on Elderly Poverty, 1961-1966,” I investigate the efforts by officials 
in the Kennedy and Johnson administration to develop a more effective apparatus at the federal 
level to deal with the economic and social problems of older Americans. These efforts both 
preceded and intersected with the War on Poverty announced by President Johnson in January 1964, 
and were marked by protracted internal struggles as differing federal agencies and officials warred 
over how to best address the topic of elderly poverty. Ultimately, while a new set of federal 
programs and agencies were created with the explicit purpose of dealing with elderly poverty, these 
efforts remained piecemeal in comparison to efforts expended on behalf of Medicare and Medicaid. 
By focusing on providing health insurance coverage on a universal basis to senior citizens, Johnson 
administration officials hoped to eradicate elderly poverty and to relieve the mounting fiscal 
pressure placed by rising elderly poverty rates upon local and state governments as well as 
individual families, which threatened to completely subsume other social welfare priorities.  
Efforts to focus the Office of Economic Opportunity to devote more resources in the War on 
Poverty to combatting elderly poverty, though, were far less successful, despite mounting criticism 
of the War on Poverty’s conduct and aims. Frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the OEO, 
congressional critics latched onto the Older Americans Act as an alternative mechanism for funding 
local and state-level efforts to combat elderly poverty and to coordinate federal efforts in this field, 
but their efforts to strengthen federal efforts via the Older Americans Act’s Administration on 
Aging met with indifference and disinterest on the part of the Johnson administration, which shared 
their goal of reducing elderly poverty but not their enthusiasm for the Administration on Aging. 
In Chapter 5 “Entitled But No Longer Pitied, 1966-1975,” I examine how, after the 
successful implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, Johnson administration officials shifted focus 
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and began to explore additional ways in which the federal government could be used to improve the 
lives of older Americans. Partly, these efforts were in response to lower-profile issues like age 
discrimination by private employers, but they also reflected an effort by the administration to 
reformulate the increasingly controversial War on Poverty in a manner that would be more 
politically viable. Beginning in 1966, the Johnson administration recruited outside experts to serve 
on newly-formed Executive branch task forces. The administration then used these task forces to 
formulate and drive the development of new policies and programs which it believed would enjoy 
sufficient social and political support in order to be sustainable over the long-term.  
However, these efforts were stymied by the administrative chaos which frequently resulted 
from the continuing conflicts among differing federal agencies and departments and the competing 
goals that the Johnson administration sought to accomplish. Some initiatives – primarily those 
which aimed to replicate social roles for older Americans or to sustain their overall health – were 
enacted, but broader reforms which would have unduly interfered with existing labor market 
conditions were placed to the side. After wading through a morass of proposals and significant 
internal dissension, the Johnson administration ultimately chose to improve the existing Social 
Security system, and to lay the groundwork for potentially more radical and universal reforms to the 
chaotic structure of the nation’s chaotic social welfare system such as guaranteed annual income for 
families and individuals at or near the federal poverty level. 
The Johnson administration’s tentative explorations of guaranteed annual income were, 
somewhat surprisingly, picked up by the incoming Nixon administration in 1969. Though the 
administration’s embrace of a guaranteed annual income plan was born in part from its hostility to 
Social Security’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – more commonly labeled as 
“welfare” and other government programs which it perceived to be unduly solicitous of 
“undeserving” members of American society – officials within the Nixon administration believed 
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that they had a rare opportunity to radically restructure social welfare policy in the United States. 
The signature policy goal sought by the administration was the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), 
which would have replaced much of the nation’s existing patchwork of social welfare programs 
with a new guaranteed annual income program.  
An unusual right-left coalition prevented the enactment of FAP, though, and instead the 
Nixon administration secured significant, lasting improvements to the Social Security system which 
included the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) plan. SSI was a scaled down 
version of FAP that provided income assistance to impoverished elderly people (its original targeted 
primary audience). These efforts signaled a consolidation of the senior state at the federal level, as 
they demonstrated the federal government’s willingness to support and expand public assistance to 
older people even as it tried to consign the War on Poverty’s signature Community Action Programs 
to a bureaucratic scrapheap. In line with its goal of devolving political power from the federal 
government back to the states, the Nixon administration also greatly amplified the amount of 
funding that the Older Americans Act had provided to various state and local programs, thus 
solidifying the cooperative alliance between federal, state, and local officials which had begun to 
take shape three decades prior. 
Finally, I conclude by briefly examining the fate of the senior state since the mid-1970s. 
While other parts of the American welfare state – most notably, the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program – have been repealed or otherwise subject to withering cuts, the 
programs and initiatives for older Americans have remained largely intact. While this outcome owes 
much to the emergence of well-funded lobbying organizations like the AARP and their ability to 
protect existing programs and promote new ones, the senior state owed its existence to more than 
the presence of increasingly mobilized older voters or well-organized interest groups to lobby on its 
behalf. After all, the Townsend Movement had successfully educated and persuaded older 
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Americans during the 1930s to see themselves as uniquely deserving of a generous old-age pension 
to be supplied by the federal government, but attempts to convert this grassroots mobilization into 
the Townsend Movement’s desired outcome had repeatedly failed at the national level, and its 
ultimate goal of a universal, generous, guaranteed monthly pension for all older Americans 
regardless of gender, race, or other backgrounds was never enacted.  
Though the Townsend Movement failed, it left behind an important legacy: it had organized 
thousands of older people, perhaps for the first time, to demand government action on their behalf. 
Ironically, the old-age advocacy and interest groups which followed in its wake during the 1940s, 
1950s, and into the 1960s were made possible because the Townsend Movement had failed. Many 
of the same drivers of social and economic insecurity that had unexpectedly propelled the Townsend 
Movement to nationwide importance had merely been exposed by the Great Depression, and would 
remain at work long after the Depression had ended in the early 1940s. 
Rather, the senior state owed both its design and its longevity to the larger needs of 
American society as it evolved over the course of the twentieth century. As the nation transitioned 
from an agricultural and rural society to an industrial and urban society during the course of the 
twentieth century, the effects of such dislocation became apparent first in New England and the 
Great Plains, two areas that witnessed a significant outmigration of residents. 53 These changes 
disrupted existing family patterns as younger and more able-bodied people left rural communities, 
which then found themselves increasingly bereft of the traditional sources of in-kind family 
assistance which had formerly existed to support older generations. As younger workers left 
          
53 In 1900, the ten states with the highest proportion of older citizens (defined as people of 65 years age or more) in their 
population were largely concentrated in New England, the Midwest, and the West Coast: Vermont, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Nevada, California, Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In 1950, this geographic 
distribution had remained fairly constant, with states in New England and Midwest accounting once more for the highest 
proportion of older citizens. The ten states with the highest proportion of older citizens in 1950 were New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Iowa, Missouri, Maine, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Indiana, Minnesota. (Source: U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Demographic Trends in the Twentieth Century: Census 2000 Special Reports by Frank Hobbs and Nicole 
Stoops, https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf, pg. 61, accessed February 24, 2017). 
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agricultural communities, traditional systems of old-age relief like county poor farms and 
poorhouses proved to be increasingly inadequate to meet the demands placed on them. The decline 
of American agriculture also lessened the employment opportunities for older people in rural 
communities and further isolated them, even as significantly longer lifespans meant that there was a 
growing mass population of older people that had not previously existed.54 
As rural communities entered an accelerated pattern of long-term demographic decline, 
urban flight helped to concentrate poverty in American cities, especially for older people who 
lacked adequate financial resources to move to nearby suburbs but who now found themselves 
increasingly isolated from younger family members who had already done so. Additionally, the 
population of older Americans – both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the general U.S. 
population – had risen considerably since the onset of the twentieth century.55 In cities like New 
York and Chicago, elderly poverty was already becoming an issue of concern by the end of World 
War II, and suburban white flight in the decades that followed the end of the war further 
exacerbated this issue. Increasingly, state and local officials found it necessary to develop new 
programs which would re-integrate older people back into the communities in which they lived.  
In order to develop these programs, officials turned to academic researchers and private 
social welfare agencies, and thereby helped forge a new cooperative partnership that united the 
public and private sectors. This partnership was already nascent in 1950 at the first National 
          
54 In 1900, the average U.S. life expectancy at birth was 47 years. By 1950, this figure had risen to 68 years. See U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, “Sixty-Five Plus in the United States,” 
https://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/statbriefs/agebrief.html, (accessed February 24, 2017). As Herbert S. Klein 
observes, “mortality rates began to fall in the last decades of the 19th century but then started to decline at an 
unprecedented pace. This trend was spearheaded by a precipitous drop in deaths from infectious diseases…the result of 
this change in traditional morality was a steady and rapid rise in life expectancy for every new generation born in this 
period.” See Herbert S. Klein, A Population History of the United States, 2nd ed., (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 129. 
55 In 1900, the total population of older people in the United States (defined by the U.S. Census as age 65 and over) was 
3.1 million, or 1/25 (4.1%) of total U.S. population. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Sixty-Five Plus in the United 
States,” https://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/statbriefs/agebrief.html (accessed February 24, 2017). By 1950, 
the population of older people in the United States was 12.3 million, which was 8.1% of the total U.S. population. 
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Conference on Aging; subsequent national, regional, and state conferences over the course of the 
next twenty years would further cement and solidify into a coherent bloc. 
As this grouping of public and private welfare officials became better organized and well-
defined, so, too, did the overarching task that they faced: namely, to leverage the resources of 
government and the expertise of private experts at the local, state, and finally federal levels to 
expand the amount of public assistance available to older Americans, but to do so in a manner that 
did not risk running afoul of the nation’s historically skeptical attitude towards support for groups or 
classes of its citizens seen as “undeserving.” While older Americans may have been viewed as 
“deserving” in the eyes of some social reformers, that sympathy was not sufficient to secure 
enactment of the Townsend Plan, nor was it sufficient to ensure that state-level old-age pensions 
enacted in western states like California and Colorado during the 1930s and 1940s would go 
unchallenged.  
Starting in the late 1940s and extending into the early 1950s, reformers sought a new way 
that would enable them to provide needed government services to older people without risking still-
potent fears that old-age pensions represented a potential corruption of American democracy. The 
solution they devised – in conjunction with their colleagues in private social welfare organizations 
as well as academia – was to emphasize social services rather than generous old-age pensions, and 
to provide services that might have been previously provided by private families. This formulation 
provided a modicum of protection to older, at-risk persons, created and fueled continuing demand 
for a new generation of social workers, gerontologists, and other experts on the problems of older 
people, and did so in a manner that did so in a manner which did not seriously impinge upon 
existing distributions of power or wealth within the United States. Ultimately, it produced a unique 
welfare state structure that was far more solicitous of the needs and demands of older people than it 
was of other needy groups, but which still did not provide true economic and social security for 
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many older Americans, despite the best intentions and high hopes of its original architects. How this 
structure came into being is the story that I wish to tell in these pages. 
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CHAPTER I  
Social Insecurities, 1929-1939 
 
 
Between 1929 and 1939, the issue of individual economic security in old age moved to the 
center of American politics and society. Fueled by the record mass unemployment and social 
discontent that the Great Depression had engendered, individual states, corporate employers, private 
advocacy organizations, and the federal government grappled over the question of how to best 
support a small but growing population of older and impoverished people. During the three decades 
prior to the Great Depression, this issue, by widespread social consensus, had remained largely out 
of the public realm. A combination of broadly inherited suspicions about the nature of centralized 
governmental power, fragmented governmental authority, and long-standing beliefs about the nature 
of public assistance and its recipients militated strongly against limited and unsuccessful efforts 
during the Progressive Era to fashion a new national order or consensus.1 Instead, old-age economic 
security remained nearly the exclusive provenance of private welfare or philanthropic organizations, 
individual families, and mutual-aid societies. 2  Despite the pointed arguments of some social 
reformers that the United States had fallen behind other western industrialized nations like the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada in how it approached the issue of old-age economic 
security, these criticisms remained confined within small circles of academic and social welfare 
experts. 
          
1 See Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
2 The scholarly literature on social provision and relief in the United States before the New Deal is substantial. I refer 
here in passing to some of the most important scholarship, including Theda Skocpol’s numerous studies (particularly 
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers); Linda Gordon’s Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 
1890-1935 (New York: 1995); Alice Kessler-Harris’s In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic 
Citizenship in 20th Century America; Michael Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1998); Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006). Other important works in this field include Edwin Amenta, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of 
Modern American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Carole Haber and Bruce Gratton, Old 
Age and the Search for Security: An American Social History (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993); and Walter 
Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State, 6th Edition: A History of Social Welfare in America (New York: Free Press, 
1998). 
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The Great Depression fundamentally challenged this state of affairs. Large portions of the 
existing but fragmented private social welfare system buckled and collapsed under the 
unprecedented duress of prolonged economic crisis and social instability. As the Depression 
deepened and worsened, individual states, led by New York State, rushed to enact public old-age 
pension programs in the hope that providing a modicum of financial assistance to their older, 
usually male unemployed workers would spare them the indignities of the public poorhouse or from 
becoming dependent upon their children and extended families. 3  As a consequence of the 
Depression, public assistance for older workers gained a new social and political legitimacy, and 
this fundamental shift represented the beginnings of the senior state that would evolve over the 
course of the next four decades. Moreover, the pattern set in the 1930s would be repeated again 
during the 1940s, the 1950s, and into the 1960s. As the needs of older people changed, new 
solutions would be devised primarily at the local and state level, sometimes in response to popular 
grassroots pressure and organizing, and sometimes as a result of proactive measures taken by social 
welfare officials to investigate and survey the actual living conditions and economic needs of older 
people.  
The specific economic and social conditions of the 1930s, though, forged the initial 
character of the senior state, and its emphasis on addressing economic insecurity. Surveying the 
failure and inability of existing private and public institutions to effectively provide a sustainable 
model of economic security in old age, public officials soon found themselves confronted by the 
          
3 The amount of information which state policymakers had in the 1930s on the subject of old-age dependency was 
fragmentary at best. See Ann Shola Orloff, The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and 
the United States, 1880–1940 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 147-148. As Gregory Wood, observes, 
“in 1929, only eleven states featured pensions by 1929. And the most industrialized states – New Jersey, Illinois, 
Michigan, and Ohio – did not pass pension laws…Pension programs of the 1920s barely reached anyone. Of a total of 
738 counties covered by state pension laws, only 293 actually paid any benefits during the decade, and these programs 
only served 102,527 Americans.” See Gregory Wood, Retiring Men: Manhood, Labor, and Growing Old in America, 
1900-1960 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012), 89-90. After the onset of the Great Depression, New 
York enacted old-age pension legislation in 1930, “followed by New Jersey, West Virginia, Delaware, Idaho, and New 
Hampshire in 1931.” (Ibid., 90). 
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prospect of organized social discontent that seemingly threatened to radically rearrange existing 
balances of power and wealth in American society. Their response – the Social Security Act – 
represented a compromise between competing interests on Capitol Hill, and its two major titles 
related to economic insecurity in old age sought to simultaneously bolster state-level efforts while 
also carving out a new role for the federal government to play in providing individual economic 
security in old age through collective effort.  
The Social Security Act only partially fulfilled its main goal of supplying broad-based 
economic security, though, because of the limited scope of categories of workers eligible for 
inclusion under its old-age insurance program and because of largely successful efforts by its 
opponents to permit it to be broadened and expanded further. Consequently, the half-finished 
scaffolding erected by the Social Security Act failed to adequately resolve the issue of economic 
insecurity in old-age for many Americans, and compelled other institutional actors within American 
society – especially state and local officials in conjunction with a resurgent private welfare sector – 
to take a more proactive role in developing solutions that could preserve the dignity of older people 
without threatening fiscal insolvency and the ability of states and local communities to provide 
needed services and assistance to other groups. 
Despite the limitations of Social Security, the incipient senior state benefitted from the law’s 
infusion of federal funds, which supplemented existing state-level public welfare administration 
infrastructure and laid the groundwork for future expansion of public efforts to assess how the needs 
of older people could best be handled. The Social Security Board’s annual reports would also serve 
a crucial role in supplying vital information about the program’s recipients, which would help to 
guide future decision-making processes. In essence, the enactment of Social Security defined the 
parameters for subsequent debate around the issue of economic security in old age. The senior state 
owed its existence to the enactment of Social Security, and future initiatives to expand government 
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involvement in providing economic security and other forms of public provision to older Americans 
would, by necessity, have to wrestle with its incomplete legacy. 
The Second Annual Meeting of the National Conference on Old-Age Security 
 
In a short article published in its April 21, 1929 edition, the New York Times reported on the 
upcoming second annual meeting of the National Conference on Old-Age Security, which was 
scheduled to be held on April 26, 1929 in New York. The meeting promised to bring together a 
wide variety of speakers on the subject of old-age security, a topic which had become the lifework 
of Abraham Epstein, the National Conference on Old-Age Security’s founder.4 Indeed, everyone 
who had gathered at the Community Church on Park Avenue and Thirty-Fourth Street in New York 
City for the conference likely believed there was a pressing need for old-age security, but that was 
probably the totality of their agreement. Even in the radiant prosperity of 1920s America, there was 
a growing recognition in both the private and public sectors of American life that while abject 
poverty persisted, millenarian hopes for its abolition might yet be fulfilled.5 The question, therefore, 
was not whether collective efforts needed to be undertaken to address the problem of elderly 
impoverishment, but rather what shape and form those efforts should take. In April 1929, no 
satisfactory answer to that question was obvious, or at least it was not evident to the men and 
women who had gathered for the day to discuss the subject under the Community Church’s 
resplendent Victorian Romanesque flying buttresses and vaulted ceiling.  
          
4  “Confer Next Friday on Old-Age Security: Religious, Welfare and Labor Leaders to Meet in Second Annual 
Conference Here,” The New York Times, April 21, 1929. 
5  To take but one example: Herbert Hoover, who had been elected President in November 1928 and who was 
inaugurated a mere seven weeks before the conference, had campaigned on a sincere and deeply-held promise and belief 
that it was possible to extinguish poverty. In a 1928 campaign speech, for example, Hoover had argued that “by 
adherence to the principles of decentralized self-government, ordered liberty, equal opportunity, and freedom to the 
individual, our American experiment in human welfare has yielded a degree of well-being unparalleled in the world. It 
has come nearer to the abolition of poverty, to the abolition of fear of want, than humanity has ever reached before. 
Progress of the past seven years is proof of it…” See Glen Jeansonne, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Fighting Quaker, 
1928-1933 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 29. 
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The conference attendees could scarcely be blamed, though, for their inability to produce 
anything other than a bland consensus. Given the diverse variety of fields they represented, such as 
(but not limited to) organized religion, municipal government, and the labor movement, it was 
perhaps a minor miracle that the conference had been able to get them to gather under one roof. 
Some of the attendees, like Thomas Kennedy of the United Mine Workers of America, represented 
the nation’s besieged labor movement; some, like Frances Perkins of the New York State 
Department of Labor, served as the ambassadors of still-curious and uncommitted state and local 
governments; and others, like Bishop Francis J. McConnell, bore witness as the last stewards of the 
Social Gospel, a once-fiery movement which had roared out of America’s churches at the turn of the 
twentieth century and demanded the amelioration of social injustices of an industrial capitalist order, 
but which now burned slowly and dimly on its last dying embers.  
Notably absent from the conference were any attendees from the many powerful 
corporations based in New York, many of whose Midtown Manhattan headquarters were within an 
easy walk of the Community Church. Corporate America was not alone in its absence, though. Also 
missing were any official emissaries from the newly-inaugurated administration of President 
Herbert Hoover. Such absences were not unintentional. In its brief preview of the conference, the 
New York Times reported that U.S. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis had sent a noncommittal letter 
to the attendees which broadly “endors[ed] the movement to secure pensions for the aged,” but 
which made no promise of succor or action on the part of the Hoover administration to that end.6 
The relative apathy with which the Hoover administration treated the conference, though, 
was not solely the product of indifference on the part of the President or the federal government 
more generally. In truth, it reflected deeper ambivalences which had long-marked the manner in 
          
6  “Confer Next Friday on Old-Age Security: Religious, Welfare and Labor Leaders to Meet in Second Annual 
Conference Here,” The New York Times, April 21, 1929. 
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which public relief had been dispensed in the United States. For example, a “solution” to the 
“pressing need of old-age security” which the National Conference on Old-Age Security sought to 
address already existed – and had for quite some time. That solution was the municipal poorhouse 
and its rural cousin the county poor farm, both of which were long-established and well-known 
features on the American landscape. As the late Michael Katz observed, “throughout the century 
before the New Deal, the poorhouse dominated the structure of welfare – or, as it was called then, 
relief…. [and] American welfare has remained within the shadow of the poorhouse.”7  Like their 
counterparts in Elizabethan and later Victorian England, American poorhouses (or almshouses) 
were designed to be unwelcoming places, in order to ensure that whomever was sheltered within 
their walls would not wish to remain terribly long. By offering living conditions that were scarcely 
better than begging and sleeping in filthy refuse-encrusted streets, many nineteenth century 
reformers believed the morality of poor and working-class individuals would be sustained and 
uplifted through honest work rather than permanently corrupted by dishonorable idleness which 
misguided public charity supposedly enabled and sustained.  
The notoriously poor conditions of poorhouses occasionally led elderly people to take extreme 
measures to avoid ending up in them. In June 1887, for example, the New York Times reported that an elderly 
couple residing in Union Hill, New Jersey (now part of Union City, New Jersey), had committed suicide 
rather than being “removed to the County Almshouse at Snake Hill.”8 While the New Jersey dual suicide 
was an extreme case, it spoke to the dread of many older people at ending up as impoverished 
residents of public poorhouses. Nevertheless, the poorhouse aimed to replace the traditional publicly 
          
7 Michael Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (1986; New York: Basic 
Books, 1996), 3. 
8 See “An Aged Couple Gone: Two Nonagenarians Take Poison to Escape the Almshouse,” The New York Times, June 
1, 1887. More recently, the legal historian Hendrik Hartog has written a brief but penetrating legal history of the 
frequently complex financial arrangements which older people sometimes undertook in conjunction with younger 
family members in order to avoid such fates in his Someday All This Will Be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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supported “outdoor relief” system in which direct assistance was provided to needy individuals, a 
method of supplying relief that many nineteenth century reformers had long decried as too 
expensive and ineffective at arresting poverty and preventing its contagious spread among working 
class people.  
Yet alongside its function as a deterrent to sloth among the poor and working class, the 
poorhouse was also designed to serve a more charitable function of sheltering orphans, the mentally 
insane, the elderly, and other individuals who could no longer work.  These twin missions of 
deterrence and compassion may have been compatible at some early point, but by the mid- to late 
nineteenth century most American poorhouses had largely shifted in favor of deterrence, despite the 
fact that the poorhouse as an institution had also failed in its mission to replace outdoor relief, which 
persisted in many localities throughout the United States. 
Perhaps nowhere was this ambivalence about public welfare and its functions truer than in 
New York City and its environs, which daily blended the splendors of a technologically superior 
industrial order with the shocking squalor of extreme human deprivation. Jacob Riis’s photographs 
of New York’s Lower East Side neighborhood had scandalized the nation when they were first 
published at the turn of the twentieth century, and the intervening three decades between their 
publication and the slow coalescing of institutions and individuals which had brought forth the 
National Conference on Old-Age Security had witnessed at best only modestly successful attempts 
to improve the living conditions of the city’s poor, especially its elderly poor, who not infrequently 
discovered that the municipal almshouse on Blackwell (now Roosevelt) Island to be their one and 
only option of last resort when they could no longer afford to keep the landlord or the bill collector 
at bay. 
It was precisely this problem – the inadequacy of the public poorhouse to meet its stated aim 
of providing real, meaningful financial security in old age without humiliating those who dwelled 
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within its walls – that had brought together the assembled attendees of the National Conference on 
Old-Age. But it was also the determined efforts of Abraham Epstein, the passionate founder of the 
American Association for Old Age Security, who had long pined for the United States to take the 
sort of decisive and positive actions in the realm of social welfare which he believed best 
characterized the most civilized nations of western Europe during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Described by his most recent biographer as “an intense little man,” Epstein had 
committed himself to the cause of old-age pensions with the fanatical devotion of a true believer.9 
To this end, he had spent nearly his entire life savings in order to start and get the American 
Association for Old Age Security organization up and running, and had also spent a considerable 
amount of time forging working relationships with New York’s well-established private charities, 
voluntary societies, and religious groups committed to alleviating the plight of the city’s poor.10 The 
annual conferences, which the American Association for Old Age Security sponsored in the late 
1920s, were very much his brainchild, but their gradually increasing prominence in New York’s 
reform circles suggested that the cause of old-age security was not solely the vanity project of a 
single man. 
Indeed, New York’s deeply-rooted system of private welfare and philanthropic organizations 
was already well aware of the limited ability (and perhaps limited desire) to minister to the city’s 
poor, even if they preferred not to publicly acknowledge it too loudly or too frequently. The New 
York branch of the international Charity Organization Society, for example, kept detailed records on 
the many families (including numerous elderly denizens) sprinkled throughout the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods, and its case workers meticulously tracked and commented upon the impoverished 
          
9 For description of Abraham Epstein, see Pierre Epstein, Abraham Epstein: The Forgotten Father of Social Security 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 93-95. 
10 Ibid. 
 49 
 
individuals they encountered on a day-to-day basis. 11  Such social work activities were hardly 
limited to New York City. Other American cities in the Midwest and New England also featured a 
growing density of voluntary societies dedicated to the eradication of poverty in their midst. 
Abraham Epstein’s work to drive and build attention for the cause of old-age security was therefore 
hardly original, though his efforts did have the salutary effect of encouraging a traditionally 
fragmented community of private welfare and charitable organizations to begin to see the benefits of 
setting aside doctrinal and territorial disputes in order to coordinate with each other. Though neither 
Epstein nor the other attendees at the 1929 conference could have possibly predicted it, their efforts 
to build public support for reforming old-age security in the United States would, in just a few short 
months, receive the devoted attention of officials from across the nation.12 
If the numerous charities, mutual aid societies, and other private organizations in New York 
remained at an impasse on the question of how best to reform old-age security in the United States, 
such vacillation was markedly absent in the upper echelons of corporate American management. 
Awash in both confidence and capital, the masters of Wall Street betrayed no vexing qualms over 
how best to solve the problem of old age poverty. Speaking in June 1925 at the Colorado Bankers’ 
Association, William E. Knox, the President of the American Bankers’ Association, publicly 
          
11 See Michael B. Katz, “Surviving Poverty in Early Twentieth-Century New York City,” in Urban Policy in Twentieth-
Century America, ed. Raymond A. Mohl and Arnold R. Hirsch (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 46-
65. 
12 By contrast, five years later, Eleanor Roosevelt would give the keynote address at a February 1934 meeting of the 
American Association for Old Age Security’s Washington, D.C. branch, as clear an indication as any of the significantly 
improved fortunes and importance of the association. See  
Eleanor Roosevelt, “A Speech Before the D.C. Branch of the American Association for Social Security, the Council of 
Social Agencies, and the Monday Evening Club,” Speech, American Association for Social Security, Washington D.C., 
February 8th, 1934. Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, The George Washington University. Available at: 
https://erpapers.columbian.gwu.edu/old-age-pensions-speech-dc-branch-american-association-social-security-council-
social-agencies-and (accessed September 21, 2016). See also Speech and Article File, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. In her remarks to the group, the First Lady observed “I do not 
feel that I have to discuss the merits of old age pensions with my audience. We have come beyond that because it is 
many years now since we have accepted the fact, I think, pretty well throughout the country, that it is the right of old 
people when they have worked hard all their lives, and, through no fault of theirs, have not been able to provide for their 
old age, to be cared for in the last years of their life. We did it at first in what I consider a terrible way – through 
poorhouses – but now we have become more humane and more enlightened, and little by little we are passing old age 
pension laws in the various states.” (Ibid.) 
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decried the “old age pensions and other forms of charitable compensation” sponsored by well-
meaning (and unspecified) industrial corporations to support retired workers. 13  Instead, Knox 
pointedly argued that “in principle, they [the pensions] are wrong and contrary to the purposes of 
democracy…what we want is an organized plan that will direct working people toward 
independence, and no system of industry can lay claim to complete success that does not 
contemplate the financial independence of every employee.”14 More specifically, Knox emphasized 
the need for American employees to have “a broad cooperative plan for systematic saving” – an 
unsurprising stand, perhaps, from the leader of a major trade association for savings banks, but one 
which encapsulated widely-held public sentiments on the subject. As Knox suggested in his 
remarks, old-age pensions were “contrary to the purposes of democracy,” an oblique reference to 
the scandals associated with the pensions granted to Civil War veterans in the decades after the 
war’s formal conclusion in 1865.  
As Theda Skocpol argued in her Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, the disproportionately 
generous expansion of old-age pensions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
successfully welded aging northern Civil War veterans to the electoral apparatus of the Republican 
Party in many key Northern states such as Indiana and Ohio.15 Such a combination had helped to 
secure the Republican Party’s dominance of the nation’s politics for the first half-century after the 
Civil War, a fact made all the more obvious by the long, unending parade of largely interchangeable 
Republican Party functionaries and middlemen who occupied high offices at both ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue. This politically fecund union between veterans and the Republican Party, 
though, had come at the high price of fatefully damaging old-age pensions as a cause célèbre for 
          
13 “Would End Poverty in Old Age of All: William E. Knox Urges System Whereby Workers Would Attain 
Independence,” The New York Times, June 21, 1925. 
14 Ibid. 
15  Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 274-278. 
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social reformers. Indeed, in the eyes of many Progressive reformers in the United States who, during 
the first decades of the early twentieth century, sought to dislodge the patronage-laced “state of 
courts and parties” (to employ the political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s phrase) which had 
existed continuously in one form or another since the deeply divisive days of Andrew Jackson’s 
administration, old-age pensions were nothing less than corruption of the democratic process writ 
large.16  
Fatefully, unlike the drive for workmen’s compensation laws, women’s suffrage, or the 
temperance movement, the push for national old-age pensions never attracted the depth or breadth 
of institutional and popular support sufficient to cross the many constitutional barriers in its path. 
While some largely rural, lightly populated, and not especially wealthy states like Kentucky and 
Nevada had, at least on paper, committed themselves to the cause of old-age pensions for their 
citizens, in reality, such mandates remained unfunded and unloved, the perennial budgetary 
stepchildren of more than one state legislature and the recipient of constant attention only from 
devotees like Abraham Epstein.17 Important industrialized states like Massachusetts – a traditional 
state-level spearhead of social and political reform – had commissioned investigations to evaluate 
the merits of state-provided old-age pensions, but had ultimately remained happily uncommitted on 
          
16 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-
1920. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), see 24-46. As one typical example of the extensive newspaper 
coverage of the scandals surrounding the Civil War veterans’ pensions revealed, there were by 1894 “more pensions 
than soldiers” – i.e., the number of elderly men on the pension rolls exceeded the sum total of soldiers in the U.S. 
military during the course of the war. See “More Pensions than Soldiers: Government Defrauded of Millions of 
Money,” The New York Times, April 19, 1894. 
17 Epstein remained evangelically committed to the cause of public old-age pensions, and was a not infrequent letter 
writer to The New York Times on behalf of this cause. See for example, Abraham Epstein, “Caring for the Aged: State 
Program Might Help Solve an Unemployment Problem,” The New York Times, November 8, 1927. As late as 1931, old-
age pension laws existed in twelve states, but “in only 137 counties of nine states have they been adopted,” with average 
monthly payments of $14.32 to each elderly recipient ($226.71 in 2016 dollars); the total number of elderly persons who 
received pensions stood at just 10,307. 
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the subject, and were largely content to let the issue be resolved by either local municipalities or by 
the mysterious machinations of the labor market.18 
The combination of popular and elite disinterest in old-age pensions remained alive and well 
long after the number of Civil War veteran pensioners had dwindled to statistical insignificance. 
The New York Times could editorialize in June 1927 – sixty-two years after the end of the Civil War 
– that “the so-called old-age non-contributory several States are not strictly pensions but are simply 
another form of public relief – outdoor relief instead of institutional relief.”19 Such public relief 
efforts, the Times observed, were “not stipends to which specific services in the past give claim,” 
nor were “they offered even in return for a general social contribution by the recipient.”20 Yet even 
the Times could sense that something was wrong with the poorhouse as the last refuge of the elderly. 
Observing in the same editorial that “poorhouses have become, for the most part, homes for the 
aged,” and the consignment of the elderly to such institutions was to effectively abandon them to 
          
18 In 1924 the state government of Massachusetts had authorized the creation of a “Commission on Old Age Pensions,” 
which then promptly spent the next two years studying and debating how to best reform the “system of caring for the 
aged in Massachusetts.” The Commission’s final report emphasized “a widespread lack of means in old age” but 
“disagreed as to the remedy,” and therefore could offer no definitive singular recommended solution to the 
Massachusetts legislature. See Richard K. Conant, “Care of the Aged Poor - Proposed Measures for Improving The Care 
Of The Aged In Massachusetts,” (presentation given at the National Conference Of Social Work’s Fifty-Third Annual 
Session, Cleveland, Ohio, May 26-June 2, 1926). Source URL:  http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/public-
welfare/care-of-the-aged-poor/ (Accessed July 17, 2016). See also Winthrop D. Lane, “Old-Age Pension Laws: Three 
More States Join Those Providing for Home Care of Indigent Persons,” The New York Times, May 19, 1929, in which 
Mr. Lane in a letter to the editor of the Times observed that three states (Minnesota, Utah, and Wyoming) had recently 
enacted old-age pension bills, thus bringing the total number of U.S. states with such pensions in place to nine. Gregory 
Wood has argued that the 1920s state-level pension movement may have been motivated by a growing belief among 
social reformers and some unionist groups that old-age pensions represented a way to legitimize social provision for 
older male workers. See Gregory Wood, Retiring Men, 60-61. In the particular case of Massachusetts, Brian Gratton has 
argued that the opposition of social workers in that state helped to prevent the enactment of a state old-age pension 
system. See Brian Gratton, “Social Workers and Old Age Pensions,” Social Service Review 57, no. 3 (1983): 403-15. 
Additionally, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, the American Association for Labor Legislation, as well as labor federations 
in some states appear to have been the main backers of state-level old-age pension movements during the 1920s. See 
Ana Shola Orloff, The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880–
1940 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 282. 
19 “Pensions vs. Poorhouse,” The New York Times, June 28, 1927. 
20 Ibid. 
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“the callous neglect of dehumanized poorhouses,” the Times held out hope that some kind of better-
designed pension system might break the cycle of elderly poverty in the future.21 
If the Times was hoping that a satisfactory answer to the question of eliminating elderly 
poverty would soon present itself, it did not have to look very far beyond the environs of the great 
corporate headquarters littered throughout Manhattan. In the first decade after the end of World War 
I, employer-sponsored welfare plans had spread throughout the industrial and commercial sectors of 
the American economy. The expansion of these plans reflected in part the unprecedented weakness 
of the American labor movement at this moment in time. But they also depended upon an 
environment of sustained economic growth, which would enable companies to promise future 
pensions contingent to a good extent on present-day profits.  
The halting of economic growth during the Great Depression which began in 1929, though, 
upset this increasingly precarious financial house of cards for many companies.22 The business 
community, which had formerly embraced welfare capitalism partly as a method to limit the appeal 
of unions to their workforces and partly out of a sense of social responsibility on the part of some 
corporate leaders, now dispensed with such initiatives in a time of economic crisis and growing 
mass unemployment.23 Faced with the prospect of having to provide ruinously expensive financial 
support to armies of newly unemployed workers, formerly benevolent businessmen now 
increasingly heard liability instead of responsibility whenever the subject of pensions was broached 
          
21 Ibid. See also Michael B. Katz, “Poorhouses and the Origins of the Public Old Age Home,” The Milbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly, Health and Society 62, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 110-140. 
22 As Robert Zieger has written, “economic catastrophe changed the equation…the collapse of advanced commercial 
and welfare capitalism transformed the nature of the bargain that…industrial workers had accepted. The devastating 
impact of the Great Depression soon overwhelmed even the most conscientious efforts of employers and government 
officials to maintain employment and wage levels. By 1931, welfare capitalism was in full retreat. By 1933, fully one-
quarter of the working population was unemployed.” See Robert Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1995), 13. 
23 For a full but concise treatment of the evolution of welfare capitalism, see Jill S. Quadagno, “Welfare Capitalism and 
the Social Security Act of 1935,” American Sociological Review 49, no. 5 (October 1984): 632-647, esp. 636-638, and 
Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), esp. 240-279. 
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in public. In short, the rapidly changing economic circumstances in depression-era America helped 
propel a dramatic shift in the financial calculus of many corporate leaders, who rapidly began to 
distance and sever themselves from any sense of social obligation to their benighted former 
charges.24  
Instead, as John Edgerton, the president of the National Association of Manufacturers in 
1930, observed, 
[t]he real responsibility for their [the unemployed] poverty…lay with 
the jobless themselves. “If,” he [Edgerton] asked, “they do 
not…practice the habits of thrift and conservation, or if they gamble 
away their savings in the stock market or elsewhere, is our economic 
system, or government, or industry to blame?”25 
 
Edgerton’s argument that poverty and unemployment was the fault of the individual failings 
enjoyed wide purchase in the United States, and it was not until the onset of double-digit 
unemployment during the Great Depression that it began to be challenged. While mass 
unemployment metastasized into a dangerous, cancerous growth on the nation’s body politic during 
the first four years of the Depression, perhaps no group of Americans experienced firsthand the 
perils of desperate unemployment and unwelcome destitution in a more pronounced fashion than 
millions of older people, many of whom confronted a world in which their life savings had been 
permanently erased, their employment terminated, and their prospects for individual economic 
salvation to be precarious at best.  
As the Depression deepened and economic recovery seemed more and more a mirage, the 
underpinnings of social stability in the United States started to come undone. William Leuchtenburg 
has further observed that “many believed that the long era of economic growth in the western world 
          
24 “Employers Oppose Pensions for Aged: New Jersey Manufacturers Say They Will Burden Industry and Put Tax on 
Thrift,” The New York Times, May 4, 1930. 
25 Quoted in Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (1963; repr., New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 
21. 
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had come to an end…[f]or the first time in three centuries, the curve of American population growth 
was leveling off; an economy accustomed to the demand of a swiftly expanding population would 
have to adapt itself painfully to a stationary population.”26 Chief among those who were stationary 
were older workers, who now found that a shrinking economy and empty public and private coffers 
afforded them precious little protection from life’s darkening vicissitudes. The 1932 presidential 
election reflected this growing social discontent and the deeply unsettled political conditions in the 
United States.  
Without having to delve too deeply into policy specifics or proposals while on the campaign 
trail, Franklin Roosevelt, like Herbert Hoover before him four years prior, was carried into the Oval 
Office courtesy of an electoral tidal wave. While older Americans were not yet characterized as a 
distinct voting “bloc” (as they would be by the 1936 election), it seems reasonable to presume that 
many, like their fellow citizens, opted to take a chance on the New York Governor with the famous 
last name rather than remain bound to the failed presidency of Herbert Hoover. 27  In the 
“interregnum of despair” between the November 1932 election and Roosevelt’s scheduled 
          
26 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 29. For every decade between 1900 and 1990, the average 
annual growth rate of the population aged 65 years or older exceeded that of the total population. This disparity was 
most pronounced during the Depression decade of 1930-1940, when the temporary dip in fertility as a result of 
economic crisis produced an average annual growth rate of 0.75% for the total population but an average annual growth 
rate of 3.1% for the population aged 65 years or older. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, by Loraine A. West, Samantha 
Cole, Daniel Goodkind, and Wan He, 65+ in the United States: 2010, Figure 1.2, “Average Annual Growth Rate of the 
Total Population and Population Aged 65 and Over by Decade: 1900–1910 to 2040–2050,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, June 2014), 7. Available at: 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf, accessed March 1, 2017. 
27 Evidence of how the elderly had begun to be viewed as a coherent voting bloc can be found in the 1936 presidential 
election when the 1936 Democratic and Republican Party platforms devoted extensive space to (respectively) making 
the case for and against Social Security as the surest guarantee of protection from the financial vicissitudes of old age. 
See Republican Party Platform: “Republican Party Platform of 1936,” June 9, 1936. Online by Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29639 (accessed February 25, 
2017) and Democratic Party Platforms: “1936 Democratic Party Platform,” June 23, 1936. Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29596 (accessed 
February 25, 2017). By the time of the 1960 presidential election, both major political parties had organized outreach 
efforts directly aimed at older Americans, a trend which accelerated during the 1960s and thereafter. 
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inauguration in March 1933, older Americans began to write the Roosevelts in the hope that they 
might be able to help, and to plead for some sort of government action on their behalf.28 
Franklin Roosevelt and New York State’s Response to the Great Depression 
Their belief that their worries would now find a sympathetic hearing in Washington, D.C., 
may have been informed by Roosevelt’s modest record of state-level action on behalf of older 
people while in Albany. As Governor, Roosevelt had taken an unusually strong interest in old age 
insurance as a solution to the mounting problem of poverty and dependency among New York’s 
thousands of older citizens, many of whom had found themselves among the first casualties of the 
Great Depression’s onslaught. 29  Even before Roosevelt had become Governor of New York, 
though, there were numerous indications at the state level that a new public consensus was 
beginning to build in favor of public pensions as a needed social reform to replace “antiquated” state 
almshouses. During the 1920s, the New York Legislature had repeatedly considered bills to do so, 
and important institutions like The New York Times had offered wholehearted support to such 
efforts. 30  In late September 1929, the New York Commission on Old Age Security, a special 
investigative body consisting of a select group of state legislators, heard numerous witnesses testify 
that “neither private charity nor group insurance and industrial pensions were adequate to cope with 
          
28 The phrase is Jordan A. Schwarz’s. See Jordan A. Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair: Hoover, Congress, and the 
Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970). 
29 As Daniel Rodgers observes, “New York State had long been the cockpit of the social insurance battles; most of the 
major clearinghouses of social welfare ideas were headquartered there. Even as blithe a young progressive as Roosevelt 
could not keep them altogether out of his formative air. To this one must add Roosevelt’s instinctual fiscal conservatism, 
to which the contributory aspects of social insurance were, from the first, congenial. He had been severely disappointed 
as governor when a special New York commission in1930 had recommended tax-financed pensions for the elderly poor 
rather than a self-financing system of contributory old-age insurance.” (Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 438). See also 
“Roosevelt Starts Old Age Aid Study: Governor Says Administrative and Legislative Phases Will Unite in General 
Conference,” The New York Times, January 21, 1929; “Roosevelt Fights for Old Age Relief: Insists on His Own Plan, 
Threatening the Republican Inquiry Bill with Veto,” The New York Times, March 1, 1929; “Old-Age Relief,” The New 
York Times, March 1, 1929. 
30 See “Modernizing the Poor Law,” The New York Times, March 18, 1928; Evans Clark, “Old Age Pensions Increase in 
Public Favor: New French Law Contrast to American Hesitation to Grant State Aid,” The New York Times, April 1, 
1928; “Poor-Law Reform,” The New York Times, February 1, 1929; “Banishing the Poorhouse,” The New York Times, 
July 24, 1929. 
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the problem of old age dependency”; rather, “economists, statisticians, and representatives of 
charitable and relief agencies insisted that old age pensions was the only method of dealing with the 
problem satisfactorily.” 31 This remarkable shift in public sentiment on the question of old-age 
pensions suggested an increasing recognition on the part of New York’s private welfare community 
that existing methods to support the elderly were not adequate to accomplish that feat. The moment 
that social reformers like Abraham Epstein had long crusaded for seemed to be at hand: if a major 
industrial state like New York could be persuaded to adopt old age pensions, then perhaps the 
movement for state-level pensions, which had ultimately sputtered and stalled out during the 1920s, 
might be revived and expanded.32 
Ultimately, the New York Commission on Old Age Security recommended in February 
1930 to the New York State Legislature that “a State and county system of pensions for the needy of 
70 years of more” be established.33 The high age qualification which the commission recommended 
– and the conditions it attached to receipt of pensions (“receipts of relief would have to be citizens 
and residents of the State for the preceding ten years for whose support no financially able person 
would be legally responsible”) suggested that the old, lingering suspicions about old age pensions as 
nothing but a thinly (and poorly) disguised dole had not been entirely banished, but more 
importantly, the commission for the first time gave official approval to the argument which Epstein 
and other reformers had been advocating for years. Speaking on behalf of the commission, state 
Senator Seabury C. Mastick observed: 
          
31 See “Worker Paying for Old-Age Relief: Witnesses at Mastick Hearing Say State in Time Can Make Pensions Self-
Supporting,” The New York Times, September 19, 1929. 
32 See “Bill Would Pension Poor at 70 or Over: State Old Age Commission Drafts Plan to Aid 40,000 Needy by Stock 
Transfer Tax Rise,” The New York Times, January 16, 1930; “Old Age Relief Laws Urged For New York: Renewed 
Effort Will Begin with Commission’s Report to Legislature in February – Measures in Force in Ten States and Thirty-
eight Other Lands,” January 26, 1930, The New York Times. See also “Ask National Plan of Old Age Pension: Delegates 
to Conference Say Security System Will Abolish Poorhouses,” The New York Times, April 26, 1930. 
33 “Pensions for Aged Proposed in Bill: Report of Legislative Commission Estimates 51,000 in State Need Them,” The 
New York Times, February 18, 1930. 
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I feel that by the introduction of these bills a revolutionary step has 
been taken in the policy of the State in regard to the discharge of its 
responsibility toward the needy aged. We have had in mind constantly 
the desirability of extending this assistance, not in the form of charity 
administered in a humiliating manner in institutions but in the form of 
aid extended in the home where the recipient will remain in contact 
and in association with his or her loved ones. The commission feels 
that it has here a sound plan which will stand the test both of the 
courts and of public opinion.34 
 
In other words, the public old-age pension – far from destroying or weakening the moral fiber of its 
recipients – was instead a humanitarian measure, designed to protect families by keeping them 
whole (and by extension, keeping the elderly out of public almshouses). After factoring in financial 
and residency requirements, the anticipated 51,000 recipients of the old age pension represented 
only a fragment of the total elderly population in the state: by the commission’s own accounting, 
there were approximately 350,000 persons aged 70 or over in New York State as of June 1929.35 
However limited in scale and scope were the commission’s recommendations for New 
York’s old age pensions, they could not have come at a better time. In March 1930, the New York 
Times reported that rapidly rising unemployment in the state was “driving an unusual number of 
persons to public and private lodging houses and increasing the number of aged poor in the care of 
public institutions.”36 In New York City, municipal lodging houses experienced a nearly 20% rise 
(from 137,032 in 1928 to 159,155 in 1929) in the number of nights’ care provided, which had led to 
          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. Abraham Epstein repeatedly – and unsuccessfully – press for the Legislature to lower the age limit to 65 from 70 
years old, but found that even within his own association that support for such a move was mixed at best. As Dr. 
Edward T. Devine of the Yorkville Belleview Health Center argued, “we don’t a repetition of the Veterans’ Bureau 
scandal with the old-age pension bill.” See “Lower Pension Age Urged: Welfare Group Asks Limit of 65 Instead of 70 
Required by Law,” The New York Times, April 18, 1930; “Wider Aged Relief Urged to Aid Idle: Conference Asks State 
Heads to Cut Qualifying Age From 70 Years to 65,” The New York Times, November 23, 1930. For more on the 
residency and financial requirements set by the New York Commission on Old Age Security, see the Committee on 
Economic Security, Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, Vol. II: Old Age Security 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935). Accessed via the U.S. Social Security Administration 
website (URL: https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2armstaff.html) on February 25, 2017. Specifically, New 
York State limited old age pension eligibility to people over the age of 65 with less than $300 annual income (1929 
dollars) and holding property worth less than $5000 (1929 dollars). 
36  “More Aged Poor Go To Almshouses: State Department of Social Welfare Lays the Increase in Numbers to 
Unemployment,” The New York Times, March 10, 1930. 
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“serious overcrowding” problems. 37  Within two months’ of the commission’s report, Franklin 
Roosevelt signed the old age pension bill into law. As he did so, he made clear his preference for a 
social insurance model of financing old age pensions by characterizing the newly-enacted measure 
as “a mere extension of the poor law” because it merely gave the “aged food and a roof over their 
heads” and noted that “my hope is that someday we can have a system to encourage savings that 
will provide ease and comfort as well as food and shelter.”38 Essentially, Roosevelt opposed using 
general tax revenues to support the new old-age pension system, and he believed that a contributory 
model for financing it would have the preferred outcome of avoiding the creation of a permanent 
financial burden on the state budget.39 
The law met with a sustained and positive response on the part of New York’s elderly 
citizens. Within the first week of open enrollment for the old-age pension system in early September 
1930, 2,609 people over the age of 70 in New York City alone had applied for coverage under the 
new law, a figure that significantly outpaced what state officials had originally expected would be 
the case.40 By November 30, 1930, 25,000 applications had been received, but only 1,656 had been 
approved by the New York City Department of Public Welfare. 41  Once he became President, 
          
37 Ibid. 
38 “Governor Roosevelt Signs Old Age Pension Bill; Praises Move, but Calls for Further Steps,” The New York Times, 
April 11, 1930. For an overview of the history of the Poor Laws, see Jill S. Quadagno, “From Poor Laws to Pensions: 
The Evolution of Economic Support for the Aged in England and America,” The Milbank Memorial Quarterly, Health 
and Society 62, no. 3 (Summer 1984): 417-446. 
39 See also Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1998), 438. As Abe Bortz has observed, Roosevelt’s preference for contributory insurance may have also 
reflected his own personally conservative instincts. As Roosevelt stated in his 1931 message to the New York State 
Legislature, “our American aged do not want charity, but rather old age comforts to which they are rightfully entitled by 
their own thrift and foresight in the form of insurance.” See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to the 
Legislature (Excerpts), January 7, 1931 in Franklin Roosevelt, Public Papers of the Presidents: Franklin Roosevelt, 
1933-1945, Vol. 9 (1940): 100-111. 
40 “Aged in Dire Straits Enroll for State Aid: Welfare Executive Says Many Will Find it Hard to Wait for First Payment 
on Jan. 1,” The New York Times, September 9, 1930. 
41 “Vote Aided Fight for Aid to Aged: 12 Governors and 6 Senators Elected This Year Are Listed as Supporters of 
Plan,” The New York Times, November 30, 1930. After the enactment of Social Security in 1935, the number of New 
York City residents who successfully applied for newly enhanced old-age assistance aid reached 44,410 by April 30, 
1937. This increase followed the lowering of the age of eligibility from 70 to 65, though New York City officials 
proudly boasted of the other restrictions which remained attached to receipt of assistance. Speaking to the New York 
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Roosevelt would have the opportunity to create the “system to encourage savings,” which he had 
publicly pined for in 1930. No doubt relying on his experience as Governor of New York State with 
old age pensions, Roosevelt maintained an active interest in the subject after he became President in 
1933. As Frances Perkins later recalled, “before his Inauguration in 1933 Roosevelt had agreed that 
we should explore at once methods for setting up unemployment and old-age insurance in the 
United States.”42 Roosevelt had been carried into office over Hoover in part because of his promises 
to undertake some manner of reform to get the country out of the Depression, and so it was not too 
surprising that older Americans hoped to grab the new President’s attention with numerous 
telegrams and frantic letters. 
While Roosevelt and his advisers were aware of just how desperate economic circumstances 
had become for many Americans, they had not unreasonably decided to spend the administration’s 
early days halting the cascading bank failures in major states like Michigan, Illinois, and New York 
which threatened to bring about an economic apocalypse. The decision to prioritize badly needed 
banking industry reform, though, would prove to have fateful consequences for the course of social 
welfare policy development in the United States, especially with respect to older and increasingly 
indigent people. Though Franklin Roosevelt announced in June 1934 his intention to push for 
legislation to provide “for the security of the men, women and children of the nation,” increasingly, 
older people had begun to look elsewhere for succor and the promise of salvation.43 
  
          
Times in May 1937, William Hodson, the city’s Commissioner of Public Welfare, noted that “unlike other states, which 
have made their old-age assistance programs vehicles for political ends, New York City and State have restricted aid to 
those who were entitled to receive it.” Hodson added that “a careful, non-political administration” ensured adequate 
safeguarding of “the rights of the beneficiaries and the taxpayers.” See “City Old-Age Rolls Up 63% in 7 Months,” The 
New York Times, May 23, 1937. 
42 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, ed. Adam Cohen (1946; repr., New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 266. 
43 “Roosevelt Sets Security For Homes, Jobs, Old Age as New Deal’s Objectives,” The New York Times, June 9, 1934. 
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The Emergence of the Townsend Movement 
They soon found it, albeit from some unlikely sources. As the Depression continued to 
deepen during Roosevelt’s first term, numerous older Americans, like many of their fellow 
Americans, soon began to gravitate towards organizations and individuals who offered possible 
solutions to the protracted economic crisis of the Great Depression. Indeed, the deeply unsettled 
politics of economic crisis during the 1930s permitted (if briefly,) the emergence of various 
dissident ideologies throughout the United States. To borrow Alan Brinkley’s phrase, these “voices 
of protest” were heard from nearly every part of the American political spectrum, ranging from the 
growing strength enjoyed by the German-American Bund and other fascist-friendly organizations 
on the far-right to the resurgence of the Communist Party of the United States on the American left.  
Perhaps no voices were louder, than those of the Reverend Father Charles M. Coughlin and 
Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, who had both succeeded in converting roiling social discontent 
into significant popular support for their respective “National Union for Social Justice” and “Share 
Our Wealth” organizations. Students of American history have rightfully emphasized the pivotal 
role played by both men in shaping “the dissident ideology” of the 1930s and its attempt to hold 
back the unruly forces of modernity which had been reshaping the United States for decades.44 Both 
men had initially sought accommodation and alliance with Franklin Roosevelt, and both had 
become bitter, implacable foes of the Roosevelt administration when it became clear the President 
had no intention of affording them privileged access to his administration for any longer than was 
necessary for survival in the fickle politics of the early 1930s. Instead, Roosevelt had merely sought 
          
44 See Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest, esp. chapter 7 (“The Dissident Ideology”), 143-168. 
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to placate them, and had studiously stroked both men’s egos just enough early in his administration 
to avoid a damaging public confrontation with them and their supporters.45 
To some extent, Roosevelt had the good fortune of seeing the national movements that Long 
and Coughlin purported to lead sputter after Long was assassinated in September 1935 and 
Coughlin veered deeper into the paranoid embrace of anti-Semitism in the late 1930s. Yet while 
Long and Coughlin were perhaps the two loudest and energetic voices of protest during the 1930s, 
other quieter, but still powerful voices, appeared in the chorus of discontent. Chief among them was 
Dr. Francis Townsend, a retired doctor who resided in Long Beach, California. Unlike Huey Long 
or Father Coughlin, Townsend lacked the brash personal energy and established media platform for 
spreading his message. Despite Townsend’s lack of charisma or a radio program, for many older 
Americans, his Townsend Movement soon became the preferred vehicle for voicing their 
frustrations and demanding sweeping changes in how America should handle the problem of 
economic security in old age.46 The Townsend Movement had come into being after Townsend had 
written a letter to the editor of a local Long Beach, California newspaper in September 1933 
highlighting his plan of guaranteed old-age pensions as a way to end the Great Depression by 
retiring and supporting all Americans aged sixty or older with $200 monthly pensions as “surplus 
workers” no longer necessary for economic growth and production.47  
          
45 My brief summary here of FDR’s relationship with Father Coughlin and Senator Huey Long relies heavily upon Alan 
Brinkley’s masterful study in Voices of Protest. For his own part, Roosevelt was under no illusions about the sort of 
threat which Father Coughlin and Huey Long posed to the established exercise of democratic governance in the United 
States. Roosevelt famously considered Long to be the second most dangerous man in America (the first, in his opinion, 
was Douglas MacArthur). See Jean Edward Smith, FDR (New York: Random House, 2008), 285. 
46 “Millions Seeking Old-Age Pensions,” The New York Times, September 2, 1934. 
47 I rely here chiefly on Robert McElvaine’s account in The Great Depression, 241. The text of Dr. Townsend’s letter 
(titled “Cure for Depressions”) can be found in Robert S. McElvaine, The Depression and New Deal: A History in 
Documents (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 91-92. 
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Figure 1. Dr. Francis Townsend (r) pictured with U.S. Senator Sheridan Downey (D-CA). Photo courtesy of the U.S. 
Office of War Information, National Archives.  
Somewhat improbably, that letter soon attracted hundreds of replies, a clear and obvious 
indication that Townsend’s proposal had inadvertently struck a chord with a wide audience. This 
reaction of mass interest and support had caught Townsend off-guard. In Robert McElvaine’s 
words, “he had planned no concrete action following his original letter,” but “Townsend quickly 
rose to the task.”48 Notwithstanding his unsteady first steps into the public arena, Dr. Townsend 
soon proved himself far savvier than his detractors would have wished him, as evidenced by the 
surprisingly resilient structure of the “Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd.” (OARP) corporation he 
quickly formed with several business partners in order to convert this unexpected audience into a 
          
48 McElvaine, The Great Depression, 241. 
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more organized political force capable of applying sufficient political pressure on elected officials to 
enact the Townsend Plan’s centerpiece objective of publicly sponsored old age pensions. 
From its unlikely origins, the OARP or Townsend Movement soon grew into a classic 
grassroots organization, grounded in the support of local Townsend Clubs scattered throughout the 
nation, though most sprang up in Townsend’s home state of California and in the Mountain and 
Midwest states.49 By 1935, local Townsend Club members had started to bombard congressional 
and state legislative offices with letter-writing campaigns demanding favorable legislative action on 
the Townsend Plan. 50 Students of the Townsend Movement have generally identified two key 
reasons for the movement’s sudden and rapid growth.51 First, like Dr. Townsend himself, many of 
the Movement’s members came from a native-born, middle-class Midwestern background, and the 
Movement’s milieu would eventually be shaped by a shared set of cultural and social reference 
          
49 “The Townsend Old-Age Plan,” The New York Times, September 8th, 1934; Robert Ordway Foote, “Pensions For All 
at 60: An Idea From the West,” The New York Times, September 16, 1934; Duncan Aikman, “California Voters Debate 
the EPIC Issue Bitterly,” The New York Times, October 14, 1934; “California Doctor Plans Old Age Utopia,” The New 
York Times, December 22, 1934. 
50 In 1938 – five years after Dr. Townsend had first written his letter to the editor proposing the Townsend Plan, and 
three years after the enactment of the Social Security Act, the Townsend Plan still enjoyed a significant amount of 
support on Capitol Hill. As Robert McElvaine notes, “a minimum of 40 of the 169 successful Republican House 
candidates in 1938 owed their victories at least in part to their (often hypocritical) endorsements of the Townsend Plan” 
(McElvaine, The Great Depression, 305). Dr. Townsend had by 1936 become thoroughly embittered and openly 
antagonistic towards Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the Social Security Act, and so the Townsend Movement 
openly made common-cause with some of the most reactionary, anti-New Deal elements within the Republican Party in 
various parts of the United States. (That such alliances with politicians who were unlikely to advance a government-
funded pension scheme far more generous in its benefits than anything enacted, proposed, or even daydreamed by even 
the most devoutly liberal New Dealer seems to have escaped the notice of Dr. Townsend and most of his followers, who 
seemed increasingly more concerned with trying to be a thorn in Franklin Roosevelt’s side rather than the enactment of 
their own agenda). While this alliance probably helped elect Republicans to Congress, such efforts did not do terribly 
much to advance the Townsend Movement’s agenda on Capitol Hill. The white South’s emissaries there were already 
happily committed to the operational Old Age Assistance provisions of the Social Security Act, and therefore saw no 
reason to ally with their usual partners in the Congressional “conservative coalition” of Midwestern Republicans and 
Southern Democrats to hamper and frustrate the more liberal New Dealers in the Roosevelt administration. 
51 The two major scholarly studies of the Townsend Movement are Abraham Holtzman, The Townsend Movement, A 
Political Study (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963) and Edwin Amenta, When Movements Matter: The Townsend 
Plan and the Rise of Social Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also James Sylvester 
O’Leary, “Old People’s Social Movement Organizations: Why They Succeed, How They Fail,” Ph.D. diss., The 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994; Steven Burg, “The Gray Crusade: The Townsend Movement, Old Age 
Politics, and the Development of Social Security,” PhD diss., The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999. 
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points of its members, who identified closely with Dr. Townsend.52  Additionally, it is probable that 
the simplicity of the Plan’s math made it intuitively easier for its grassroots members to understand 
and support. As Robert McElvaine has written, the Townsend Plan 
proposed to pay every American citizen over the age of sixty $200 
each month, provided that he or she had never been convicted of a 
crime, agreed to give up all other income, and pledged to spend the 
$200 within thirty days. Townsend contended that his plan would end 
the Depression and benefit young as well as old. The aged would no 
longer compete with younger people for jobs, the economy would be 
stimulated by all the purchases the elderly would make, and everyone 
would live happily ever after.53 
 
Of course, in reality, everyone would not live happily ever after. The Townsend Plan’s funding was 
predicated upon a massive, regressive “transaction tax” that would penalize the everyday 
transactions of American consumers.54 The Plan would therefore “help one poor group (the aged) at 
the expense of another (working-class consumers)…the rich would be unharmed, the economy un-
helped.”55 The amount of economic havoc that the Townsend Plan would have wreaked upon a 
debilitated economy is probably incalculable, but such concerns were almost secondary in the 
frenetic atmosphere of the Great Depression. What mattered, as McElvaine has observed, is that  
Townsend offered the American middle class – particularly its older 
members – a panacea, and he presented it in terms they could 
understand. It was very attractive. A married couple, both over sixty 
years of age, would be given $4800 a year. What this meant can be 
fully appreciated only when it is realized that 87 percent of all 
American families had annual incomes below $2500 in 1935. That 
fact in itself indicates that the plan was unworkable.56 
 
          
52 Duncan Aikman, “Townsendism: Old-Time Religion,” The New York Times, March 8, 1936. 
53 McElvaine, The Great Depression, 241. 
54 Ibid. McElvaine further observes that “the Townsend Plan was essentially conservative. Unlike Huey Long, or even 
Father Coughlin, Townsend never seriously proposed to soak the rich. He indicated no desire to challenge the basic 
tenets of capitalism.” (Ibid., 241). 
55 Ibid., 241. 
56 Ibid., 242. McElvaine writes that “the sum Townsend proposed to pay the aged was one-half of the national income 
for 1934.” (Ibid., 242). 
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Despite widespread support in the Midwest and the West, the Townsend Plan did not enjoy much 
support from most of the established players in American politics, regardless of their place on the 
political spectrum. Indeed, condemnation of the Townsend Plan made for the strangest of 
bedfellows in an already topsy-turvy political climate: politically right-leaning organizations such as 
the New Deal-loathing Liberty League and National Association of Manufacturers denounced it; as 
did the avowedly left-wing Communist Party of the United States of America, the Socialist party, 
and the politically cautious American Federation of Labor.57 
          
57 Ibid., 242. While not explicitly condemning the Townsend Plan by name, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce made its 
feelings on the subject known in November 1934 when it publicly declared that “the President is the great and lone 
barrier against radicalism,” in the hope that Roosevelt would block “radical” measures (such as legislation to enact the 
Townsend Plan) proposed by members of Congress. See The New York Times, November 18, 1934. The late Robert 
Zieger has observed that the crisis of the Great Depression did not deeply unmoor the AFL from its traditional aversion 
to direct intervention on behalf of public social programs to benefits for the working class. See also William Forbath’s 
Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). Green’s 
presence on the Committee on Economic Security’s membership roster seems to have been largely pro forma rather 
than deeply participatory. The CIO – which did not exist until the mid-1930s – only became an active partner of the 
Democratic Party in the early 1940s (see Robert H. Zieger, The CIO: 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995), 111). Though the AFL had a strained relationship to Social Security, its president William Green 
had offered the organization’s tentative support to the old age pension movement in 1931. See “Green Pledges Aid to 
Old-Age Relief: A. F. of L. Head Urges State Control and Minimum Benefit of $300 a Year at 65,” The New York 
Times, April 11, 1931. 
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Yet this lack of obvious institutional support did little to deter Dr. Townsend or his 
supporters, and may have actually helped bolster Townsend’s public image and appeal to his 
followers as a selfless servant of older people who could be trusted to act in their best interests 
regardless of what politicians in Washington, D.C., or elsewhere desired. In Robert McElvaine’s 
words, “the sandcastles that Dr. Townsend built were very pretty and his movement flourished.”58 
Moreover,  
Public sentiment was ripe for a plan to aid the aged. When asked in 
December 1935 whether they favored government old-age pensions 
for needy persons, a whopping 89 percent of a cross section of 
Americans answered affirmatively…In 1936, Townsend Club leaders 
claimed a nationwide membership of 3.5 million. In only three months 
Townsendites collected over 20 million signatures on their petitions. 
This represented one-fifth of the adults in the United States…Two 
1936 public opinion surveys showed even greater support for the 
          
58 McElvaine, The Great Depression, 242. 
Figure 2. Townsend supporters rally in Columbus, Kansas in May 1936. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress. 
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doctor’s scheme. Approximately one-half of the Americans surveyed 
early in 1936 favored the plan.59 
 
Despite all of the condemnation and mockery which the Townsend Plan had received, its supporters 
remained firmly anchored in place. New York journalists and Washington politicians may have 
chortled at him, but Townsend was confident that he had the necessary popular support to press 
forward with his agenda. Such growing confidence probably owed much to the letters from elderly 
Americans which he received from across much of the nation. Just as they had once largely turned 
to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt for succor, now the letters from older Americans to the 
Roosevelts revealed an increasingly ominous change in mood and tone. As a “tak payer [sic]” from 
Manistique, Michigan wrote to the Roosevelts in March 1936: 
Do you think that a man of the age of 60 or 70 years old can do the 
work that a man can do at the age of 25 he can not he would collapes 
[sic]. When old age creaps upon you. you come incontact with all 
kinds alments akes pains nerviness sleepless and sightless. There is 
know [sic] 60 per cent of the W.P.A. workers over 60 years old. The 
younger class seems to forget the forefathers. And denie the old age 
the $200.  a month old age pention something that would give the old 
age a little pleasure for the last few years they have to live. Such 
pention [sic] plan is the only thing that will brin back this cuntry [sic] 
to normal and prospairty a decint liven and liveing wages.60  
 
Moreover, while the appeal of publicly sponsored old age pensions to impoverished older 
Americans might seem obvious in retrospect, such pensions also appealed to the younger family 
members of older Americans who frequently now found themselves more burdened by the need to 
support elderly parents or relatives. As “Mrs. J.S.” from Akron, Ohio, wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in 
February 1936: 
A few weeks ago, I heard your talk over the air, on the subject of the 
Old age pension [sic], and I got to thinking what a blessing it would 
          
59 Ibid. Alan Brinkley observes that fully one sixth of the residents of San Diego, California were dues-paying members 
of Townsend Clubs, and that 105,000 men and women out of a population of 180,000 signed an appeal to their 
Congressman on behalf of the Townsend Plan (Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 223-224). 
60 McElvaine, Down and Out in the Great Depression, 187-188. 
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be to my mother, if it was possible for her to receive that pension, if 
the bill should pass…I thought as long as I lived there was no need to 
worry about her being taken care of, but I never dreamed of a 
depression like we have had well it changed the whole course of our 
lives we have suffered, and no one knowes [sic] but our own 
family…I am in position to do the right thing for mother, I cant [sic] 
give her anything but her living…61 
 
Other voices echoed the sorrows of Mrs. J.S.’s letter.62 The extraordinary strains of the Great 
Depression had placed a new financial burden upon middle and working-class families throughout 
the nation, and consequently mothers, daughters, and wives began to write more persistently to 
Eleanor Roosevelt to plead the case for old-age pensions to help their elderly relatives. Such women 
might have been able to take care of older relatives in happier days – and indeed, many had – but 
the Great Depression was unforgiving to such arrangements. In the brave new world of the 
Depression, a perfect storm had brought about the collapse of innumerable private charities, the 
dissolution of family bonds, and shattered the ability of state and local governments to adequately 
deal with the crisis of mass unemployment.  
Faced with the choice between supporting their children or their parents, many Americans 
could only despair and hope for a miracle – “a gift from heaven” (as Mrs. J.S. put it) – to save them. 
Given such conditions, the broad appeal of the Townsend Plan’s publicly sponsored old age 
pensions to older Americans and their families is not hard to fathom. The economic climate of the 
Depression had created an environment in which publicly supported old age pensions no longer 
seemed like a venal corruption of American democracy; more and more, they appeared to be a tool 
to safeguard and protect the economic security of the indigent elderly.63 State legislatures which had 
          
61 Ibid., 99-100. 
62 See, for example, Ibid., 100-107. 
63 “1,044 Editors Back Old-Age Pensions,” The New York Times, December 6, 1931.  As the Times reported, inn a 
survey published by Abraham Epstein’s American Association for Old Age Security (AAOS), a survey of 1,345 
newspaper editors on the question of old-age security revealed that 77% (1,044 papers) advocated some form of old-age 
pension (though not necessarily the pension plan which the AAOS favored). In May 1933, the Times reported that nine 
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once been reluctant to even go through the formality of setting up a commission or a council to 
investigate the subject now energetically leapt into the fray, and long-beleaguered old-age pension 
advocates like Abraham Epstein could almost feel the winds of change beginning to blow in their 
favor.64 
The Townsend Movement and the New Deal 
Though the Townsend Plan and its founder were subjected to derision, in truth such mockery 
betrayed nervousness on the part of anxious New Dealers like Frances Perkins.65 As Perkins later 
recalled in a 1962 speech on the origins of Social Security, the growing strength of the Townsend 
Movement had necessitated inclusion of old-age public assistance provisions to the Social Security 
Act, which sought to alleviate pressure on members of Congress who were on the receiving end of 
the Townsend Movement’s concerted fury.66 Specifically, Perkins recollected that 
The Wagner Lewis bill in the Congress covered only unemployment 
insurance, but there was a great demand for old-age insurance also. It 
was easy to add this feature – and politically almost essential. One 
hardly realizes nowadays how strong was the sentiment in favor of the 
Townsend Plan and other exotic schemes for giving the aged a weekly 
income. In some districts the Townsend Plan was the chief political 
issue, and men supporting it were elected to Congress. The pressure 
from its advocates was intense. The President began telling people he 
was in favor of adding old-age insurance clauses to the bill and 
putting it through as one program.67 
 
          
new states had enacted old-age relief legislation, a development which brought the total number of states with old age 
pensions to twenty-five (i.e., a majority of the then forty-eight states). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Henry Hazlitt, “Townsend’s Plan Explained and Analyzed,” The New York Times, December 22, 1935; “Split at 
Hearings On Security Plan,” The New York Times, January 24, 1935; “Townsend’s Plan Called Absurdity,” The New 
York Times, December 29, 1935; Frances Perkins, “The Roots of Social Security,” October 23, 1962, Baltimore, 
Maryland, “Social Security History” website,  U.S. Social Security Administration. Source URL: 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/perkins5.html (Accessed October 10, 2016); “Townsend’s Plan Called Absurdity,” The 
New York Times, December 29, 1935. 
66 Perkins’s assessment of the Townsend Movement’s role in forcing the issue of old-age security legislation is also 
supported by a contemporary overview of the development of Social Security authored by J. Douglas Brown, a 
Princeton University economics professor and staff consultant on the Committee on Economic Security (the appointed 
body ultimately responsible for drafting the Social Security Act). See J. Douglas Brown, “The Development of the Old-
Age Insurance Provisions of the Social Security Act,” Law and Contemporary Problems 3, no. 2 (1936): 186-198. 
67 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, ed. Adam Cohen (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 266-267. 
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While influential New Dealers and established social commentators might have believed the 
Townsend Plan was a form of magical thinking which required suspension of disbelief in order to be 
remotely plausible, grassroots support for the Townsend Movement remained palpable throughout 
the 1930s. This support eventually compelled the Roosevelt administration to try and blunt any 
potential impact the Townsend Movement might have on federal policies designed to address the 
impoverishment of formerly middle- and working-class older Americans, and to ensure that neither 
Townsend nor his movement could threaten the long-term viability of the Roosevelt administration.  
In June 1934, therefore, the Roosevelt administration announced the appointment of a 
Committee on Economic Security charged with carrying out the President’s “pledge to insure the 
future social well-being of the United States” by studying “almost every phase of economic and 
social hazard from old age and unemployment to the ‘economic aspects of maternity.” 68  The 
Committee, which consisted primarily of academic economists, social welfare experts, and federal 
and state officials hastily borrowed from across the country, soon went to work at a breakneck 
pace.69  
By November 1934, the Committee on Economic Security had begun to consider which 
legislative proposals it would recommend to the President, who had made known his desire for a 
“comprehensive program for economic security” that he could then present to Congress at the start 
of its session in January 1935. 70  In the December 1934, Barbara Armstrong, a University of 
California economist and consultant to the Committee on Economic Security, offered strong 
implicit evidence of the impact of the Townsend Movement’s ability to organize older Americans 
          
68 “Roosevelt Cabinet Group to Gather National Data For Wide Social Program,” The New York Times, June 30, 1934; 
“Roosevelt Names Social Study Aides,” The New York Times, November 11, 1934. 
69 “Roosevelt Studies Permanent Plans for Social Relief,” The New York Times, August 26th, 1934; see also “Historical 
Background and Development of Social Security,” U.S. Social Security Administration, Source URL: 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (Accessed October 13, 2016). 
70 “200 to Meet Today on Social Security,” The New York Times, November 14, 1934. See also Committee on Economic 
Security Report to the President, U.S. Social Security Administration website, Source URL: 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces.html (Accessed October 13, 2016). 
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into a potentially powerful political force on the Committee’s deliberations. Writing in the New 
York Times, Armstrong observed that the existing social welfare infrastructure of poorhouses and 
county poor farms had proven to be woefully ineffective and financially inefficient in assuring 
impoverished older people some modicum of economic security without humiliating them in the 
process. Keeping her cards close to the vest, Armstrong highlighted the laggard pace of the United 
States compared to the United Kingdom and other industrialized nations in providing for the 
indigent elderly, and hinted that reforms to replace the humiliation and deprivation of the poorhouse 
and poor farm would soon be forthcoming from the Committee on Economic Security’s 
recommendations.71 
When the Committee’s report arrived on the President’s desk in January 1935, its 
recommendations on the subject of old-age economic security were threefold: first, that the federal 
government subsidize existing state-level old age assistance programs; second, that “a national 
compulsory old age insurance system to cover the major number of the nation’s industrial workers” 
be enacted; and finally, that “a national system of voluntary individual old age annuities for person 
not covered by either of the other measures” also be set up.72 Aside from its three major policy 
recommendations, the Committee’s report asserted that “State action alone cannot be relied on to 
provide either adequate or universal old-age insurance…although twenty-eight States and two 
Territories have old-age assistance laws, many of these are not functioning, and others have cut 
benefits below a proper minimum and have long waiting lists.”73  
In essence, the Committee on Economic Security was proposing to solve the problem of old-
age economic security by means that were both compulsory and voluntary, and to buttress existing 
          
71 Barbara N. Armstrong, “Plans for Old-Age Security Studied As a Leading Issue,” The New York Times, December 2, 
1934. See also “Roosevelt on Old-Age Security,” The New York Times, December 2, 1934; “To Urge Old Age 
Security,” The New York Times, December 4, 1934. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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state-level relief efforts with the might of the Federal treasury.74 While it avoided singling out any 
one particular state or Territory for censure, the Committee on Economic Security’s report made 
clear that state-level efforts to provide old-age assistance were simply inadequate, and by 
establishing a federal system, the Committee’s members hoped to move the shift of economic 
security away from state and local level governments permanently.75 Such a major shift of social 
responsibility – and in an area of domestic policy in which the federal government had traditionally 
not played an overt role – was sure to provoke political controversy and opposition, and it was not 
immediately clear how such legislation would get through Congress, even though the President did 
enjoy the luxury of lopsided congressional Democratic majorities. 
Taking stock of the report, the Roosevelt administration began to plan its strategy for getting 
the Committee’s report translated into law. Speaking before a joint session of the Senate and House 
on January 4, 1935, Roosevelt told the Congress that the “Federal Government must and shall quit 
this business of relief,” a goal he meant to accomplish by “providing 3,500,000 jobs on public 
works projects for the nation’s idle ‘employables.’” 76  Alongside measures to provide public 
employment for “employables,” Roosevelt promised Congress a set of recommendations for “social 
security, covering unemployment insurance and old-age pensions” among a plethora of items which 
          
74 As Frank Bane, the Executive Director of the original Social Security Board, stated in a December 1936 radio 
address, “With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the federal government entered into a long-time 
partnership with its states and their communities – a partnership for the protection of the American people. In this joint 
enterprise, the state takes the lead… [i]f the objectives of the Act are to be realized – actually realized in the daily lives 
of our people – it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the job of administration must be done by the states.” U.S. 
Social Security Administration website, source URL: http://www.ssa.gov/history/history.html (Accessed October 16, 
2016). 
75 See also “Congress Faces a Heavy Program,” The New York Times, January 2, 1935. 
76 Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Annual Message to Congress,” January 4, 1935. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project (source URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14890). See also 
“Roosevelt to Make Jobs For 3,500,000 Now on Relief; Pushes His Social Program,” The New York Times, January 5, 
1935. 
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the Committee on Economic Security had identified as crucial to reducing “dependency and 
illness.”77  
Within two weeks of the President’s Message to Congress, the administration submitted the 
Committee on Economic Security’s report for the consideration of Capitol Hill’s sachems. 78 
Sensitive to the possible objections of Southern Democrats to a strengthening of Washington’s role 
in social welfare, Roosevelt let it be known that the proposed Social Security program was designed 
“to assist States in every way in setting up their own social security systems,” and that any 
assistance to states in “meeting the immediate emergency problems of the indigent where States 
have pension plans now in operation” would be on a strictly temporary basis.79  
While liberals in the House immediately sought “to broaden the proposed legislation,” the 
Roosevelt administration remained coolly noncommittal on the subject of expanding the Social 
Security legislation beyond what had already been proposed to Congress. The word from the White 
House, on both Social Security and other measures of pending legislation, was caution, with the 
President himself describing the administration’s legislative agenda as not of “a drastic nature.”80 
The administration’s strategy of caution was a deliberate one. The proposed Social Security Act did 
not enjoy much support on Capitol Hill; instead, members of Congress seemed more and more 
attracted to the siren song of the Townsend Movement. Writing in the New York Times, Arthur 
Krock observed in mid-January 1935: 
Unless the members of Congress are almost unanimously ignorant of 
the national state of mind, people who would seriously damage or 
destroy the economic security program offered by the President today 
would simply be letting the country in for calamitous alternatives. If 
Senators and Representatives accurately describe the feeling in their 
          
77 “Roosevelt to Make Jobs For 3,500,000 Now on Relief; Pushes His Social Program,” The New York Times, January 5, 
1935. 
78 See “Roosevelt to Ask 3 Social Measures,” The New York Times, January 8, 1935; “Roosevelt Limits Social Aid 
Grants,” The New York Times, January 12, 1935. 
79 “Roosevelt Limits Social Aid Grants,” The New York Times, January 12, 1935. 
80 “Finishes Measure on Social Security,” The New York Times, January 16, 1935. 
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districts and the testimony of their correspondence, then the defeat or 
extreme dilution of the Roosevelt proposals will mean the ascendancy 
of the ideas of Huey P. Long, Dr. Townsend, or both. 
 
While Krock proceeded to mock the pretensions of both Long and Townsend to high political 
power, he conceded that “a glance at any Senator’s correspondence will demonstrate [that] many, 
many people – perhaps several millions – believe firmly in the practicability and justice of the 
Townsend Plan.”81 
Despite Krock’s attempts to portray the Roosevelt administration’s approach as the only 
reasonable choice, the administration’s foes could not be placated. The National Association of 
Manufacturers (N.A.M.) declared itself to be in favor of “the general objectives of the program but 
unalterably opposed to the payroll tax through which it is to be financed,” on the grounds that the 
tax would have an overall deflationary effect on the economy be removing far too much money 
from active circulation.82 While N.A.M.’s objections to the Roosevelt administration’s proposals 
were not always fairly made, on the issue of Social Security’s financing, N.A.M. had a point: Social 
Security’s payroll tax would remove money from circulation, and it would have a deflationary effect 
at a time when more rather than less money pumped into circulation by the government was the 
preferable solution as John Maynard Keynes and other economists had argued.  
For the moment, though, the Roosevelt administration was far more concerned about the 
possible effect that Townsend Movement’s growing numbers might have on Congress than it was 
about N.A.M.’s opposition. In mid-February 1935, Dr. Townsend had appeared before a hostile 
Senate Finance Committee to try and persuade them of the rightness of his proposed $200-a-month 
old-age pension plan. Peppering the elderly doctor with questions about the Townsend Plan’s 
financing that he was unready or unwilling to answer, the hearing soon devolved into a carnival-like 
          
81 Arthur Krock, “In Washington: Roosevelt, Long, or Townsend: Our Social Security Choice,” The New York Times, 
January 18, 1935. 
82 “Hits Payroll Tax For Age Pensions,” The New York Times, February 8, 1935. 
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atmosphere, with each of the assembled senators taking turns baiting and berating Townsend. An 
unsmiling Townsend parried with most of the senators, who made clear that they thought him little 
more than a confidence man. Instead, Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison made clear at the Townsend 
hearing that the Senate Finance Committee would focus its energy and attention on the Roosevelt 
administration’s Social Security program proposal, even though, as Senator Harrison later confided 
to Marion Folsom, he wasn’t entirely sure what the Committee on Economic Security was asking 
Congress to do.83  
Despite the subdued reception that greeted the proposed Social Security bill on Capitol Hill, 
it turned out there was one constituency that the Roosevelt administration found it could count upon 
to shepherd the legislation through Capitol Hill: the South. If southern legislators had no great love 
for New Deal programs like the Works Progress Administration, the same was not true for the 
Social Security Act, especially its title providing for Old Age Assistance – in effect, a kind of 
federal-state matching grant program designed to temporarily provide non-contributory pensions for 
older Americans who would likely be ineligible for the provisions of Old Age Insurance.84  
In essence, the Social Security Act’s two main titles were designed to deal with old-age 
economic security in a way that distinctly disadvantaged African Americans. First, it excluded from 
eligibility two of the major categories of work that employed African-Americans (especially in the 
still largely agricultural Southern states). Secondly, it offered matching federal funds to supplement 
          
83 Ibid. As Harrison reputedly told Folsom with reference to the Social Security Act, “You know, this is a hell of a 
complicated proposition we’ve got here. You’re the first fellow we’ve had to testify that we can understand. Just what 
do you want us to do?”  See Tom Wicker, “Social Security Marks 25th Year,” The New York Times, August 14, 1960. 
84 For more on the background of Old Age Assistance, see Committee on Economic Security, Volume II. Old Age 
Security, Final Staff Report, Old Age Security Staff Report, January 1935, 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2armstaff.html, (accessed October 13, 2016). As Ira Katznelson has 
highlighted, the Roosevelt administration secured Southern support for the entire Social Security Act by largely 
acquiescing to Southern demands that agricultural and domestic servants be ineligible to participate in Social Security’s 
Old Age Insurance program. See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2013) and Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold Story of Racial 
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America (W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), 42-48. 
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existing but underfunded state-level pension plans in the Southern states without exercising direct 
oversight of state-level authorities as to how those funds would actually be administered.  
In other words, both Social Security’s Old Age Insurance and its Assistance titles were 
altered to placate the demands of white Southerners that little if any old-age relief would ever reach 
impoverished African-American communities.85 Despite Roosevelt’s obvious distaste for direct old 
age assistance – which he viewed as being far too similar to the sort of “dole” that good government 
reformers had been fighting to render extinct since the turn of the twentieth century – he acceded to 
Southern demands. Doing so ultimately permitted the enactment of the overall Social Security Act, 
including Roosevelt’s favored method of contributory old age social insurance. Unlike the Old Age 
Assistance title, the Old Age Insurance title was significantly less popular with both parties on 
Capitol Hill because it was not scheduled to go into effect until 1942, and therefore would do little 
to calm congressional jitters about the Townsend Movement’s threats to dislodge them from 
office.86 
The South and Social Security 
Southern Democrats had good reason and the necessary political standing to demand the 
non-contributory pension funds proffered by the Old Age Assistance title of the Social Security Act. 
In Oklahoma and Texas, for example, between forty-three and forty-five of every one hundred 
people aged 65 years or older received old-age assistance, with the federal government responsible 
          
85 As Michael Katz has noted, the categorical limitations placed on eligibility to enroll Social Security by Southern 
legislators ensured that two-thirds of African-Americans ineligible to receive assistance. See Katz, In the Shadow of the 
Poorhouse, 252. 
86 As Daniel Rodgers has observed, in order to make Social Security politically palatable, “direct grants-in-aid were 
extended to the states for a number of family welfare and public health programs and, more generously still, for 
categorical, British-style payments to the elderly poor. It was the popularity of the last section that ultimately pulled the 
rest through Congress. The insurance sections, by contrast, ran into much more considerable flack. Conservatives, 
beating the old corruption drum, worried that the reserves proposed under the old-age insurance section of the act would 
become simply a gigantic political slush fund.” (Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 443). 
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for supplying a considerable amount of the funds necessary to support this assistance.87 As a later 
Federal Security Agency report on Social Security’s old age assistance program noted,  
great variations are to be found among the States in the number of 
recipients of old-age assistance in relation to aged population. In 
December 1949 the recipient rate ranged from 67 per 1,000 in 
Delaware and New Jersey to 829 per 1,000 in Louisiana...In general 
the States that are predominantly rural – and consequently have the 
least protection from the old-age and survivors’ insurance system – 
have the highest recipient rates.88 
 
Of the states with the ten highest Social Security Old Age Assistance program recipient rates, seven 
were in the South (Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama), while 
three were outside the South (Oklahoma, Colorado, and New Mexico). By contrast, none of these 
states ranked among the ten states with the highest old age insurance recipient rates, nor did any 
Southern state.89 Furthermore, G. Calvin MacKenzie and Robert Weisbrot observe that 
[t]he Democratic Party was the only party in nearly every part of the 
South and all of that region’s representatives in Congress were 
Democrats. Because southern incumbents were rarely defeated in 
primaries, and never in general election, they amassed seniority much 
more effectively than representatives from other regions. And when 
the Democratic Party found itself in the majority in the House after 
1930, southerners in large numbers reaped the benefits of their 
accumulated seniority.90 
 
Because of its strong position within the now-dominant Democratic Party, the South was now newly 
empowered in the nation’s politics in a manner that it had not been for generations, and its 
representatives on Capitol Hill were unafraid to wield a legislative cudgel on behalf of their region’s 
interests. Any legislation of major significance had to pass through the South’s committee-heavy 
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legislative gauntlet on Capitol Hill, and even Franklin Roosevelt at the height of his power and 
popularity was obliged to respect Southern prerogatives (even as he occasionally sought ways to 
shortcut them).  
Social Security’s Old Age Assistance title allowed the South to have its cake and eat it too: 
the federal government would pick up the tab of subsidizing the South’s elderly (white) citizens 
because the administration and disbursement of old age assistance (not old age insurance) monies 
were left up to the individual states to decide eligibility criteria and disbursement methodology.91 
Such allowances were crucial to winning the support of firmly entrenched white Southern powers-
that-be, who made no pretext of doling out federal old age assistance funds in a racially equitable 
manner to the great masses of impoverished Southerners.92 The Jackson Daily News of Mississippi 
spoke for many white Southerners when it declared that “the average Mississippian can’t imagine 
himself chipping into pay pensions for able-bodied Negroes to sit around in idleness on front 
galleries supporting their kinfolks on pensions, while cotton and corn crops are crying for workers 
to get them out of the grass.”93  
Such hostility had helped defeat the efforts of the Townsend Movement to expand and 
organize in Southern states; for many white Southerners, however deep the appeal of the Townsend 
Plan’s generous, guaranteed old-age pension plan may have been, the prospect of elderly African-
Americans also receiving such pensions made Dr. Townsend a persona non grata in much of the 
          
91 As W.J. Cash observed in his The Mind of the South, “all the [Southern] states were adopting social security and old-
age pension laws, to avail themselves of Federal largesse [italics in the original]. Wilbur Joseph [W.J.] Cash, The Mind 
of the South (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1941), 371. 
92 In the words of Daniel Rodgers, “Southerners wielded their potential veto power to slice out every phrase in the 
[Social Security] act that the courts might have construed as equalizing black and white welfare benefits – and, with the 
help of Roosevelt’s always fiscally cautious secretary of the treasury, to cut workers in agriculture, which was still the 
core of the southern economy, out of both the old-age and unemployment insurance provisions of the act.” (Rodgers, 
Atlantic Crossings, 443-444). 
93 Jackson (Miss.) Daily News, June 20, 1935; originally quoted in Robert McElvaine, The Great Depression, 257. 
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South, despite early and repeated attempts by the Townsend Movement to organize older white 
Southerners into local Townsend clubs in the region.94 
Thus, in Ira Katznelson’s fitting phrase, Social Security’s provisions for old age assistance 
was a classic case of “when affirmative action was white”: the traditionally wary South had 
acquiesced to new, unprecedented federal legislation in the form of the Social Security Act, but had 
done so on terms that could hardly have been more favorable to its rulers.95 If the Social Security 
Act had any sort of impact on reducing old age dependency for the next two decades of its 
existence, it came as a result of the most politically regressive region in the nation demanding a 
virtually no-strings attached federal subsidy for its elderly citizens, a result that the New Dealers – 
with their earnest commitment to eradicating the poorhouse and the county poor farm system (and 
their heartfelt concern for preserving the “dignity” of elderly individuals and their families) could 
hardly have desired or foreseen, but that they largely acquiesced to as the devil’s due. 96 
While it is tempting to solely locate the blame for Social Security’s early deformities on the 
backs of racist white Southerners – and they were certainly not blameless in this respect – such a 
judgment overlooks the fact that non-Southern New Dealers – including Franklin Roosevelt himself 
– were also directly responsible for Social Security’s shortcomings. As Daniel Rodgers has 
observed, “the puzzle of the Social Security Act is not why the New Deal Congress should have 
addressed the economic hazards of unemployment and old age, but why it should have done so 
          
94 Implicit evidence of the Townsend Movement’s difficulties in organizing white Southerners and persuading them to 
join can be found, for example, in Duncan Aikman, “Townsendites Plan High-Pressure Drive,” The New York Times, 
December 15, 1935. Aikman reported that “in states like Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina organizers are making 
headway by energetically preaching that any possible harm from giving aging Negroes $200 a month in purchasing 
power would be outweighed by the good from getting that $200 spent for white man’s goods. As a result the South is no 
longer upon as the Townsend Movement’s Death Valley.” 
95 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
96 By contrast, African-American lobbying groups as well as the Socialist Party quickly recognized the inherently 
discriminatory aspects of Social Security as it was originally enacted, and thereafter began to mobilize and demand that 
the law be amended to be more inclusive of African-American workers. See “Negroes File Plea on Social Security,” The 
New York Times, January 15, 1937, pg. 7 and “Assails Roosevelt on Sharecroppers: Thomas Tells National Press Club 
President Ignores South’s Laboring Man,” The New York Times, September 23, 1936. 
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through insurance.” 97  The method of financing Social Security’s old age insurance system, in 
particular, financially penalized the minority of American workers who were eligible for coverage 
in the late 1930s. As Robert McElvaine has written, 
The [old age] insurance system was based on payroll taxes, as 
Roosevelt had insisted. The regressive nature of such taxation is 
obvious: the lower-income workers paid a far larger percentage of 
their wages in social security taxes than did those whose incomes 
were above the maximum taxable level.98 
 
Roosevelt’s insistence on payroll taxes to fund the Social Security system had been politically 
motivated; possibly because he still shared the old Progressive disdain for noncontributory pensions 
or possibly because he understood that the Social Security system would have to endure withering 
attacks from both within and without the federal government in the future. As Roosevelt later 
explained, the Social Security payroll taxes were  
[n]ever a problem of economics. They are politics all the way through. 
We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors 
a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their 
unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician 
can ever scrap my social security program.99  
 
Whatever the reason, the eventual cornerstone of liberal action to expand and develop future federal 
old-age policy and programs would be based upon a program that depended upon a regressive rather 
than progressive tax structure to fund it.100 
While the Roosevelt administration eventually succeeded in preventing the Townsend 
Movement from exerting too much influence on the legislative design of Social Security, it could 
not entirely prevent the Movement’s demand for immediate, guaranteed public assistance for the 
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elderly from having some impact. While the President and the Committee on Economic Security 
plainly favored the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, these measures were not 
especially popular on Capitol Hill or elsewhere, for both good reasons and bad. Critics of the 
administration questioned the efficacy of the old-age insurance system in solving the problem of 
economic insecurity in old age, given that it was not designed to go into effect until 1942 (seven 
years into the future), and even then would only cover certain categories of workers.101 For many 
representatives and senators, the far more popular option was Social Security’s provisions for old-
age assistance, a program under which the Federal government effectively matched and subsidized 
existing state-level old age pension systems, and under which assistance would flow much sooner 
from federal to state coffers (and thenceforth to voters).102  
In the legislative wrangling that took place over the course of the spring and early summer of 
1935, the Roosevelt administration and its allies on Capitol Hill eventually forged a modus vivendi 
on Social Security, under which concerned congressional representatives got the administration to 
acquiesce to the inclusion of old-age assistance under the umbrella of Social Security (that the 
President had opposed as little better than setting up a government dole), with the understanding that 
old-age assistance would be a temporary program and would be discontinued once the old-age 
insurance system was up and running at full speed.103 In return for its acquiescence, though, the 
administration was able to keep Congress in line and prevent favorable action on the Townsend 
          
101 “Gag Rule Dropped on Social Security,” The New York Times, April 11, 1935. 
102 See “New Drive in House to Limit Welfare,” The New York Times, March 18, 1935. 
103 As Frances Perkins later recalled, Roosevelt was particularly insistent on the need for old-age insurance. “We have to 
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Plan, despite the pressure the Townsend Movement exerted, especially on representatives from 
western and midwestern states where its membership was most pronounced and active.104 
By the time Social Security was signed into law in August 1935, the vituperative fight over 
its enactment had lent it the interesting distinction of being bitterly and publicly opposed not only by 
the Townsend Movement but also by representatives of the nation’s industrial community, who had 
managed to prevent the enactment of the proposed voluntary old-age insurance annuity program 
which the Committee on Economic Security had pushed for in January; private insurers and their 
allies had regarded it as an existential threat to the long-term viability of the private commercial 
insurance industry.105 Such attacks on Social Security were not without some merit. The architects 
of the Social Security Act, in particular, were well aware that it was barely sufficient to meet the 
crisis of poverty and mass unemployment and that much work remained to be done to improve the 
law.106 As former Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins later recalled,  
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[i]t was evident to us that any system of social insurance would not 
relieve the accumulated poverty. Nor would it relieve the sufferings of 
the presently old and needy. Nevertheless, it was also evident that this 
was the time, above all times, to be foresighted about future problems 
of unemployment and unprotected old age. It was never, I think, 
suggested by any reasonable person that relief should be abandoned in 
favor of unemployment and old-age insurance, but it was thought that 
there could be a blend of the two.107 
 
Though the New Dealers hoped that Social Security would one day be a universal program – 
Franklin Roosevelt himself had repeatedly expressed his wish that “every child, from the day he is 
born, [should] be a member of the social security system,” the Social Security Act was inherently 
debilitated at the moment of its birth. 108 As William Leuchtenburg observed, “the law was an 
astonishingly inept and conservative piece of legislation…in no other welfare system in the world 
did the state shirk all responsibility for old-age indigency and insist that funds be taken out of the 
current earnings of workers.”109  
The Townsend Movement Regroups 
While the business community licked its wounds after losing the high profile fight over 
Social Security, the Townsend Movement also moved to reorganize and to expand its national 
grassroots support in the hope that the Social Security Act was not the last word on the subject of 
public old-age economic support.110 As the Roosevelt administration moved to smooth the business 
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community’s ruffled feathers after the enactment of Social Security, it offered no such comfort to 
the Townsend Movement.111 Instead, the Roosevelt administration worked to reach out to individual 
states to try and speed up their participation in the Social Security program at the earliest possible 
moment.112 As Frances Perkins, Eleanor Roosevelt, and other Roosevelt administration officials 
unofficially campaigned on behalf of Social Security, the Townsend Movement continued to 
organize and gather its strength in its native California and elsewhere.113  
The Townsend Movement’s objectives for doing so were not mysterious. With both eyes 
clearly focused on the coming presidential election in 1936, Dr. Townsend hoped to be able to flex 
far more political muscle against the Roosevelt administration, which it not unreasonably suspected 
of maneuvering behind the scenes to prevent Congress from considering the Townsend Plan.114 
Throughout the fall of 1935 and winter of 1936, the Townsend Movement sought to organize 
support on Capitol Hill, and enjoyed some modest success in doing so: by the end of December 
1935, the Townsendites were loudly trumpeting the support of thirty-nine congressmen (roughly ten 
percent of the House of Representatives), and were openly working to court both political parties.115 
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By the time Congress reassembled in early January 1936, though, it was clear that the 
gathering senators and representatives were in no mood to entertain Townsend’s proposals, 
whatever magnetic attraction such plans may have held for state and local politicians in the states 
where the Movement was strongest. 116  The strained relationship between the Movement and 
Congress, which had begun with Congress alternating between fearful worry behind closed doors 
and open derision and mocking of Dr. Townsend at public hearings, now veered into more 
treacherous waters. In late February 1936, leaders of the Townsend Movement declared their 
intention of contesting three hundred congressional seats in the upcoming 1936 election; not long 
thereafter, Congress began investigating Dr. Townsend and his close associates for possible 
fraudulent use of the OARP’s funds.117 As Congress began to investigate the OARP’s finances, 
other unflattering revelations began to inflict damage on both Dr. Townsend and the OARP’s 
credibility as selfless advocates on behalf of the nation’s older citizens. A May 1936 New York 
Times article revealed confidential correspondence sent by Dr. Townsend in which he had boasted 
that he had “the world by the tail with a down-hill pull,” an arrogant claim that was backed by 
increasingly scant evidence of the OARP’s ability to actually persuade Congress rather than merely 
try to intimidate it into submission.118 
Eventually, as William Leuchtenburg relates, the OARP began to splinter under the pressure 
of hostile congressional hearings, which revealed that Townsend’s business partner Robert 
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Clements had reaped tremendous personal financial gains from the organization.119 Townsend and 
Clements broke off relations, and without Clements at the helm of the OARP, the organization 
swiftly fell apart at the national level. Townsend later joined forces with Father Coughlin and 
Gerald L.K. Smith, a former protégé of Huey Long, to form a new third party on a quixotic quest to 
oust Franklin Roosevelt from the White House in 1936.120 Franklin Roosevelt was instead re-elected 
in one of the largest single landslide electoral victories in the history of the United States.  
Though congressional offices were no longer drowned by a deluge of mail from the 
Townsendites after 1936, the Movement’s goal of a broad and generous guaranteed old-age pension 
continued to animate the actions of its members.121 Despite the miscalculations made by Townsend 
and other senior leaders of the OARP about the organization’s ability to secure passage of its 
agenda, the Townsend Movement continued to enjoy substantial popular support, courtesy of the 
numerous local, grassroots Townsend Clubs scattered throughout the nation. Alan Brinkley has 
observed that “the Townsend Clubs survived and prospered, developing into a large and vibrant 
national movement, infiltrating the fabric of insurgent politics in nearly every region of the country, 
and encouraging the hopes of those who believed a major new force was establishing itself in 
American public life.”122 As one elderly Michigan woman wrote to the Roosevelts in late January 
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1936, while the Townsend Plan “looked like a fairy tale or the Milinium [sic] at first yet as we think 
of it + examine its details we believe it is workable if really tried.”123 
In the first year or so after Social Security’s enactment, though, it appeared that Franklin 
Roosevelt and the key architects of social policy in the New Deal like Frances Perkins and Harry 
Hopkins had been successful in sapping just enough of the Townsend Movement’s energy and 
grassroots strength to largely defang it at the national level. The fact remained, though, that that 
Townsend Movement continued to exert substantial influence at the state level, especially in 
California.124 In the words of William Leuchtenburg,  
…Townsend’s strength reached its apex after the passage of the Social 
Security Act; in fact, he gained recruits precisely because of the 
inadequacy of the New Deal pension system, which left millions of 
elderly Americans unprotected.125 
 
The Social Security Act’s social insurance provisions, while promising to alleviate elderly poverty 
in the future, did little to address it in the present, as most of its intended beneficiaries were already 
well past their prime working years.126  
As a consequence, unlike Father Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice or Senator 
Huey Long’s “Share the Wealth” movements, the Townsend Movement soldiered on despite its 
repeated defeats at the national level. While George Murray, a Chicago journalist associated with 
the Movement from 1938-1945, somewhat incredulously claimed that 12,000 Townsend Clubs 
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remained in active operation when he took the realms of the Movement’s newspaper in 1938, it was 
true that neither the defeat of the Movement nor the enactment of Social Security had put the issue 
of publicly-supported old age pensions to rest.127 A 1936 report by the Twentieth Century Fund, for 
example, while castigating Dr. Townsend and his plan as little better than hucksterism writ large, 
pointedly conceded that “the strength of the Townsend movement, despite its fallacies…has 
undoubtedly focused the attention of the country upon the fact that the richest nation of the world 
has not yet provided adequate economic protection for old age.”128  
In other words, despite the enactment of Social Security the year before the Twentieth 
Century Fund’s report, well-informed social welfare experts continued to believe that the problem 
of old age economic security remained only partially solved. Whatever its other failings as an 
organization, the Movement had succeeded in focusing national attention on the issue of old-age 
economic security. The splinter and successor groups which emerged in its wake inherited many of 
the Movement’s politicized supporters, who continued to press for state-level publicly funded old-
age pensions in the late 1930s that were capable of providing a level of economic security that 
Social Security could not. 
The State Level Struggle over Old-Age Economic Security 
In particular, these successor groups would prove to be most influential in Colorado and 
California.129 The November 1936 elections brought the re-election of Franklin Roosevelt, but it 
also brought victory and near-victory for old-age pension groups in those two states.130 In Colorado, 
voters failed to remove a $40 a month pension system, despite its potentially adverse effects on the 
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state’s treasury, while in California, old age pension advocates successfully mobilized their 
supporters to secure the election of a pro-pension Governor and U.S. Senator, despite narrowly 
losing a popular referendum on a guaranteed state-level $120 a month old-age pension system.131 In 
other states like Oregon and North Dakota, similarly mixed messages from the electorate were also 
in abundance: while both states’ voters defeated referenda on proposed state-level pension systems, 
they also were happy to elect new representatives to Congress who had publicly committed 
themselves to expanding Social Security.132 
Such state-level agitation continued throughout the late 1930s, even after the Supreme Court 
upheld Social Security as constitutional in 1937 and the Roosevelt administration began to 
cautiously call for the expansion of Social Security in the wake of the Court’s decision, a move that 
also enjoyed the support of influential think tanks like the Twentieth Century Fund.133 While the 
Roosevelt administration moved tentatively to bolster Social Security, the popular discontent that 
had powered the Townsend Movement to national prominence continued to register its displeasure. 
In Colorado, leading elected officials received threatening mail ahead of a pending vote on an old-
age pension bill, while in California, old age pension advocates accelerated their efforts to place a 
new referendum on public pensions before the state’s voters at the earliest opportunity.134  
The California movement, which backed a ballot proposal formally titled the “Retirement 
Life Payment Plan” but more widely known by its colloquial nickname of “Ham and Eggs,” did 
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eventually succeed in placing its proposed pension on the November 1938 ballot in California.135 
However, it failed to persuade a majority of voters to endorse “Ham and Eggs,” and subsequent 
attempts in 1939 and 1940 also met with failure. Likewise, the political wrangling over old age 
pensions in Colorado reached a fever pitch in 1938 and became the marquee issue for both elected 
state and federal politicians in that state.136 Even in eastern states like New York – where the 
Townsend Movement had never enjoyed comparably strong grassroots support – there was growing 
evidence that existing social welfare measures remained insufficient to address the problem of 
providing economic security in old age.137 The November 1938 midterm elections revealed that the 
question of old-age pensions remained a pressing one in many western and Midwestern states.138 In 
Colorado, voters overwhelmingly chose to retain the state’s $45 per month old age pension law, 
while the “Ham and Eggs” movement’s old age referendum was defeated by Californian voters.139 
Elsewhere, state campaigns on behalf of old age pensions in North Dakota, Oregon, Washington 
State, and Minnesota were showing evidence of growing support which, even if not fully realized in 
1938, threatened to ripen into full-fledged social movements in the future.140 
Observant federal administrators like Arthur J. Altmeyer, the chairman of the Social Security 
Board, were sufficiently alarmed by these state-level developments that they began to push for 
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accelerated implementation of Social Security’s old age insurance provision and for an extensive 
broadening of old age assistance payments already been made by the program.141 The New York 
Times took note of the political developments out west, observing in late October 1938 that “not 
long ago the Townsend Plan was thought to be as dead as Huey Long’s Share the Wealth 
scheme…but a Washington dispatch in Sunday’s TIMES showed that the doctor’s plan or some 
modification of it is to be submitted to the voters in seventeen states.” Reading the tea leaves, the 
Times noted that “[congressional] candidates are easily pressed…Nearly a fourth of the last House 
[of Representatives] was in favor of a bill for a Federal old-age pension of $50 a month…In the next 
House another demonstration for fatter old-age pensions is plainly to be expected.”142 While Dr. 
Townsend himself opposed the various 1938 state pension proposals – possibly in a pique of anger 
that the Townsend Movement’s thunder had been stolen by other old-age pension advocacy groups 
– his rejection of them apparently did little to blunt their popularity.143  
Instead, despite repeated defeats at the ballot box, such groups refused to disappear from the 
nation’s political scene. This surprising resilience owed much to the continued poor economic status 
of many older Americans, who, as critics of Social Security had predicted, continued to find little if 
any succor to alleviate their woes from the Social Security program or from other existing public 
measures.144 The dire economic conditions faced by many older Americans was borne out by a 
March 1938 report commissioned by the Social Security Board which revealed that only 33% of the 
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aged – defined as people aged 65 and over – were self-supporting; the two-thirds majority continued 
to depend heavily on “public, private, or family aid.”145 
In response to the continuing tumultuousness of state-level fights over old age pensions as 
well as growing concerns that the disparate old-age pension advocacy groups might yet coalesce 
into a national movement once more, the Roosevelt administration announced its intentions in 
January 1939 to push for a major extension of the Social Security Act as rapidly as possible.146 In its 
coverage of the administration’s move, the New York Times reported that 
In a passage generally interpreted as an attack on the Townsend and 
similar plans the President said: “I cannot too strongly urge the 
wisdom of building upon the principles contained in the present Social 
Security Act in affording greater protection to our people, rather than 
turning to untried and demonstrably unsound panaceas.” 
 
To a large extent, the President was moving in accord with public opinion; a February 1939 Gallup 
poll revealed that an overwhelming 94% of surveyed voters favored government old-age pensions, 
and that most voters believed that “the present Social Security Act falls short of providing…an 
adequate old-age pensions system at this time.” 147 Alongside its interest in the growing public 
support for increases to Social Security, the Roosevelt administration also tested the waters for other 
solutions to the problem of old age economic insecurity. In March 1939, a Department of Labor 
special committee studying the problems of older workers (defined as 40 years or older) 
recommended that the “federal government lead the attack on the problem of unemployment for 
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older workers by abolishing age limits for entrance into the government service except for positions 
requiring physical strength and endurance.”148  
The committee’s recommendations came and went without any action by the Roosevelt 
administration, but they did represent a new approach to the problem of economic insecurity in old 
age. If Social Security could not be increased to a sufficiently high level to keep older people out of 
poverty, then perhaps an alternative solution which kept them employed in the labor market longer 
could have the same salutary effect. Members of the Social Security Board were already becoming 
concerned that the costs of raising benefits to Social Security would continue to rise an at 
unsustainable rate; as one March 1939 Social Security Board report detailed, the total amount 
expended for old-age assistance between 1937-1938 stood at $360,239,000, with the federal 
government supplying nearly half of that sum ($174,085,000). 149  While this percentage only 
represented approximately 2% of the federal government’s entire outlays for fiscal year 1938, 
federal officials and outside observers worried that that proportion could potentially grow much 
higher if monthly benefit payments were substantially increased or if the number of people enrolled 
in the Social Security system grew too large.150 
As the same 1939 Department of Labor report argued, the political pressure to raise old-age 
assistance levels would possibly permanently undercut the rationale for social insurance. 
Consequently, the Social Security Board recommended that old-age assistance funds should be 
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allocated only to the truly financially needy elderly rather than made into a universal entitlement for 
all older people above a certain age, as the Townsend Movement and its successor organizations had 
advocated for.151 In order to achieve this outcome, though, the Social Security Board urged that 
Social Security’s social insurance system be made as universal in coverage as possible, or else the 
temptation to liberalize and raise old-age assistance payments at both the state and federal levels 
would soon prove irresistible in the near future.152  
The brewing political fight over old age pensions in 1939 ultimately resulted in the 
enactment of amendments to the original Social Security Act that raised benefits, accelerated the 
payment of old age benefits by two years from January 1, 1942 to January 1, 1940, and extended 
coverage of Social Security to more groups of workers.153 The amendments also “added two new 
categories of benefits: payments to the spouse and minor children of a retired worker (so-called 
dependents benefits) and survivors benefits paid to the family in the event of the premature death of 
a covered worker.”154 As the official legislative history of Social Security observes, “this change 
transformed Social Security from a retirement program for workers into a family-based economic 
security program.”155  
The enactment of the 1939 amendments soon after the original Act was passed, though, was 
not exactly a planned event. Mounting criticism of Social Security from both the political right and 
the left convinced the Roosevelt administration of the need to speed up the dispensing of Social 
Security benefits, a process which was originally scheduled to begin in 1942 but which began 
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instead in 1940 after the 1939 amendments were passed.156 As Sung Won Kang has argued, this 
development would not have been possible without continuing pressure from the Townsend 
Movement on Congress and the Roosevelt administration.157 In particular, the Movement’s clubs 
continued to organize older Americans and to persuade supportive Congressmen to submit its bills 
for consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives. While these bills usually never made it out 
of committee, the Townsend Movement’s persistence – as well as the increasingly widely 
acknowledged problems surrounding Social Security, which congressional opponents of the 
Roosevelt administration were all too happy to publicize – persuaded the architects of the original 
Social Security Act that additional legislation was necessary to relieve some of the still-obvious 
economic and social discontent among older Americans.158 
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These improvements, which the Roosevelt administration and most educated observers had 
hoped would be sufficient to dampen the appeal of the revived old-age pension movements scattered 
throughout the United States, achieved only limited success in accomplishing that objective.159 
Observing the continued agitation over old age pensions, the Times noted that, in stark contrast to 
the 1935 fight over Social Security, “practically no opposition arose in Congress to the proposals for 
liberalizing the old age security plan” because of “the tremendous pressure…exerted upon the 
members as the result of the Townsend and general welfare pension movements, together with the 
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Figure 3. A Social Security Poster featuring an old man. Photo courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
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accentuated public interest in the general subject of social security.” 160  By expanding Social 
Security, congressional leaders hoped both to stave off the Movement and to continue sharing the 
costs of public assistance for the elderly; under Social Security, such costs were shared between the 
federal government and the individual states, but if the Townsend Plan were enacted, such costs 
would fall almost entirely upon the federal government. While New Dealers like Frances Perkins 
were acutely aware of Social Security’s incomplete nature, they hoped that expansion of the 
program would in time lessen the appeal of the Townsend Movement and other similar groups to 
insignificance.161  
Instead, despite the 1939 improvements to Social Security, the pension movements 
continued to soldier on in California and elsewhere, including Capitol Hill, where the backers of the 
Townsend Plan succeeded in forcing a vote on its adoption.162 The overwhelming defeat which 
these backers suffered – a 302 to 97 loss – seemed to have little effect in deterring the revived 
Movement; if anything, as the New York Times noted, “it seems likely that Townsendite agitation 
will continue so long as the country contains a large body of unemployed and the national income 
level remains below the level where economists say it can go.”163  
Events throughout 1939 soon bore out the Times’s prediction. Though it had been defeated 
again in Congress, the Movement and other old-age pension advocacy groups continued to press 
their case in various western states.164 In November 1939, the Times reported on special elections 
being held in California and Ohio to determine the fate of proposed publicly supported old age 
pension plans in those states, and hinted that similar movements were underway in New England 
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and New York State. As the Times editorialized, “the general belief…is that the country is still some 
years away from general pension legislation, but the ranks of those who predict that the country 
never will accept a general pension program are being decimated by the unceasing gunfire of the 
pension advocates.”165 
Unexpectedly, though, the old-age pension proposals fell short in the special state elections 
held in November 1939. California’s voters rejected – again – the “Ham and Eggs” plan, while 
voters in Ohio similarly declined to endorse a guaranteed old-age pension for state residents.166 In a 
rare showing of bipartisanship, representatives of the leadership in both the Democratic and 
Republican parties openly celebrated the defeat of the proposed pension plans, as did Abraham 
Epstein’s American Association for Social Security. The Townsend Movement did not take its latest 
loss well; speaking before a public audience in Boston the following spring, Dr. Townsend bitterly 
assailed the New Deal as a “failure,” heaped particular scorn on the Social Security Act as “the 
worst of all,” and expressed his belief that Social Security would be repealed by 1941.167 
Even as the official establishment in Washington rejoiced once more in the defeat of the 
Townsend Movement, the poor economic conditions which the New York Times had identified as 
the primary cause of the continuing social discontent among older Americans showed no signs of 
abating. While Social Security’s expansion would help some retirees, its acknowledged inadequacy 
meant that many more remained dependent upon other public, private, or family aid. The 
improvements to the Social Security Act, though, allowed the Roosevelt administration to make 
long-desired changes to other New Deal programs. In December 1939, after a public fracas with 
Governor A. Harry Moore of New Jersey over the dismissal of workers aged 65 years or older who 
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had been employed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in New Jersey, President 
Roosevelt personally repudiated the suggestion of a Labor Department committee made earlier in 
1939 that the federal government abolish age limits in federal employment as a way to ensure that 
older workers would find it easier to remain in the workforce. Instead, as the President wrote in his 
letter, since older workers were eligible for assistance under Social Security’s provisions, the 
limited number of jobs which the WPA had to offer should be reserved instead for unemployed 
persons who were not eligible for such assistance.168 In the view of the Roosevelt administration, 
public employment should be reserved for younger, able-bodied workers, while older, less 
physically able workers should vacate jobs at the WPA and elsewhere for them.169 
The Roosevelt administration’s reasoning for barring older workers from public 
employment, while strongly protested by Governor Moore and by other state officials, bore the 
marks of how the persistent economic crisis of the Great Depression had reshaped beliefs and 
assumptions about the role which older people should play in the nation’s political economy. 
Ironically, like the Townsendites, the New Dealers had, by the end of the 1930s, come to embrace 
the belief that the place of older workers was in the home – not the old persons’ home – but rather 
that the precious limited economic opportunity available in a stagnant economy be reserved for 
people who had families to support. New Dealers assumed – not entirely without reason – that older 
people did not have young children to support, and that the combination of Social Security, other 
public or private assistance, as well as traditional forms of family-based in-kind assistance would be 
sufficient to keep the majority of elderly people out of poverty, while also making room in the 
workforce for younger workers who could not fall back on public assistance as easily. Without 
intending to do so, Social Security’s emphasis on ushering older workers out of the labor force 
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would make it more difficult for future generations of federal officials to rectify elderly poverty 
because nearly all future solutions to deal with the issue would, in some way, be obliged to conform 
to the model of social insurance which the architects of Social Security had preferred and would 
work diligently to place at the center of the American welfare state during the 1940s and into the 
1950s.170 
For the moment, though, the fight in statehouses and on Capitol Hill over the fate of old-age 
pensions entered a period of uneasy stasis beginning in late 1939. The problem of providing 
economic security in old age remained far from solved, as the constant drip of articles from the 
Times revealed, but no major action on the subject would be taken by federal or state officials for 
several years.171 This diminished activity was a direct result of rising domestic employment as the 
federal government began to ramp up the production of war materials in the expectation that it was a 
merely a question of when and not if the United States would again be engaged in large-scale 
foreign wars. Former Townsend Movement manager George Murray later recalled that “the 
[Townsend] movement was at its height just before the war and went downhill after that. It lost its 
momentum. The Townsend Plan was a Depression movement. Now it became a pie-baking 
movement, just old people.”172  
As was the case for most Americans, older Americans greatly benefitted from the advent of 
World War II, not the New Deal, which largely eradicated the scourge of mass unemployment from 
the land. Already Social Security was becoming the centerpiece of the New Deal’s reforms. Despite 
its shortcomings, the Social Security Act was a potent sign of the New Deal’s commitment to the 
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mythical “forgotten man” whom Franklin Roosevelt had discussed in an April 1932 radio address. 
As Robert McElvaine has observed, the Social Security Act  
[w]as a significant achievement in that it at last acknowledged a 
modicum of societal responsibility for the care of the aged, 
unemployed, handicapped, and impoverished. It was also important as 
a symbolic gesture to demonstrate that Roosevelt’s heart was in the 
right place, no small accomplishment with a presidential election little 
more than a year away. Although the Townsend organization 
continued to thrive for more than a decade, Social Security deflated 
the movement as a threat to Roosevelt.173 
 
However, while Social Security may have deflected Franklin Roosevelt and his administration away 
from the popular discontent of some older Americans, it did not actually resolve the problem of 
widespread economic insecurity in old-age. That insecurity would soon be obscured by the booming 
wartime economy in which essentially full employment became a fact not a fantasy. The 
unanticipated changes wrought by mass mobilization on the home front during the course of World 
War II would revive the question of public responsibility to impoverished older Americans after the 
war’s conclusion, and re-open a national debate once more on what role – if any – Social Security 
should play in alleviating elderly poverty and the supply of workers in the labor force.  
In sum, while Huey Long’s antics and Father Coughlin’s bombast would devour far more 
drums of newspaper ink – and consume far more of Franklin Roosevelt’s attention and concern 
during the 1930s – it was the Townsend Movement that ultimately left a far deeper legacy at all 
levels of government by helping to organize older middle-class Americans into a mass movement 
committed to their collective betterment on the basis of their age.174 Summarizing the Townsend 
Plan, William Leuchtenburg has observed that it “represented the conviction of millions of 
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Americans that they had to take action themselves in order to restore the country to its former 
prosperity, and that, if the right formula could be found, they could lift themselves by their own 
bootstraps.”175 Eventually, the Townsend Movement became largely irrelevant as a force in national 
politics – a change brought about more by the return of widespread employment opportunities for 
older Americans during World War II, rather than by Social Security’s old age insurance and 
assistance titles.  
Still, its rise and fall would serve as a guidepost and warning to successor old age lobbying 
groups, including the as-yet unborn American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), whose own 
name echoed Dr. Townsend’s Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd. (OARP) organization (the 
incorporated name of the Townsend Movement). 176  As William Leuchtenburg has noted, the 
ultimate effect of the Townsend Movement was to unleash “a new force in American politics: the 
old people...[b]uffetted by the depression…they found in the Townsend clubs a home; in the 
movement, a sense of unity with other elderly people; in the plan, a cause; and in the crusade, a 
newfound sense of their political power.”177 This newfound sense of power did not diminish with 
the national downfall of Dr. Townsend, but instead persisted at the local and state levels, especially 
in western states like California and Colorado. The scaffolding erected during the New Deal to 
          
175 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 105. 
176 The persistence of the OARP’s influence at the state and local (rather than simply the national) level of government 
has largely been overlooked by students of the 1930s and 1940s. For an exception that proves the rule, see Steven Bret 
Burg, “The Gray Crusade: The Townsend Movement, Old Age Politics, and the Development of Social Security,” Ph.D. 
diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999. Aside from Burg, the only full-length study of the Townsend Movement 
are Abraham Holtzman, The Townsend Movement: A Political Study (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963) and more 
recently Edwin Amenta, When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). An important snippet examination of the Townsend Movement can be found in 
Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval (1960; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 29-42. 
Burg argues that the OARP served as the main progenitor for old age advocacy groups such as the AARP which formed 
after it had largely dissolved into a nonentity because of Dr. Townsend’s ability to organize older people into a cohesive 
and organized bloc, a development which outlived the organization he founded in the 1930s. Despite this considerable 
accomplishment, the Townsend Movement eventually did fade, both as a political force and as a subject of scholarly 
study. As Burg observes, “the Townsend Movement suffered the fate of a movement that not only failed but that earned 
the enmity of liberals challenging the New Deal and conservatives for demanding extravagant pensions. It became an 
orphan of history, its legacy unwanted and left unclaimed by subsequent activists” (Burg, Old People’s Social 
Movement Organizations, 4). 
177 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 106. 
 104 
 
secure the economic security of older people and to prevent them from falling into penury remained 
incomplete and unfinished. However, the return of near-full employment as the United States 
mobilized for entry into World War II camouflaged and obscured this fact. As soon as the wartime 
demand for labor began to slacken after Japan’s surrender in 1945, the concerns which Townsend 
and his compatriots had helped to give at least semi-coherent form and organization would have the 
opportunity to resuscitate once more, and thereby force anew arguments about the role of the state at 
all levels of government in providing provision to older Americans. 
By 1939, the effects of the Great Depression had laid the groundwork for the emergence of 
the senior state. While Social Security proved to be pleasing to both the Roosevelt administration 
and to its Southern congressional allies, it offered limited succor to many older Americans, not a 
few of whom were unlikely to benefit from the old-age insurance program scheduled to go into 
operation in 1942, seven years after the enactment of the Social Security Act. The Townsend 
Movement therefore continued to feed off the discontent among older Americans in economically 
unstable conditions, despite the enactment of amendments to the Social Security Act in 1939, which 
accelerated the scheduled payment of monthly benefits under the old-age insurance program, as well 
as the payment of enlarged state-level old-age pensions under Social Security’s old-age assistance 
program. The Townsend Movement continued its efforts to mobilize and organize older Americans, 
and achieved its most notable successes in California, where voters authorized a new state-funded 
old-age pension in addition to benefits created by the Social Security Act.  
By the close of the 1930s, therefore, an uneasy environment had come into being in which 
mass social discontent among many older Americans remained, despite the creation of Social 
Security and the expansion of state-level efforts to provide more economic security in old age. 
Additionally, the economic and political crisis of the 1930s had necessitated federal intervention in 
old-age economic security, as well as increased federal and state cooperation on this issue in order 
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to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the private social welfare system and extended mass 
unemployment. From these building blocks, over the course of the 1940s, the architects of the senior 
state would seek to expand Social Security into a truly comprehensive public system that would be 
at the center of the nation’s social welfare apparatus.  
In so doing, they believed the time had come for lasting reform of social welfare in the 
United States, and that the remnants of the old order – its poorhouses and its county poor farms – 
would be permanently swept away by a new, more humane system, which could preserve the 
dignity of older people without bankrupting individual families or the public treasury. To 
accomplish this goal would first require the expansion of Social Security, and second the 
cooperation of state and local officials in the administration of Social Security. The senior state in 
1939 remained half-formed and incomplete, and its future direction, liberal reformers believed, 
would naturally lead to the growing assumption by the federal government of its new-found 
responsibilities in the realm of providing sufficient security in old-age for more and more 
Americans. 
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CHAPTER II  
In Townsend’s Shadow: Reconstructing Old Age Security, 1939-1950 
 
 
On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, some of the building blocks of the senior 
state had come into being, but the coordination between federal, state, local, and private welfare 
officials that would become its hallmark remained inchoate. With the enactment of Social Security 
in 1935 and subsequent legislative amendments in 1939, the federal government had begun to play a 
role in providing old-age economic security to a degree that had not been true since its sponsorship 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of thousands of pensions for northern Civil War 
veterans. The Roosevelt administration had purchased this new role despite its costly price tag; 
namely, despite the aspirations of New Deal reform-minded liberals, the Social Security system 
remained far from universal, and its coverage and benefits remained uneven with significant 
differences among the states.1  
Moreover, the enactment of Social Security had spurred a ferocious response from much of 
the Republican Party, important segments of the business community, as well as the Townsend 
Movement and other old-age pension movements in the western United States, which had continued 
to flourish after 1935.2 Though the Social Security Act had passed constitutional muster by the 
Supreme Court in 1937, it remained unclear what the next steps in its evolution would be.3 Popular 
          
1 “Moves to Expand Old-Age Insurance,” The New York Times, August 15, 1940; Arthur J. Altmeyer, “Toward the 
Social Security Goal,” The New York Times, August 15, 1937. By October 1938, 1,722, 317 people were receiving old-
age assistance funds nationwide, or roughly 22 percent of the total population aged 65 years or older. Such old-age 
assistance funds varied widely on a state-by-state basis. In California, for example, older state residents could expect a 
relatively generous old-age assistance monthly payment of $32.65, whereas in Mississippi the monthly payment was 
just $5.65 [both figures 1938 dollars]. See “August Relief Cost Put At $259,100,000,” The New York Times, October 10, 
1938. 
2 See Russell B. Porter, “Ham and Eggs Buoys Coast Aged,” The New York Times, October 1, 1938; “$50 a Month at 
the Age of 60 Asked by Olson for California,” The New York Times, November 13, 1939. 
3 Luther A. Huston, “Social Security Grown to Giant Size in 5 Years,” The New York Times, August 11, 1940. As 
Huston wrote, “the consensus [in Washington] seems to be that expansion, rather than curtailment, will mark the future 
course of the program, although changing circumstances and the exigencies of shifting political control may bring 
alterations in the method of its administration. No one who speaks with the voice of influence has yet asserted that 
liquidation of such a concern should be attempted.” (Ibid.) 
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support for the New Deal’s reforms had begun to ebb by this time, as evidenced by the willingness 
of voters to deliver both houses of Congress back to the traditional ruling conservative coalition of 
southern Democrats and Republicans after the 1938 primary and general elections.4 Surveying the 
situation in December 1940, John Winchell Riley of the New Jersey College for Women observed 
in the New York Times that “there has been a steady relative increase in the number of older persons 
in our population…[a]nd as a nation we haven’t yet learned what to do about this. We have set up 
old-age pensions and retirement funds, and still we are plagued by the Townsend Plan and its 
variations.”5 
At the state and local level, officials wrestled with the demands of voters who continued to 
agitate for comprehensive action.6 Public opinion seemed to militate in favor of more relief for older 
people: a Gallup poll released in November 1939 revealed that 90% of surveyed voters believed in 
government old-age pensions and that Social Security benefits be made payable at age 60 rather 
than 65 (the actual threshold set by the architects of Social Security).7 Such sentiments were not 
limited to formal surveys or polls. In 1938, one million California voters supported a ballot initiative 
to pay older state residents $60 per month; likewise, in Ohio, nearly half a million voters supported 
an unsuccessful measure to pay state residents aged 60 years or more a pension of $40 per month; in 
Arkansas, the state courts vigorously debated the constitutionality of a proposed old-age pension 
plan; and in Washington state the Washington Old-Age Pension Union campaigned vigorously for 
an expansion of state welfare programs.8  
          
4 For more on the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to remake the Democratic Party during the late 1930s, see Susan 
Dunn, Roosevelt’s Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010). For the late 1930s swing to political conservatism, see Charles R. Michael, “Both Parties Hail Pension Defeats,” 
The New York Times, November 9, 1939. 
5 John Winchell Riley, “Social Changes Reflected by the Hundred Neediest,” The New York Times, December 29, 1940. 
6 Luther A. Huston, “Federal Pension Drive is Unshaken by Rebuffs,” The New York Times, November 5, 1939. 
7 “$40 a Month Held Proper Pension,” The New York Times, November 26, 1939. 
8 R.L. Duffus, “Old Age: Old Age,” The New York Times, December 17, 1939. The Washington Old-Age Pension 
Union claimed 32,000 members distributed amongst 157 locals throughout Washington State. See Russell B. Porter, 
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Feeling the budgetary pinch, state and local officials from Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New 
York pled their case in January 1938 to federal officials in Washington for further assistance with 
public assistance rolls, which had continued to rise despite the enactment of old-age and 
unemployment insurance. In New York alone, statewide relief cases had risen from 268,139 in 
November 1937 to 304,711 in December 1937.9 This increase proved especially distressing to New 
York state welfare officials, who had regarded needy persons past the age of 65 not as “permanent 
charges” but rather as individuals “who might be expected to return to self-support when jobs were 
available.”10 Further west, state officials in Wisconsin reported in the spring of 1938 that Social 
Security had failed to reduce old-age dependency and enrollment in county poor farms, where 
enrollment had remained steady at 40,000 people between 1935 and 1938.11 
The continued poor economic conditions and dependence of thousands of older people upon 
state and federal assistance thereby nudged local, state, and federal officials into close cooperation. 
In some localities like New York City and Westchester County, New York, federal funding 
accounted for 75% of all old-age assistance funds disbursed to recipients by 1941, and state and 
local officials were loath to lose access to such funds. 12 With no obvious end in sight to the 
Depression, local, state, and federal welfare officials had come to appreciate the virtues of 
cooperation, especially given the looming specter of popular discontent. Noting that New York City 
had benefitted from such cooperation, New York City Welfare Commissioner William B. Hodson 
observed in November 1937 that “the first thing that the Federal, State, and city partnership has 
          
“State Income Tax Washington Issue,” The New York Times, September 28, 1938. Explaining the group’s motivations to 
a New York Times reporter, one leader of the Washington Old-Age Pension Union stated that “we have enlisted for the 
duration of the New Deal war against poverty and unemployment.” (Ibid.). For Arkansas, see Russell B. Porter, 
“Pension Scheme Up to Arkansas Court,” The New York Times, October 15, 1938. See also Russell B. Porter, “Old-Age 
Pensions Burden Colorado,” The New York Times, October 6, 1938. 
9 Louis Stark, “Says Job Insurance Does Not Cut Relief,” The New York Times, January 20, 1938. 
10 “State Aid to Aged Up Only 8% in Year,” The New York Times, October 9, 1938. 
11 “Age Pensions Fail to Aid Poor Farms,” The New York Times, April 18, 1938. 
12 “Westchester Digs Into Relief Abuses,” The New York Times, June 8, 1941. 
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done is to enable us to care for nearly twice as many aged persons without any increase in the sum 
appropriated by the city.” 13  Indeed, New York City benefitted as well from generous W.P.A. 
allocations, which ensured that over 80,000 older New York City residents – almost entirely 
workers aged forty years and older – remained employed on the W.P.A.’s rolls.14  
The growing alliance among public welfare officials on the local, state, and federal level – at 
least on the question of old-age economic security – also drew strength from the refusal by some 
surviving private welfare agencies to offer much assistance to the destitute elderly. As William H. 
Matthews, the director of New York’s Community Service Society observed in April 1939, “[the] 
private agencies were doing little to aid the aged because they regarded them as a government 
responsibility.”15 In New York State, at least, private welfare agencies had considered public old-
age pensions to have released them from their obligations to the elderly poor; the long-established 
Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor, in particular, had previously celebrated the 
enactment of New York State’s old age pension in 1931 as a tremendous lightening of the financial 
burdens it faced in trying to assist the growing population of needy elderly people in the state.16 The 
enactment of Social Security and the assumption by the federal government of these burdens further 
shifted the responsibility away from private welfare agencies and local authorities, who seemed 
relieved and delighted by the federal largesse.17  
In sum, some of the senior state’s elements were becoming more coherent. On the one hand, 
there was now newly created federal authority and funding for old-age economic relief; on the other 
          
13 “Security Funds Aid City’s Aged Relief,” The New York Times, November 7, 1937. 
14 “Half on WPA Rolls in City Over 40 Years Old; Age a Problem in Return to Private Jobs,” The New York Times, 
February 16, 1939. Before the WPA and the enactment of Social Security, city officials in New York had contended 
with hundreds of older people trying on a daily basis to claim public assistance. See “460 in Day Ask Old-Age Relief,” 
The New York Times, September 12, 1930 and “264 Seek Old Age Relief in Day,” The New York Times, September 25, 
1930. 
15 “Old-Age Relief Barred to Many: 1,800 Entitled to Help Are Affected by City’s Failure to Provide Funds,” The New 
York Times, April 15, 1939. 
16 “Old-Age Relief Law Aids Charity Groups,” The New York Times, July 20, 1931. 
17 “State Gets 2,000,000 for Social Security,” The New York Times, June 3, 1936. 
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hand, this new federal funding soon found its way to existing state and local welfare offices and 
programs, though this interaction between federal, state, and local authorities was probably most 
apparent in New York City.18 Yet the range of problems faced by the elderly that were addressed by 
this growing cooperation remained limited: older people were still primarily a budgetary problem, 
and the best solution to that problem remained finding a way to support them that did not bankrupt 
the state or threaten to rob self-dignity away from now indigent but formerly middle-class older 
people. Other issues such as ensuring access to regular medical care or long-term assisted care were 
scarcely mentioned.  
The development of the senior state thus was uneven during the 1940s, both in terms of 
geography (New York City and California already had an extensive public welfare system, but 
Louisiana and Mississippi did not), funding, and range of services.19 These limitations were not 
necessarily seen as permanent features; indeed, welfare officials and academic experts confidently 
assumed that Social Security’s further expansion would take place in due time, and that the issue of 
providing economic security in old-age would become the near-exclusive provenance of public 
welfare, with issues of funding, responsibility and administration divvied up among local, state, and 
federal authorities. But the failure to expand Social Security and the continuing inadequacy of 
Social Security, state old-age pensions, and other extant mechanisms for providing economic 
security in old age would necessitate public welfare authorities reaching out to their private sector 
counterparts in order to supplying assistance to vulnerable elderly people. 
In late November 1945, the New York Times held a radio forum on the needs of older people 
in New York City. The program, which was broadcast live throughout the five boroughs, gathered a 
          
18 Besides the availability of federal funds, state and local authorities also benefitted from newly-available data collected 
and provided by the Social Security Board that helped them to prevent “chiseling” (i.e. people filing for duplicative 
forms of assistance that they may or may have been entitled to receive). See “Localities to Get U.S. Pension Data,” The 
New York Times, December 21, 1939. 
19 “Asks Sliding Scale for Old-Age Relief,” The New York Times, June 5, 1939. 
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variety of social welfare experts and public officials, some of whom were battle-tested veterans of 
the New Deal while others were still fresh from the halls of academia. The panelists suggested that 
the needs of older people could not be met solely by increasing their economic security and 
purchasing power as mass consumers.20 Instead, older people wanted “better housing facilities,” 
“more recreational facilities,” and “a new public attitude recognizing their individuality” in order to 
make their lives worthy of being lengthened.21  
Such concerns were both longstanding and novel: on the one hand, rising public disgust at 
the condition of public poorhouses had helped lay the groundwork for the rise of the old-age 
pension movement in the 1930s; on the other, the interest in “recreational facilities” and a new 
public attitude towards the elderly were two issues that had not previously been a major subject of 
concern for either old-age pension advocates or their opponents. The Townsend Movement had 
primarily conceived of the elderly as an overlooked audience of citizens and consumers who, if 
given sufficient purchasing power via pensions, would be able to initiate a virtuous economic cycle 
in which their spending would stimulate new sources of market demand for consumer goods while 
simultaneously ensuring that new jobs for younger Americans would be available, either due to 
economic expansion or because such positions had been vacated by now-pensioned elderly people.  
While this emphasis on the elderly as consumers did not dissipate entirely in the postwar era, 
social workers, public welfare officials and academic experts increasingly focused on the elderly as 
a group of individuals who merited the expansion of social service programs and agencies in both 
the private and public sectors. This long-term shift away from considering the elderly solely as 
economic actors was partly a delayed reaction to one of the major grievances of the Townsend 
Movement and other old-age advocacy groups: namely, that if the elderly lacked sufficient 
          
20 “Needs of Aged Stressed: Better Housing and Recreation Asked on Radio Forum,” The New York Times, November 
28, 1945. 
21 Ibid. 
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economic power, they would also lose social stature in time. To turn Linda Gordon’s phrase, the 
elderly supporters of Dr. Townsend wanted to be entitled but not pitied: they wanted guaranteed 
old-age pensions as well as respect from other, younger members of American society. The repeated 
defeats of the Townsend Movement at the national level had not eradicated this desire. If anything, 
it had shifted it to the state and local levels, where the intense struggle over public and private 
provision for the elderly would heat up to a degree in the late 1940s that it had not reached since the 
nadir of the Great Depression in 1933.  
In particular, these debates would increasingly occupy center stage in three separate arenas: 
academia, national politics, and labor-management relations, and ultimately, they would help to 
catalyze the construction of the senior state at the local and state levels of government  by a 
coalition of elected officials, voluntary welfare organizations, and other interested parties who 
wanted to ensure social stability by providing the elderly with a role in society that did not impinge 
too heavily upon the ability of private employers to nudge workers toward retirement or place the 
public treasury in too great a danger of imminent bankruptcy due to unsustainable pensions. 
Essentially, during the 1940s, the sluggish, limited reforms made at the national level and the high 
stakes clashes between organized labor and corporate management eventually helped facilitate the 
haphazard creation of new programs for older Americans at the state and local levels. As I will 
address more fully in a subsequent chapter, these efforts were most pronounced in localities like 
New York City, where city and state officials grew increasingly concerned that the growing 
population of older people represented an unsustainable financial burden upon local welfare 
resources. In response, New York officials sought new solutions to the problem of old-age poverty 
including the construction of subsidized public housing and enactment of legislation to curb age-
based discrimination in employment in New York State. Similar efforts were undertaken elsewhere 
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– particularly in California, which, like New York, had a large resident concentrated population of 
older people that dwarfed the population of numerous other U.S. states.22  
Back to the States 
In order to understand the development of the senior state at the local and state levels of 
government, though, it is necessary to put it within the context of larger national politics. Ironically, 
the failed efforts at the national level during the 1940s to enact national health insurance, along with 
slow, piecemeal expansions of Social Security, helped to broaden and transform the policy agenda 
for older Americans sought by the emerging coalition of academic experts, elected officials, and 
voluntary organizations. Previously, long-time old-age pension advocacy groups as varied as 
Abraham Epstein’s American Association for Social Security and the Townsend Movement had 
emphasized the enactment of old-age pensions as a panacea which would eradicate old-age poverty 
while guaranteeing true economic security and protection from the vicissitudes of old-age, 
disability, and unemployment. The enactment of Social Security in 1935 and its accelerated rollout 
in 1940 offered partial relief on this issue.  
However, rising health care costs greatly strained the ability of many older people to pay for 
such care, and the Social Security Act’s prohibition against its funds being used to pay for costs 
associated with lodging in public poorhouse left them, their families, and their communities with 
          
22 In 1950, New York City’s total population stood at 7.9 million people. (Source: Office of the New York State 
Comptroller, Division of Local Government Services & Economic Development, “Population Trends in New York 
State’s Cities,” December 2004, Albany, NY: New York State Comptroller’s Office; URL: 
http://www.esf.edu/cue/documents/pop_trends.pdf, accessed March 1, 2017). Of that 7.9 million, 7.5% of New York 
City’s population was over the age of 65, and therefore had a resident elderly population of approximately 600,000 
people. (Source: New York City Department of City Planning, December 2006, New York City Population Projections 
by Age/Sex & Borough, 2000-2030, pg. 10; URL: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-
population/projections_briefing_booklet.pdf accessed March 1, 2017). New York City’s elderly population in 1950 
exceeded the total population of seven individual states, and was comparable in size to the total population of Buffalo, 
New York and New Orleans, Louisiana. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1951, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1951; source URL: 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1951/compendia/1951statab.html, accessed March 1, 2017). For more on 
housing for the elderly initiatives in New York City, see Lawrence O’Kane, “Hospitals Urged to House Aging,” The 
New York Times, May 8, 1960; “State-Aid Housing Must Take in Aged,” The New York Times, November 26, 1951.  
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limited options.23 Increasingly, during the 1940s and into the 1950s, the main objectives sought by 
the senior state’s architects broadened to include both income and health security in old age. Other 
goals – including better housing, access to adult education programs, and expansion of long-term 
care facilities – would eventually become part of this agenda, as city and local officials debated how 
best to provide government services to older people in a way that did not debase them by appearing 
to be undeserved charity. Taken collectively, these goals added up to a dedicated effort to secure the 
economic and social independence of older people without sacrificing other social welfare 
objectives.  
In essence, the senior state’s creators sought to enact a broad agenda that would prevent the 
needy elderly from becoming “dependent” upon public assistance, but to do so in a way that did not 
place too onerous a burden upon limited local and state resources. In this pursuit, they would be 
only partially successful, and would turn to other community and voluntary organizations such as 
private philanthropies and organized labor to help fund and administer local initiatives.24 In areas 
where state and local officials could find and establish strong partnerships, such as New York City 
and Chicago, these efforts were relatively successful. In other, less developed parts of the country – 
          
23 For more on Social Security’s connection to poorhouse funding, see Carole Haber and Brian Gratton, Old Age and the 
Search for Security: An American Social History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 132. For more 
information about the impact of rising health care costs on the economic resources of older people before the enactment 
of Medicare in 1965, see Elizabeth A. Longford, “Medical Care Costs for the Aged: First Findings of the 1963 Survey 
of the Aged,” Social Security Bulletin, July 1964, 1-8. Available at: 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v27n7/v27n7p3.pdf (Accessed March 1, 2017). The leading factor in rising health 
care costs for older people was short-term hospitalization, which included charges made by hospitals but not by 
physicians or surgeons. Self-reported data collected by the Social Security Administration revealed that “almost a fourth 
of the aged couples had at least, one member hospitalized, and nearly 15 percent of the non-married persons reported at 
least one stay in a general or other short-stay (special) hospital. In numbers, these two groups totaled about 2.5 million 
aged units. Nearly 640,000-just about 1 in 4 of the hospitalized units-turned to public assistance or some other agency 
for help in meeting the costs of needed care.” (Ibid., 7). 
24 In New York City, welfare officials began to work more closely in the early 1950s with the Community Service 
Society to promote new community and recreational centers in the state designed specifically for older people as well as 
public housing designated for older city residents. The William Hodson Recreation Center in the Bronx was perhaps the 
most prominent example of a successful recreation center for older people in New York City. See Warren Moscow, 
“Community Study of Aged Stressed,” The New York Times, April 20, 1950. State and city officials also explored 
expansion of the city’s Day Centers for the Aging and to remove limitations on the amount of public housing units that 
could be set aside for the elderly. See “Age Job Bias Law Urged for State,” The New York Times, December 15, 1950. 
See also “State Bills Stress Problems of Aging,” The New York Times, February 15, 1952. 
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in particular, much of the American South – such efforts were much more limited, and Social 
Security’s old age assistance program remained the primary source of publicly available old-age 
economic support. This turn to local solutions and improvisations, though, drew much of its urgency 
from the underdevelopment of the Social Security system and the failure to enact national health 
insurance in the late 1940s, a turn of events that led local and state officials to seek alternative 
arrangements.  
The senior state’s evolution during the 1940s and 1950s, was unexpected, given the 
trajectory which New Deal (and later Fair Deal) liberals had originally hoped for during World War 
II and in the immediate aftermath of the war. For their part, New Deal reformers continued to hope 
that a more complete expansion of the Social Security Act’s old-age social insurance provisions 
would permanently put the issue of economic insecurity in old age to rest. Elite opinion reflected 
this worry. When the first Social Security checks were mailed in February 1940, the New York 
Times commented that  
Yesterday, when elderly men and women who had established their 
claims received their first checks from the Government, the Federal 
old-age pension system was launched in earnest. It is a curious fact 
that, though, the legislation establishing the plan was passed nearly 
five years ago, and though tax payments have been building up the 
reserves for it for three years, the Townsendites, ham-and-eggers and 
other old age pension extremists have been conducting their 
propaganda just as if no such actual plan were in existence or in 
contemplation. The actual flow of checks, let us hope, will bring this 
situation to an end, and future discussion will recognize the realities.25 
 
Essentially, the Times considered the subject of old-age pensions to be settled, and that Social 
Security’s enactment and its implementation to have been the final word on the matter. Yet there 
were nagging hints that the Times had been perhaps overly optimistic in its 1940 assessment of the 
situation. A year later, the Times conceded in a July 1941 editorial that “no doubt it would be a 
          
25 “Old-Age Checks Flow Out,” The New York Times, February 2, 1940. 
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better country if all elderly Americans enjoyed economic security without being obligated to their 
children. But until the Hitler problem is disposed of the country can bear up under the reproach that 
a considerable number of elderly Americans…have to turn for help to a son or go to live with a 
married daughter.”26 
The NRPB and the Senior State 
As its own editorial suggested, the New York Times believed that resolving the issue of old-
age pensions would need to be postponed until global affairs were more tranquil. Even though the 
United States was not officially at war when the Times published its editorial on old-age pensions in 
1941, the Roosevelt administration had already begun the process of ramping up defense 
production, which resulted in plummeting unemployment rates. As the acrimonious pre-war debates 
about social policy increasingly took a backseat to wartime preparations, the Roosevelt 
administration kept an eye on the need to plan for the postwar period. In September 1941, the New 
York Times reported on the activities of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), a small 
advisory council originally established in 1939 by the Roosevelt administration. In its initial reports, 
the NRPB argued for the need to plan for full employment, but to do so in a way that would not 
require “the aged” to work, should they so desire to leave the workforce.27 Sparse details were 
supplied to the Times’s reporter about how the NRPB planned to provide for elderly people who no 
longer wished to work but did not want to starve, either. 
In the coming months, the NRPB and the Roosevelt administration began to fill in some of 
the details. At the end of September 1941, President Roosevelt announced his intention to “send a 
special message to Congress soon requesting that the social security program be enlarged to provide 
          
26 “Topics of the Times,” The New York Times, July 16, 1941. 
27 Ibid. 
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protection for a much greater number of individuals than are now covered.”28 In what would later 
become a catechism of postwar liberalism, the Roosevelt administration asked for favorable 
Congressional action to expand Social Security to include more workers, and also asked for 
Congress to expand Social Security’s old-age assistance program to raise the pensions received by 
elderly residents of poorer, more rural (and generally Southern) states.29 
Congress, though, declined the President’s request. The regnant conservative coalition on 
Capitol Hill saw no reason to act favorably on the President’s message, and instead ignored it. The 
President chose not to press Congress on the subject, opting to defer the matter to another day. 
Roosevelt’s cautious approach to Congress did not seem to alarm liberals, some of whom boldly 
believed and hoped that a return to the New Deal’s reforming heyday was at hand. Boldly setting 
forth “the outlines of an expanded program,” first and second generation New Dealers like Arthur J. 
Altmeyer, I.S. Falk, and Wilbur J. Cohen, seized upon Franklin Roosevelt’s words in 1942 reaffirm 
the necessity of social security. Prophetically, though, this coterie of New Dealers argued that 
Social security cannot be achieved wholly by formal, government 
disciplines just as it cannot be achieved wholly without those 
disciplines. The failure of non-governmental programs of social 
security to meet the major depression of the early 1930’s must not be 
accepted as indicating they have no place at all in the American way 
of life. As a matter of fact, attention should be drawn to the fact that 
the possibilities of encouraging and fostering group programs of 
social security have been almost completely overlooked in the 
landslide of legislation and administration which has resulted from the 
great depression.30  
 
By acknowledging that “non-governmental programs of social security” should have a role in the 
“American way of life,” these New Deal liberals were extending an olive branch to voluntary 
organizations and charities, though it was predicated upon the understanding that a broader social 
          
28 “Roosevelt Would Spread Aid to More Under Security Act,” The New York Times, October 1, 1941. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Smith Simpson, “Fundamental Princples,” Ch. 1 in Wilbur J. Cohen and Arthur J. Altmeyer, eds. War and Post-War 
Social Security (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), 2. 
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security system would be first among equals in the postwar social welfare order. As the authors of 
War and Post-War Social Security noted, “security in the availability of employment is the heart of 
the security problem. If the problem of maximum production is solved, most of the other social 
problems of security are capable of solution. If the problem of full employment cannot be solved, 
none of the others can be adequately solved.”31 Fatefully, the problem of “full employment” would 
only be partially solved.32 Despite spirited attempts by liberals in Congress to enact legislation that 
would provide for a broad expansion of Social Security as well as meaningful federal guarantees of 
full employment, such attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, and the development of Social 
Security into a broader program was in essence halted.33 
This turn of events, though, was scarcely foreseen by liberals during World War II, who 
confidently assumed that the Roosevelt administration would ultimately throw its considerable 
weight behind a concerted effort to expand Social Security and other elements of the New Deal’s 
reform agenda. The NRPB’s increasingly numerous reports urging the postwar establishment of “a 
new bill of rights” including “the right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, 
dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident” probably lent considerable weight to this 
belief.34 In particular, the reports, while bearing the imprint of the entire board, were in reality 
largely the work of Dr. Eveline Burns, a British émigré and trained economist who had been a 
professor of social work at Columbia University. Burns, who had also served on the 1934 
          
31 Ibid., 3. 
32 The most authoritative treatment of the failure to enact full employment during the postwar era is Margaret Weir’s 
Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
33  Chapter 3: The Third Round, 1943-1950, in Peter Corning, The Evolution of Medicare, 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap3.html (accessed October 1, 2016). 
34 “Predicts Doubling of 45-64 Age Group,” The New York Times, July 29, 1940; “New Bill of Rights is Urged For 
Peace,” The New York Times, November 15, 1942; John MacCormac, “Wider Social Security A Major Roosevelt Aim: 
Prospects of Expanded Benefits are Uncertain in the New Congress,” The New York Times, December 20, 1942; 
“Federal Aide Asks End of Want Here: Dr. Eveline Burns Urges Social Security Plan to ‘Implement Ideal of Freedom,” 
The New York Times, February 25, 1943. 
 119 
 
Committee on Economic Security which had been responsible for the authorship of the original 
Social Security Act, had been deeply influenced and impressed by the development of the British 
welfare state, and believed that the time was opportune for the United States to adopt broader social 
welfare policies to secure and strengthen the New Deal’s promise of economic security.35  
From her position as the chief of the NRPB’s Economic Security and Health Section, Burns 
was ultimately responsible for the NRPB’s most important report, entitled “Security, Work, and 
Relief Policies,” released in 1942. “Security, Work, and Relief Policies” proposed a sweeping 
reconstruction of the American welfare state in a manner similar to the framework drawn up in the 
United Kingdom by Lord William Beveridge, an academic economist and social reformer. The 
Beveridge Report was released in November 1942 and quickly enjoyed substantial support from the 
British public, who viewed the Report’s proposed reforms as a worthy future reward for the trials 
and travails of wartime Britain. 
The American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) cautiously added its voice to the NRPB’s. 
A.F.L. President William Green increasingly began to sound the alarm that “an inadequate social 
security program would mean that at least one-half of the population would be ‘on the dole,’” a 
message which was soon echoed by voluntary organizations in New York and elsewhere.36 In a 
lengthy January 1943 letter to the editor of the New York Times, W.H. Matthews, the Director of the 
Community Service Society of New York, expressed similar arguments, observing that 
[a]s our national security administrators and others who sit in high 
places plan for a society where security shall be assured to every one 
[sic] in this world from ‘the cradle to the grave’ one can but wish that 
they would come down to earth long enough to make life a bit more 
          
35 I rely here on Landon Storrs’ discussion of Burns in The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left, 
26. 
36 “A.F.L. Favors Rise in Security Taxes: Green Indicates Stand for 10% if Congress Adapts Federation’s Objectives,” 
The New York Times, January 21, 1943. 
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livable to our present aged people…The vision of future Utopias 
should not blind us to unjust, harmful realities of the present.37 
 
Matthews and other leaders of private voluntary organizations did not have to wait much longer to 
find out just what the “national security administrators and others who sit in high places” had 
planned for American society.  
Unlike the positive response that Lord Beveridge’s plan had received in Britain, though, the 
NRPB’s report met with a cool reaction from the Roosevelt administration, which released it 
without much fanfare in March 1943.38 It was perhaps unsurprising that the response from both 
Congress and the general public was decidedly underwhelming. Moreover, the Congress that 
received the NRPB’s report, though, was a far different beast than the one which had ratified the 
Social Security Act in 1935. In 1942, conservative southern Democrats and Republicans had scored 
important victories in the midterm elections held that year, which had simultaneously weakened the 
administration’s ability to push for more liberal domestic legislation and increased its dependence 
upon southern Democrats for passage of defense spending and other measures related to American 
involvement in World War II. Energized congressional conservatives had succeeded in pressuring 
the Roosevelt administration to dismantle the celebrated Work Projects Administration (W.P.A.) 
even before the new Congress met in January 1943, and had their eyes set on eliminating other New 
Deal agencies and programs.39 Though the NRPB was a small agency, its ideological kinship with 
the New Deal’s reformist impulse made it a prominent target for members of Congress who were 
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York Times, January 23, 1943. 
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eager to remove and dismantle any New Deal programs which envisioned a continuing role for the 
federal government to play in planning the nation’s political economy.  
Consequently, when Congress did eventually respond to the NRPB’s reports, it acted not to 
implement them but rather to cut the NRPB’s funding down to the bone.40 As the New Yokr Times 
noted in its coverage of Congress’s response, “the temper of Congress is such that it is in revolt 
against what it calls “government by directive.”41 Within a month of FDR’s transmission of the 
NRPB’s report, the NRPB was engaged in a fight for its very existence. The House of 
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee had voted to eliminate its funding in February; now the 
Senate appeared to be poised to concur with that action.42 Ultimately, the Senate relented, but only 
partially; instead of its previous annual appropriation of $1.4 million, the NRPB would now have to 
make do with $200,000 instead. 43  Having narrowly escaped the fate of the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), the NRPB thereafter pressed on, now significantly emaciated for lack of 
funds and muscular support from the Roosevelt administration, which seemed almost too eager at 
times to bury and forget the half-dead agency.44 
The Townsend Movement, Redux 
As Congress moved to squelch the NRPB, developments elsewhere in the nation were 
bearing out the warnings sounded earlier by the A.F.L. and other organizations with a vested stake 
in seeing the federal government make significant improvements to the nation’s social security 
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system. In the ten years since the emergence of the Townsend Movement in 1935, California had 
remained a focal point in the struggle by the Townsendites and other old-age pension advocacy 
movements to enact a state-level old-age pension. 45  This continuing struggle remained largely 
confined to California, but it continued to attract attention from concerned observers that successful 
enactment of an overly generous old-age pension in California might inspire older people in other 
states to organize and campaign for similar measures elsewhere.46 After repeated defeats at the 
ballot box between 1938 and 1942, California’s motley coalition of old-age pension advocacy 
groups shifted tactics and instead worked to exert pressure on the state’s legislators to improve the 
state’s old-age pension system.  
These efforts succeeded in May 1943, when the California Legislature approved a bill that 
increased the state’s monthly pension maximum by roughly 25%, from $40 to $50 per month.47 
Governor Earl Warren signed the measure into law, but the state’s organized and still-restive old-
age pension movement remained unsatisfied with the improvements. This development served only 
to fuel the fears of the state’s political establishment, which remained seriously concerned that the 
state would have to face once more the return of a Townsend Movement-style political drama.48 
          
45 Besides the Townsend Movement, the most significant old-age pension movement in California during the 1930s was 
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University Press, 1970), 130. This policy in turn “made many more persons eligible for pensions and kept the rolls 
 123 
 
Their fears were well-grounded. By late October 1943, California was paying approximately 
$90,000,000 per year (approximately $1.2 billion in 2016 dollars) to support its needy aged citizens, 
a sum that greatly exceeded that spent by New York State or Ohio, both of which were more 
populous than California.49 Moreover, the wartime tightening of the labor market in California had 
had only a limited effect on lowering the demand for old-age pensions. In December 1941, 158,723 
elderly Californians had received old age pensions; this figure had dropped to 151,412 in May 1943, 
but had rebounded back up to 153,412 by October 1943, and was continuing to rise.50 A year later in 
October 1944, California voters defeated an attempt by re-organized members of the Townsend 
Movement to enact a new, higher pension for citizens aged 60 or over that would have provided a 
guaranteed $60 per month, largely due to the pension’s proposed funding mechanism, which would 
have instituted a new 3 percent gross income tax.51 
California was not the only place in which signs of restlessness among organized old-age 
groups were becoming more apparent. Back on the East Coast, the Welfare Council of New York 
City had reported in June 1943 that “a half million aged persons in New York are being neglected,” 
and that old-age assistance monthly cash grants were continuing to rise due to the city’s increasing 
elderly population. 52  Thus far, this growing population of “neglected” elderly people had not 
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attempted to organize and press for a more generous old-age pension – as had happened in 
California – but it remained an issue of concern.  
As the A.F.L. had predicted before the submission of the NRPB’s report to Congress, 
though, the problem of old-age economic dependency was already reasserting itself. While the 
heightened demand for labor during World War II provided older Americans, especially those still 
in or trying to re-enter the workforce, with unexpectedly bountiful employment opportunities, it had 
only obscured for a time the fundamental weaknesses of the Social Security system in providing 
adequate income maintenance to older people.53 Evidence of the temporary effect of labor shortage 
during World War II on employment patterns among older men were revealed in a postwar report 
produced by the U.S. Department of Labor.  Between 1890 and 1940, the percentage of older men 
aged 65 and over in the workforce had declined from nearly 70 percent to just over 40 percent. But 
between 1940 and 1945, this figure rose back to 50 percent, and then resumed its long-term decline. 
By 1950, the figure had dropped once more to approximately 45 percent.54  
Additionally, of the approximately 825,000 men over the age of 65 who were eligible to 
receive Social Security benefits in 1941, 585,000 – roughly 71.1% of the total – had deferred 
acceptance of Social Security in order to remain at their jobs, suggesting that most eligible older 
men preferred to remain employed full-time rather than retire and receive Social Security 
payments. 55  Even though the Roosevelt administration had set the NRPB’s report aside, its 
arguments reflected just how dramatically participation in World War II had altered perceptions of 
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the American economy. Instead of the “mature” economy thesis which had formed the central 
assumption of many New Dealers during the Great Depression, the NRPB’s members optimistically 
reported instead that the United States could “plan for a dynamic expanding economy on the order 
of 100 to 125 billions national income…It has taken total war to reveal to us the capacity of our 
production machine, once it is fully energized…Little vision is required to see that our production 
machine can be made to produce plenty for peace as well as plenty for war.”56 As part of its broad 
set of proposals to the President, the NRPB recommended “extension of coverage of Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance and continuing efforts to provide more adequate minimum benefits” as well as 
the “creation of an adequate general public assistance system through Federal financial aid for 
general relief available to the States on an equalizing basis and accompanied by Federal 
standards.”57  
Implicitly, these recommendations recognized and acknowledged the deficiencies of the 
Social Security system as it then existed: namely, it did not cover enough people, and the people 
who were eligible to receive support from it did not receive nearly enough to sustain meaningful 
economic security. As the NRPB had noted in the “Equal Access to Economic Security” section of 
its 1943 report, “although social insurance programs now protect a substantial proportion of the 
population against loss of income due to temporary or permanent impairment of earning power, we 
have failed to make full use of this convenient and popular security device.”58 In other words, the 
federal government was doing relatively little to combat economic insecurity in old age, despite the 
fact that such a goal had been at the heart of the New Deal’s rhetoric to boost collective economic 
security through the use of state power. 
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Perhaps aware of this discrepancy, Roosevelt had publicly shied away from further specific 
comment on the NRPB’s fate or the broader subject of economic security until January 1944, when 
he publicly committed himself once more to using the federal government’s resources to wage the 
great fight for economic security for all Americans, including the elderly.59 In his 1944 State of the 
Union Address, in which he famously called for a second Bill of Rights focused on economic 
security, Roosevelt pointedly listed “the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old 
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment” as one of the key rights and “economic truths” which 
he described as “self-evident.”60 While soaring in rhetoric, the President’s words failed to have 
much of an effect on Congress, which continued to ignore the President’s proposals. By the time of 
the President’s death in April 1945, the fate of his proposed second Bill of Rights remained opaque 
at best.  
What was becoming clear in the months that followed was that the return of peace also 
meant the return of unemployment for millions of surplus war workers, who were no longer 
necessary to keep the blast furnace of industrial production burning at a feverish pace. 61  The 
underdevelopment of Social Security as a mechanism for preventing economic insecurity – and 
thereby arresting the impoverishment of older people who were no longer actively employed – was 
becoming obvious by 1946.62 Only 33 per cent of the aged in the United States could be classified 
as self-supporting; the remainder was “either helped or supported by relatives and friends and by 
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public agencies or private philanthropy…most homes for the aged, both private and public, have 
staggering waiting lists.”63 That figure of dependent elderly people was the same as it had been in 
1941, when Social Security was entering its first year of operation, and its persistence suggested that 
Social Security was having a marginal effect at best on lessening poverty among older people.64 
In response to this fact finding, public attention began to turn once more to the issue of how 
to best preserve the economic security of older Americans. At times, these discussions took on 
alarmist tones. The New York Times portrayed the growing number of older people as a looming 
threat to the vitality of American society. This threat was the prospect of a rapidly aging population, 
courtesy of “a comparatively slow population growth,” which could lead to population decline in 
the long-term.65 The Times, though, was not alone in fearing the worst if nothing was done. As J.C. 
Capt, the Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, warned in 1946, “the principal change will be 
in the character of the dependency problem rather than its size. The shift from young-age to old-age 
dependency calls for careful planning of ways and means to discharge the altered responsibility 
efficiently, economically, and equitably.”66 In order to prevent “the dependency problem” from 
metastasizing, Capt urged the adoption of “programs of retraining for older workers, special job 
placement services, and possibly publicity campaigns aimed at fuller utilization of this segment of 
the labor supply.”67 In addition, as the Times editorialized in December 1946, “the present [social 
security] system needs a fundamental overhauling to make it universally operative on a basis that 
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will enable aged persons to retire and keep body and soul together without the humiliation of 
applying for supplementary relief.”68 In its annual report two months later, the Social Security 
Board concurred with the Times’s findings, and urged Congress to extend Social Security to more 
workers and make its provisions more generous.69 
Congress’s response was to increase the amount of aid funneled to poorer states under Social 
Security’s old age assistance provisions. While this action benefitted largely rural and Southern 
states, it did little to help California or other states facing a restive and resurgent old-age pension 
movement.70 The unresolved impasse over providing economic security in old age through Social 
Security and other public means soon contributed to the resumption of protracted conflict in labor-
management relations, which organized labor had, under duress from the federal government, 
largely suspended during the course of World War II. Walter Reuther and other labor leaders had 
labored mightily to navigate the perilous shoals of public opinion, the wartime Roosevelt 
administration, and newly energized corporate management as they tried to ensure that workers in 
the wartime labor force received a fair return for their efforts.71 The holding pattern which resulted 
lasted for the duration of the war, as organized labor feared alienating its sometime allies in the 
Roosevelt administration by risking any sort of large-scale action to demand higher wages or better 
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compensation. Such concerns were deferred, a development that would later come back to haunt 
Reuther and other labor leaders. 
Postwar Developments 
The political and social situation during the first few postwar years therefore remained 
fragile. At the national level, both labor and management had benefitted from the ramped up 
defense needs of the nation during World War II, but business had arguably benefitted more because 
it had been able to restore much of its ability to shape the currents of American politics. Moreover, 
the impasse at the national level over programs like Social Security merely meant that the still 
unresolved issue of economic insecurity – especially for older Americans – was left at the doorstep 
of individual states, local communities, and other actors, of which the organized labor movement 
was the most prominent.  As J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton University economist and one of the 
chief architects of the 1935 Social Security Act argued in a 1946 interview with the New York 
Times, “the great cause of bitterness in labor relations today was not wages as such, but the sense of 
insecurity felt by workers as human beings.”72 According to Brown, “problems such as sickness 
benefits, medical care, pension plans and dismissal payments remain fundamental causes of rancor 
in bargaining negotiations, despite the Government’s social security program.”73 
Deeply cognizant of the very real limitations of Social Security to promote broad economic 
security, various factions within the organized labor movement attempted to use their newly 
strengthened position within the nation’s political economy to push for a more fully developed 
welfare state, the broad contours of which had been outlined by Franklin Roosevelt and other New 
Dealers. Despite unprecedented membership strength, organized labor’s ability to challenge the 
wartime alliance forged between the federal government and a revitalized business community was 
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considerably more limited than labor leaders probably wished it to be.74 Sensing that the political 
winds were shifting after the end of World War II, Walter Reuther and other labor leaders publicly 
made the case for higher wages as a necessary component of the nation’s political economy to 
ensure that mass purchasing power would not be weakened, lest the factors which had made the 
Depression possible begin to take root once more.75  
Moreover, “the wartime economic experience had discredited the Depression-era idea that 
the U.S. economy had become ‘stagnant’ or ‘mature’ and replaced such pessimism with a vision of 
limitless postwar growth.”76 As Robert M. Collins has written: 
The coming of World War II resolved the ambivalence of the 
Depression era, tipping the balance decisively away from the 
economics of scarcity and toward economic expansion. The goals of 
balance and recovery gave way to the pursuit of all-out production 
and full employment.77 
 
In other words, the economic conditions that had contributed to the on and off partnership between 
organized labor and the New Deal had been replaced by a political order in which organized labor, 
which had benefitted from the New Deal’s emphasis on restoring “balance” in arranging the 
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nation’s political economy, now faced a world in which the need for such balance seemed far less 
compelling or necessary. Realizing that their window of political opportunity was swiftly closing, 
Reuther, Philip Murray, and other labor leaders struggled mightily to forge a tripartite pact between 
the federal government, labor, and corporate management, which would stabilize relations among 
the three and make it possible to create “the sort of democratic corporatism that came to characterize 
countries like Austria, Sweden, and Germany in the 1950s and 1960s.”78 This pact, which Reuther 
eagerly yearned for, did not materialize, in part because of divisions among trade unionists, and also 
because the administration of President Harry S. Truman offered lukewarm support at best to this 
effort, a reflection of the administration’s frustration with organized labor after a series of strikes 
shook the nation between 1945 and 1946.79 
Above all else, the strident opposition of corporate America prevented the 
institutionalization of an American form of democratic corporatism in the late 1940s. As Nelson 
Lichtenstein has observed, 
The CIO had profoundly misjudged the tenor of the postwar business 
community. The progressive industrialists with whom the industrial 
union federation hoped to achieve an accord…were in fact a relative 
uninfluential minority. Key business spokesmen were the practical 
conservatives who presided over the core manufacturing firms in 
steel, chemical, electrical, auto, rubber, and transport 
industries…These industrialists had emerged from the war with 
enormous sophistication and self-confidence…They felt little need for 
the kind of state-sponsored labor-management collaboration that 
          
78 Ibid., pg. 226. See also Kevin Boyle’s analysis of this period in his The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 
1945-1968 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pgs. 1-9, which, while partly agreeing with Lichtenstein’s analysis 
of Walter Reuther and the UAW in The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit also challenges it by positing that “Walter 
Reuther and his supporters…were not the harbingers of the postwar liberal order but rather the inheritors of the social 
democratic ideological and political formations Steve Fraser has so effectively traced for the 1930s and early 1940s. The 
UAW leadership did not abandon this social democratic agenda in the late 1940s. On the contrary, Reuther and the 
UAW leadership continued to promote democratic economic planning and an expanded welfare state throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. They did so, moreover, at the highest levels of government.” (Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of 
American Liberalism, 4). In Boyle’s interpretation, it is the continuing power of Southern Democrats and their ability to 
neuter or outright block progressive legislation sponsored by a UAW unhappily housed within the same umbrella of the 
Democratic Party which was largely responsible for the UAW’s valiant but ill-fated attempts to  successfully advance a 
social democratic policy agenda. (Ibid., 5). 
79 Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, pg. 227. 
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helped legitimize a mixed capitalist economy in Germany, France, 
and Italy in the immediate postwar era.80 
 
Flush with confidence and enjoying a near-miraculous rejuvenation in their fortunes not seen since 
before the onset of the Great Depression, most corporate leaders saw no reason to parley with 
Reuther, Murray, or any other labor leader. Instead, “executives of corporations at the core of 
American industry sought the restoration of the managerial prerogatives that wartime conditions had 
eroded in the areas of product pricing, market allocation, and shop-floor work environment.”81 
Consequently, “they were intensely suspicious of the kind of New Deal social engineering favored 
by labor, and only with some reluctance did they accommodate themselves to the modest degree of 
economic stimulation that would later go by the name “commercial Keynesianism.”82  
Instead, corporate leaders sought to “be free of government or union interference in 
determining the wage-price relationship in each industry.”83 Eager to avoid being in situation where 
a savvy labor union leader like Reuther would have a real say in setting the terms of the “wage-price 
relationship,” corporations like General Motors and the Ford Motor Company instead acceded to 
union demands for improved benefits and private pensions, provided that those pensions remained 
firmly under the control of corporate management. The pattern of postwar collective bargaining was 
thereby set: organized labor and corporate management would periodically do battle over private 
welfare benefits, an arena in which corporate leaders gradually realized could be turned to their 
advantage. As Joshua Freeman has written: 
Private and public welfare benefits were intimately linked. The Auto 
Workers’ and Steelworkers’ drives for company pensions stemmed 
from the inadequacies of Social Security. Inflation had eaten away at 
the spending power of federal retirement payments, which in 1948 
averaged only $25 a month, and nearly half the country’s workers 
          
80 Ibid., 227-228. 
81 Ibid., 228. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
 133 
 
were not covered by the program at all. Business opposition had 
blocked repeated efforts to improve benefits by raising taxes. The CIO 
unions, by demanding that employers provide retirement benefits 
above and beyond Social Security payments, created an incentive for 
business to drop its opposition to improving the government system.84 
 
The CIO’s overriding economic policy priority in the immediate postwar years was to support 
“extensive governmental action” in order to prevent economic stagnation. 85  Realizing the 
increasingly high stakes in its fight with management over how best to provide economic security 
for older workers and retirees, organized labor recognized that Social Security would be insufficient 
to fulfill this purpose.86  
As Harry Becker, the Director of the UAW-CIO’s Social Security Department observed in a 
December 1949 speech before the American Economic Association and Industrial Relations 
Research Association: 
The retirement problem can be quite simply stated. We have an aging 
population with the proportion of old to young increasing; the 
expectations of living longer are increasing; and the cost of living 
longer is sharply upwards in trend...The economic impact of the 
problems is accentuated by the lack of an organized and universal 
program assuring financial security to the worker when he is no 
longer able to work whether the reason be primarily age or 
incapacity.87 
 
The “lack of an organized and universal program” which Becker highlighted in his speech was  
          
84 Joshua Freeman, American Empire: The Rise of a Global Power, the Democratic Revolution at Home 1945-2000 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 120-121. See also A.H. Raskin, “Workers Insisting on Steel Pensions: Murray Tells 
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85 Zieger, The CIO, 314. 
86 As a 1950 U.S. Department of Labor report noted, “even in 1948, a period of ‘minimum’ unemployment generally, 
unemployment rates for wage and salary workers aged 45 or over were significantly higher than for younger adults. See 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, “Fact Book on the Employment Problems of Older Workers,” August 13-15, 1950, 
pg. 22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). Available at: available at California and West Coast 
Labor and Industrial Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment 
Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/#c01-1.3.9.5 (Accessed September 15, 2016). 
87 Harry Becker, Director, UAW-CIO Social Security Department, “Labor’s Approach to the Retirement Program,” 
Paper before joint session of the American Economic Association and Industrial Relations Research Association; 
December 29, 1949, New York, New York. Available via the Online Archive of California at: 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/?query=older%20workers#c01-1.3.9.5 (Accessed 
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 134 
 
 
an obvious reference to the Social Security Act. As Becker continued, 
 
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935 there were hopes 
that public social insurance legislation was the solution to the 
problem. These hopes have not been realized. Those who framed and 
supported the Federal social security program had conceived of this 
legislation as the foundation for an integrated approach to provide 
economic security for those who had served industry and society.88 
 
Instead of serving as a permanent solution to the problem of old age economic insecurity, Social 
Security had, as Becker then suggested, contributed to its further irresolution. As he noted, Social 
Security’s Old Age Assistance program, which had been “conceived as a stop-gap and auxiliary 
program” had instead become “the basic approach to the problem,” and that “county and state poor 
relief” remained “the only universal provision for incapacity.”89  
After having painted Social Security and other old age assistance programs as fragmented, 
piecemeal, and ultimately inadequate, Becker then enunciated labor’s proposed solution, which 
would remain at the heart of its postwar political strategy for the next several decades. What labor 
wanted, in Becker’s words, was a  
[t]wo-way drive for social security…a drive on the legislative front 
and a drive on the collective bargaining front. Labor’s position is that 
to the extent that adequate security for workers is not provided 
through governmental programs the problem of workers’ security will 
be taken to the collective bargaining table. Economic security for the 
worker when he is no longer able to work is as fundamental a concern 
of the Union as wages and working conditions.90 
 
As Becker fatefully observed, “security for union members only or for members of those Unions 
with sufficient economic strength to win their collective bargaining demands is not an adequate 
solution because the problem of insecurity is common to all segments of our society.”91 If organized 
          
88 Ibid., 2. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 2-3. 
91 Ibid., 3-4. 
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labor wanted to continue to speak credibly on behalf of all American workers – regardless of 
whether or not they were union members – then it had to continue to fight for “inclusive Federal 
legislation and good public administration” so that “all workers in America can be assured of an 
equitable retirement income based upon employment, whether it be in industry or in other economic 
pursuits. The basic retirement income program must provide protection for all workers in the 
economy. Protection must be more stable, continuous and broader in scope than can be achieved in 
private and isolated pension plans.”92 
While Becker painted an ominous picture in his remarks about the state of security for older 
workers approaching retirement, his conclusion, that “the purposes for which the [Social Security] 
legislation was enacted in 1935 have been in large measure negated for the millions of aged persons 
who are without any means of support when their pay checks stop,” was supported by the 
continuing discontent in California, where old-age pension advocates and opponents battled over 
that state’s pension plan, and by similar rumblings in Colorado. 93  Corporate leaders like C.E. 
Wilson, the President of the General Motors Corporation, had also taken note of the increasing 
inadequacy of Social Security, and had at least publicly expressed some measure of support for 
strengthening the Social Security system.94 
Believing that labor and management had therefore reached a rare place of agreement and 
accord about the need to increase the economic support available to older and retired workers, 
          
92 Ibid., 4. 
93 Ibid. See also Gladwin Hill, “California Worry Rises on Pensions,” The New York Times, April 17, 1949; “Pacific 
States: California Prepares to Vote on Old-Age Pension Law,” The New York Times, August 7, 1949. 
94 Harry Becker, Director, UAW-CIO Social Security Department, “Labor’s Approach to the Retirement Program,” pgs. 
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Becker outlined the UAW’s position on private pension plans.95 Namely, the UAW held that they 
should be “formulated and administered by a Board of Administration on which the Union and 
Management have equal representation and that this Board should have an impartial chairman 
selected from the general public.”96 But joint administration of private pension plans was a bridge 
too far for most corporate managers, who had traditionally viewed such plans as their sole 
prerogative and not open to negotiation or question. Unions like the UAW-CIO wanted joint 
administration not only to “assure democratic administration” of such plans, but also to ensure that 
there would be a “degree of employee participation and identification with the program that would 
not otherwise be possible.”97 For much the same reason, management wanted to ensure that unions 
would have no say whatsoever in the administration of private pension plans. In essence, 
management hoped to use such plans to inculcate the values of corporate management among its 
workforce, while unions wanted to use such plans as a way to make sure that workers would be sure 
to associate pensions as a hard-won right exacted by collective bargaining rather than a generous 
and benevolent gift on the part of management. 
Ultimately, though, the UAW hoped that the need for private pension plans which Becker 
repeatedly referred to as “supplementary,” would be rendered largely obsolete by improvements to 
Social Security.98 “As public programs are strengthened during the next few years the pressure for 
          
95 As Becker stated in his remarks, “present negotiations for workers’ security programs establish a new and significant 
area for labor-management cooperation through collective bargaining and in the joint administration of the programs. 
These programs are the evidence of maturity and increased social responsibility of both unions and management.” 
(Ibid., 13). 
96 Ibid., 7. 
97 Ibid., 8. 
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supplementation through collective bargaining will be lessened.”99 The CIO-UAW’s embrace of 
private pensions was therefore guided by the hope that they would be a short-term, stop-gap fix and 
not a long-term, permanent solution to the problem of economic insecurity in old age. Ironically, 
then, while organized labor had been lukewarm and somewhat distant in its relationship to Social 
Security when it had first been enacted in 1935, it had now come to embrace the program in a much 
more wholehearted way. 
Failing to Revive the New Deal 
As organized labor and corporate management struggled to define the terms of economic 
security during the early postwar years, liberals within the Democratic Party hoped the return of 
peace would revive the New Deal’s reformist impulse.100 As they soon found out, reviving the New 
Deal was easier said than done. Consequently, the fight over the New Deal’s incomplete legacy took 
place on many different fronts during the immediate postwar years, with the battle over national 
health insurance occupying perhaps the most bitterly fought-over ground. That conflict, which 
erupted between the Truman administration and the American Medical Association during the late 
1940s, would inadvertently contribute to the rise of the senior state. The calamitous political defeat 
that liberals eventually suffered would prod them into an embrace of a more limited version of the 
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welfare state than they had originally hoped for, with the thin consolation that perhaps one day it 
might serve as the foundation for a more expansive one. 
 In 1945 and 1946, though, it was not yet clear how the fight over national health insurance 
would turn out. Liberals in the Democratic Party and elsewhere believed the cause of national health 
insurance was self-evident – provided the public was properly educated about the benefits that 
would accrue from national health insurance.  Leading the charge for national health insurance was 
the Federal Security Agency within the Truman administration. However, the Truman 
administration’s seemingly halfhearted commitment to the legacy of the New Deal gradually 
became a source of frustration for many liberals, who became increasingly concerned that the 
impasse at the federal level over social and economic policy was amplifying problems at the local 
and state level. In a December 1947 column in the New York Times, John J. Corson, the Director of 
the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Bureau of the Social Security Board and one of the architects 
of the original Social Security Act, observed that one in three people over the age of 65 was 
receiving public aid, and that this figure was expected to continue growing, despite the return of 
sustained economic prosperity in the late 1940s.101 Corson argued that it was the responsibility of 
the “government…[to] guarantee each family a minimum of well-being,” which he defined as 
meaning “every man, woman or child who can’t work and is without wages be assured a definite, 
minimum cash income; and second, that every family, without regard to its ability to pay…be 
assured medical care and decent housing,” instead of allowing fragmented and duplicative public 
assistance programs in states and local communities to continue growing at an unchecked rate.102 
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Corson’s public plea for a revival at the federal level of New Deal-style economic security 
measures signaled to the Truman administration that it needed to shore up its liberal flank before the 
upcoming presidential election. The administration thus began making efforts to woo disaffected 
New Deal liberals back into the fold during the winter and spring of 1948 with broad public gestures 
designed to demonstrate that it had not forgotten the New Deal’s unfinished work.103 Specifically, in 
May 1948, President Truman recommended a comprehensive expansion of Social Security that 
advocated adding 20,000,000 workers under the program’s umbrella, a measure that was highly 
symbolic, at best, given the fact that the Republican-controlled Congress was unlikely to embrace 
any such measure. Alongside its muscular embrace of Social Security, the Truman administration 
had already begun to publically espouse the cause of national health insurance with a vigor that 
surprised many liberals.  
The administration’s new tack had begun in the fall of 1947, when President Truman had 
asked Oscar R. Ewing, a corporate lawyer and longtime Democratic Party official in New York 
State, to serve as the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency (FSA).104 While Ewing lacked 
any formal training or experience in the practice of medicine, he did bring an evangelical fervor and 
a lawyerly tenacity to his new position, which helped to reestablish the administration’s bona fides 
with disaffected liberals. Late in January 1948, Truman publicly charged Ewing with the task of 
“undertak[ing] a comprehensive study of the possibilities for raising health levels,” an innocuous-
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sounding command that would have tremendous political ramifications for the administration.105 
Ewing dutifully carried out the President’s request, and presented his final report “The Nation's 
Health: a Ten Year Program,” in early September 1948 to the President.106 Ewing had worked hard 
to build a broad base of support in the nation’s medical and health community for the 
administration’s program, and had managed to garner the begrudging participation of the American 
Medical Association (A.M.A.), the main lobbying organization and professional membership 
society for the nation’s doctors.  
 
Figure 4. Oscar R. Ewing (center) is sworn as Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, August 27, 1947.  
Photo courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library. 
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The A.M.A.’s participation in the administration’s study of the nation’s health needs, 
though, had not lessened its opposition to the administration’s desire for a new national health 
insurance system, potentially along the lines of the recently enacted National Health Service in the 
United Kingdom. Ewing, characteristically, refused to back down from his pursuit of this goal. 
Speaking before the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates meeting in Cleveland, 
Ohio, he made the case for national health insurance. At the same time, he extended an olive branch 
to the assembled physicians by expressing his hope that the Federal Security Agency and the 
A.M.A. might yet find common ground on other issues, such as support for “more and better 
medical education, for more hospitals, for local diagnostic clinics, for local health officers.”107 
Ewing’s attempts to conciliate the AMA fell mainly on deaf ears, as he later bitterly recalled: 
[t]he American Medical Association wanted to be the exclusive 
sovereign of medicine. They didn't want the Government to have a 
thing to do with medicine. … They raised the awful specter of 
Government control. As a matter of fact, Government didn't want 
control, I know, because I was in the driver's seat at that time.108 
 
Though the Truman administration would, in conjunction with Congress, later enact legislation 
providing for greatly increased medical research, such laws were merely a consolation prize when 
considered against the goal of national health insurance. Ewing would labor valiantly over the 
course of 1948 to generate support from a motley coalition of private voluntary organizations 
willing to support the Truman administration’s domestic policy programs, but more often than not 
such efforts yielded limited results.109 
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Shifting from Health Insurance for All to Health Insurance for Some 
Ultimately, Ewing and the administration’s efforts to secure the enactment of national health 
insurance would not be entirely in vain. After the President’s proposed national health insurance 
plan had been defeated in Congress in 1949, liberals like Ewing and Wilbur Cohen began to 
examine ways of gradually securing enactment of national health insurance, albeit in a gradual and 
incremental fashion.110 One promising area in which Ewing and his colleagues began to focus on 
was the issue of health care solely for older Americans. As John Thurston, a senior aide to Ewing 
later recalled, the administration’s study of the nation’s health needs throughout 1948 “brought into 
relief many problems related to our aging population. As a result, Mr. Ewing asked me to establish 
an [a]gency committee to review the situation and to report to him on how adequately existing 
programs were meeting the need of older people.”111 As Thurston related, this informal committee 
helped lay the groundwork for the Truman administration’s National Conference on Aging held in 
the summer of 1950.  
By focusing on the health needs of the elderly, Ewing and his colleagues hoped to enact a 
partially universal national health insurance that would include only the elderly, but which could 
serve as an experimental model of sorts to demonstrate the virtues of a national, universal health 
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insurance system encompassing all Americans. That assumption, of course, rested on the success of 
the initial program aimed at older Americans. Assuming such success, Ewing hoped that future 
administrations would be able to build on it and expand it over time, and that universal national 
health insurance would be achieved in a slow but sustained manner, much as Social Security had 
gradually been expanded to include more classes of workers, as well as more groups that previously 
had been excluded. 
Ewing and the Truman administration’s shift to prioritizing the health care of elderly people 
may have also benefitted from the popular discontent among older Americans that had begun to 
emerge once more during the late 1940s. In late May 1948, the New York Times reported that Dr. 
Francis Townsend had resumed speaking tours throughout the country. Backed by the support of a 
numerically diminished base of supporters, Townsend’s tours hinted that the underlying conditions 
of economic insecurity among older people in the Great Depression that had fueled the growth of 
the Townsend Movement during the 1930s had begun to reassert themselves. The continuing 
viability of the Movement owed much to the continuing inadequacy of the Social Security system. 
As the New York Times observed in late 1948, after President Truman’s upset victory in that year’s 
presidential race, 
Congress had been urged repeatedly to broaden and change the 
Federal Social Security program. During the presidential campaign 
just ended leaders of both political parties added their voices to this 
plea. And there can be no doubting the need. A good many aging 
people in this country face the dismaying fact that the Social Security 
system cannot keep the wolf from their doors.112 
 
The net result of congressional inaction, though, was to effectively shift the problem of managing 
economic insecurity among older people shifted back to the states and localities, many of which 
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lacked either adequate resources or infrastructure to actually accomplish the goal of controlling the 
spread of elderly poverty.  
Despite lacking adequate resources, the desire of some state and local politicians to garner 
votes had led them to once more embrace the cause of state-financed pensions for older people. In 
December 1948, at the annual meeting of the Americana Public Welfare Association (A.P.W.A.), 
the major professional gathering of leading public welfare administrators in the United States, 
APWA Director Howard L. Russell expressed alarm that an increasing number of states had 
instituted pension plans for persons over the age of 65 with loose eligibility requirements. As 
Russell publicly fretted, “we believe the aged should receive adequate help, but the whole picture of 
welfare services must be considered…[s]tates with pension programs use up so much of their 
welfare resources for the aged that they bankrupt themselves where other welfare services…are 
concerned.”113 Russell’s alarm was echoed by J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton economist and one of 
the architects of the original Social Security Act, who warned in April 1949 that “unless 
contributory social insurance is strengthened and enlarged now, it may be displaced ‘by its more 
demanding step-sisters, assistance and relief.”114  
Russell’s and Brown’s concerns did not go unheeded by Ewing and other liberals in the 
Truman administration. In their eyes, the surprise election results in November 1948 that returned 
Harry Truman to the White House seemed to be nothing less than an ex post facto vindication of the 
embattled administration’s domestic policy agenda.115 Flush with victory in the months following 
          
113 Lucy Freeman, “Pensions Scored as Welfare Drain: H.L. Russell Says Assistance Based on Need is Put Second in 
Some Western States,” The New York Times, December 10, 1948. 
114 “Social Insurance Is Held in Danger: Dean Brown of Princeton Says Contributory Set-Up Must Be Stronger to Live,” 
The New York Times, April 26, 1949. 
115 See, for example, Ewing’s address to the Women’s City Club of Boston on December 7th, 1948, in which he claimed 
that in light of the previous month’s election results that “I think…we know pretty well now what the people of this 
country want…I think you will all recognize that the majority of the plain people of this country stand squarely behind 
the great program of social legislation that President Truman has advocated. And that, to a very large extent, these 
people voted for him because they trusted him sincerely and vigorously to carry out and expand this program.” See 
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Truman’s victory, Ewing took to the stump to campaign on behalf of the newly reinvigorated 
administration. The time had finally come, in Ewing’s mind, for the resumption of the reforms 
promised or even tentatively outlined in the New Deal’s waning days.116 Moreover, by enacting 
these reforms, the United States would be able to demonstrate its commitment to the sort of broad, 
sweeping rethinking of the social compact that had become de rigueur in much of war-torn Western 
Europe.117 On June 20, 1949, Ewing spoke before the New York Public Welfare Association to rally 
its support for the administration’s proposed improvements to the Social Security system.118 Though 
Ewing repeatedly emphasized the cooperative nature of federal social welfare efforts, his words 
appear to have had little effect in generating favorable press coverage or swaying public opinion in 
favor of the administration’s proposals. 
Instead, by late 1949, public opinion on the issue of old-age pensions was approaching a 
degree of volatility not seen since the halcyon days of the Townsend Movement fifteen years earlier. 
The New York Times’s coverage of the labor-management strife in the steel and automobile 
manufacturing industries and the fights over old-age pensions in California and Colorado, 
contributed to an increasingly feverish atmosphere. 119  As John J. Corson, one of the original 
          
Oscar R. Ewing, Speech – Women’s City Club, Boston, Massachusetts, December 7th, 1948 folder, in the Box 41, the 
Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, HSTL. 
116 Ibid. See also Ewing’s article “More Security for You,” in the January 1949 issue of The American Magazine in 
Oscar R. Ewing, Article – “More Security for You,” The American Magazine, January 1949 folder, in the Box 41, the 
Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, HSTL. 
117 See Tony Judt, Postwar: Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), for a further treatment of this subject. 
Ewing in essence wanted to rekindle the sort of “Atlantic crossing” which had marked American reform before World 
War II, and his commitment to a transnational variety of social reform was demonstrated by his and other FSA staff 
member visits to Western Europe (particularly Great Britain) during the late 1940s in order to learn more about the new 
social welfare systems then being designed and implemented in that region. See Rodgers’ discussion of the New Deal in 
Atlantic Crossings, 415-417. 
118 Oscar R. Ewing, Address before the 79th Annual Dinner Meeting of the New York Public Welfare Association, June 
20, 1949, Speech – New York Public Welfare Association, Lake George, N.Y. (June 20, 1949) file, Federal Secur. 
Agency Subj. File, Federal Security Agency – General Correspondence, Box 29, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, HSTL. 
119 See, for example, Seymour E. Harris’s article “What to Do With 18 Million Aged?” The New York Times, July 10, 
1949, which argued that “Social Security may make a contribution but so far the Government’s insurance program has 
been niggardly and unresponsive…surely a sensible approach is a Social Security program for the aged which will 
eventually cost $20 billion, with (say) two-thirds to be paid by the workers or their employers and one-third by the 
general taxpayer…this is the way to counter the semi-crank movements – the Townsend Plan and the extreme Rankin 
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architects of the Social Security Act observed in the pages of the Times, “Americans must appear 
pension mad to the world at large,” partly because “existing [pension] arrangements are not 
satisfactory…the problem of the aged is relentlessly growing.”120  
In order to solve this “relentlessly growing” problem of economic insecurity (and by 
extension, increasing dependency) on the part of older Americans, Corson could only offer cold 
comfort to political liberals. Arguing that “there is little evidence that Congress proposes to adopt a 
rational system of public old-age security that will fit the needs of the aged as well as the bounds of 
our economy,” Corson argued, instead, for a piecemeal expansion of Social Security, in the hope 
that doing so might prevent state governments from “forego[ing] the temptation to make political 
capital of assistance for the needy aged,” a temptation which Corson suspected state officials, in 
order to secure votes from grateful older voters, had given into.121 Corson cautioned Times readers 
that “this prescription must be taken promptly if we are to meet rationally, and without tempting 
national bankruptcy, the unavoidable problem of old-age dependency.” If it was not, Corson 
warned, pro-pension organized groups would eventually “force through a pension for everyone at 
65…with staggering costs to the national economy or the stronger unions will win relatively high 
pensions for a favored group of employees, and more money will be poured into the relief method 
of caring for the aged.”122 
          
pension plan – which play upon the fears of the old, and do not provide aid in an equitable manner.” See also Louis 
Stark, “Nation’s Economy Tied to Wage-Pension Talks: Parleys Going On Between Unions And Industry Will Shape 
Pattern,” The New York Times, July 17, 1949; Sumner H. Slichter, “The Pressing Problem of Old-Age Security,” The 
New York Times, October 16, 1949; Lawrence E. Davies, “Fight on Pensions Stirs California,” The New York Times, 
October 30th, 1949; Joseph A. Loftuss, “Question of Pensions; Who Pays, How Much?” The New York Times, 
November 6th, 1949. 
120 John J. Corson, “Our Pension Madness – And Possible Cures,” The New York Times, July 3, 1949. 
121 Ibid. As the New York Times reported in October 1949, “in Louisiana no less than four out of five persons of 65 years 
of age or more are receiving old-age assistance – a sudden doubling of the number since June 1948.” Furthermore, the 
Times added that “in Oklahoma and Georgia more than half, and in Texas, Colorado, Alabama, and Mississippi nearly 
half of all persons 65 years of age or over are drawing old-age assistance, but in New York and New Jersey the 
proportion is only one out of ten.” See Sumner H. Slichter, “The Pressing Problem of Old-Age Security,” The New York 
Times, October 16, 1949. 
122 Ibid. 
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Corson’s warnings were not merely idle or solitary threats. In subsequent issues of the 
Times, other social welfare experts chimed in, echoing his concerns. New York City Welfare 
Commissioner Raymond M. Hilliard argued that existing Social Security benefits were 
“preposterously insufficient,” and that “this country might not be facing strikes in the steel and other 
industries if adequate social security benefits had been put into effect.”123 At its annual conference 
that year, the Western Governor’s Conference went on record “in favor of ‘broad extension’ of 
Social Security and liberalization of benefits under a contributory plan” and declared “such a 
program to be ‘much preferable’ to the present old age assistance afforded only after persons 
become destitute,” a remarkable feat, given that the delegation of twelve state governors at the 
conference was neatly and evenly split between the two major political parties.124 
A few months after Corson’s column appeared in the Times, California’s voters, in yet 
another round of that state’s seemingly endless war over old-age pensions, cut back much of the 
state’s existing old-age pension rolls by increasing eligibility requirements needed to qualify for 
public assistance.125 While the November 1949 electoral results in California undoubtedly reassured 
anxious elected public officials in that state and elsewhere, a deep and growing sense of unease 
persisted in the business community, which remained deeply divided on the merits of public-
provided old-age pensions.  
From his perch as Treasurer and Director at the Eastman Kodak Company, Marion B. 
Folsom, a stalwart member of the Republican Party’s eastern wing and one of the drafters of the 
          
123 “Hilliard Asks Rise in Social Security,” The New York Times, September 27, 1949. See also “The Necessity for 
Private Welfare Aid,” The New York Times, December 4, 1949, in which Hilliard and Robert T. Lansdale, the New York 
State Commissioner of Social Welfare, publicly pleaded that “the urgent task of meeting the health and welfare needs of 
the community cannot be performed by the public welfare agencies alone. It requires the assistance of all members of 
the community…we need private as well as public welfare programs to take care of our most pressing burden – human 
need and distress. We cannot afford to have less private welfare. We need more of it. We need more of it than ever 
before.” (Ibid.) 
124 “Governors Urge Widened Pensions,” The New York Times, November 9, 1949. 
125 “California Alters Its Pension Set-Up,” The New York Times, November 10, 1949. 
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original Social Security Act, began to sound the alarm over what he perceived as the rising threat of 
fiscally unsustainable state pensions. At a late November 1949 meeting of the National Industrial 
Conference Board, Folsom argued that  
unless steps are taken very soon to strengthen the contributory 
insurance plan, the country faces the grave danger of losing this plan 
by default and adopting the charity approach entirely. The aim should 
be to extend the insurance program as soon as possible to all those 
gainfully employed and then to shift the Old Age Assistance entirely 
to the states for those who cannot be covered adequately under the 
insurance program.126 
 
In essence, Folsom was trying to make the case to his fellow corporate executives that it was in their 
self-interest to support expanding Social Security. In his concluding remarks to the assembled 
conference attendees, Folsom pointedly stated that  
businessmen now have a great opportunity to assist in solving the 
problem of providing economic protection for the aged…they should 
first support early Congressional action to extend the coverage of the 
contributory Old Age Insurance Plan to most of those gainfully 
employed and to bring the benefits more in line with present living 
costs. Secondly, companies without pension plans should study their 
particular situation to determine if a supplementary plan is necessary 
to provide adequate protection for the worker who has spent his 
lifetime in industry.127 
 
If businessmen undertook these two tasks, Folsom assured them “these plans, both government and 
private, if kept on a reasonable basis should not be considered as conflicting with the private 
enterprise system. On the other hand, they should prove to be strong adjuncts to it.”128  
Folsom’s viewpoint was not particularly popular in the business community. In contrast to 
Folsom’s argument for an enlightened corporate liberalism, the historically anti-union National 
          
126 Marion B. Folsom, “The Pension Drive: Social and Economic Implications,” Talk before the 308th Regular Meeting 
of the National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., November 22nd, 1949, The Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York. 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online 
Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/#c01-1.3.9.5 (accessed October 1, 
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Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) vigorously denounced the promotion of the “welfare state” 
and “statism” on the part of the Truman administration a few weeks later at an annual meeting.129 
Seemingly against Folsom’s enunciation of the need for corporate leadership in the realm of social 
welfare, the assembled speakers at the N.A.M. meeting instead “charged that business, big and 
small, had failed to make its case understandable or convincing, either nationally or among its own 
neighbors and friends.”130 As Lee H. Bristol, president of the Bristol-Myers Company, stated in his 
remarks, “communications is a two-way street and we’ve got to see that we are effective from our 
end of it,” and urged that management instead do more to communicate to its employees, lest they 
“follow the false gods and carry all of us to the precipice.”131 
The mood at the N.A.M. meeting was that one of combativeness rather than cooperation, 
with most of the assembled business leaders more inclined to do battle with organized labor. 
N.A.M.’s attitude on the question of expanding public assistance of any sort – whether through the 
Social Security system or otherwise - was part and parcel of the larger struggle over public and 
private pensions that roiled the politics of the late 1940s and into the early 1950s. Despite the hopes 
and original intentions of the architects of the 1935 Social Security Act, the law’s old age assistance 
program rather than its old age insurance program had become increasingly ensconced as a 
permanent feature of the nation’s public welfare system. The limited breadth of old age insurance’s 
eligible worker categories and the meager benefits that it offered meant that much of the burden of 
supporting retired workers fell chiefly upon either private industry, old age assistance, or western 
states like California, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Oregon in which old-age advocacy groups had been 
          
129 “Statism Is Called Peril to Business,” The New York Times, December 8, 1949. N.A.M.’s concerns were similar to 
those made by Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH), who had expressed his concern that “the country was drifting into a 
problem of providing $100 a month through Government or business for all persons over 65 years of age.” See “Taft 
Sees Pensions As Huge Problem,” The New York Times, November 23, 1949. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. Bristol did not clarify to what precipice he meant elsewhere in his remarks. 
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able to successfully utilize popular referendums to enact statewide old age pension systems.132 
Howard L. Russell, the director of the American Public Welfare Association, charged that these 
groups represented “a very serious threat to good public welfare administration.”133 California’s 
enacted old-age pension stood at $75 per month in 1949 for all residents over the age of 63, which 
led to fears that older people would move to the state in order to take advantage of its relative 
generosity.134  
Unlike New York’s old age pension system, with its more stringent requirements, 
California’s pension made no stipulation that family members of pension recipients were obliged to 
provide support as well, and it included a modest prior residency requirement of only five years, 
rather than ten or fifteen.135 As a result, the cost of old age pensions in California had risen to 17% 
of the state’s overall billion-dollar budget, and was projected to continue rising, sparking fears that 
the pension system might eventually bankrupt the state.136 Likewise, in Washington State, Governor 
Arthur B. Langlie publicly warned that “the state may face bankruptcy unless welfare aid is reduced 
drastically,” with publicly-supported pensions accounting for 43% of Washington’s state budget in 
          
132 See A.H. Raskin, “Cost of Aid to Old Rises 250 Millions,” The New York Times, December 24, 1949; A.H. Raskin, 
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1949.137 Unsurprisingly, in November 1949 a conference of western governors had urged a “broad 
extension” of Social Security and “liberalization of benefits under a contributory plan” in the hope 
of shifting the costs of old-age economic security off of their ledgers and to the federal government 
and workers contributing into Social Security’s national old-age insurance program.138 
Strengthening Social Security? 
The developing national crisis around old age economic insecurity had, by the end of 1949, 
led to an emergent recognition among Federal and state officials that Social Security’s old age 
insurance system needed to be greatly augmented.139 As the New York Times reported in December 
1949, approximately 1 in 4 people over the age of 65 was receiving public assistance of some sort, 
and the cost of supporting them stood at roughly nine times what it had been in 1936, the last year 
before the enactment of Social Security.140 Signs of alarm were not limited to federal and state 
policymakers. The commercial insurance industry, for example, which had long been in the 
vanguard against Social Security, had come to begrudgingly embrace Social Security’s old age 
insurance system, in part because its actuarial calculations had unsurprisingly revealed that neither 
the federal nor the state governments would be able to adequately shoulder the burden of old age 
dependency if the number of older people in need of assistance continued to rise at an exponential 
rate. 141  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, recognizing that unions would continue to push for 
pension plans so long as Social Security remained inadequate, suddenly found religion on the 
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subject and began to dampen (though not entirely withdraw) its criticism of the program as one 
more step on the slippery slope towards socialism.142  
Likewise, nine months after its fiery 1949 annual meeting, the N.A.M. had taken stock of the 
generous contracts which the UAW and the USWA had won from the Ford Motor and Bethlehem 
Steel companies. As an internal N.A.M. report observed, “1949 saw pension proposals assume the 
status of major demands as some unions exerted industry-wide or nation-wide power and sought to 
impose a standardized benefit plan package on various industries.”143 Consequently, the N.A.M. 
recommended that its member companies make a “full exploration” as to whether or not they should 
adopt a private pension plan; in N.A.M.’s words, “although the many legal complexities 
surrounding compulsory bargaining on pensions seem to impose stumbling blocks in the way of 
employee initiation of plans, the several advantages which can accrue as the result of the 
establishment of a sound program may outweigh these difficulties.”144 
In other words, N.A.M. was advising its members that it was in their best interest to develop 
a private pension program or else run the risk of having one thrust upon them during collective 
bargaining agreements that might give far too much power to labor unions.145 By linking such plans 
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with Social Security, corporate managers could avoid having to carry the entire cost of a 
noncontributory pension program and possibly generate and earn employee loyalty by offering such 
plans as a preemptive tactical move in the ongoing battle with organized labor. 146 As N.A.M. 
described it, private pension plans should “be constructed so as not to place an undue burden on the 
company during years of poor earnings but at the same time provide for employees as they retire in 
a fashion that, when added to social security, will give adequate retirement income.”147 In N.A.M.’s 
telling, private pensions were neither paternalistic nor necessarily reflective of an enlarged sense of 
social responsibility on the part of management; rather, they were a tool or a device which, if used 
properly, could help to wean workers away from the clarion call of union solidarity. Hinting at the 
continuing communications benefits a private pension plan could offer, N.A.M. observed that 
“during the years of employees’ participation in the plan, there is considerable necessity for re-
selling it because the details become vague as employees are unaware of the continuing cost to the 
company and because such benefits sometimes are taken for granted.”148 
While N.A.M. and its constituent members debated how best to approach the dual issues of 
private pensions and the question of whether or not to support expanding Social Security, Ewing 
and his allies within the Truman administration found themselves grasping for a new way to 
approach the issue of national health insurance. After the highly publicized defeat of the Truman 
administration in the fight over national health insurance at the hands of the American Medical 
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Association in 1949, Oscar Ewing and other senior level administrators decided to try a different 
method to build public support for national health insurance.149 On June 7 1950, with President 
Truman’s blessing, Ewing announced that the Federal Security Agency was inviting experts on 
aging to convene in Washington in two months’ time in order to explore “the various problems 
incident to our increasingly older population.”150  
Ewing’s colleague Clark Tibbitts, to whom Ewing largely delegated the administration of 
the conference, thereafter traveled to various universities in order to drum up further interest in the 
academic community for the federal government’s efforts, while Ewing reached out to the 
administration’s organized labor allies.151 Tibbitts, a pioneer in the field of gerontological research 
at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Human Research, where he and his colleague Wilma 
Donahue had planned and executed pioneering studies of Washtenaw County, Michigan’s older 
population that had begun to supply badly-needed economic and social information to local and 
state officials in Michigan. In addition to his connection to the University of Michigan, Tibbitts had 
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been a student of the famed sociologist Ernest W. Burgess at the University of Chicago, and had 
extensive contacts within the growing community of academic gerontologists, social welfare 
experts, and elected or appointed public officials who were interested in taking a more active 
approach to the needs of older people.  
Ewing and Tibbitts recognized that while the Social Security’s old age and survivors’ 
insurance provision was designed to address economic security for older Americans, its limited size 
and benefits meant the public assistance rolls would continue to rise with the rising population of 
older Americans. A fiscal crisis thereby loomed on the horizon for both the federal and state 
governments if measures were not taken to halt and reverse the growing financial dependency of 
older people on federal and state grants-in-aid under the Social Security system.152 In a June 1950 
speech to the United Textile Workers of America Convention, Ewing made the case for the 
necessity of the aging conference, observing that 
I do not think any of us are so limited in our thinking that we would 
be ready to assume that Social Security benefits could possibly solve 
all the problems arising from the aging of our population…The dream 
of every man and woman is to be able to live a full and happy life, and 
to grow old gracefully, with security, contentment, and dignity.153 
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demands for public assistance programs, with expensive effects in some states, notably California and Colorado” and 
“the current expansion of private pension systems, most spectacularly in the steel, coal, and automobile industries” 
which were already proving to be less “an ideal solution to the retirement income problem.” As Tibbitts continued, 
“national policy during the 1930s was to retire older workers in an effort to take care of the apparent surplus of 
manpower. I think you all know that the wisdom of this policy is now being seriously questioned” because “we now 
know that gainful employment is the principal means of meeting the need of older people to be wanted and to feel 
useful.” See Clark Tibbitts, Ibid., 9-10. Tibbitts, speaking on behalf of Ewing (and by extension the Truman 
administration), thereby connected the administration’s efforts to its illustrious predecessor, but also revealed the drastic 
change in assumptions among reform-minded liberals about how the federal government  should best address the issue 
of economic security in old age. 
153 Oscar R. Ewing, Address Before the Eleventh Biennial Convention, United Textile Workers of American (AFL), 
June 20, 1950, pgs. 3-5 in Speech – United Textile Workers of America Convention, New York, N.Y. (June 20, 1950) 
folder, in Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, Box 41, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, HSTL. 
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As both Ewing and Tibbitts realized, the issue of expanding federal protection for older Americans 
had to be handled gently, for fear that too swift government action might provoke cries of 
encouraging older Americans to become overly dependent on the federal welfare state.154 Instead, 
Ewing and the Federal Security Agency stressed the conference’s necessity based on demographic 
changes such as the large-scale shift from a rural to a more urban population, and the extended life 
span of older Americans. By emphasizing these factors, Ewing hoped to position the conference as 
apolitical as possible, despite the obvious fact that its hoped-for recommendations would generate 
proposals for governmental action at the local, state, and federal levels.155 
In August 1950, the first ever National Conference on Aging convened in Washington, 
D.C.156 In his well-publicized opening message to the conference attendees decrying the evils of 
arbitrary age limits on retirement, President Truman expressed his hope that the conference would 
produce recommendations for his and future administrations to act on in order to combat the 
creeping increase in poverty among older Americans.157 Truman emphasized the dangers of forcing 
          
154 Clark Tibbitts, Address before the University of Michigan’s Third Annual Institute on Living in the Later Years 
conference, June 29, 1950 in Speech – Institute on Living in the Later Years, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 29, 1950 
folder, in Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, Box 41, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, HSTL. 
155  Program for an Aging Population: A Progress Report to the Federal Security Administrator by the Working 
Committee on the Aging, March 17, 1950, Federal Security Agency, in Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles 
– 1950, Box 41, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, HSTL. As this progress report observed, there was a need for “national 
policy [to be] directed toward the provision of employment for older people who wish to work and who have the 
capacity for it.” (Ibid. 9). While not quite as far-reaching as the original full employment legislation which had failed to 
make it through Congress unscathed five years earlier, the Federal Security Agency’s emphasis on securing employment 
for older workers remained remarkable nonetheless. There were limits to this willingness to use government power, 
though. As the progress report further noted, “women represent a special problem because most of them have gaps in 
their employment history during the child-rearing period. They find difficulty in re-entering employment...Imaginative 
communities may find ways of using these women to provide housekeeping, nursing, and other services” (Ibid., 11). 
156 Bess Furman, “Ewing Bids U.S. End ‘Penalties’ to Aged,” The New York Times, August 14, 1950; Oscar R. Ewing, 
“Conference to Sift Problems of Aged,” The New York Times, August 13, 1950. 
157 The initial idea for the conference had come from Ewing himself, who had written to the President’s secretary in 
January 1950 to see if the President would support the conference. Truman somewhat belatedly acquiesced to the 
conference in early June 1950. See Harry S. Truman to Oscar R. Ewing, June 6, 1950, in “White House Conference on 
Older Americans; National Conference on Aging” file, OF 2604, Box 1880, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, 
White House Central Files, HSTL. 
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skilled workers out of employment “at a time like the present when we need increasing production 
to insure our national security.”158 In his letter to the conference attendees, he asserted that 
Arbitrary age limits deprive us of some of our best workers…I would 
like to emphasize that the work of this Conference is of great 
significance to the strengthening of our democratic way of life. Our 
country is committed to the proposition that there should be 
opportunities for every citizen in it to use his abilities to the utmost as 
a member of his community. As we increase the opportunities for our 
older citizens to stand on their own feet, and live out their lives in 
self-respect, free from fear and want, we shall be helping to fulfill the 
promise of our free society.159 
 
While the President’s message to the conference did receive significant and largely favorable 
newspaper coverage, neither it nor the conference itself succeeded in moving the dial of public 
opinion in any meaningful way.160  
In part, this negligible effect may have reflected the ambivalence and indecision on display 
at the conference itself. While the various panels agreed that there were many problems facing older 
Americans, the delegates seemed conflicted as to how the government could best help older people 
in declining neighborhoods and communities scattered across the nation. Was it best for the federal 
government to improve the eligibility and benefits available to retirees under the Social Security 
system, an approach the President seemed to strongly support, even as it ran the risk of arousing the 
still virulent critics of the administration who claimed it would undermine American individual self-
reliance, a claim that the administration had never properly addressed or rebutted? Or was it best to 
encourage private employers to retain older workers rather than compel them to retire at age 65 (or 
some other age), thereby provoking the attention of the N.A.M. or other like-minded business 
organizations, which would likely oppose any intervention by the administration in the affairs of 
          
158 Bess Furman, “President Decries Age Limits on Jobs: Nation Needs Older Workers to Meet Production Quotas, He 
Tells Conference,” The New York Times, August 15, 1950. 
159 Harry S. Truman to Oscar Ewing, August 12, 1950, in 1950 August 11, President’s letter to Conference on Aging 
file, Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Administration, Speech File (June 5 – August 30, 1950), Box 45, 
HSTL. 
160 Ibid. See also “Hope for the Aged,” The Washington Post, August 17, 1950. 
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private companies as symptomatic of an out-of-control federal government slouching towards 
socialism? No good answers were apparent, nor did any appear on the horizon. 
The conference’s limited objectives also seemed to be designed to avoid controversy, and 
tended toward the banal, such as the need “to stimulate the exchange of ideas among persons of 
varied experience, with a view to solving problems of the Aging through voluntary and public 
organizations in each State, city, and community” and promotion of research on the problems of 
older people “in fields [such] as employment, health, education, recreation, rehabilitation and social 
and psychological adjustment.” 161  Assuming an almost defensive tone, Ewing assured the 
conference attendees on opening day that “the Federal Government has merely undertaken to 
provide the services and machinery for this conference…the thinking, the discussions, and the 
conclusions of the next three days will be the product, not of government, but if private citizens who 
have gathered here as experts and authorities in their personal and professional capacities.” 162 
Qualifiers aside, Ewing ensured that the conference would be as open to the press as possible in 
order to generate interest in the proceedings. The press responded with half-hearted concern; the 
war in Korea, not surprisingly, provided much more compelling copy for newspapers in the late 
summer of 1950. 
The Aftermath of the 1950 Conference 
Despite being largely drowned out by the press coverage of events in Korea, the 
conference’s official findings would have growing importance in the years to come for local, state, 
and federal officials as they wrestled with the issue of old age economic insecurity. The various 
          
161 U.S. Federal Security Agency, Conference on Aging, “Some Facts About Our Aging Population,”, August 13-15, 
1950, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Security Agency, 1950, in Cooperative League of the USA: Housing – Labor 
Leaders Association, Box 36, Papers of Wallace J. Campbell, HSTL. 
162 Oscar R. Ewing, Address Before the Conference on Aging, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., Sunday, August 13, 
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working groups assembled under the conference’s aegis marshalled some arresting statistics that 
suggested just how much mass suburbanization was beginning to alter the structure of many 
American families.163 Increasingly, the conference found, many older Americans lived in “smaller 
families” largely consisting of aging couples separated from their children and grandchildren.164 Of 
course, there were plenty of widows, widowers, and unmarried elderly people. Attendees repeatedly 
– and incorrectly as it turned out – argued that the American population would likely fall in the 
future due to a declining birth rate. Statistics later provided by the 1950 Census would reveal a 
dramatically different portrait of America’s changing demography, courtesy of the postwar Baby 
Boom.  
The emphasis on a shrinking population added a sense of urgency to the conference’s final 
report. Many of the attendees seemed inclined to believe that the nation’s overall population would 
stagnate whilst its elderly population would continue to increase at a disproportionately high rate, 
courtesy of improvements in nutrition and medical care, and that this rising number of older people 
would eventually place a yoke around the younger generations of Americans who still remained 
active participants in the nation’s labor force and the chief source of its tax receipts. In essence, 
while the attendees did not believe that the nation was facing a demographic crisis just yet, they 
believed that it was fast approaching on the horizon, and that steps needed to be taken – quickly – to 
ensure that the nation’s institutions (public and private) would be ready to handle it. As a conference 
summary later stated, “older people constitute the most rapidly growing portion of our 
population.”165 Using data from prior Census reports, the delegates had calculated that the number 
          
163 As Michael Harrington would later observe in The Other America, by 1959, “two-thirds of the people over sixty-five 
live with a spouse or a relative in a two-person household. They signify the breakdown of the old patterns of family 
living in the United States.” (Harrington, The Other America, 107). 
164 U.S. Federal Security Agency, Conference on Aging, “Some Facts About Our Aging Population,”, August 13-15, 
1950, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Security Agency, 1950, in Cooperative League of the USA: Housing – Labor 
Leaders Association, Box 36, Papers of Wallace J. Campbell, HSTL. 
165 Ibid. 
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of Americans aged 65 years or older constituted 4.1% of the overall U.S. population (and numbered 
approximately 3 million individuals), and that these figures had risen to 7.6% of the overall 
population (and numbered approximately 11 ¼ million individuals) by 1949.166 
Also striking were the conference attendees’ frank acknowledgments that they frequently 
lacked sufficient information to adduce solutions to the problems of an aging population.167 As a 
summary report of the conference bluntly stated: 
Very little is known about the number of aged persons with income 
from other sources, i.e., insurance annuities, private retirement 
systems, investments and other types of savings, contributions from 
friends or relatives, etc. There is only scanty information, also, on the 
extent to which income is received from more than one source. 
Surveys indicate that generally speaking, the larger the aged person’s 
income, the larger the number of sources from which it is derived.168 
 
What the attendees at the National Conference on Aging did know, though, was that “the surveys 
made by the Social Security Administration of the income, assets, and living arrangements of old-
age and survivors insurance beneficiaries suggest that half or more of the commercial and industrial 
          
166 See U.S. Federal Security Agency, Conference on Aging, “Some Facts About Our Aging Population,” August 13-15, 
1950, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D.C., in Cooperative League of the USA: Housing – Labor Leaders 
Association, Box 36, Papers of Wallace J. Campbell, HSTL and United States Federal Security Agency, Conference on 
Aging, Man and His Years; An Account of the First National Conference on Aging (Raleigh: Health Publications 
Institute, 1951). 
167 See, for example, Background Statement, Section III, National Conference on Aging, 1950. Arguably the most 
important section of the conference, the Income Maintenance section representatives could only conclude from limited 
data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and Social Security that “the aged…have lower incomes than other adults in 
the population,” but that “information on the number of beneficiaries of private retirement plans in industry is not 
available in detail.” The representatives further conceded that “we know even less about the number of older persons 
with income from privately accumulated assets…how many older persons are in receipt of dividends, interest, rents, or 
are living in whole or part on withdrawals from savings accounts or the sale of assets, is unknown.” (Ibid., 3). Based on 
information provided by Social Security, the representatives estimated that “between one fourth and one fifth of all 
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past employment or service.” (Ibid., 3). This lack of information about the income and assets held by older Americans 
was problematic for policymakers because, as the representatives noted, “perhaps the best measure of the effective 
ability of persons to save for old age is the amount of assets held by those now aged” (Ibid., 9). 
168 U.S. Federal Security Agency, Conference on Aging, “Some Facts About Our Aging Population,” August 13-15, 
1950, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D.C., in Cooperative League of the USA: Housing – Labor Leaders 
Association, Box 36, Papers of Wallace J. Campbell, HSTL. This void of information would later prove crucial in 
turning many aging advocates to embrace Ewing’s proposal to provide hospitalization for Social Security OASI 
recipients, for whom the Federal Security Agency did – courtesy of the Social Security Administration – have 
considerably more data about their living conditions, relative poverty, and overall sources of income. 
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workers who have retired in recent years have some assets but that such assets are typically 
small.” 169  Based on the limited information at hand about the inadequacy of most people’s 
retirement assets, the conference delegates agreed that that the best way to reduce possible future 
financial burdens which supporting older people might place upon the federal treasury was to 
“enabl[e] the aged to do productive work in accordance with their capacity.” But the delegates 
realized that “this would mean change, change, change” because “nothing in our present cultural 
institutions…is adequate to deal with the consequence of this new development of the increasingly 
aged.”170  
Essentially, the conference delegates had concluded that existing levels of public and private 
support were adequate to sustain most people in their old age, and that the best way for older people 
to support themselves was to continue working for as long as they could. Encouraging older workers 
to remain in the labor force, though, undermined the assumptions that governed the Social Security 
Act and most private employers pension systems: namely, that most workers would exit the 
workforce at or around the age of 65, and that their re-entry would be at most on a part-time basis, 
limited by the penalties which Social Security applied to annual earnings above a certain threshold. 
While the conference delegates expressed their belief that “there are no insuperable obstacles to the 
employment of older people” because “management, labor and Government working together, 
could do the job,” it was not entirely clear by what mechanism this objective could be 
accomplished.171 
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Although the conference ultimately seemed more of a trial balloon to test public opinion 
than anything else, it did have the salutary effect of assembling for the first time a wide range of 
academic experts, elected officials, and appointed public servants from across the country to discuss 
and debate the issues of older Americans, and also of drawing press attention.172 For these reasons, 
Oscar Ewing pronounced it “an unqualified success.” 173  This theme of increasing state action 
referred to in the following quote from Representative Sidney Yates (D-IL) during a congressional 
debate over his bill to create a House Select Committee on Problems of the Aging,  
[E]ver since the National Conference on Aging called by the Federal 
Security Agency more than a year ago there has been a quickening of 
interest all over the country in creating a more satisfactory 
environment for aging people. My own State of Illinois set up a 
commission last year. My neighboring States of Michigan and 
Minnesota have set up study committees this year…All of these states 
and many others are desperately in need of information that will tell 
them the nature of the problems they face and how to go about 
meeting them.174 
In addition, Congressman Yates pointed out that “scores of local communities and organizations are 
trying to go ahead without waiting for State leadership. They, too, are besieging the Federal Security 
Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and other Federal agencies for guidance and assistance.”175 
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It also reflected an emerging transformation in the federal government’s approach to the 
problem of old age security. Whereas the Roosevelt administration during the New Deal had 
labored mightily to encourage the retirement of older workers from the labor force – even going so 
far as to remove older workers from the W.P.A.’s employment roster in New Jersey – the Truman 
administration increasingly embraced the retention of older workers where possible. As Oscar 
Ewing had observed in his remarks to delegates assembled at the National Conference on Aging, 
“when all is said and done…I think most of your will agree that the question of continued 
employment – for those who desire work – reaches close to the heart of this whole problem of the 
aging.”176  
Ewing’s statement was in line with the Truman administration, which had begun to promote 
university and private philanthropic studies that sought to counter social stereotypes about older 
workers as less efficient and more costly than younger workers. Underlying this new approach to 
the problem of older people in a rapidly changing society was the unspoken argument that private 
employers could do more to keep older workers on rather than compelling them to retire at a defined 
age. 177 Retaining older workers would also counteract the limited resources available to many 
retired workers, including those who were eligible to receive Social Security old-age insurance 
benefits. Those benefits remained quite low: In 1950, the average monthly benefit paid to 384,000 
Social Security eligible was $33.24, or $332.45 in 2016 dollars.178   
          
176 Oscar R. Ewing, Address delivered at Conference on Aging Banquet, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., August 
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The Aftermath of the 1950 Conference 
Roughly a year after the conclusion of the 1950 Conference on aging, Oscar Ewing was in 
San Francisco to address the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). In 
his remarks, Ewing mentioned his recent proposal to the President to “supplement the present cash 
benefits under old-age and survivors insurance by also providing to beneficiaries hospitalization 
insurance covering up to sixty days a year.”179 Ewing hoped, as he put it, that the assembled A.F.L. 
delegates would “give it very serious thought” as a “simple, logical advancement of the traditional, 
pay-as-you-go, self-respecting, common-sense American idea of social insurance,” a wordy 
description which, nonetheless demonstrated the boundaries in which public discussions about 
Social Security and public responsibility for the elderly could operate in September 1951.180  
By that point, the Truman administration’s ability to shape national politics had been greatly 
weakened by Joseph McCarthy’s relentless attacks on the State Department from the Senate floor, 
as well as withering criticism over the president’s handling of the conflict in Korea. The amount of 
political capital left to spend for someone like Oscar Ewing was thus quite sparse. It is not clear if 
Ewing believed that his proposal had a realistic possibility of being enacted, or if he expected the 
A.F.L. to embrace it as truly the next logical step in Social Security, a program which had hitherto 
not been directly involved in providing health insurance to its beneficiaries. 181  All the same, 
Ewing’s public announcement marked a new step in the continuing evolution of the senior state, 
which would rapidly come to embrace what historian Tamara Mann Tweel has aptly labeled the 
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“Medical Security Solution” to old age in America, both for reasons of practicality and growing 
ideological alignment.182 It remained true, as Ewing conceded during an October 1951 Voice of 
America radio broadcast discussion on Social Security, that roughly 1 out of 6 workers in the United 
States still lacked access to Social Security and other related social insurance plans, and that the 
administration’s aspirations for expanding Social Security’s scale and scope to embrace as many 
workers as possible remained incomplete.183 
In December 1951, a year and a half after the 1950 conference, President Truman authorized 
the creation of a “President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation.”184 The newly formed 
commission consisted primarily of physicians and hospital administrators, but also included such 
luminaries as labor leader Walter Reuther of the UAW and Chester Barnard, the president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Ollie A. Randall, a longtime consultant to the Community Service Society 
of New York City as well as New York State’s Joint Legislative Committee on the Problems of 
Aging, as well as Gunnar Gundersen, M.D., a member of the American Medical Association’s 
          
182 See Tamara Mann, “Honor Thy Father and Mother: Defining and Solving the Problem of Old Age in the United 
States, 1945-1961.” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2014. Mann argues that “by 1961, the definition, the 
problem, and the solution to old age at the federal level had crystallized. Gone were the multifaceted definitions of aging 
and its attendant problems. In their stead, congressmen and policymakers came to agree that old age could be defined 
chronologically at the age of sixty-five and that the essential, and treatable, problem for citizens over sixty-five was 
poverty due to health failure.” While I concur with Mann that a “Medical Security Solution” gradually became a 
preferred option for federal policymakers who dealt with the problems of older Americans, I disagree that the solution to 
old age had been so simply reduced down to the issue of health maintenance. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, 
policymakers at the federal level persisted in their attempts to build a well-rounded and more fully developed welfare 
state for older Americans which encompassed but was not limited solely to health care issues. 
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(A.M.A.) Board of Trustees.185 The administration’s defeat by the A.M.A. had demonstrated that 
the A.M.A.’s opinion on the subject of national health insurance could not be disregarded, and Dr. 
Gundersen’s inclusion quietly reflected the Truman administration’s recognition of the A.M.A.’s 
power to make or break its health policy agenda. 
Learning from their earlier missteps, Ewing and other administration officials altered their 
strategy of trying to enact national health insurance on a universal basis and opted to push for 
publicly subsidized health care for older Americans. They did so in the hope that a more limited 
program would rebut the argument that government intervention in the field of medicine was 
unwarranted. In pursuit of this goal, the President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation 
met several times throughout 1952. At its July 1952 meeting, Lucille Smith, the Public Health 
Administrator for the U.S. Public Health Service, succinctly defined the Commission’s limited 
objectives, which notably did not make any visible mention of providing institutional support for 
national health insurance: 
I think it is very important that we identify immediately the fact that 
in the United States the problem of chronic illness is not identical the 
problem of care of the aged since chronic illness affects all age groups 
and it is exceedingly important that we spend our efforts on the 
preventive aspects and begin long before people are old.186 
 
Smith’s opening statement was a pushback against long-held beliefs in the medical community (and 
throughout American society) that age and chronic illness were intrinsically linked, and that age 
itself was a form of illness. Specifically, her remarks reflected how the changes in the biological 
understandings of age, which had been pioneered at the University of Chicago and at the University 
of Michigan over the course of the previous decade, were beginning to seep into policymaking 
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circles, and would soon allow the case to be made for enacting broader social policies on behalf of 
older Americans. After all, if it was possible to become old without necessarily becoming 
chronically ill, that suggested that old age was merely a phase of life and not the result of some 
disease, as many medical practitioners had believed since the start of the twentieth century. As 
Smith observed, “ten years ago [in 1942], chronic illness was thought to be a problem of old age; 
today it is wisely recognized as a problem in all age groups.”187  
It also meant that appropriations on behalf of the elderly, such as providing health care, 
would not necessarily be a waste of money if it kept at least some elderly people healthy enough to 
continue working or being productive members of society rather than pointlessly prolonging the 
suffering of chronic invalids. While the quiet revolution in defining old age that had begun roughly 
ten years earlier would still require time to be acknowledged by the academic and scientific 
community, evidence of growing acceptance could be found in the increasing number of studies 
sponsored by private philanthropic foundations, state governments, and universities to determine 
what exactly happened to the human body in old age. 
As Smith further pointed out in her testimony, the evolving understanding of old age was 
also accompanied by a changing understanding of chronic illness. As she observed: 
In the year 1946 there began a very important national movement in 
planning for the chronically ill…when the American Public Welfare 
Association decided that it was high time they called to the attention 
of the people the fact that chronic illness was a major part of 
dependency and whereas unemployment had been in the thirties, in 
the forties chronic illness was the major thing bringing people on 
relief. The welfare people realized that they could not solve this 
problem but they also realized that unless somebody solved it the cost 
of relief would continue to mount.188 
 
          
187 Ibid., 5571. 
188 “The President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, Joint Panel on Health of the Aging and Care of the 
Chronically Ill,” Wednesday, July 9, 1952 meeting transcript; p.5569, Joint panel on Chronic Disease & Aging 7/9/52 
transcript, RG 220: Pres. Commission on Health Needs of the Nation; Box 10, HSTL. 
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Here lay the continuity between the New Deal’s war on economic dependency in the 1930s and the 
attempts of the Truman administration to address the nation’s health needs in the 1940s. World War 
II had inadvertently revealed just how uneven decent health care coverage was in the United States; 
in many parts of the South, the West, and in impoverished communities nationwide, medical care 
barely existed at subsistence levels. The A.M.A., aware of this spotty coverage, had happily joined 
hands with President Truman when his administration had sought to expand the number of hospitals 
and medical training facilities in underserved areas. The thorny issue of assigning responsibility for 
the cost of relief (i.e., paying for health care) would end the hitherto happy alliance between the 
Truman administration and the A.M.A. As Smith pointed out,  
chronic illness has a much higher incidence in the aged than in any 
other group…therefore, the aging of the population is producing an 
also very rapidly increasing volume of chronically ill people and 
disabled people…that increase in volume is at such a rate that it will 
force the attention of the public and of the professions on this 
problem. The mounting volume is such that society will simply have 
to find some way of dealing with it.189  
 
In other words, the undeniable fact that health care costs were continuing to rise compelled the 
Truman administration and the A.M.A. to remain working partners, as their cooperation on the 
President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation suggested would be the case. As social 
policy consultant Ollie Randall dryly observed during the same meeting, “I do not think it takes a 
very vivid imagination to realize that the maintenance of the health of this group [the aged] presents 
serious problems to the individuals themselves as well as to many people who are in the younger 
age groups who are carrying the responsibility of many older relatives.”190 Consequently, she added, 
“the health problems of the aged and the aging are an integral part of the nation’s health problem, 
          
189 Ibid., 5580. 
190 Ibid., 5587. 
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[and] the older age groups do require special attention…the solution to their problem cannot be 
found if they are entirely segregated from services to others or isolated from the community.”191  
The solution, Randall believed, was threefold: first, to acknowledge the need to expand and 
improve the nation’s infirmaries and nursing homes, and second to enhance the training of medical 
nursing and custodial care personnel.192 Along with these improvements, Randall emphasized the 
inadequacy of current old age assistance programs to pay for medical care for the aged. As she 
observed,  
the economic status of a great majority of old people is such that 
adequate medical care can be provided for most of them only through 
substantial use of public funds…about a third of people over [the age 
of] 65 or about 4 million people are totally dependent upon public 
funds, [and] another third are estimated to be partially dependent upon 
either public resources or assistance from relatives.193 
 
In essence, the growing number of dependent elderly people in the United States was 
simultaneously becoming too heavy a burden upon both the public treasury and individual families, 
and a vicious cycle of dependency was taking root and growing stronger. As more families had to 
support their older relatives, it became more likely that such families might find their own economic 
resources stretched to the breaking point and beyond, and result in growing impoverishment not just 
for elderly individuals but for members of younger generations as well. 
Though Randall left it unsaid in her testimony, it was clear to the other assembled members 
of the Commission that the question of how to address the growing number of chronically ill had 
          
191 Ibid., 5589. 
192 Randall was supported in her belief that families would prioritize the needs of children and younger members of the 
family over older members by Dr. Edwin Witte, who observed that “children are taken care in the great majority of 
cases as they should be in the families, and you have no public problem…on the other hand, the family under modern 
conditions does not take care of the aged member, and that creates an institutional problem.” Ibid., 5625-5626. As 
Michael Harrington later observed in The Other America, by 1960, approximately 500,000 people lived in nursing 
homes in the United States, but “only 58 per cent of these were considered acceptable by Government standards. And 
these figures understate the gravity of the problem, for they exclude unlicensed homes and units with three beds or less” 
(Harrington, The Other America, 117). 
193 “The President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, Joint Panel on Health of the Aging and Care of the 
Chronically Ill,” Wednesday, July 9, 1952 meeting transcript; p.5594, Joint panel on Chronic Disease & Aging 7/9/52 
transcript, RG 220: Pres. Commission on Health Needs of the Nation; Box 10, HSTL. 
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reopened the questions of how best to provide collective economic security which had vexed the 
New Dealers two decades beforehand. At the previous meeting of the Commission in May 1952, its 
assembled members had conceded as much when they resolved that “the health and welfare needs 
of the older citizen are inseparable…not only physical but also social, economic, psychological, and 
other factors must be combined in a “wholistic” approach to the problem.”194 In keeping with this 
approach, the Commission recommended that the responsibility for meeting the needs of older 
citizens be shared by “the community – local, state, or national…through private enterprise, 
voluntary organizations and governmental effort.” While acknowledging that it would be necessary 
to work together with the nation’s private social welfare organizations, the insistence that 
government had a necessary role to play in solving the question of old age economic dependency 
revealed the continuing legacy of New Deal-era reform liberalism. 
Throughout the last days of the Truman administration, Oscar Ewing remained as busy as 
ever campaigning on behalf of the causes that he and other New Deal liberals had long held dear. In 
September 1952, he spoke before the first annual conference of State Commissioners on Aging in 
Washington, D.C. 195  Like the 1950 conference, the state commissioners’ conference brought 
together officials from various state social welfare departments, many of which were still incipient 
in nature.196 In his remarks, Ewing greeted the assembled delegates from the fifteen states which 
          
194 “Summary of Prevention and Care of Chronic Illness, Panel on Care of Chronically Ill, May 22, 1952,” pg. 5, Joint 
Panel on Chronic Disease and Aging 7/9/52 misc. panel file, RG 220: Pres. Commission on Health Needs of the Nation, 
Box 10, HSTL. 
195  The development of State Commissions on Aging varied widely on a state-by-state basis. In California, the 
administration of Governor Earl Warren had appointed an “Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Aging,” in 
1948, but the committee was solely advisory in nature. Additionally, it lacked the power to award or to administer state 
funding. See California Department of Aging, “Description,” Inventory of the Department of Aging Records, California 
State Archives, available at Online Archive of California, source URL: 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt529027dh/ (accessed March 5, 2017). Other states represented at the 
conference included Arizona, Florida, and Massachusetts. See “States Put First in Care of Aging,” The New York Times, 
September 11, 1952. 
196 For example, California did not hold its first state-wide Governor’s Conference on Aging in 1955, three years 
afterward. See California Department of Aging, “Description,” Inventory of the Department of Aging Records, 
California State Archives, available at Online Archive of California, source URL: 
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had dispatched them to Washington, and emphasized the federal government’s role in facilitating 
the conference.197 “We are here not to read set speeches or to make reports,” he said, adding later 
that “we expect you to do the talking…the Planning Committee has been meticulously careful to 
avoid imposing its own ideas of what this Conference should discuss,” an indirect reference to 
Ewing’s proposed program to provide health insurance to some Social Security recipients, and a 
sign as well of the perilous political landscape through which the Truman administration was still 
carefully navigating.198 By this point, Ewing was complete anathema to the A.M.A. along with 
many members of the powerful conservative congressional coalition of Southern Democrats and 
Republicans, and so his activities had become increasingly limited to advocating on behalf of causes 
which did not necessarily require congressional input or command high profile press attention.  
Within this more limited ambit of movement, though, Ewing remained determined to act. As 
he observed in his address to the commissioners, “two years ago there were not more than two 
official State Commissions or Committees functioning in this field”; now, he noted, there were 
fourteen state commissions, with more being planned.199 Ewing interpreted this development as 
tangible proof of progress. Implicit in his remarks was his satisfaction that, even if action at the 
federal level had been frustrated by the AMA and congressional hostility, there might still be hope 
          
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt529027dh/ (accessed March 5, 2017). Likewise, that same year, New 
York Governor Averell Harriman’s administration organized the state’s first Interdepartmental Committee on the 
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197 During the course of the conference, Derek Van Dyke, an Arizona state legislator, called for state commissions on 
aging to be permanently separated from the Federal Government because of the potential for resistance “on the local 
level” if the commissions were “identified with a Federal Government agency.” See “States Put First in Care of Aging,” 
The New York Times, September 11, 1952. 
198 Oscar R. Ewing, Address to the Conference of State Commissioners on Aging, September 8th, 1952, Washington, 
D.C., in Speech – Conference of State Commissioners on Aging, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 8, 1952) file, in Federal 
Secur. Agency Subj. File, Federal Security Agency – General Correspondence, Box 29, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, 
HSTL. 
199 Ibid., 3. 
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for meaningful solutions at the state and local levels of government, where the partisan rancor 
seemed practically somnolent in comparison to Washington, D.C. Underscoring his nascent faith in 
the power of individual states and local communities to carry out needed reforms, Ewing noted that 
while “there [were] many things the Federal Government can do” to help solve the economic and 
social problems of older Americans, ultimately “the real job must be done by the States and 
communities – by individuals and groups helping their own neighbors.”200 
Ewing’s emphasis on the need for subnational units of government and local community 
action to “solve the problems of older Americans” reflected an emerging belief among some reform-
minded liberals that efforts to use government power on behalf of older Americans would not be 
successfully achieved solely at the federal level in the near future, given the strident opposition of 
the A.M.A. and other powerful centers of organized political resistance. Instead, if such efforts were 
to succeed, they would require the active participation of state and local officials as well as local 
community organizations. This pivot in favor of using local governance to achieve a national goal 
marked a quiet shift in tactics utilized by reformers who sought to strengthen the nation’s social 
welfare net for older Americans. Repeated efforts to push through change at the national level had 
been stymied for a variety of reasons, including the resurgence of a conservative governing majority 
in Congress and the unwillingness of the Roosevelt administration to challenge conservative 
legislators after the disastrous 1938 and 1942 midterm elections, which had reduced the number of 
Democratic congressmen and senators who were able to support more progressive legislation. This 
blockade did not lift after Harry Truman’s upset electoral victory in 1948, which had also restored 
Democratic, though not progressive, control of Congress. Instead, the Truman administration’s rout 
          
200 Ibid., 4. In an interview on the Voice of America radio broadcast three days later on September 11, 1952, Ewing 
reiterated his belief that “it is the State Governments and the local communities which have most of the responsibility 
for developing the various services for these older people to enable them to live happier and better adjusted lives.” See 
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at the hands of the A.M.A. in the multi-year battle over national health insurance, as well as the 
resurgent popular fear of centralized state power that characterized the early years of the Cold War, 
helped to paralyze further efforts at national reform and narrowed the range of possible legislative 
policy outcomes. 
Faced with staunch resistance at the national level, social reformers like Ewing and Wilbur 
Cohen, as well as labor leaders like Walter Reuther, had instead settled upon a more limited and 
ultimately fragmented course. Organized labor, largely blocked in its attempts to win a meaningful 
expansion of the welfare state after the end of World War II, made a separate peace with a resurgent 
corporate leadership. Disastrous midterm election results in 1946 and 1950 deeply cut into the 
number of surviving congressional liberals on Capitol Hill. As a result, the Truman administration’s 
liberal coterie, led primarily by Oscar R. Ewing, opted to lay the groundwork for a scaled back 
version of the broader welfare state, which had first been outlined by Dr. Eveline Burns and the 
NRPB during World War II. This more limited welfare state consisted largely of adjustments to 
Social Security and a universal health insurance plan limited only to older people. This shift in 
strategy explicitly aimed to utilize favorable social attitudes towards older people as a way to 
advance stalled social reform policy goals – in effect, to try and mobilize elderly people (and their 
families) as well as broader public opinion as an effective counterweight to the power of the A.M.A. 
and other organized medical and business groups hostile to any significant expansion of existing 
public social welfare programs. 
In order to build the case for the necessity of public health insurance for older people, the 
Truman administration had turned to the select group of academic experts and researchers who had 
begun during the late 1940s to investigate the changing social and economic conditions of older 
Americans in various urban and rural communities scattered throughout the nation. Through 
conferences like the 1950 National Conference on Aging, as well as regional and state conferences, 
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academic researchers, social welfare experts, and public officials forged a cohesive policy 
community that sought to investigate the many dimensions of old age in America. Chastised by 
defeat at the national level, this community sought to implement programs and initiatives at the 
local and state level. These efforts were accelerated by growing popular discontent in places with 
concentrated populations of older people such as southern California and New York City, where 
local officials increasingly struggled to understand the full dimensions of the problems faced by 
their older constituents. With limited financial resources, these officials welcomed partnerships with 
private philanthropic organizations to fund social science studies, thus cementing a new alliance 
between academic researchers, local officials, and social welfare experts.  
Conclusion 
Demand for expertise resulted in the growth of new organizations such as the National 
Coalition on the Aging, an outgrowth of the long-established National Social Welfare Association, 
and a stronger intermediary role for more established voluntary social welfare organizations like the 
American Public Welfare Association. These voluntary sector organizations played a vital role in 
supplying the necessary expertise to local and state officials as they adapted and developed new 
government services to assist older Americans that would balance the competing demands of 
limited funds and rising popular demands for assistance. Ultimately, as national programs for older 
Americans like Social Security remained decidedly modest and private pension plans favored 
certain categories of workers over others, public officials increasingly turned to the voluntary sector 
to devise policy solutions that would replicate the previously private social and economic functions 
performed by individual families in meeting the needs of older people that Social Security and 
private pensions were unable to cover. These efforts achieved significant success, but as the cost of 
medical care, hospitalization, and prescription drugs continued to rise during the 1950s, this 
infrastructure would increasingly be directed towards the enactment of national health insurance for 
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the elderly as a way to alleviate the growing financial strains which the costs associated with 
providing health care coverage to older people had begun to place on families and local and state 
governments. 
Nevertheless, the expansion into providing health insurance to older people risked obscuring 
the continuing problems with the Social Security program, which had mainly been designed to 
provide older and retired male workers with a form of economic support in retirement that did not 
negate their previously prominent status as the primary family wage-earner or necessitate their 
becoming a financial burden upon their families or the public. In essence, the earnings received 
under the old-age insurance program would replace both the poorhouse and public assistance 
without replicating the least desirable features of either. Despite Social Security’s original intent, by 
1946, twice as many people received payments from Social Security’s noncontributory old-age 
assistance program as drew monthly benefits from its contributory-based old-age insurance system, 
an imbalance that was nearly the reverse of what Social Security’s architects had intended.201  
Moreover, while Social Security’s framers had assumed that old-age assistance would be a 
temporary federal salve to lighten the financial burdens upon states and localities during the 
economic crisis of the 1930s, its southern supporters in Congress saw no reason to wind down the 
program once near-full employment and steady economic growth were restored after the end of 
World War II. For many southern states, Social Security’s old-age assistance program generously 
supplemented meager existing state old-age pension programs but distributed the costs of doing so 
on a nationwide basis because the revenue to support the program was collected from general 
federal taxes rather than earmarked payroll taxes. Southern politicians therefore saw no reason to 
          
201 A.H. Raskin, “Relief for Aged Soars in U.S. As Social Security Falls Short,” The New York Times, December 30, 
1946. Old-age assistance payments totaled $800,000,000 in 1946 (Ibid.) Financially, it made more sense for older 
people to receive old-age assistance monthly payments, which averaged $34.43 nationwide. By contrast, enrollees in the 
old-age insurance program could expect on average to receive $24.83 for men and $19.83 for women. (Ibid.) 
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shift the program’s footing back towards contributory social insurance because such an alteration 
had the potential to divert significant federal monies. 
Alongside their assumption that Social Security’s old-age assistance program would be a 
temporary measure that would be jettisoned once the Social Security old-age insurance program was 
fully operational, liberal New Dealers and other reform-minded individuals had expected that the 
expansion of Social Security into a fully-fledged, modern public welfare system was only a matter 
of time. However, this development did not materialize, as the unfortunate fate of the National 
Resources Planning Board vividly revealed. Instead, defense spending during World War II had 
reduced unemployment to levels not seen since before the onset of the Great Depression. That turn 
of events had helped weaken the arguments once advanced by New Dealers on behalf of the Social 
Security program. It demonstrated that the United States did not have a stagnant “mature economy” 
in which mass unemployment would be a persistent feature, with a fixed number of jobs that had to 
be rationed, and thereby government intervention in order to ration limited employment and 
financial resources was a matter of national survival. 
As the ideological case for the New Deal’s reforms weakened over the course of the 1940s, 
so, too, did the impetus for further action. The enactment of an incomplete Social Security system, 
state old age pensions, and improved economic conditions proved to be sufficient during the course 
of the 1940s in diminishing the mass appeal of the Townsend Movement and its facsimiles in other 
states, though not entirely, as the continuing battle over public old-age pensions in California, 
Colorado, and Washington State revealed. Reform liberals like Dr. Eveline Burns had hoped that 
government domestic policy planning for the postwar world would pick up where the New Deal had 
left off in 1938-1939, and that a more comprehensive, rational public welfare system, on the model 
of Great Britain’s Beveridge Plan, perhaps, would ensure that an economic catastrophe like the 
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Great Depression would not be possible again, and that the social and political instability that had 
followed in the wake of the Great Depression would be relegated to the past.202 
The failure to complete the development of Social Security into a more comprehensive 
program at the national level during the 1940s, created an opportunity for other actors to once more 
take the stage, and inadvertently helped to build the case for the senior state. Because the Social 
Security system remained underdeveloped, many state and local authorities still found themselves 
frequently compelled to deal with the issue of economic security for older people whether they 
wanted to or not, and this issue became more pressing after the war ended and the nation returned to 
a peacetime economic footing, with the expectation that older workers would retire, leave the 
workforce, and be replaced by younger workers. It was no accident, that New York’s pioneering 
Joint Legislative Committee on the Problems of the Aging was established in 1947, or that its scope 
and functions were expanded in 1949. As New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey observed in his 
1949 message to the New York legislature, the Federal Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance program 
had “failed” to create a financially sustainable welfare system because of its limited coverage and 
even more limited benefits. Thus, the impetus had shifted back to individual states like New York to 
try and forge a workable solution to the problem of providing economic security in old age.203 
But solutions to this problem were not immediately forthcoming. The social and political 
atmosphere at the end of World War II and into the early Cold War years was not conducive to 
further expansion of state power, as the failure of Franklin Roosevelt’s proposed Second Bill of 
Rights and the dramatic defeat of the Truman administration’s proposed national health insurance 
program demonstrated. Beleaguered proponents of the welfare state like Federal Security Agency 
Administrator Oscar Ewing, Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, and historian 
          
202 Dr. Burns took a particular interest in the Beveridge Plan. See “Security Program Viewed as Costly,” The New York 
Times, May 8, 1943. 
203 “Broad Aid to Aged Sought by Dewey,” The New York Times, December 31, 1949. 
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Henry Steele Commager attempted to defend the welfare state as a necessary safeguard against the 
temptations of more radical political alternatives like communism, but the balance of public opinion 
seemed more inclined towards the position articulated by the American Medical Association, which 
decried expansion of the welfare state as a pernicious threat to individual liberty in the United 
States.204  
State and local officials who sought to deal with the issue of old-age economic insecurity 
therefore faced a quandary: how to provide needed economic and social support for a category of 
citizens without running afoul of rising anti-statist sentiments or running the risk of supporting 
programs that would be financially unsustainable for limited state budgets. Solutions varied 
according to variables of geography, wealth, and ideology. In less wealthy southern states, local 
officials remained content to rely upon Social Security’s old age assistance program, which 
effectively funneled federal funds to older southern whites. In some wealthier northern states like 
New York and Illinois, state and local officials began to explore partnerships with the private 
welfare community, both as a way to access additional funding and to increase the reach of limited 
social programs.  
This public and private cooperation was born of necessity, but as the 1950 National 
Conference on Aging revealed, state and local welfare administrators were hungry to forge new 
partnerships that would enable them to assess the needs of a growing elderly population and devise 
policy solutions that could be implemented without having to depend upon federal action, since 
dramatic federal action on Social Security and national health insurance seemed a distant possibility 
at best. Finally, in some western states like California and Colorado, popular agitation and 
          
204 For William O. Douglas’s defense of the welfare state, see Gladwin Hill, “Douglas Demands a ‘Welfare State,’” The 
New York Times, February 20, 1949. For Henry Steele Commager, see “Appraisal of the Welfare State,” The New York 
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November 12, 1949. Likewise, Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Carnegie Institution registered a less virulent but still potent 
denunciation of the welfare state; see Russell Porter, “Bush Fears Excess in Welfare State,” The New York Times, 
November 3, 1949. 
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organization of older people into mobilized voters by old-age pension groups continued to roil state 
politics and alarm observers elsewhere, who worried that a revival of the Townsend Movement or 
something similar might elevate a demagogue to high national power. 
While public and private officials wrestled with the issue of economic security in old-age, 
the failure to enact national health insurance in the late 1940s, and the subsequent deliberate strategy 
by liberal reformers to try and secure its enactment via the backdoor of adding health insurance for 
the elderly to the existing Social Security system, would set the agenda and accelerate the 
construction of the senior state in the 1950s and 1960s. Health insurance via the Social Security 
system would become a focal point of liberal reformers during the 1950s, despite (or perhaps 
because) the Social Security system’s existing mechanisms to provide economic security in old-age 
remained grossly inadequate for achieving that purpose.  
The solution, liberal reformers like Wilbur Cohen hoped, would be a new approach to social 
welfare that embraced the public and private sector. In practice, this meant accepting newly revived 
instruments of retirement security like private pensions in order to fill the financial gap left by 
inadequate Social Security benefits. It also meant new connections to the private welfare sector, 
which had begun to pay more attention to the possible economic and social implications of a 
growing aging population in the United States. Over the course of the 1950s, these links would be 
strengthened further, in part by the Eisenhower administration, which favored non-interference on 
the part of the federal government in social welfare matters, and also by liberal reformers and labor 
organizations, which stepped in to fill the gap left by the federal government. 
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CHAPTER III  
Adding Life to Years, 1950-1961 
 
 
By 1950, a new pattern was beginning to emerge in how federal, state, and local officials 
dealt with the issue of providing economic security in old-age. The Social Security system remained 
incomplete, and the development of a new privatized system of pensions and fringe benefits 
provided by many employers which had begun to take shape during World War II had begun to 
accelerate. However, this new private welfare system remained uneven in its reach. While some 
industries – notably automobile and steelmaking – witnessed the expansion of generous new private 
welfare benefits as employers begrudgingly sought to accommodate themselves to the presence of 
organized labor, this development did not extend to all employers. As a result, the level of economic 
security in old age that older Americans could expect to receive varied widely, with race, gender, 
class, and employment status playing determinative roles. 
Consequently, social welfare officials at the local, state, and federal level increasingly found 
themselves confronted during the 1950s with the reemergence of economic insecurity in old age as a 
pressing issue of political and social importance that required active intervention and inventive 
policymaking. However, unlike during the Great Depression, when mass unemployment had made 
it easier to advance the ideological arguments necessary for the development of a more universal 
system like Social Security, unemployment and poverty after the end of World War II was 
increasingly concentrated among groups that were not benefitting as much from the postwar 
economic surge in private sector employment.  
The failure during the Truman administration to secure a significant expansion of the 
welfare state – and the increasing unlikelihood that such expansion at the national level would be 
forthcoming in the near future, given the chill of the Cold War on domestic politics in the United 
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States – shifted the center of action back towards individual states, local communities, and new 
voluntary organizations which began to appear during the decade between the 1950 National 
Conference on Aging and its successor the 1961 White House Conference on Aging. During the 
Eisenhower administration, this tendency was especially pronounced, as senior members of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare tasked with examining and studying the problems 
and needs of the nation’s growing older population emphasized an advisory and consultative role for 
the federal government in this field rather than an active and interventionist one, as had been the 
case during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.  
The lack of substantive action on the part of the federal government and the limited ability of 
state and local governments to fully resolve a fundamentally national problem left a vacuum in the 
nation’s social welfare system that different actors competed to fill during this period. Older but still 
mobile individuals and couples living on fixed incomes, encouraged by the prospect of cheap newly 
developed private housing and overall lower costs of living than in the Northeast and Midwest, 
began to move to Florida and other southern and western locales, a process which would continue 
during the rest of the twentieth century. 1  Unions like the United Steelworkers of America 
experimented with new programs designed to improve the quality of life of their retired members.2 
These new experimental directions in social welfare policy for older people aimed not to provide 
economic security, but rather to offer a kind of social security that reconnected older people to the 
communities in which they lived or had worked. If the emphasis during the 1930s and 1940s had 
been on providing a modicum of economic security in old age, by the 1950s this vision had also 
          
1 See Merrill Folsom, “Retired Persons Flock to Florida For Life in Sun at Modest Cost,” The New York Times, March 
10, 1957. Some unions also helped facilitate the relocation of their retired members to Florida, where they could benefit 
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begun to encompass the belief that guarantees of economic security were no longer sufficient, and 
that problems of old age were not solely limited to inadequate individual or family financial 
resources. 
However, the issue of economic security in old age had never entirely receded. During the 
1950s, this issue became increasingly tangled with the broader issue of health security. After 1950, 
senior officials in the Truman administration and later congressional liberals and union leaders had 
begun to focus on amending the original Social Security Act in order to provide health insurance to 
Social Security recipients. Their purpose in doing so was to shift the battleground in the long 
running war over national health insurance in the United States by stressing the health care needs of 
older Americans, whom they assumed would be a far more appealing constituency for such a bold 
expansion of public assistance. Essentially, it was a deliberate move designed to make the expansion 
of the federal government’s role in facilitating collective economic security seem far less 
controversial to skeptical public opinion and wary opponents like the American Medical 
Association (A.M.A.). 
At the same time, the tactical shift to emphasizing publicly subsidized health care coverage 
was not only the product of a strategic decision made by its proponents. It was also a response to a 
financial problem that had already begun to roil labor-management relations and to upset public 
finances as well as state and local politics. In 1955, for example, a California state report noted that 
“the medical needs of Old-Age [Social] Security recipients and the manner of meeting them 
constitute a problem which is increasingly predominant,” and as Dora L. Costa observes, “state and 
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local expenditures on vendor medical payments rose by almost 130 percent between 1950 and 
1956” in the United States.3  
It was perhaps no accident, then, that California would again prove to be the launch pad for 
another large-scale old-age advocacy organization with national ambitions. Twenty years after the 
Townsend Movement had spread out far and wide from Long Beach, California, the American 
Association of Retired Persons (or A.A.R.P.) founded by Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus in 1957 would 
discover unexpectedly high mass demand for its new voluntary group health insurance plan 
originally aimed at its core membership of retired white middle-class teachers. In a short period of 
time, the A.A.R.P. went from a small, regional organization to national prominence, a transition that 
was partly facilitated by the Eisenhower administration and by some members of the business and 
medical community who were eager to offer a compelling and viable alternative to the proposed 
expansion of the Social Security system to include health insurance advocated by some 
congressional Democrats, local and state welfare officials, and organized labor leaders. Though 
access to affordable health insurance was only part of the A.A.R.P.’s original founding purpose – 
namely, to permit older people to lead independent lives without requiring public or private 
assistance – the organization’s emphasis on expanding social and community services as a 
necessary component of active senior living harkened an evolution in how federal, state, and local 
welfare officials would approach the intertwined economic and social problems of older people in 
America. 
In sum, the senior state underwent the first of its two major postwar shifts during the 1950s. 
In a semi-coordinated fashion, state and local welfare officials, along with their counterparts in the 
private voluntary sector and the organized labor movement, had come to appreciate the limitations 
          
3 Jackson Putnam, Old Age Politics in California from Richardson to Reagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1970), 134, quoted in Dora L. Costa, The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 177. 
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of the existing Social Security system and the growing number of private pension systems, both of 
which continued to offer meager financial assistance to selected categories of workers. As rising 
medical and hospitalization costs outstripped the economic resources of individual retirees and their 
families and threatened to overwhelm the overall fiscal stability of corporate, labor union, and 
public budgets, expansion of affordable coverage – whether by private insurance companies or by 
public means – became a paramount goal for the architects of the senior state.  They worried that if 
such costs were not arrested, the expenses associated with providing health care coverage would 
require a more dramatic restructuring of welfare programs at a time when such funds were both 
limited and increasingly needed to meet other social needs associated with the dramatic postwar 
population expansion in the United States. In the late 1940s, the problem of economic security in 
old age had been conceived of in terms that were almost entirely financial in nature; ten years later, 
that problem had been redefined to include not only economic security but also health security as a 
fundamental right for older Americans. 
The Golden Years? 
 
If, as Eric Hobsbawm has written, the thirty years immediately following the end of World 
War II were “golden years” of increasingly widespread affluence and growing prosperity for the 
developed, capitalist nations of Western Europe and North America, economic growth during this 
period did not necessarily spread its blessings evenly.4 After the end of World War II, older workers 
were frequently dismissed in order to open up employment opportunities for returning World War II 
veterans.5 Leaving the workforce, though, also meant losing access to a steady source of income 
          
4 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage, 1996), 257-258. 
5 As Dwight MacDonald wrote in his 1963 New Yorker review of Michael Harrington’s The Other America, “the post-
1940 decrease in poverty was not due to policies or actions of those who are not poor, those in positions of power and 
responsibility. The war economy needed workers, wages went up, and the poor became less poor. When economic stasis 
set in, the rate of decrease in poverty slowed down proportionately, and it is still slow.”  See Dwight McDonald, “Our 
Invisible Poor,” The New Yorker, January 19, 1963. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1963/01/19/our-
invisible-poor (accessed September 24, 2016). 
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sufficient to adequately maintain a household. As a University of Chicago-sponsored study of 
Kansas City’s older population published in 1952 observed, “the problem of financial security in old 
age is not an ordinary “poverty” problem. Many of the impoverished aged have [sic] had substantial 
middle-class incomes during their active lives. Public assistance cases occur in all parts of the 
city.”6 Invoking the specter of the Cold War, the Kansas City study intoned that “the United States 
and Western Europe have aging populations; the Communist countries do not. National survival 
may depend in part on our ability to utilize older workers at a time when the young are called to 
military service…in short, an aging population is not only a moral and humanitarian problem, but 
also a utilitarian problem of great importance.”7  
The solution, according to the study, was “to change the conditions that produce economic 
dependency, social isolation, and long-term illness in old age; and we also need to assure the 
welfare of those who become dependent.”8 Statistics collected by the federal government on old age 
poverty supplemented the findings of the Kansas City study, and shed light on the growing number 
of older people who were increasingly turning to public assistance due to inadequate personal 
financial resources. Of the approximately 12 million older people in the United States in 1950 
(defined as persons aged 65 years or older) only slightly more than half had income support from 
either continued employment or social insurance. Additionally, approximately 23% of all older 
people were receiving some form of public assistance exclusive of Social Security payments or 
income received from private pensions.9 
          
6 Community Studies, Inc., “We All Grow Old: A Study of Kansas City’s Aging Population”, 1952. Online Archive of 
California, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via 
the Online Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/#c01-1.3.9.5 (accessed 
September 24, 2016). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 U.S. Social Security Administration, Division of Program Research, Money Income of Aged Persons, Mid-1960*, 
Research and Statistics, Note No. 28 -1960, December 5th, [1960?], U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
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The growing number of postwar studies conducted on the economic and social needs of 
America’s growing older population had its origins in academic research conducted at the 
University of Chicago by a loose, informal network of trained sociologists and statisticians. In 1948, 
University of Chicago sociologists Ernest W. Burgess, Ruth S. Cavan, and Robert J. Havighurst 
undertook a study of older Americans in order to determine “what interests these people may have, 
of how they are spending their time, or the kind of work they do.” 10 Burgess, along with his 
colleague Robert E. Park, had founded the famed Chicago School of Sociology, and had conducted 
pioneering studies of urban life, crime, family, and marriage in American life. With the assistance of 
his colleagues at the University of Chicago and elsewhere, Burgess now sought to undertake a 
groundbreaking study of aging in American life.  
Though Burgess and his collaborators were not the first sociologists to professionally 
address the subject, there was a growing urgency to his study. As Burgess and his colleagues knew, 
the number of older Americans was rising in a twofold manner: first, in terms of aggregate 
population, and second, the percentage of Americans who could be classified as “older” had also 
increased significantly during the 1940s. Despite this shift in the nation’s demographics, the amount 
of scholarly research available to help the nation’s policymakers make informed decisions about its 
growing older population was surprisingly limited.  
Instead, in many instances policymakers were making decisions based on educated 
guesswork. In perhaps the most famous instance of such guesswork, the architects of the Social 
          
Washington, D.C., in Box 11, Staff Research Group, White House Office (Albert P. Toner and Christopher H. Russell): 
Records, 1956-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter “DDEL”). 
10 Ernest W. Burgess, Ruth S. Cavan, Robert J. Havighurst, “Your Activities and Attitudes,” Chicago: Science Research 
Associates, 1948, 1. California and West Coast Labor and Industrial Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online 
Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4. 
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Security Act had arbitrarily selected the age of 65 as the age of benefit entitlement.11 Burgess’ study 
spearheaded at the University of Chicago would therefore begin the process of filling in the gaps 
about the lives of older Americans. The questions that the study sought to answer were difficult. At 
its base, the study wanted to know who older Americans really were, where they lived, and how 
they conducted their lives. These and other questions remained to be answered, as public officials, 
private philanthropies, and other interested parties tried to decide how best to allocate limited 
resources and develop solutions that could mitigate the social and economic challenges which a 
growing population of older people seemed increasingly likely to impose upon their communities. 
By putting together enough data, the study aimed to paint a portrait of older people that would be 
both scientifically rigorous and useful for public policy practitioners. 
Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst were not the only academics investigating America’s aging 
population. At the University of Michigan, Clark Tibbitts and Wilma Donahue were already deeply 
involved in their community studies of older residents in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and surrounding 
towns and villages in Washtenaw County. Additionally, Tibbitts and Donahue also led and directed 
the University of Michigan’s Institute for Human Adjustment, which, over the course of the late 
1940s and into the 1950s, had become a focal point of professional exchange among government 
officials, academics, and private welfare practitioners for delving into the numerous issues 
generated by the aging of American society.12 
 
 
          
11 As Wilbur Cohen (one of the junior level staffers for the Committee on Economic Security responsible for devising 
the original Social Security Act) later wrote, “There was no scientific, social or gerontological basis for the selection [of 
the age of 65] . . . it was the general consensus that 65 was the most acceptable age.” See Wilbur J. Cohen, Retirement 
Policies Under Social Security (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957) 24. 
12 For more on Tibbitts and Donahue, see “Biography,” Institute of Gerontology (University of Michigan) Records 
1948-1987, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, available online at: 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/b/bhlead/umich-bhl-86996?byte=21750099;focusrgn=bioghist;subview=standard;view=reslist 
(accessed August 18, 2016). 
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The Problem of Older Workers in a Growing Economy 
In a sign of the Institute’s growing importance as a meeting point between academic 
researchers and federal officials, Ewan Clague, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics for the U.S. 
Department of Labor, gave an address at the University of Michigan in July 1948. In his speech, 
Clague explained the federal government’s emerging understanding of the scope of the issues facing 
older Americans, and focused primarily on older workers (a group he defined as those workers aged 
45 years or older). As he and other federal officials had come to understand the matter, there was 
“no particular problem of aging and employability,” given that older workers had left the overall 
labor force during the Great Depression, but many had subsequently reentered the workforce during 
the wartime home front labor shortage between 1941 and 1945.13  
In other words, Clague believed that the relative employability of older workers rested less 
upon the fact that such workers were old, and more on the overall manpower needs of the economy. 
As Clague acknowledged, 
[d]uring the depression years one of the reasons advanced for the 
passage of Social Security legislation was that it would encourage 
retirement of older workers, and thus make room for younger men. 
However, the actual scale of old age benefits has never provided a 
reasonable choice to the older workers. Most of the retirements under 
old age insurance have been forced upon the worker by previous 
unemployment…With the higher costs of living existing today, these 
benefits are even less of an inducement to retire.14 
 
          
13 Ewan Clague, “Aging and Employability,” July 22, 1948, Address to the Charles A. Fisher Memorial Institute on 
Aging, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, California and West Coast Labor and Industrial Relations, selected 
publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4. Clague would make addresses similar 
to this one over the course of the next several years at a wide variety of venues across the United States. See for example 
Ewan Clague, “Problems of the Aging Worker,” Summary of Address before the Tenth Annual Industrial Nurses 
Conference, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 19, 1950 in California and West Coast Labor and 
Industrial Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, 
University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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The inadequacy of Social Security benefits had, in turn, led some unions to demand private pension 
plans able to close the gap between Social Security benefits and the cost of living and to emphasize 
seniority rights in the collective bargaining agreements they forged with corporate management. 
Such plans were necessarily tied to gainful employment and frequently based upon years of vested 
service, and as a result they favored long-term workers (and therefore workforce stability) over 
older workers with fewer years left to work.15 In the words of a report later published by the Federal 
Security Agency, 
When the program [Social Security] was adopted in 1935, it was the 
intent of Congress that this program should become the Nation’s 
primary method of preventing dependency in old-age. This 
expectation was not realized, however, because only a little more than 
half of the Nation’s jobs were under the program and the millions of 
workers who had already retired or did do soon after the program 
began had no opportunity to qualify for benefits.16 
 
Even the subsequent amendments to Social Security enacted in 1939 “proved to be inadequate” 
which resulted in “many beneficiaries…living at income levels considerably below those prevailing 
for public assistance in a given locality…benefits for a retired worker and his wife averaged about 
$41 [per month] in December 1949.”17 
Ultimately, the inadequacy of benefits under Social Security’s old-age insurance provisions 
combined with the inability of many older workers to secure gainful employment had again created 
a political and social climate in which poverty in old-age was rising by the late 1940s. As had been 
the case during the Great Depression, many impoverished older people increasingly turned to public 
          
15 Ibid., 7. 
16  See Federal Security Agency, National Conference on Aging, Background Statement: Section III, Income 
Maintenance, pg. 15, August 13-15, 1950. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, available at 
California and West Coast Labor and Industrial Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on 
Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4 (accessed August 25, 2016). (Hereafter 
cited as Background Statement, Section III, National Conference on Aging, 1950). 
17  Ibid. According to the CPI Inflation Calculator available at the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor 
Statistic’s website, $41 in 1949 would be equivalent to roughly $414.56 in 2016 dollars. See the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ CPI Inflation Calculator available at: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (accessed August 25, 2016). 
 190 
 
assistance for help. As a 1950 Federal Security Agency report later noted, “in December 1949, more 
than 2.7 million persons, or 241 persons per 1,000 persons in the population 65 years of age and 
over, were receiving old-age assistance…in mid-1948 about one recipient in 16 was getting old-age 
assistance in addition to his old-age and survivors insurance benefit.18” 
In other words, while more workers (approximately 7.7 million people) were covered by 
Social Security’s old age insurance program than by its old age assistance program (approximately 
2.7 million people), those covered under the old age insurance program were still resorting to the 
old age assistance program, a situation the architects of the Social Security Act had assumed would 
be a temporary bug rather than a permanent feature of the system.19 Additionally, a growing number 
of unemployed older workers presented a challenge for policymakers like Clague, who believed that 
“if truly adequate and reasonable benefits are established for the oldest workers (over 65), then there 
will be pressure to lower the age limits and bring in the unemployed in the next lower age groups.”20 
Invoking the ghost of the Townsend Movement, Clague warned that “in times of severe 
unemployment the numbers of these [older] persons may be so great as to constitute a powerful 
social and political force.”21  
Rather than wait for that development to transpire, the superior alternative, Clague reasoned, 
was for the federal government – in conjunction with local and state governments, as well as 
          
18 See Background Statement, Section III, National Conference on Aging, 1950. 
19 Ibid. In 1950, there were approximately 12.3 million people aged 65 years or older in the United States. See U.S. 
Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (source: https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf, 
pg. 60, Figure 2-6, Population Age 65 and Over: 1900 to 2000). Broken down by race and sex, there were 5.36 million 
white males aged 65 years or older, 6.0 million white females aged 65 or older, 412,000 black males aged 65 or older, 
and 454,000 black females aged 65 or older. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1970, Part 1, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970 (Accessed at: 
https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/histstats-colonial-1970.pdf). 
20 Ewan Clague, “Aging and Employability,” July 22, 1948, pg. 4, Address during to the Charles A. Fisher Memorial 
Institute on Aging, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Available at California and West Coast Labor and Industrial 
Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of 
California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4. (Accessed August 25, 2016). 
21 Ibid., 4. 
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concerned private organizations – to encourage older workers to remain in the workforce beyond the 
age of 65. As Clague argued, “the constructive long-run solution of the problem is the development 
of jobs and occupations which can be adequately filled by older workers.”22 As he recognized, 
though, “the major attack on the problem will have to come within industry itself, which employs 
the vast proportion of the labor force” even as Clague conceded that “I have no intention here of 
saddling businessmen and employers generally with this problem.”23 Instead, he held out hope that a 
coalition of “the community” and industry would forge a workable solution that would meet the 
needs of older workers for gainful employment, or else “unemployment and destitution” among 
millions of older workers would become chronic, and they might in time become “numerous enough 
to force us to some kind of social action.” Otherwise, Clague asserted, “what we may get from such 
pressures may be very unsatisfactory – socially, economically and politically.”24 
Neither Clague nor his colleagues in the federal government were alone in their growing 
concern over the potential social and political disruption which a growing army of unemployed 
older workers might be capable of. A few months before Clague’s speech at the University of 
Michigan, the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) had made its views on the subject 
clear. Speaking before the New York League of Business and Professional Women on March 7, 
1948, Phyllis H. Moehrle, a N.A.M. vice president, noted that “N.A.M. feels that a great deal 
remains to be done…Industry has a major responsibility to hire as many older people as possible.”25 
To this end, Moehrle announced that NAM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had joined forces 
“in a campaign to interest employers in the problem of physically handicapped and older workers, 
          
22 Ibid., 6-8. 
23 Ibid., 8-9. 
24 Ibid., 9. 
25 Phyllis H. Moerhle, “Taking a Look at the Age Factor in Employment,” Address before the New York League of 
Business and Professional Women, Inc., March 7, 1948, New Weston Hotel, New York City. Online Archive of 
California, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4 (accessed August 25, 
2016). 
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and the importance of making every possible effort to provide increased employment opportunities 
for these groups of our citizens.” 26  In language redolent of advocates for corporate-sponsored 
welfare capitalism in the 1920s, Moehrle stated that “good management does not think it is fair or 
good business to let out a long-service employee without some provision for assisting him to 
maintain a reasonable standard of living.”27  
Taking aim at the recent efforts by the AFL and the CIO as well as other unions to gain 
some measure of control over pension plan administration and funding in collective bargaining 
agreements, Moehrle made clear N.A.M.’s hostility to such efforts. The N.A.M. insisted instead on 
the right of employers to avoid “having a workforce [that] does not become too heavily loaded with 
older people.”28 While agreeing with federal officials like Oscar Ewing that much work remained to 
be done to “change public concepts about age” in order to eradicate “false ideas which people have 
about the influence of age on ability,” Moehrle asserted that this task could best be accomplished by 
voluntary efforts and suasion within and among members of the business community, and there 
were “no panaceas, no formulas” which could rightfully be imposed by either unions or elected 
officials on management hiring and firing decisions.  
Instead, Moehrle argued that “full employment offers the most effective solution,” but that 
“this can’t be achieved without increasing industrial activity and [creating] an atmosphere in which 
business can function.”29 If unions or the government insisted on exerting “an undue or artificial 
pressure in behalf of the older aged” that would “result in senseless discrimination against 
youth…there is no point in merely transferring the problem from one group of workers to 
          
26 Ibid., 2. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Ibid., 6. 
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another…we can’t set one group against another.”30 N.A.M.’s strategy was clear: by defining the 
problem of aging workers solely as “an individual problem” rather than a collective one, it could 
portray itself as a protector of the rights of individual workers and thereby put labor unions on the 
defensive.31  
N.A.M. thereby skillfully employed the rights-based language of New Deal liberalism in 
order to buttress traditional corporate control over private employer practices. It argued that 
government or union interference based on “arbitrary age requirements or physical characteristics” 
was impeding employers from providing truly full employment, and if such barriers were removed, 
then employers would once again feel confident enough to employ and hire all qualified workers. 
N.A.M.’s main objective was to simultaneously preserve the ability of private employers to oversee 
their workforces as they saw fit without giving the appearance of discrimination or favoritism, even 
if the actual, private day-to-day practices of a significant proportion of its members suggested just 
that. 
The Desmond Committee and New York’s Campaign against Age Discrimination 
N.A.M.’s concerns were not merely with what the federal government might do in the realm 
of employment hiring practices. In states like New York and California that had active state-level 
legislative committees examining the problems of older workers, evidence was beginning to mount 
of widespread discrimination by employers against older and handicapped workers. In December 
1949, Ewan Clague appeared before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems 
          
30 Ibid. 
31 For an example of NAM’s efforts to persuade employers to treat older workers on an individual case-by-case basis, 
see National Association of Manufacturers, “The Productive Years – Ages 45-65: A Guide for Employers in Making the 
Best Use of the Older Work Force,” New York, 1961. Available via the Online Archive of California at: Accessed via 
the Online Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4. 
(Accessed September 8, 2016). 
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of the Aging at the request of its chairman, State Senator Thomas C. Desmond.32 Desmond and his 
committee had successfully pushed in the past for important investigations into potentially 
discriminatory employment practices in New York, but the amount of information at his fingertips 
was confined primarily to New York State. Clague’s task was therefore to help the Committee 
ascertain which discriminatory employment practices in New York were also present elsewhere in 
the nation, and to provide information collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics about the 
employability of older workers. 33  As Clague had explained in his speech at the University of 
Michigan earlier that same year, the chief problem confronting older workers was twofold: “on the 
one hand, the advances of medical science enabled a growing proportion of the population to 
survive into old age. On the other hand, employment opportunities did not keep pace with this 
increase in the aged population.”34 
This growing disparity between increased lifespans and decreased employment opportunities 
was problematic in Clague’s view because  
if we fall short of our full employment goals and if we fail to provide 
adequate work opportunities to those older men and women who want 
to and are able to work…the increased span of enforced idleness in 
old age will place a heavy financial burden…on those in the labor 
          
32 Senator Desmond had been the driving force behind the “New York Plan,” a program developed by state legislators 
and community service organizations that emphasized an “individualized community approach that recognizes the 
social and health as well as the economic aspects of aging.” The New York Plan, according to its creators, stood in 
contrast to the state-wide solution undertaken in California, which an internal New York State legislative report 
unfavorably described as searching for the “easy panacea of boosting old-age assistance, a process which threatens to 
bankrupt the state.” The New York Plan therefore sought to address a wider range of issues faced by older people, but to 
do so in a collaborative way that would not create an unsustainable financial burden on New York’s budget. See 
Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Community Aid for Old Folk Helps Solve a Major Problem,” The New York Times, July 31, 
1949. The New York Plan consisted of a ten-step program that included “smashing artificial age barriers that keep 
oldsters from employment,” and “extending vocational and medical rehabilitation so oldsters can resume work.” In fact, 
the thrust of the Plan emphasized returning as many older people to gainful employment, possibly as a way to keep the 
number of older people dependent upon public assistance in the state from growing too numerous. 
33 Ewan Clague, Commissioner of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “How Long Do Our Workers Last?,” 
Statement before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on the Problems of the Aging, New York, New York, 
December 8, 1949 in California and West Coast Labor and Industrial Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, Berkeley. Accessed via the Online 
Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4 (accessed 
August 25, 2016). 
34 Ibid., 2. 
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force who will be contributing to their support, either directly as 
individuals, or by increased levies on their current earnings.35 
 
In contrast to NAM’s insistence that the problems of older workers could best be addressed solely as 
an internal matter and on an individual basis by private employers, Clague instead concluded his 
statement to the Joint Legislative Committee by observing that the dilemma of older workers “will 
command the combined resources of the Federal and State and local governments, of labor and 
management, and of many community groups, if it is to be dealt with effectively.” 36 Clague’s 
statement lent encouragement to the committee’s efforts to get legislation passed in New York State 
which would mandate the use of fair employment practices with regard to older and disabled 
workers. The prospects for the successful enactment of such legislation were likely better in New 
York State than they were at the national level, where the presence of a powerful conservative 
congressional coalition on Capitol Hill militated against the passage of progressive legislation 
intended to expand on the Wagner Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act.  
In fact, New York State, California, and a host of other major industrial states had already 
begun by the late 1940s and early 1950s to address the issue of how to best provide for economic 
security in old age. Senator Desmond’s New York State Joint Legislative Committee on the 
Problems of the Aging was steadily producing reports, brochures, and other publications designed to 
help older New Yorkers find gainful employment, a step that few other states had yet taken.37 
Perhaps more importantly, Desmond’s committee was already beginning the process of shepherding 
pioneering proposed legislation to protect the rights of older workers from discrimination into 
          
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 See Warren Weaver, Jr., “State is Put First in Helping of Aged,” The New York Times, August 13, 1950. In addition to 
New York, by 1950 the states of California, Illinois, and Michigan had taken formal steps to create new agencies or 
departments specifically designed to address the social and economic security of older people. 
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tangible law in New York State.38 Eventually, New York State would enact legislation prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of age in June 1958 by adding older workers (whom the law defined as 
persons “between the ages of 45 and 65”) as a protected class of worker.39 New York thus joined a 
small group of states like Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Colorado that had enacted such laws, 
though in the latter two these laws had proven to be ineffective at serving their stated purpose 
because they lacked enforcement provisions.40  
By contrast, New York’s statute created a process for older workers to file complaints with 
the State Commission Against Discrimination (S.C.A.D.), and for state officials to then investigate 
the veracity of those complaints. In the months following the enactment of New York’s age 
discrimination legislation, hiring practices in the state showed a modest but appreciable change. 
Prior to the law’s enactment, roughly ten percent of newspaper employment advertisements in New 
York included explicit age requirements or prohibitions, whereas afterwards less than one percent 
did. Hundreds of workers also filed complaints alleging either age discrimination in employer hiring 
or retention practices with the S.C.A.D., though not all of these cases were resolved in their favor.41 
In order to deal with such claims without inflaming private employers, S.C.A.D. insisted upon a 
policy of “direct contact” that emphasized “education and persuasion” rather than “prosecution and 
          
38 For an example of one of the many publications put by the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on the 
Problems of the Aging, see New York State Joint Legislative Committee, “Memo to Older Workers, re: How to get a 
Job,” Albany, New York, November 1950. Available via the Online Archive of California at: 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/?#c01-1.3.9.5 (Accessed September 8, 2016). As the 
“Memo to Older Workers” pamphlet cited an oversupply of workers for available jobs as well as the “old-fashioned 
hiring habits on the part of employers.” (Ibid., 3). In 1950, when Desmond’s committee first began to debate new state 
legislation designed to bar discrimination on the basis of age in hiring practices in New York State, its hearings in 
Albany drew a crowd of “several hundred social workers and representatives of philanthropic organizations,” a telling 
sign of the growing interest which New York’s social welfare community took in the proposed legislation. See “Age Job 
Bias Law Urged for State,” The New York Times, December 15, 1950. 
39  “The Age Discrimination Law,” The New York Times, June 16, 1958. New York’s delay in enacting age 
discrimination legislation rested on the concerns of state legislators that attempts by other states to achieve lessened 
discrimination on the basis of age through new laws had not proven to be particularly effective because employers had 
simply evaded or ignored these laws. See “State Ban on Barring Jobs to Aged Put Off,” The New York Times, December 
9, 1951. 
40 Charles Grutzner, “Age Limit on Jobs Yields Slowly,” The New York Times, January 17, 1960. 
41 “Age Bars to Jobs Found Declining,” The New York Times, November 26, 1958; “Age Limit to Jobs,” The New York 
Times, January 23, 1960; “Less Age Discrimination,” The New York Times, November 29, 1958. 
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punishment,” a strategy that ultimately yielded modest but measurable compliance.42 Dr. Elmer A. 
Carter, the chairman of S.C.A.D., summed up the commission’s approach by describing its tactics as 
an “initial educational period” that aimed less at dictating to private employers and instead sought to 
teach employers to set aside preconceived notions about the productivity of older workers.43 By 
building productive relationships with private employers, S.C.A.D., in conjunction with the New 
York State Employment Service, sought to build support for its long-term initiative to increase job 
opportunities for older workers, which would have the double benefit of reducing both age 
discrimination and poverty among older workers in New York.44 
The Elderly Poor and the Rise of Community Services in New York City 
New York State’s pioneering efforts during the 1950s represented an important response to 
the crisis over economic security in old-age that had reemerged during the late 1940s. In the public 
sector, state and local officials tentatively explored new ways to assist older people who lacked 
access to Social Security or to private pensions. The situation they confronted would have been 
shockingly familiar to old-age pension reformers twenty years earlier. As part of a major five part 
series on the problems of aging Americans, the New York Times sent reporter Edith Evans Asbury in 
February 1955 to visit the mental hospitals, private nursing homes, and other institutions sprinkled 
throughout New York City, which had become the final residence of thousands of elderly New 
Yorkers.45 As Asbury soberly noted in her articles, “most of the havens in which these men and 
women have found refuge for their declining years were not designed to handle their problems.”46  
The residents of these institutions, though, were not destitute paupers without any means of 
economic support. While many of them had some combination of Social Security, Old Age 
          
42 See “Abrams Asks Hiring of Older Workers,” The New York Times, May 6, 1958. 
43 Charles Grutzner, “Age Limit on Jobs Yields Slowly,” The New York Times, January 17, 1960. 
44 “More Jobs for Older Workers,” The New York Times, November 1, 1958. 
45 Edith Evans Asbury. “Care Inadequate for the Sick Aged: Most Institutions Accepting Them Were Not Designed for 
That Purpose,” The New York Times, February 22, 1955. 
46 Ibid. 
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Assistance, and private pensions (“all income groups are struck,” the Times noted), they had still 
ended up in institutional care, in no small part because “the average, self-supporting, middle-income 
family…finds it impossible in New York City to solve the problem of long-term custodial care for a 
senile relative in a way commensurate with its pride and self-respect.”47 As Asbury wrote, only “by 
reducing their own standard of living [could] some middle income families…manage to maintain a 
senile parent or grandparent…Usually, as things are now, the senile from the middle and lower 
income family eventually goes to a taxpayer-supported institution, despite his family’s financial 
sacrifices and pride.”48 The economic strains felt by many New York City families to support older 
relatives were felt elsewhere in the nation. As Michael Harrington would later write in The Other 
America, 
it is a fact that the problems of the aged are so great that families, 
probably the majority of them in the nation, cannot really deal with 
them…[d]uring the fifties…all costs on the Consumer Price Index 
went up by 12 per cent. But medical costs, that terrible staple of the 
aged, went up by 36 per cent, hospitalization rose by 65 per cent, and 
group hospitalization costs (Blue Cross premiums), were up by 83 per 
cent. These figures have clearly priced the care of the aged out of the 
budget of millions of American families.”49 
 
Asbury’s series on the plight of New York’s elderly poor was just the latest piece of evidence that 
programs like Social Security that were designed to keep older people out of economic penury were 
becoming increasingly ineffective at performing that task.50  
In the decade before the New York Times ran Asbury’s series, its reporters had covered in 
extensive detail the struggle by organized old age groups in California and Colorado to enact 
          
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Harrington, The Other America, 118. 
50 Edith Evans Asbury, “Growing Ranks of the Aged Pose Grave Social Problem,” The New York Times, February 21, 
1955; Edith Evans Asbury, “Rise in Aged Burdens Young: Longer Survival Beyond Point at Which Health Begins to 
Fail Piles Up Medical Bills,” The New York Times, February 23, 1955; Edith Evans Asbury, “Aids to Morale Needed for 
Aged: As Over-65 Population Rises, Experts Are Concerned Over Ways to Keep It Occupied,” The New York Times, 
February 24, 1955, 18; Edith Evans Asbury, “Europe Leads U.S. in Assisting Aged,” The New York Times, February 25, 
1955. 
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guaranteed pensions for the older residents of those states – effectively, to legislate the Townsend 
Plan into existence on a state-by-state basis.51 As the Times reported, California’s old-age pension 
had eliminated the traditional “support-by-relatives” stipulation which many states (including New 
York) insisted upon, and consequently had a far greater number of eligible applicants and recipients, 
with the pension’s cost amounting to approximately 17% of a $1 billion budget (1949 dollars) and 
rising in its first year alone.  
Within a year of enacting this unusually generous old-age pension, California voters in a 
November 1949 special election largely rescinded its more liberal provisions, but not before roughly 
a third of its citizens over the age of 65 (approximately 250,000 people) had signed up for a pension 
(the pensions averaged out to $71 monthly in 1949 dollars). By contrast, less than ten percent of 
residents aged 65 years or older received pensions in New York and Pennsylvania; in both of those 
states, the pension averaged between $40 and $52 monthly in 1949 dollars, a figure that was 
considerably less generous than California. Colorado and Washington State, though, had the highest 
overall proportion of elderly citizens over the age of 65 receiving state old-age pensions at 47.71 
and 38 percent, respectively.   
As the Times coverage of these state-level struggles over old-age pensions hinted, there had 
been a political re-awakening among the elderly that had galvanized them into action, a fact that 
local welfare officials and experts in New York City were also becoming aware of.52 In November 
          
51 See, for example, Gladwin Hill, “California Worry Rises on Pensions: $75 a Month at Age 63 Is Big Attraction to the 
Elderly from Other States,” The New York Times, April 17, 1949. See also Lawrence E. Davies, “California Limits 
Utopia for Aged: In a Reversal of Form, Voters Decide to Drop Thousands of Pensioners from the Rolls,” The New York 
Times, November 13, 1949. 
52 See, for example, Peter Kihss, “41% of Pensioners Are Found Unhappy: Inadequate Income and Desire to Work Are 
Chief Problems, Mayor’s Committee Hears,” The New York Times, May 17, 1953. The New York City Mayor’s 
Advisory Committee for the Aged had been organized in late 1949 with funds donated by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
and had rapidly become a clearinghouse of information about the approximately 675,000 older people living in New 
York City, a figure which dwarfed the entire population of most American cities, and which represented the single 
largest geographical concentration of senior citizens in the entire country, exceeding even the Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
California region which had been the wellspring of the Townsend Movement. 
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1945, the New York Times sponsored a broadcast radio forum in which Ollie Randall from the 
Community Service Society, Dr. Frederick Zeman of the private Home for Aged and Infirm 
Hebrews, and Lillian Poses, a regional Social Security representative, discussed the growing “needs 
of the aged.”53 In particular, the three speakers emphasized the demand by elderly people that there 
be “better housing facilities…more recreational facilities…and a new public attitude recognizing 
their individuality,” all of which were needs that were not being met by the Social Security system. 
Furthermore, these new demands suggested how many older Americans had begun to redefine the 
parameters of economic and social security programs beyond the principles of basic economic 
security that had guided the assumptions made by the architects of the original Social Security 
Act.54 
Increasingly, the Times warned in its coverage of state-level pension movements in western 
states like California and Colorado that elderly Americans were again becoming increasingly active 
in seeking to have their demands met by the political system. 55  The ferocity of the fight in 
California between resurgent latter-day Townsend Movement-style old age advocacy groups was 
particularly alarming to the New York Times reporters stationed there, who could not help but 
wonder if the generational conflict in California was merely the opening act in a new, potentially 
much larger national struggle over old-age economic security, much as it had been during the Great 
Depression.56 In truth, though, while the Townsend Movement had largely ceased to be an effective 
          
53  See Harry S. Truman: “Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program,” 
November 19, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12288 (Accessed September 24, 2016). 
54 “Needs of Aged Stressed: Better Housing and Recreation Asked on Radio Forum,” The New York Times, November 
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55 Lawrence E. Davies, “California Limits Utopia for Aged: In a Reversal of Form, Voters Decide to Drop Thousands of 
Pensioners from the Rolls,” The New York Times, November 13, 1949. 
56 In a 1950 report, the U.S. Department of Labor found that approximately 8% of the population in both California and 
Colorado was over the age of 65. As the Labor Department report noted, though, “in general…the highest proportions of 
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Southern States, the proportion of aged persons tends to be relatively low.” The same report predicted that the 
proportion of workers aged 45 and over is “likely to increase significantly in future years.” See U.S. Department of 
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force in national politics, it had left a formidable legacy in many western states, where its organizers 
had successfully politicized many older Americans on the issue of old-age economic security.57 
Even more troubling, evidence of discontent among older Americans was not merely a regional 
phenomenon confined to western states like California or Colorado: a 1953 poll funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation of retired New York City teachers and city employees – many of whom 
already had publicly supported pensions – revealed broad dissatisfaction due to “inadequate 
income” and an inability to secure continued gainful employment.58  
While the western states roiled with the continuing fights over state-level pensions, private 
philanthropic foundations were also taking important steps to investigate the problems of the 
elderly. On May 29, 1951, the New York Times reported that the Rockefeller Foundation had given a 
$25,000 seed grant to the New York City Mayor’s Advisory Committee for the Aged to fund 
research on facilities for the aged in New York.59 Raymond M. Hilliard, the executive director of 
the city’s welfare council, immediately appointed Louis Dublin, a vice president of the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company to carry out the study, which Hilliard hoped would try to determine “what 
we can do best to prevent the debilities of old age…[and] how we can enrich the lives of those of 
our older people, particularly how we may remove from them the fear of old age, the fear of its 
          
Labor, Fact Book on the Employment Problems of Older Workers, August 13-15, 1950, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
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poverty and its sickness and its uselessness and humiliation and its desolation.” 60  Hilliard’s 
ruminations had real meaning in New York, which in 1951 counted approximately eleven percent of 
its elderly population on public assistance rolls.61 Earlier in the year, Hilliard, in a speech before the 
Economic Club of Detroit, had warned that “unless the root causes were attacked the United States 
would face ‘an almost inevitable straight-line increase in the volume of dependency.”62 As Hilliard 
noted, “we cannot prevent people from reaching old age, but we can prevent them from reaching it 
in a condition of dependency.”63 
Hilliard’s campaign throughout 1951 suggested the inadequacy of the existing framework of 
public and private security provision, at least for local welfare officials who had to devise creative 
solutions to fill the gap between Social Security and the rapidly increasing numbers of impoverished 
elderly people with limited options. If the demographic projections put out by the 1950 U.S. Census 
were correct – as the New York Times noted, persons over 65 in New York constituted 7.3 per cent 
of the city’s population in 1950, but had made up just 2.8 percent in 1900 – then the city would very 
likely soon face the unwelcome fact of growing old-age dependency on public assistance, a 
development no one particularly welcomed.64 
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61  Approximately 7.8% of New York State’s overall population was aged 65 or over as of July 1948. See U.S. 
Department of Labor, Fact Book on the Employment Problems of Older Workers, August 13-15, 1950, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950. Available at: California and West Coast Labor and Industrial Relations, 
selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of California, 
Berkeley. Accessed via the Online Archive of California at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/#c01-1.3.9.5 (Accessed September 15, 2016).Washington, 
D.C. In May 1958, New York City Welfare Commissioner observed in a public address that “if the aged ever united on 
their needs they would be the most potent force in the city, state, or nation” due to the fact that New York City’s 
population of people aged 60 years or older stood at roughly one million (out of a population of roughly seven and three 
quarters of a million people). See “Exploration of Aging,” The New York Times, May 5, 1958. 
62 “Drive to Aid Aged Urged,” The New York Times, January 30, 1951. 
63 Ibid. 
64 “Rockefeller Fund Gives to Help Aged,” The New York Times, May 29, 1951. See also U.S. Department of Labor, 
Fact Book on the Employment Problems of Older Workers, August 13-15, 1950, Washington, D.C., which predicted that 
“by 1980…there will be over 22 million persons past 65…underlying these changes in the age structure of the 
population have been the long-term decline in the birth rate, the cessation of large-scale immigration, and the increases 
in longevity resulting from advances in living standards.” Available at California and West Coast Labor and Industrial 
Relations, selected publications, IRLE-LB01. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library, University of 
 203 
 
Even in 1951, though, a city as prosperous as New York, like other local municipalities, 
could only do so much for its elderly residents. The Truman administration’s 1950 National 
Conference on the Aging had recognized this reality in its final recommendations, observing that 
“while each local community should assume as much responsibility as possible and ‘not pass the 
buck,’ many cannot solve the problem alone. Thus planning for the aged should be on a State-wide 
basis, with many communities working together.”65 The emerging partnership between the Mayor’s 
Advisory Council and the Rockefeller Foundation thus represented a pioneering model which could 
demonstrate that government and philanthropy could productively partner together to solve 
important social problems.66 By developing programs in New York City which could try to improve 
the living conditions of the city’s impoverished elderly residents, Hilliard and other city welfare 
officials hoped to offer an attractive alternative solution to them that promised to re-integrate them 
back into the community as respected members rather than pitied elders, and that would also have 
the effect of diminishing the appeal of newly re-energized old-age pension advocacy groups.  
In the months which followed the Rockefeller Foundation’s grant, new facilities dedicated to 
assisting the lives of older New Yorkers began to appear throughout the city.67 As he opened up one 
recreational center in Harlem, New York Mayor Vincent Impellitteri stated that “it is a tragedy of 
our time…that while we have learned how to prolong life, we have not learned how to make the 
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later years of life happier and more livable. We may, however, be learning here today how we can 
more amply meet our responsibilities to our senior citizens.” 68  Impellitteri’s remarks neatly 
encapsulated how public officials and social welfare experts had decided to try and resolve the issue 
of old-age economic insecurity at the local level. Implicitly conceding that the wartime and 
immediate postwar hopes for Social Security’s expansion into a truly comprehensive program were 
unlikely to be achieved anytime soon, municipalities like New York City and major private 
philanthropies like the Rockefeller Foundation had decided to work in partnership in order to devise 
and provide alternative options which “would make the later years of life happier and more 
livable.”69  
The newly opened recreational and vocational centers were soon joined by other city-wide 
initiatives.70 A citywide orchestra consisting of elderly musicians was formed; New York’s mayors 
and governors quickly got into the habit of proclaiming city and state-wide “Senior Citizen” month, 
Times Square was renamed for a day as “Senior Citizens Square,” and perhaps most importantly, 
delayed legislation began to be drafted in Albany which attempted to give real teeth to efforts to 
prevent age discrimination in New York State.71 As Eleanor Roosevelt wrote in her May 15, 1952 
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“My Day” column, “I think this work for our really senior citizens is going to succeed and I think 
we will learn even to humanize some of our laws. Social Security is not always sufficient for an 
older person to live on.”72 Twice more in future years, Eleanor Roosevelt would highlight New 
York State’s “Senior Citizens Month” in her column, urging her older readers in her May 10, 1955 
column to write to the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aged to get 
copies of the committee’s recently published “bill of rights and responsibilities for senior citizens.” 
As Roosevelt observed in her column, “people are living longer than their ancestors lived and it is a 
necessity for them to live usefully and happily even if they have to change their type of occupation 
at a given retirement age…they should not be made to ‘retreat from life.’ They should be used for 
the good of the community.”73 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s insistence on the vitality of older people probably came in part from her 
own life experience – she had, after all, remained a vital force in American politics despite her own 
age (she was 66 years old in 1950) – but her columns also neatly captured both changing popular 
and academic understandings of old age in the 1950s. In June 1951, for example, at a major 
academic conference held at Northwestern University, University of Chicago sociologist Philip M. 
Hauser lamented the effects of urbanization and industrialization on the American family, which he 
argued had led to a shift from a “large family system” in which older people had clearly defined 
roles as respected elders to a “small family” model in which older people lacked any clearly defined 
social role to play.74 As Hauser observed, “the modern American family is not what it used to 
be…the family has long since lost many of its various historic functions or has shared them with 
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new, specialized, urban institutions.”75 In Hauser’s view, the shift for many families from a rural to 
urban living pattern had led to “considerable strain” on “the historic bonds of solidarity, sentiment, 
and affection” which had marked many rural communities. Urban living patterns had introduced 
“new dangers and new forms of insecurity” for older Americans, and “these changing forms of 
hazards and insecurity coupled with the decreasing size of family vitally affect the position of older 
persons,” and in his view, “so attenuated have the protective functions of the contemporary urban 
family become that it often cannot – even when it wishes to do so – provide security to its aging 
dependent members.”76 
In essence, Hauser argued that the declining ability of the American family to supply its 
oldest members with their traditional roles had exacerbated the types of insecurity that beset many 
older Americans.77 Summing up his argument, Hauser stated that “although problems of aging are 
by no means restricted to the economic sphere, there can be little doubt that the maintenance of 
means is perhaps the basic and critical problem of old age.”78 Hauser’s arguments and assumptions 
about the changing nature of the American family and by extension American society had found 
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expression a year earlier at the 1950 National Conference on Aging, and increasingly they began to 
influence policymakers, newspaper columnists, and social welfare experts.79  
Following from these premises, in Hauser’s view, the “expanding services of the 
government directed at meeting the needs and dealing with the problems of old age” could be 
“regarded as social inventions designed to deal with the problems of aging no longer being 
adequately met by our inherited culture and social institutions.”80 While conceding that the United 
States had a long political tradition of limited government, Hauser ultimately argued that  
the wide range and the complexity of the problems of personal 
adjustment in old age in contemporary life, the changing role and 
uncertain economic position of the older person in our urban industrial 
society, together with the rapidly increasing number and proportion of 
older persons in our urban industrial society, together with the rapidly 
increasing number and proportion of older persons in our population 
seem definitely to call for concerted action of individuals and of 
private and public agencies to deal with the problems of old age and 
to facilitate personal adjustment.81 
 
While condemning the efforts of the federal government to relieve old-age economic insecurity as 
hitherto “a combination of musty inherited social institutions and patch work improvisation under 
pressures of severe depression and great political unrest,” Hauser admitted that “from a practical 
standpoint it is probably desirable to improve the programs we already have – to work on them as a 
point of departure rather than to start in new directions, however sound, de novo.”82 Instead of 
hoping for the federal government to solve the problem of economic insecurity, Hauser expressed 
his hope that state and local governments would “make a contribution to the solution of economic 
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81 Ibid., 19. 
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problems of old age.”83 In sum, a comprehensive approach was necessary to solve the economic and 
social problems associated with older people; only in this way could, as Hauser poignantly put it, 
American society “add life to years” rather than simply add years to life. 
Hauser’s speech at the conference was just one marker of an evolving consensus about the 
role the federal, state, and local governments should play in shoring up the social and economic 
status of older Americans, given that the traditional non-governmental institutions of family life, 
organized religion, and private-sector employment were proving to be increasingly inadequate. That 
consensus was powered both by changing ideas in academia, but also by the rising costs associated 
with state-subsidized support of the elderly. For example, in late December 1949, the New York 
Times had reported that the total annual cost sustained by the federal, state, and local governments 
to provide public relief for impoverished elderly people had surpassed $250 million, a figure which 
was nine times greater than it had been a decade earlier.84 Despite this tremendous outlay of funds, 
though, 1 in 4 elderly people remained mired in poverty, and the costs of providing relief showed no 
signs of slowing down as the number of older people continued to steadily increase. 
Strengthening Social Security 
This tremendous expenditure of public funds had led, as the Times reported, to “virtually 
complete agreement among Democrats and Republicans, federal and state officials, and industry and 
labor that the only effective antidote to the handout philosophy in care for the aged lies in measures 
to buttress the old-age insurance system by stepping up the benefits and extending coverage to 
millions not now protected.” 85  After years of being subject to bitterly partisan fights, Social 
Security’s old-age insurance provisions rather than its old age assistance provisions now enjoyed the 
limelight as the favored solution to the resurgent issue of old-age economic insecurity. Additionally, 
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there were mounting concerns made by some social welfare experts that some states were abusing 
the Social Security old age assistance program’s cost-sharing feature in order to support their elderly 
citizens. For example, in Louisiana, roughly 82 out of every 100 older people in the state were 
recipients of benefits provided by Social Security’s old-age assistance program.  That figure had 
roughly doubled in the four years in between the end of World War II and 1949.86 Moreover, 
because the Social Security’s old age assistance program in Louisiana was subsidized with federal 
funds, meant that Louisiana was effectively receiving a generous discount on the costs of supporting 
its elderly population at the expense of other states that had far more robust participation by their 
older residents in Social Security’s old age insurance system, which did not receive similar federal 
subsidies. Several states – including Washington State, Colorado, and California – were already 
strongly signaling that this arrangement was not financially tenable for the long term, and were 
beginning to invoke the specter of state bankruptcy should Social Security’s old-age assistance 
program continue to outpace its old-age insurance provisions. 
Making common cause with the uneasy state officials were many of the nation’s private 
insurers. While they had been opposed or indifferent to Social Security when it had first been 
enacted in 1935, increasingly private insurers worried that Social Security’s old age assistance 
program might create a de facto Townsendite-like sense of personal entitlement on the part of the 
nation’s older citizens to guaranteed benefits, regardless of how those benefits were actually funded. 
In a November 1949 speech before the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Reinhard A. Hohaus, the chief 
actuary for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, warned that “the availability of additional 
Federal funds for relief would tend to encourage the handout approach to pensions and negate the 
benefits to be derived from strengthening the insurance program,” and suggested that more states 
          
86 Ibid. It is unclear how much of Louisiana’s elderly African-American population received benefits from Social 
Security’s old-age assistance program.  
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might be tempted to follow Louisiana’s example and redesign their old-age assistance programs so 
as to maximize the amount of federal appropriations they could receive.87 
The fiscal fears that both Hohaus and the coterie of state officials had publicly worried about 
had their origins in the work of the 1948 Social Security Advisory Council, which had assembled a 
broad spectrum of academic, labor, and insurance officials to re-evaluate and examine Social 
Security’s increasingly untenable financial condition. After a series of in-depth investigations, the 
Advisory Council had found that Social Security’s social insurance model was being undercut and 
was ultimately in danger of being swept away by its public assistance provisions. Specifically, the 
Council found three major deficiencies in Social Security: “inadequate coverage” of American 
workers; “unduly restrictive eligibility requirements for older workers” which resulted in “only 
about 20 percent of those aged 65 or over [as] either insured or receiving benefits under the 
program”; and finally “inadequate benefits” which were insufficient to prevent retirees from falling 
below the official poverty line.88 
In order to remedy these problems, the Advisory Council had recommended the inclusion of 
more categories of workers, including the self-employed, farm and household workers and 
expanding the eligibility requirements of Social Security’s old-age insurance program, along with 
an increase in the benefits paid by its old-age insurance rather than its old-age assistance program.89 
In making these recommendations, the Advisory Council hoped to strengthen Social Security’s old-
age insurance program and to weaken its old-age assistance program, with the ultimate goal of 
ensuring more even economic protection for older people throughout the United States that would 
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Administration website, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/48advise1.html (accessed December3, 2016). 
89 Ibid. 
 211 
 
be less subject to the vagaries of state-by-state assistance. As the Council frankly admitted in its 
report,  
the economic and legislative developments of the past year have 
served effectively to confirm the Social Security Administration in its 
belief that the present limited system of social security, comprising 
the various programs operating under the Social Security Act and 
under other separate legislative measures, is an inadequate and 
inequitable way of providing the basic essentials of economic and 
social security for the Nation’s gainfully employed persons and their 
families.90 
 
The changes proposed by the Council would therefore have the effect of putting Social Security 
onto a more secure financial footing, given that it would be taking in more revenue from the payroll 
taxes levied on newly included groups of workers.  
 It was becoming increasingly clear that the old-age assistance aspect of Social Security had 
metastasized into a program that dwarfed Social Security’s old-age insurance provisions and which 
threatened to award the Townsend Movement a posthumous victory. To rectify the situation and 
place Social Security back on a firmer footing, the Truman administration, in conjunction with the 
CIO’s unions, sought passage of a series of legislative amendments in 1950 to the Social Security 
Act in order to translate the 1948 Social Security Advisory Council’s recommendations into law, 
even though those amendments largely steered clear of the question raised by Cohen about how to 
“provide genuinely productive jobs” for older people. 91  After a fierce political battle, the 
administration and the CIO succeeded in their quest; by August 1950, President Truman had signed 
the Social Security amendments into law.   
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Despite the lack of provision for “genuinely productive jobs” for older people, the Social 
Security amendments enacted in 1950 began the process of tipping the balance within Social 
Security towards old-age insurance and away from old-age assistance. By January 1952, the number 
of people receiving old age insurance exceeded the number receiving old age assistance, and 
likewise the “total amount of insurance payments to aged persons exceeded the amount of old-age 
assistance payments.” 92  Even as they rejoiced in the expanded protections afforded to Social 
Security, some astute New Deal liberals could not ignore the fact that the Social Security system 
remained far from universal in its scope or sufficient in its benefits to end the scourge of old-age 
economic insecurity. As social welfare expert and New Dealer Wilbur Cohen observed in January 
1952, “there are still many aged persons with inadequate incomes, many pressing problems with 
respect to income for the aged still unsolved or awaiting consideration, and a need for much more 
information on the economic status of the aged.”93 
State Actions to Bolster Economic Security in Old Age 
Whilst the fight over Social Security benefits continued to play out in Washington, evidence 
of the increasingly muscular response on the part of state and local officials in New York and 
elsewhere to provide more firm guarantees of economic security in old age to their elderly 
constituents.94 In 1955, while speaking at a three day conference on the problems of the aging, New 
York Governor Averell Harriman expressed his hope that New York State’s government could act 
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as “a catalyst in the process of galvanizing a state-wide onslaught against the economic, physical, 
emotional and spiritual problems of the aging.”95  
Sensing that the time was right to propose new legislation, in January 1956 New York State 
Senator Thomas C. Desmond announced that he would propose a series of forty bills “to help 
prevent poverty among the aged.”96 His motivation was simple. As he declared in an interview with 
the New York Times, “it is not enough to feed and house the indigent aged…Society’s basic problem 
is to prevent indigency.”97 Alongside long-sought goals like extension of unemployment insurance 
benefits, Desmond proposed to “withhold public contracts from companies that discriminate against 
workers of 40 or more in hiring practices” and to “encourage ‘portable’ pension plans under which a 
worker retains accrued benefits when changing jobs.”98 In November 1956, the New York State 
Division of Housing directed that “at least 5 percent of apartments in state-aided projects be 
designed and reserved for aged persons,” in order to meet the growing demand for suitable housing 
for the state’s elderly population, most of whom could not afford “the rents that private builders find 
they must charge.”99 Taken as a whole, these proposals and initiatives represented an unprecedented 
expansion of New York State’s role in ensuring the well-being of its older citizens; indeed, with the 
possible exceptions of California or Colorado, no state had done more on behalf of its elderly 
residents.100 
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Unlike California or Colorado, though, New York State’s role in providing extensive social 
services to its senior citizens was a more recent development. Between the end of World War II and 
the 1955, New York State’s spending on pensions, welfare, and institutional care for the aged 
increased by almost five times. 101  Governor Harriman’s administration expected spending to 
continue to rise at a similar rate for the duration of the 1950s and well into the 1960s; as one report 
noted, “in 1945 payments by government agencies to all persons in New York 65 and over plus the 
public expense of maintaining the aged in hospitals totaled $170,000,000” whereas in 1955 “the 
comparable figure was $833,000,000.”102 The growing concerns about the rising number of elderly 
people found resonance throughout New York’s busy private welfare establishment. In February 
1957, B’nai B’rith, a major American Jewish organization, publicly declared that “increasing 
problems confronting the aged required ‘concerted effort’ on local levels.”103 Citing what it termed 
“principal danger spots for senior citizens,” such as “discrimination in employment…the 
concentration of older persons in dense urban areas…insufficient medical care for the aged, and a 
decline in the standard of living for the aged,” Philip M. Klutznick, the president of B’nai B’rith, 
urged “cooperative action” by federal and local officials to “ameliorate the threats to our aged and 
aging population.”104  
These efforts indicated that much of the impetus for resolving the issue of how best to 
provide economic security for older people had begun to return to the state and local levels of 
government, usually in conjunction with the efforts of private welfare and philanthropic 
organizations. In essence, while the effects of the Great Depression had bankrupted or otherwise 
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driven many private charities either out of existence or very nearly to the brink, the continuing 
stalemate at the federal level over Social Security and other unfinished items from the New Deal 
wish list had created a vacuum that needed to be addressed at the local and state levels.  
Put somewhat differently, the mere fact that the federal government took only halting action 
on the issue of economic security in old age did not extinguish it as an issue. The prospect of 
indigent or formerly middle-class elderly people organizing and demanding more direct government 
action on their behalf was not a remote one. On October 29, 1955, Albert J. Abrams, the director of 
the New York State Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging addressed the Gerontological 
Society of America’s annual meeting in Baltimore, Maryland.105 In his remarks, Abrams asserted 
that “the shadow of Mr. [Francis] Townsend still hovers over Congress…his demonstration of the 
political potentials of the aged, coming within only a few scanty votes of winning in the House of 
Representatives, still manifests itself on the deliberations of the lawmakers.”106  
The Townsend Movement was still taken sufficiently seriously in 1957 that it could 
persuade Congressman John A. Blatnik (D-MN) to reintroduce the Townsend bill as a major 
modification of the Social Security Act, and for Blatnik’s home-state colleague Senator Hubert 
Humphrey (D-MN) to praise the bill on the Senate floor in 1958.107 The Eisenhower administration 
kept close watch on the Townsend Movement as well, and sought to avoid any open conflict with it. 
Eisenhower personally met with Dr. Townsend in 1958, which suggests that the Townsend 
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Movement might not have been as irrelevant as some students have assumed it had become after the 
1930s. The continuing appeal of the Townsend Movement was a stark reflection of the fact that as 
late as November 1953, a significant proportion of the nation’s population over the age of 65 was 
still receiving some form of publicly funded old-age financial assistance, with the highest state-by-
state percentages still concentrated in southern and western states. 108 Additionally, nearly sixty 
percent of that same population group remained ineligible for payments under the terms and 
conditions of Social Security’s OASI social insurance provisions, with ineligibility particularly 
highest among older women.109  
The Eisenhower Administration and the Search for Old-Age Economic Security 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower’s newly inaugurated administration in January 1953 thereby 
confronted a situation in which the future direction of old-age economic security in the United 
States remained in limbo. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s disdain for the New Deal’s emphasis on 
collective security through governmental action was particularly pointed. In 1949, long before he 
had begun to campaign for the presidency, Eisenhower had intemperately remarked that “if all that 
Americans want is security, they can go to prison. They’ll have enough to eat, a bed and a roof over 
their heads. But if an American wants to preserve his dignity and his equality as a human being, he 
must not bow his neck to any dictatorial government.”  
Eisenhower later came to regret those words once in office, but his personal disapproval of 
the New Deal’s commitment to collective economic security through the use of government power 
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was hardly a secret.110 His 1949 remarks did little to assuage concerns about what an Eisenhower 
administration might do to Social Security once in office. The Republican rank-and-file became 
sufficiently alarmed that an openly antagonistic stance might cost Eisenhower the election. In a 
confidential memo from Major Corliss C. Moseley, a senior executive at the Curtiss-Wright 
corporation in Glendale, California to Reuben H. Fleet, an important San Diego businessman, and 
subsequently passed along to Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Sherman Adams by Senator William 
Knowland (R-CA), Moseley confided that  
[a] careful and confidential study of our approximately 5,000 
employees, conducted during the last few months, indicates 
conclusively that General Eisenhower has NOT come forth with a 
firm position and stand on what he is going to do for the “WORKING 
MAN.” Practically every employee of ours, who is opposed to 
Eisenhower, states that “The Democrats gave us social security; I 
need it for my old age,” “General Eisenhower has said nothing about 
it or the working man,” and “If I vote for him we may lose it.”111 
 
Moseley urged Eisenhower to speak more frequently about Social Security, advice which 
Eisenhower’s campaign took to heart. While on the campaign trail throughout October 1952, 
Eisenhower spoke often about Social Security and in much calmer, softer tones. As candidate 
Eisenhower remarked in Schenectady, New York on October 23, 1952: “we believe in expanded 
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and improved social security. We believe in better security for our aged, to make certain that they 
do not have fears that come about through things over which they have no control.”112 
 Once elected, though, some of Eisenhower’s supporters within and without the Republican 
Party expected him to take decisive action against Social Security, though others remained more 
circumspect in their attitude. In October 1953, Edward F. Hutton of the stock brokerage firm E.F. 
Hutton & Company wrote to Eisenhower urging him to consider drastically revamping Social 
Security as a voluntary system. Eisenhower candidly responded in a confidential letter that  
I have had an analysis made of our existing system – and the analysts 
were among the most hard-headed, conservative individuals that I 
know of. In general the conclusions are about as follows: We have 
had a compulsory system since 1935. We must keep it on that basis or 
else abandon it entirely…if we should put Social Security on a 
voluntary basis, we would be in competition with every life insurance 
company in the United States…it would appear logical to build upon 
the system that has been in effect for almost twenty years rather than 
embark upon the radical course of turning it completely upside down 
and running the very real danger that we would end up with no system 
at all.113 
 
Behind closed doors, though, Eisenhower revealed a certain amount of open-mindedness on the 
issue of Social Security. During a November 1953 Cabinet meeting, as HEW Secretary Oveta Culp 
Hobby outlined her department’s proposals to strengthen OASI (Social Security’s old age insurance 
program) in order to reduce and eventually eliminate Federal grants for Social Security’s old age 
assistance program (OAA), Eisenhower wondered out loud about the relative merits of the 
Townsend Plan, only to be firmly dissuaded from it by Secretary Hobby and other assembled 
Cabinet members.114 
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That Eisenhower and his Cabinet were even still discussing the Townsend Plan suggested 
just how deep an imprint the Townsend Movement had left on national politics as well as the 
continuing potential relevance of its proposed old-age pension program. In December 1952, after 
Eisenhower had been elected but before he had taken office, the New York Times reported on the 
continuing inadequacy of Social Security to keep its recipients above the poverty line.115 The next 
month, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce surprisingly added its voice to a rising chorus of supporters 
for Social Security expansion, it planned to do so by increasing payroll taxes on employees and 
largely ending Social Security’s old age assistance program. 116  The Chamber’s proposal drew 
immediate fire from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), which agreed that Social 
Security needed improvements but did not concur with the Chamber’s method for doing so.117 At 
stake in the fight was approximately $1.5 billion in public spending monies as well as the existing 
relationship under Social Security whereby individual states rather than the federal government 
determined the criteria for old age assistance eligibility.118 
Refusing to remain on the sidelines, Professor Edwin Witte, the chairman of the original 
Committee on Economic Security which Franklin Roosevelt had convened to forge the Social 
Security Act twenty years earlier, lambasted the Chamber of Commerce for proposing “a baby 
Townsend Plan” under which “the Santa is not the Government, but the employers and employees 
who contribute to O.A.S.I.”119 Refusing to surrender the fight over Social Security, Representative 
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Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) responded by declaring at the annual meeting of the National Conference of 
Social Work that the program was “a tangle of legalistic snarls and contradictions” and that 
“searching inquiry into [it] was needed.”120 Albert J. Abrams, the director of New York State’s Joint 
Legislative Committee on the Problems of the Aging, joined the fray soon thereafter, and 
condemned the Chamber of Commerce’s proposals as ultimately more detrimental to the long-term 
viability of Social Security rather than beneficial.121 
The fight over old age assistance was not confined to national politics either. California’s 
elderly citizens continued to be the recipients of state expenditures which were “greater than the 
combined total of old age security payments made by New York and Pennsylvania,” both of which 
were states that were comparable in population size; only rapid and sustained influx of younger 
people into California kept state old age pension expenditures at a fiscally sustainable rate.122 In 
New York, Welfare Commissioner Henry L. McCarthy declared at a conference of public and 
private welfare officials that rampant alcoholism and the rising number of elderly people were the 
two biggest problems facing the city’s welfare administration, an argument that brought together 
much of the attendees in agreement.123  
McCarthy’s relatively placid assessment was upstaged, though, by the Rev. Milton A. 
Galamison, Minister of Siloam Presbyterian Church of Brooklyn, who condemned the lackadaisical 
attitude of religious officials in the city towards the problems of the elderly, and acidly observed 
that “it is easier to interest churches in a problem at the North Pole than one in New York City.”124 
Mincing no words, Galamison declaimed that “Puerto Ricans, delinquents, the aged, parolees, die 
on their [churches’] very doorstep for lack of their help…the institutionalized church needs to be 
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reminded that charity, if it is to be effective, begins at home.”125 Letter writers to the Times groused 
over the alleged ill-treatment of old people, with one letter writer demanding that “old people must 
organize to help themselves…the only effective organization would be a political organization…an 
adequately organized ‘Old People’s Political party’ would soon stop the uncivilized practice of 
shutting industry’s doors to the employment of healthy and capable old people.”126 
It was clear in 1953 that neither major political party wanted a return of the Townsend 
Movement or of any nascent “Old People’s Political party” to once again emerge. Congressional 
Republicans, in particular, had been watching the largely negative reaction to the Chamber of 
Commerce’s proposed plan and had surmised that it would be the wiser course of action not to upset 
voters in the upcoming midterm elections in 1954. They eventually won administration support for 
expansion of Social Security, although their embrace of Social Security came at the price of sowing 
seeds of division within their own ranks.127  
The Eisenhower Administration’s Struggle for a Coordinated Response  
In truth, though, the Eisenhower administration was beset by differing factions fighting over 
how to best handle the issue of old age security, which in turn reflected divisions among different 
organizations and individuals advocating on behalf of the elderly. After completing a study of 
existing federal initiatives on behalf of the elderly, Assistant Secretary of the newly-formed 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Roswell Perkins found their range to be striking; he 
later recalled that it also made coordination of such efforts next to impossible. To counter this 
tendency towards fragmentation of services and responsibilities, Perkins later successfully pushed 
for the creation of a Federal Council on Aging. The President eventually authorized it in 1956 in the 
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hope that it would successfully mediate among the various executive branch agencies that seemed 
far more interested in jealously guarding their respective turf.128 
The move to create a Federal Council on Aging revealed some measure of shrewdness on 
the part of Perkins and other like-minded administration officials. As Perkins conceded, his desire to 
produce a more coordinated approach to the problem of older Americans was motivated partly by 
political concerns. He later recalled that “I tried to beef up the Department [of Health, Education, 
and Welfare]’s focus on older people because of this very feeling that we were not giving enough 
public highlighting to both what was being done and what needed to be done” – but there were other 
considerations as well. 129  Perkins, like other Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
officials, was still mindful of the political tumultuousness of the Townsend Movement during the 
1930s, and feared that inadequate federal efforts to address the needs of older Americans might 
spark a revival of Townsendism: 
The startling vehemence of the Townsend movement and other 
movements demonstrated to anyone who gave it any reflection at all 
the fact that this was dynamite. So I certainly did not minimize in my 
own mind the extent to which, given what I would call improper or 
wrong leadership, the problem of the aged could get completely out of 
hand and could be demagogued to death.  
 
Fearful of the return of political demagoguery, Perkins and his like-minded cohorts in the 
Eisenhower administration instead wanted  
to see to it that the Department’s approach to the aged was soundly 
based and soundly articulated; and by that I mean not separating the 
aged out from other population groups but to accept the fact that 
scientific aging begins with birth… and to do everything possible to 
get the problem of the aging reviewed dispassionately as a continuing 
phenomenon throughout life rather than to let the demagogues take 
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over and segregate the problems of older people from those of the rest 
of society [sic].130 
 
Perkins, along with other moderate Republicans ensconced in key policy positions throughout the 
Eisenhower administration, therefore came to embrace the expansion of Social Security as the 
decidedly lesser of two evils, at least compared to the return of the Townsend Movement.131  
Previously, in September 1954, Eisenhower had signed amendments to the Social Security 
Act, which raised benefit payments and expanded eligibility for Social Security to 10,000,000 
additional workers. 132  Speaking before an annual meeting of the New York State Welfare 
Conference, Perkins conceded that “much must still be done to strengthen the social security 
system,” but contended that “we have now completed the laying of an essentially solid 
foundation.” 133  Instead of focusing on Social Security reform, Perkins urged the assembled 
delegates to devote more attention to the aging of the U.S. population, claiming that it “represents 
one of the great social welfare challenges of our times…the principal problem in dealing with the 
aged is to change the concept that aging is a problem for society to the concept that old age is a 
period of great value to society.”134 Perkins did not elaborate further on how he thought this change 
in thinking about aging could be accomplished, but as developments a decade later would reveal, 
federal, state, and local policymakers would be actively engaged in designing and implementing 
programs to bring this change into existence. 
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Perkins’ publicly expressed concern about the mounting problems of elderly people was 
echoed at the same New York conference by Elizabeth Wickenden, a leading figure in both social 
welfare policy and liberal Democratic Party circles. In her remarks, Wickenden noted that the 
United States’ “abundant economy and unprecedented advances in medical science have permitted 
more than 13,000,000 of our countrymen to live beyond…the sixty-fifth birthday…[but] our society 
does not offer to this older group the same opportunities for self-realization that it extends to those 
that are younger.”135  
Other voices added their concern over the gap between the growing number of elderly 
people and the lack of a well-defined social role for many older people.  Returning from a trip to 
Scandinavia, Ollie A. Randall, the national president of the American Gerontological Society, 
reported her impressions of the social role which older people enjoyed in other countries, noting that 
“we sensed above everything else a feeling that nothing was too good for the old people. It is 
something that we in this country have not acquired to the same degree.”136 In Scandinavia and the 
United Kingdom, elderly people were eligible not only for old age pensions; most also qualified for 
government subsidized low-rent housing, free medical care, and were encouraged to remain 
working rather than to retire. For those older people who had retired, free hot meals were provided 
by mobile food service and a vigorous government-sponsored network of social clubs provided 
older people with companionship and purpose.137 Enviously comparing the paucity of American 
assistance to the elderly with that available in western Europe, one American welfare official could 
only conclude that “it puts to shame the meager efforts in this country.”138 
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However dilatory the Eisenhower administration may have been during its first term in 
dealing with the problems of older Americans, the President did eventually take some actions to 
better coordinate and direct federal programs on behalf of the elderly. 139 In 1956, Eisenhower 
authorized the creation of a Special Staff on Aging within the Office of the HEW Secretary.140 In 
addition, Roswell Perkins’s newly-established Federal Council on Aging replaced an informal ad 
hoc Interdepartmental Working Group on Aging that had bounced around within the administration 
without being attached to any particular department or agency.  
By placing direct responsibility for the Special Staff on Aging with the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Eisenhower administration hoped to demonstrate that it was 
taking the problems of older Americans seriously. As the President’s memo creating the Federal 
Council noted,  
[i]n considering the changed circumstances presented by the 
lengthening life span, we must recognize older persons as individuals 
– not a class – and their wide differences in needs, desires, and 
capacities. The great majority of older persons are capable of 
continuing their self-sufficiency and usefulness to the community if 
given the opportunity. Our task is to help in assuring that these 
opportunities are provided.141 
 
However, the question of how exactly to define the problems of older Americans and their possible 
solutions continued to vex the Eisenhower administration’s domestic policy makers. Even after 
Eisenhower signed new amendments to the Social Security Act in 1956 that helped to broaden and 
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expand eligibility for the program, officials within the administration continued to debate how best 
to deal with the problems of aging people in the long-term beyond expanding Social Security.142  
While these officials agreed that the elderly should not be treated as a “class,” and that state 
and local governments (as well as private voluntary organizations) should take the lead, other 
questions abounded. What was the appropriate way to “help make it possible for older persons who 
desire and are able to work to continue their productive lives through suitable gainful 
employment”? 143  Or how could the federal government “help lessen anxiety about economic 
insecurity in the later years through an improved income maintenance program,” given the 
administration’s reluctance to expand the federal government’s reach by creating new social welfare 
programs?144  
As the Eisenhower administration recognized, the federal government could “not enact 
happiness” but it could “attempt to reduce barriers to continued social usefulness and a fuller life for 
older people,” which included “restricted opportunities for useful employment, insufficient income 
for retirement, living arrangements unsuited to real needs or income, ill health, and lack of 
preparation for retirement.”145 Some initiatives to achieve this end were eventually undertaken. The 
federal Labor Department, for example, strengthened its nationwide employment service system to 
place older workers back into active employment, noting that “individual older workers receive 
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special attention in all public employment offices” and “sustained efforts are made to eliminate or 
reduce artificial age barriers.”146 
Gradually, the Eisenhower administration came to embrace a public-private approach to 
solving the issues of older Americans. By design, its Federal Council on Aging remained limited 
both in terms of manpower and resources allocated, which meant that it was unlikely to compete 
with larger, better funded entities within the federal government. Instead, the Council used its 
limited resources to encourage increased cooperation among state and local governments and 
private voluntary groups which were involved in the day-to-day minutiae of dealing with the 
problems of older people.147  
Over time, it became clear that the Eisenhower administration’s three top policy priorities 
for older Americans were to ensure that older people would be able to find gainful employment, 
provide income support for those older people who remained unemployed, and finally to provide 
subsidies to the private housing construction industry and thus encourage banks and real estate 
developers to increase the supply of housing suitable for older people on fixed incomes. On the 
issue of providing access to affordable health care, the Eisenhower administration declined to 
support measures designed to use public funds to subsidize the costs associated with medical care 
and hospitalization. Instead, it chose to support increased funding for medical research and the 
construction of hospitals. In sum, the Eisenhower administration proved at times to be quite willing 
to use state power to improve the lives of older Americans, albeit in much more narrowly channeled 
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and cramped ways than it probably could have, given Eisenhower’s popularity and favorable 
relations with Congress during much of his tenure in office. 
Once established, the Eisenhower administration’s Federal Council on Aging seems to have 
met infrequently, and produced far more paperwork than policy.148 The Council did produce some 
reports which enjoyed limited circulation within the administration, but was terribly constrained by 
the part-time nature of its staff (most of whom were borrowed from other departments), limited 
funds, and lack of an effective legislative mandate to investigate, enforce, or propose problems such 
as age discrimination in the workplace or the lack of adequate health provision for older people in 
many parts of the United States.149 Increasingly cognizant of the Council’s limitations, Eisenhower 
publicly ordered that it be strengthened and given cabinet rank in March 1959, but by then 
congressional Democrats and organized labor had seized the initiative from the administration in 
defining how best to solve the problem of old-age security.150 By September 1959, even the Federal 
Council had to acknowledge in its official report to the President that “inadequate income can mean 
inadequate medical care,” a connection it had heretofore pointedly omitted. 151  Beyond such 
relatively plain language the Council dared not go.  
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Marion Folsom, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Struggle for Health Security 
Once the Eisenhower administration had made its reluctant peace with Social Security, other 
proposals began to percolate up through the administration’s ranks.152 Nelson Rockefeller, then 
serving as an Under Secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, urged the 
administration in January 1955 to do more to provide subsidized housing for retired workers, though 
his counsel was usually politely ignored by other administration officials.153 Requests made by 
outside groups for more concrete action by the administration were met with noncommittal answers. 
In one typical response, after receiving a telegram from a Berkeley, California senior citizens 
grassroots organization in 1956, pleading for the administration to do something about “the pressing 
problems confronting the over 13 million voters 65 years and over in the United States,” Howard 
Pyle, a deputy assistant to President Eisenhower, responded by highlighting the “determined efforts 
of the Administration to combat inflation” as “perhaps of greatest benefit to citizens who have 
pensions and savings accounts,” a response that neatly sidestepped the issue of providing health care 
coverage through the Social Security system. 154  The point was clear: while interested in the 
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problems of older people, the administration did not support efforts to create expensive new 
government programs to assist the elderly; if at all possible, it would try to encourage the creation of 
private rather than public solutions to the problems of older Americans. 
In this vein, not long after he had taken the oath of office in 1955 as HEW Secretary, Marion 
Folsom, a former senior executive with Eastman Kodak and well-connected member of the 
Republican Party’s Northeast wing, convened a friendly breakfast with the presidents of the nation’s 
leading private life insurance companies. The purpose of the breakfast, Folsom later recalled, was to 
try and persuade the assembled insurance industry leaders to underwrite a health insurance policy 
for retired people which would offer them adequate coverage once they had ceased to be eligible for 
employer-provided health care benefits. Folsom’s proposal was backed by the full support of the 
administration, which was increasingly becoming determined to find a solution to the mounting 
question of providing health insurance to older Americans without having to employ the Social 
Security system or to set up a new government program to do so. The Eisenhower administration’s 
preferred solution was to offer financial support in the form of reinsurance to privately underwritten 
insurance plans, provided there was sufficient interest and commitment on the part of the nation’s 
largest life insurance companies in doing the actual work of creating and administering such a plan.  
Essentially, the Eisenhower administration wanted private insurers to offer health insurance 
plans to senior citizens, and would reimburse them for any financial losses that such plans might 
sustain. The reaction Folsom got to his proposal was not encouraging. As one unnamed insurance 
company president told him: “Marion, you’ve got to realize that we are in business. We’re not 
politicians here. And being in business, we are responsible to our stockholders, and we’ve got to 
make money. It’s just as simple as that.”155 In the somewhat heated exchange which followed, 
Folsom replied to the assembled gathering that “you gentlemen seem to be operating on an ostrich-
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like basis; if you don’t move more rapidly and more effectively in this field, the government is 
going to take over, just as sure as the day follows the night.”156 
Though he pointed out that any delay on the part of the insurance companies was likely to 
galvanize demands that the federal government intervene in the matter, he met stiff resistance. As 
Folsom later remembered: 
When the [insurance company] presidents got back to their offices and 
got in touch with their lawyers, they were scared to death. Their 
lawyers said, “Don’t you have anything to do with Washington. If you 
get into anything with anything else in Washington they’re going to 
be regulating the whole [life insurance] industry. We want to keep it 
under state regulation. We don’t want the federal government 
regulating the life insurance companies.” So the big [insurance] 
companies were scared off…So that was the end of that plan.157 
 
Folsom was puzzled by the resistance he encountered. During his tenure as a senior executive at the 
Eastman Kodak Company, he had helped oversee the adoption of a medical plan, and had also 
worked with the administration of Republican New York Governor Thomas Dewey to adopt a 
statewide disability plan to provide coverage to state employees. Both plans had been successful, 
and Folsom could not understand why other states and private corporations had not undertaken 
similar measures.  
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Disappointed by the refusal of private insurers to be more proactive in addressing the needs 
of older Americans, Folsom increasingly sought to put the administration ahead of the issue. At a 
Cabinet meeting in early June 1958, he gingerly brought up the subject of adding hospitalization 
coverage to the Social Security system, only to be met with Eisenhower’s fervent insistence that 
holding down inflation was of paramount importance to older Americans on fixed incomes. 158 
Defeated, Folsom would later come out in favor of Medicare in 1961, but his words of caution went 
unheeded by the President.  
Eisenhower’s insistence upon holding down inflation was not groundless. By 1958, federal 
agencies distributed more than $12 billion in funding to programs aimed at helping older 
Americans, with the vast majority of these funds disbursed through the Social Security old-age 
assistance and insurance programs. The growth of these programs and the lack of coordination 
between the various federal departments responsible for administering them meant that the federal 
government’s activities were fragmented on the whole and duplicative in many respects. For 
example, as a confidential cabinet memo circulated among senior Eisenhower administration 
officials had acknowledged in January 1959, both HEW and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
sponsored public health and rehabilitative programs, despite the administration’s declared position 
that the federal government’s activities remain within “existing fiscal limitations.”159  
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A Modest Record 
Despite the lack of coordination amongst the various departments in the Executive Branch, 
by the summer of 1959, the Eisenhower administration could boast a successful if modest record of 
accomplishment in developing programs to deal with the nation’s aging population.160 When they 
were questioned about this modest record, Eisenhower administration officials tended to emphasize 
other domestic policy initiatives insofar as they might be applicable to the problems of older 
Americans. For example, in her testimony to the U.S. Senate’s newly-formed Subcommittee on 
Problems of the Aging and Aged, HEW Under-Secretary Bertha Adkins stated that “the guarantee 
of an assured income, free from the ravages of inflation…has been one of the primary concerns of 
the [Eisenhower] administration.”161  
Adkins, an educator and longtime Republican Party organizer from Maryland, had been 
appointed Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1958. In 
that capacity, she worked closely with Arthur Flemming, Marion Folsom, and other moderate 
Republicans to devise a social policy framework that would allow the administration to occupy the 
political middle ground between the New Deal and the deeply conservative elements within the 
Republican Party that sought to undo as much of the New Deal as possible. The Eisenhower 
administration’s efforts in this regard, such as the creation of the Federal Council on Aging and 
HEW’s Special Staff on Aging embodied this search for a middle way on domestic policy: use of 
          
160 In January 1959, Eisenhower had given his personal blessing to the reconstitution of a Federal Council on Aging to 
consist primarily of Cabinet officers after HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming had lobbied for it. In reality, much of the 
Council’s actual work was performed by HEW Under-Secretary Bertha Adkins. See Record of Action, Cabinet Meeting 
of January 30, 1959, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), 
Cabinet Series, Box 13, Cabinet Meeting of January 30, 1959 file, DDEL. 
161 Senate Subcommittee on Problems of the Aging and Aged, Statement of Bertha Adkins, Under-Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare on Programs on Aging in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare before the 
Subcommittee on Problems of the Aging and the Aged, U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, July 23, 
1959, pg. 6, Papers of Bertha S. Adkins, 1907-1989, Box 30, “Programs on Aging in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare,” DDEL. The Senate’s Subcommittee on the Problems of the Aged and Aging was formed in 
1959 and was subsequently succeeded by a new Special Senate Committee on Aging in 1961. The Senate Subcommittee 
and the Special Committee were created at the behest of Senator Patrick McNamara (D-MI) in order to build publicity 
and support for the enactment of Medicare before and after the 1961 White House Conference on Aging. 
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the federal government’s power, but with limits placed upon the amount of funds to be expended or 
manpower to be used, and with a decided emphasis on using federal power in collaboration with 
state, local, and private sector organizations in order to solve public policy problems. 
In order to meet that goal in the field of old-age economic security, Adkins emphasized the 
efforts of HEW’s Special Staff on Aging starting in the mid-1950s to “develop and maintain liaison 
with national organizations working in the [aging] field,” including the American Public Welfare 
Association and the National Committee on the Aging of the National Social Welfare Assembly. 
These links allowed the Special Staff to “render assistance to organizations in development of 
activities, planning and conducting conferences, and securing specialized help,” and to operate “an 
information clearinghouse and publications service.”162 Overall, the tone that Adkins struck during 
her testimony was one of cooperation and coordination rather than of discord and dissent: the 
administration was happy to help assemble the infrastructure necessary to maintain and strengthen 
the activities of states, localities, and private welfare agencies in meeting the myriad social problems 
of the elderly.163 Adkins’ tone was matched by that of her boss, President Eisenhower, who in 
November 1959 publicly underscored his agreement with the Federal Council on Aging that 
“responsibility [for the elderly] must be shared by the individual, his family, the community and the 
local and state governments, as well as by the Federal Government.”164 
But perhaps the clearest evidence of the Eisenhower administration’s approach to the 
economic and social problems of older Americans inadvertently came from the testimony of a 
deputy executive in Department of Labor before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee 
          
162 Ibid., 20-21. 
163 By Adkins’ own count, this included 1,800 local employment offices operated by the Department of Labor, the 
activities of the Housing and Home Finance Agency to secure cost-subsidized housing for older people, and the efforts 
of the Veterans Administration, as well as new tax benefits for aged and retired persons. (Ibid., 26.) 
164 “President Backs Plan to Open New Opportunities to the Aged,” The New York Times, November 13, 1959. 
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on the Problems of the Aging in late 1957. Speaking to the assembled New York State legislators, 
Newell Brown, an Assistant Secretary of Labor, stated that 
[t]he Federal Government must give overriding priority to defense 
needs, a responsibility it cannot divide. On what bases then can we 
expect continued improvement in the conditions under which older 
people live? There are essentially two bases: (1) a close partnership 
with State and local governments and voluntary groups and (2) our 
enormous resources.165  
 
Lest any of the legislators have missed the point he was making, Brown opined that “I hope that we 
will never accept the philosophy that the best and only way to meet problems is always more and 
bigger Federal Government.” 166  Instead, Brown argued that “people should consider in each 
instance whether it is the Federal action that is most needed and likely to be most effective; or 
whether individual effort and private enterprise or local or state governments that bring the best and 
most lasting results.”167 This approach was not without its merits; as Brown argued, “it is the [local] 
community to which all our programs must be oriented… [f]ederal and [s]tate governments can 
move with more confidence into new activities, if these activities are community-tested and 
approved,” but such an approach also made it far less likely that any national solutions to systemic 
problems would be brought forward anytime soon. 
New York Mobilizes 
While the Eisenhower administration debated behind the scenes over how best to approach 
the mounting issues surrounding old-age security, pressure continued to build at the grassroots level 
in New York for more thorough intervention by the federal government. Despite New York State’s 
pioneering efforts during the 1950s to construct a governmental infrastructure capable of more fully 
          
165 Newell Brown, “The Federal Governments Approach to Programs for Older Persons,” Address to the New York 
State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, December 18, 1957.  Available via the Online Archive of 
California; source URL at: http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/dsc/#c01-1.3.9.5 (Accessed 
December 4, 2016). 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
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addressing the needs of the state’s elderly citizens, these efforts had produced modest results which 
were becoming increasingly ineffective in the face of rising medical costs. These costs had 
prompted the state to build its own program of medical care for the elderly, though disputes between 
New York City and the state government in Albany had delayed the city’s residents from 
participating in the program.168  
Despite the success of the state’s efforts to provide affordable public housing for older 
people, this achievement did little to mitigate the growing need for older people to have access to 
affordable medical and hospital care.169As a 1957 report in the New York Times revealed, though the 
number of elderly people receiving benefits from the New York City Welfare Department was 
decreasing, the amount of public expenditure for the care of older persons continued to rise.170 In 
February 1960, a growing ad hoc coalition of New York City-based voluntary organizations sent a 
joint telegram to the President imploring him to improve the federal government’s initiatives for 
older Americans. Led by Zalman J. Lichtenstein of the Golden Ring Clubs, the organizations 
pleaded their case: 
Dear Mr. President, we are grateful and much encouraged by the 
concern you exhibited about us senior citizens at the press 
[conference] last Wednesday. We look forward with great anticipation 
to your favorable recommendations for health benefits for Social 
Security beneficiaries…Good health, decent shelter, and knowing 
where the next meal comes from are of primary importance to our 
peace of mind and enjoyment of retirement. Millions of us, when 
serious illness strikes, without adequate protection, face plain 
          
168 “Dumpson Defends City Care of Aged,” The New York Times, May 12, 1961. 
169 George Auerbach, “Housing for Aged is Lagging in City,” The New York Times, October 8, 1961. Eventually, in 
February 1961, New York State would allocate $40,000,000 to expand the state’s medical care program for the indigent 
elderly. See Layhmond Robinson, “Rise of 40 Million in Care of Elderly Voted by Assembly,” The New York Times, 
March 14, 1961; Warren Weaver, Jr., “Insurance Eased for the Retired,” The New York Times, April 27, 1960. 
170 Morris Kaplan, “City Outlays Rise in Aid to Elderly,” The New York Times, January 25, 1957. As Henry L. 
McCarthy, the city Welfare Commissioner reported, in 1957 “there were fewer than 50,000 persons 65 years and older 
on the relief rolls [whereas] in 1950 there were 62,000” despite the fact that the city’s older population had not 
measurably changed during this period. Despite the drop on the relief rolls, New York City was spending approximately 
$52.4 million dollars on old-age relief in 1957, whereas it had spent only $45.6 million in 1950. McCarthy attributed 
this increase in expenditures to “greater longevity and its concomitant diseases.” (Ibid.) 
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terror…Please Mr. President, use your great influence to expand the 
Social Security Act to contain health provisions…171 
 
As had been the case during the Great Depression, the growing support of the voluntary 
organizations for a strengthened federal role in social welfare issues was born of their growing 
inability to adequately shoulder the mounting costs of old-age security. As Irving Kane, then serving 
as President of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, stated bluntly in a March 
1960 letter to President Eisenhower: 
The costs of…medical care for the aged places a heavy burden upon 
our Jewish voluntary organizations, with inadequate resources, which 
they are unable to meet even while diverting funds from other 
essential needs. It is the conviction of our Health Services Committee, 
our Public Welfare Committee, and our Board of Directors…that 
Federal responsibility through the use of the OASDI is required.172 
 
Within a month of the Golden Rings Clubs’ telegram, congressional Republicans’ offices were 
worriedly reporting to the Eisenhower administration that they were receiving vast numbers of cards 
asking that they support legislative efforts to enact health care using via the Social Security 
system.173 Despite the growing concerns of Republicans on Capitol Hill about the possible costs of 
opposition to enacting the proposed Forand bill, the Eisenhower administration remained steadfast 
in its opposition.174  
Surveying this inaction, the administration’s opponents moved into action. A March 1960 
rally in New York to demonstrate support for the legislation drew six thousand retired labor 
          
171 Telegram, Adolph Held, President, Golden Ring Clubs of Senior Citizens, 25 E. 78th Street, New York, NY, and 
others to Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 5, 1960), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House 
Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL. 
172 Irving Kane to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 31, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House 
Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL. 
173 Memorandum, Jack Z. Anderson to Fred Fox, March 25, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White 
House Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL. 
174 Eisenhower reiterated his opposition to the legislation at a press conference held in March 1960. See “Eisenhower 
Bars Wider Aged Care,” The New York Times, March 31, 1960. Among those opposed to the Forand bill was H.E.W. 
Secretary Arthur Flemming, who would later change his mind and embrace Medicare once its passage became 
inevitable after the 1964 election. See Bess Furman, “Health-Care Bill for Aged Fought,” The New York Times, July 14, 
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members who lustily booed Eisenhower in absentia was followed by an even larger one in May 
1960 at Madison Square Garden.175 The latter rally, which had been organized by the Golden Rings 
Club, drew a crowd of 15,000 older people who listened and cheered on proponents of the proposed 
legislation to enact health care via Social Security spoke.176 Among the speakers were Congressman 
Aime J. Forand (D-RI), former Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, Mayor Robert Wagner, David 
Dubinsky of the ILGWU, and Walter Reuther of the UAW, all of whom drew raucous cheers from 
the assembled crowd as they expounded on the virtues of the legislation. The only Republican 
speaker at the rally – U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits – drew boos as he attempted to defend the 
Eisenhower administration.  
The administration defended its non-interference on this issue as necessary to safeguard 
against government-supported compulsion.  As Gerald D. Morgan, Eisenhower’s Deputy Assistant, 
wrote to an administration supporter: 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, at the direction of 
the President, is exploring approaches to the problem of providing 
adequate medical care for the aged which would strengthen existing 
protection under voluntary auspices. It is consulting groups inside and 
outside the government, including representatives of the insurance 
industry. The administration is opposed to the use of a compulsory 
governmental system to provide health care for social security 
beneficiaries, and, accordingly, opposes the Forand bill and similar 
measures. It does not believe that compulsory health insurance 
constitutes a sound approach to the problem of providing health care 
services for aged persons.177 
 
The Eisenhower administration was not alone in its opposition; the A.M.A. had long crusaded 
against any such federal intervention in the provision of organized medicine. Likewise, the U.S. 
          
175 Ralph Katz, “Eisenhower Booed at Rally Here as 6,000 Support Forand Bill,” The New York Times, March 24, 1960. 
176 Emma Harrison, “15,000 at Garden Rally Demand Passage of Forand Health Bill,” The New York Times, May 19, 
1960. 
177 Gerald D. Morgan to Albert C. Adams, April 20, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House 
Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041, GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL. Albert C. Adams was a 
private insurance agent for the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company and a President of the National 
Association of Life Underwriters, and had testified in July 1959 before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Ways and 
Means Committee against the Forand Bill. 
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Chamber of Commerce, having lost its earlier fight to prevent the expansion of Social Security, now 
took to the press to protest that “the whole Social Security program would be jeopardized if it were 
broadened to provide hospital, nursing home, and surgical services for the aged.”178 Given its past 
record of largely opposing Social Security improvements, the Chamber of Commerce’s protests 
were not surprising. What was new, though, was how the Chamber attempted to portray itself as a 
true defender of Social Security’s financial stability by arguing that attempts to include health care 
coverage for the aged would capsize the entire Social Security system.  
This line of argument was different from the one used by the Eisenhower administration, 
which had initially opposed adding health care for the elderly to Social Security because key 
officials within the administration – including Eisenhower himself – believed the best course of 
action was to continue to permit private medicine largely free rein in this arena without government 
interference. Before the enactment of Medicare in 1965, this argument carried significant weight. 
After the enactment of Medicare, though, the Chamber of Commerce’s line of argument would 
prove to be far more potent in allowing opponents of expanding the federal government’s role in 
social welfare to make their case, namely, that any new social welfare efforts by the federal 
government could threaten or harm existing ones. By this logic, opposition to enacting Medicare 
while claiming to support Social Security made sense, and as the politics of social welfare played 
out over the course of the 1960s, such appeals would become increasingly attractive to opponents of 
the Great Society’s attempted reforms of domestic social welfare policy. 
Ultimately, the Eisenhower administration would, in its twilight years, embrace a federal 
role in providing medical care for the aged, but sought to do so under a program separate from 
Social Security, administered solely by individual states, but jointly financed by the federal and state 
          
178 “Chamber Assails Health-Care Bill,” The New York Times, July 15, 1959. 
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governments. 179  The Eisenhower administration’s proposed plan also emphasized voluntary 
participation by Americans aged sixty-five or older, provided that their entire annual income 
remained below $2,500 (or $3,800 for a couple), and sought to “preserve the opportunity for private 
insurers to continue to demonstrate their ability to develop major medical expense programs for the 
aged.”180 
Sensing that the Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to fully address the issue of 
providing health insurance for older Americans had created a rare opportunity to spotlight the issue, 
the AFL-CIO began to increase the pressure on Congress to do something.181 In his April 1960 
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging, James B. Carey, 
secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department, pointedly stated the AFL-CIO’s 
hope that the Subcommittee would “bring forth legislation which will improve the material, health 
          
179 Statement by Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare before the House Ways and Means 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, May 4, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White 
House Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041, GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL. Eisenhower had 
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28, no. 4 (Dec., 1961): 1-12. 
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the 1959 annual convention of the American Medical Association, Eisenhower told the assembled physicians “if the 
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Jr., “President Lauds Private Medicine,” The New York Times, June 10, 1959. 
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and social status of those whose work years are past” because “the position of the Eisenhower 
administration, which seems intent upon studying this problem to death.”182 Carey’s testimony had 
come on the heels of a 10,000 member-strong rally of United Auto Workers in Detroit, and was 
greeted with jeers from Senate Republicans; the normally staid Senator Everett Dirksen pronounced 
it to be “shameful and stinking.”183 Carey countered “that the greatest fear of our older citizens is 
failing health,” an arguable statement given how frequently the issues of decent housing and 
adequate income support had cropped up in the letters and telegrams which Eisenhower 
administration officials had been receiving for years.184  
From the perspective of the AFL-CIO, though, health costs were the most pressing issue, 
especially for many retired workers. The pitchfork battles which the AFL-CIO’s various constituent 
unions had fought with corporate America over the course of the previous decade had revealed just 
how committed many companies remained to preventing any expansion of negotiated collective 
bargaining agreements to cover retirees, and the sheer costs of trying to do so singlehandedly had 
the potential to exhaust much of the funds available in organized labor’s coffers.185 Challenging the 
Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on encouraging private insurers to offer health insurance 
plans to older Americans, Carey emphasized that “just as private pension plans are not considered a 
substitute for old age insurance benefits, neither are private health plans a substitute for an over-all 
insurance approach,” and pointedly stated that “so far as I personally am concerned, the 
Administration’s shameful surrender to the American Medical Association and to the insurance 
          
182 Testimony, James B. Carey before the Senate Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging, April 6, 1960, 
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companies is an outright betrayal of the needs of America’s 16 million elder citizens…[a]s these 
citizens ponder their fate, they will know full well whom to thank for their plight.”186 
The Eisenhower administration remained split on the question of how to provide health care 
for older people, with the President adamantly opposed but some other members of the 
administration more open to negotiating on the issue. In a private October 1959 meeting with his 
friend and sometime personal advisor Robert Burroughs, Eisenhower was told that 
The problem of the cost of hospital and medical care for the retired 
aged can be met only through insurance. Very few retired persons 
have financial resources sufficient to pay for the cost of illness as it 
occurs. The realistic alternative to insurance coverage is that health 
care costs of the aged will increasingly be met by relief and public 
assistance, with consequent loss of dignity and self-respect to 
individuals and large added burdens on the general revenues…Health 
protection is the biggest need of the aged and its present lack is the 
greatest threat to their security. There is a good solution at hand which 
would do a tremendous amount of good and which would finance the 
cost on insurance principles, actually saving considerable money from 
general revenues...187 
 
The pressure that organized labor and congressional Democrats were placing on the Eisenhower 
administration was beginning to have an effect. As William Mitchell, a former Eisenhower 
administration official, later recalled: “in the welfare field, a rather considerable amount of 
Flemming’s response was a result of outside pressures of the organized groups in the welfare field, 
the American Public Welfare Association (APWA), the National Association of Social Workers, 
outfits like that, to whom he responded very sympathetically, and he very promptly courted their 
good will.”188  
The closer links being forged between Flemming and the voluntary organizations which 
performed much of the actual work in the field of social welfare signified just how much the 
          
186 Ibid., 9, 12. 
187 Statement to the President by Robert P. Burroughs, October 16, 1959, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President 
(Ann Whitman File), 1953-61, Administration Series, Box 15, Flemming, Arthur S., 1959-61 (2) file, DDEL. 
188 Oral History with William Mitchell #2, January 30, 1968, pg. 74. Interviewer: Peter Corning, DDEL. 
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Eisenhower administration had evolved on the issues of Social Security, health care coverage for the 
elderly, and a host of other issues related to the welfare of older Americans. Eisenhower had come 
into office emphasizing the dangers of government spending in order to corral inflation; while 
Eisenhower never fully retreated from these beliefs, high ranking officials in his administration like 
Marion Folsom, Arthur Flemming, and Bertha Adkins had come to embrace a far more pragmatic if 
cautious approach that sought to work with voluntary organizations like APWA without openly 
alienating the American Medical Association or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.189 
 Ultimately, the actions taken by the Eisenhower administration strengthened the growing 
relationship between federal, state, and local officials with private social welfare experts and 
voluntary organizations. Suspicious of the New Deal social welfare programs it had inherited from 
twenty years of Democratic rule in Washington, key Eisenhower administration officials like Arthur 
Flemming, Marion Folsom, and Bertha Adkins worked to bolster alternative options to increasing 
the reach of the federal government in national social welfare.  
In order to accomplish this goal, they worked in conjunction with private social welfare 
organizations to try and promote solutions to the social and economic problems of older Americans 
which de-emphasized federal involvement, a striking reversal from the approach which liberals like 
Eveline Burns and Oscar Ewing has emphasized during the 1940s. By de-emphasizing the role of 
the federal government as the body primarily responsible for providing economic and social security 
          
189 As Arthur Flemming later recalled about Adkins, “We had a Special Staff on Aging…I placed this staff under the 
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complicated problems had to be worked out involving often antagonistic public and private groups and other 
governmental agencies…I can only say that my faith in Miss Adkins was amply justified by her performance. 
Considering the fact that the Eisenhower Administration had opposed the authorization of the White House Conference 
on Aging, nevertheless, under Miss Adkins’ stewardship, and coordination the government produced a very satisfactory 
conference from the standpoint of the many diverse groups invited to participate. See Arthur Flemming to John J. 
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to older people, the administration instead placed much of the burden upon local and state 
governments as well as private social welfare organizations. Consequently, while the national 
debate over public assistance to older people became focused on Social Security, other issues 
separate from Social Security were left to be resolved at other levels of government. 
The 1961 White House Conference on Aging 
 The administration’s approach to the problem of economic security in old-age was put on 
vivid display during the three years of planning for the 1961 White House Conference on Aging, an 
initiative foisted upon the Eisenhower administration by anxious congressional Democrats during 
the summer of 1958, and which the administration then successfully delayed to its last days in 
January 1961. 190  Despite the administration’s limited approach to using government power to 
address the economic and social problems of the elderly, it became apparent that numerous states 
had already developed extensive state-level commissions and activities designed to promote the 
enactment and implementation of policies that might be proposed at the conference.191 For example, 
forty-seven of the forty-eight states had availed themselves of federal funds to conduct state level 
conferences leading up to formal participation in the national White House Conference, which 
suggested just how much the mounting problems of the elderly cut across traditional regional 
          
190 See “Reports to the President on Pending Legislation Prepared by the White House Records Office, (Bill File), Sep. 2 
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divisions and ideological barriers which normally beset and prevented unified action among the 
states.192 
Increasingly, these state-level conferences revealed significant public interest in enacting 
some sort of legislation to provide economic relief to older people in the form of background papers 
being prepared by delegates to the conference. This deep interest in health-care legislation for older 
Americans was likely being driven by the economic effects of inadequate retirement income for 
older people and for their families. As the New York Times noted in the months leading up to the 
conference, “for many of the elderly, lack of sufficient funds has turned the added years provided by 
medical research into a humbling period of prolonged economic dependency. For many of their 
grown children, it has become an economically untenable period of prolonged responsibility.”193 
The New York Times’s argument was echoed in the words of one background paper prepared for 
delegates to the White House Conference on Aging, which made much the same point: “the capacity 
of adult children to provide for all the needs of aged parents is limited by the modest character of 
most family incomes, the demands of growing families of children, and the heavy burden of health 
care among the elderly.”194 
Regardless of the machinations of individual administration members and the swiftly 
growing number of voluntary old-age organizations, what stood out most about the White House 
Conference on Aging was the sheer breadth and depth of individuals, institutions, and local 
communities involved in its planning and execution. 195  Three thousand delegates were on the 
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conference’s invitation list, three hundred national voluntary organizations, and twenty subject areas 
covering nearly every possible realm of public and private life were prominent on the conference’s 
manifesto.196  
Such diversity of representation was all the more remarkable given the relative paucity of 
numbers and attention that had met the unofficially sanctioned Truman-era Conference on Aging in 
the summer of 1950. As Eisenhower administration officials repeatedly emphasized, the 1961 White 
House Conference on Aging was to be a “Citizens’ Conference” that would “represent the sum total 
of the thinking, experience, and recommendations of every section of our country.”197 Implicit in 
this argument were two factors: first, the desire by the Eisenhower administration not to give any 
outward appearance of the federal government’s dictating policy to state and local municipalities; 
and second, the very real fact that, aside from the scattered reports that the Social Security 
          
Conferences on Aging: Their Implications for Social Change,” Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1984. See 
also Henry J. Pratt, “Symbolic Politics and White House Conferences on Aging,” Society 15, Issue 5 (July 1978): 67–
72. Pratt harshly condemned White House conferences on the problems of elderly people as little more than glorified 
dog and pony shows, claiming that they are “a means of responding to the incipient demands of a large number of older 
voters – and their allies elsewhere among the voting public – and yet to do so in a setting where symbolic reassurances 
can be made to appear as action and where rhetoric, skillfully articulated, can seem to be something concrete.” (Ibid., 
68). See also Dale Vinyard, “White House Conferences and the Aged.” Social Service Review 53, no. 4 (1979): 655-71. 
Vinyard offers a more positive assessment than Pratt, writing that while “it is clear that the millennium will not be 
achieved as a result of a particular [White House] conference or even a series of them. About all that can reasonably be 
expected is that some modest, incremental policy gains will be achieved or advanced…most conferences will have some 
immediate policy impact” because “White House conferences generally have a fallout effect over the long run which 
may lead to a more substantial policy change.” (Ibid., 668). William Bechill, a former U.S. Commissioner on Aging, 
supported Vinyard’s interpretation, writing in 1990 that “the White House Conferences on Aging have been 
‘directional’ and, as a result, have influenced specific legislation.” See William Bechill, “White House Conferences on 
Aging: An Assessment of Their Public Policy Influences” Journal of Aging & Social Policy 2, Issue 3-4 (1990): 13-25. 
196 “The Seasoned Sixties: A New Decade Spiced by the Wisdom and Skills of Our Older People,” Address delivered by 
Bertha S. Adkins, Open Forum on the White House Conference on Aging, St. Petersburg Coliseum, St. Petersburg, 
Florida, January 18, 1960, Papers of Bertha S. Adkins, 1907-1989, Box 50, “American Association of Retired Persons 
Forum for the White House Conference on Aging, St. Petersburg, Florida, 1/18-19-60 (1) folder, DDEL. 
197 Bertha Adkins, “The Philosophy of the White House Conference,” speech delivered before the National Leadership 
Training Institute Dinner, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 25, 1959. National Leadership Training Institute, White House 
Conference on Aging, University of Michigan, 6/24-25/59 file, Papers of Bertha S. Adkins, 1907-1989, DDEL. Adkins 
further added that “the President and Congress believe that while the primary responsibility for meeting the challenges 
and problems of aging is that of the States and communities, and of individuals themselves, the Federal Government 
should work jointly with the States and their citizens to develop recommendations and plans for action.” Moreover, 
“these recommendations and plans for action would look toward the purpose of assuring middle-aged and older persons 
[sic] equal employment opportunities, providing such persons with adequate incomes, suitable housing, and assistance 
in preparing themselves for their later years, and stepping up research in the field of aging.” Ibid. Notably, publicly 
subsidized health insurance for older Americans was omitted from Adkins’ list. 
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Administration was able to make available on an occasional basis, the federal government lacked 
any real, permanent apparatus for collecting, collating, and comprehending information about the 
nation’s older population. 
Ultimately, the long-delayed White House Conference on Aging in January 1961 
recommended that the Social Security system should be utilized as the primary framework for 
organizing health care for older Americans, a position starkly at odds with the one staked out by the 
Eisenhower administration, but one that was consistent with the AFL-CIO and the incoming 
Kennedy administration’s thinking on how best to use the federal government’s resources to address 
the issue of economic security in old age. While much of the conference’s numerous policy 
recommendations would gather dust for the next four years, the advent of the Great Society in 1964-
5 would make them relevant as the Johnson administration searched for new and innovative ways to 
address the needs of senior citizens beyond the provision of health care. 
Conclusion 
In the meantime, localities like New York City and California took the initiative to provide 
subsidized housing, to build new community centers, and to enact laws designed to protect the 
welfare of older people. In the decade between the first National Conference on Aging in 1950 and 
the 1961 White House Conference on Aging, these efforts multiplied and spread as local officials 
worked to bridge the gap between the needs of older people and the lack of governmental services 
to meet those needs. These efforts enjoyed the verbal blessing but not the financial backing of the 
Eisenhower administration, which argued that spending on any new social welfare programs would 
merely lead to increased inflation and thus hurt older people living on fixed incomes. Instead, the 
administration commended private sector actors to fill the gap between the unmet needs of older 
people (which increasingly meant the need for access to affordable health insurance by the end of 
the 1950s) and the limited support provided by Social Security. This course of action helped to 
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amplify the fragmentation of social services provided to older people, and to ensure that such 
services would also vary widely from state to state. Subsequent efforts to rectify this development 
by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations like the passage of the Older Americans Act in 1965 
would have to address these disparities, even as they attempted to erect a new national framework to 
provide essential services to older people, wherever they lived.  
By 1959, the shift from old-age assistance to old-age insurance had dramatically decreased 
the costs associated with relief while seemingly bolstering economic security. Old-age assistance 
rolls had peaked in September 1950 at 2,890,000 enrolled individuals; by April 1959 this figure had 
diminished by 450,000, with further reductions expected as assistance recipients were replaced by 
social insurance recipients.198 This trend would continue into the 1960s, as the effects of the Social 
Security amendments passed during the course of the 1950s gradually brought more categories of 
workers into the system while significantly bolstering the benefits that its social insurance program 
provided. 
Social Security’s social insurance program expansion was made possible by the Eisenhower 
administration’s reluctant conclusion that improving Social Security would be less costly in the 
long-run than abolishing it. The disempowerment of southern Democrats between 1953 and 1955, 
also made the expansion possible because it removed a key congressional obstacle to reform efforts, 
given the traditional proclivity of southern Democrats for growing Social Security’s old-age 
assistance program rather than its old-age insurance program. While not originally intending to do 
so, the Eisenhower administration strengthened Social Security as a way to ensure that future 
administrations and Congresses would not be tempted to overpromise and spend more on public 
assistance to older people, a development it feared would prove disastrous in the long-term to the 
nation’s fiscal stability. 
          
198 Edwin L. Dale, Jr., “Rise in Old-Age Pay Cutting Relief Rolls,” The New York Times, April 26, 1959. 
 249 
 
While this development was, on the whole, beneficial to many older Americans, it still 
sidestepped the crucial issue of health security that had been mounting since the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s. For most of its duration, the Eisenhower administration, led personally by the President 
himself, had adamantly opposed the enactment of health insurance for Social Security recipients, 
and had largely aligned itself with the A.M.A. and some elements within the business community in 
viewing such expansion of government power as unnecessary and unwise interference in the realm 
of organized medicine and private commercial insurance. Only in 1960 did the administration 
grudgingly embrace a limited new government program, the Medical Assistance for the Aged 
(MAA) that allowed individual states to use means testing to determine which older people would 
qualify for financial assistance in paying their medical bills, with a mixture of state and matching 
federal funds to support such assistance.199 
While the Eisenhower administration and its allies battled an increasingly restive 
Democratic Congress and organized labor movement during the 1950s over the issue of health 
security for older Americans, policy developments at the state and local level began to outstrip the 
types of assistance offered by the federal government. State, local, and private welfare officials, 
primarily in New York City and California, worked to construct a new social welfare infrastructure, 
which would be capable of addressing the growing community and social service needs of their 
elderly resident population. While economic and health needs remained of paramount importance, 
state and local officials increasingly turned their attention to programs designed to provide 
affordable public housing, senior community centers, and educational opportunities designed to help 
foster access to part-time employment and voluntary roles within the community.  
          
199 As Julian Zelizer observes, the Medical Assistance for the Aged program’s reach was quite limited: “only twenty-
eight states had adopted it, and the guidelines for participation were so stringent that only one per cent of the elderly 
received benefits.” See Julian Zelizer, “How Medicare Was Made,” The New Yorker, February 15, 2015. Accessed at 
the New Yorker website, source URL: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/medicare-made (accessed March 29, 
2017). 
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Their motivation for doing so was, in part, underpinned by the wealth of new academic 
studies that had emerged over the course of the late 1940s and into the early 1950s which offered a 
new active and dynamic portrait of older people’s lives than policymakers had been previously 
assumed to be the case. Rather than seeking to merely supplement the meager financial resources of 
older people, state and local officials celebrated them as elder or “senior” citizens without whose 
wisdom and experience local communities would be impoverished. While some of this rhetoric was 
at times, vacuous or patronizing, it did signify another evolutionary step in the development of the 
senior state. Rather than merely viewing the elderly as undifferentiated mass of citizens who could 
be bamboozled or misled by possible charlatans like Dr. Francis Townsend or other such figures, 
local and state welfare officials in New York and California began to see them as individuals who 
could contribute to society, whether by remaining in the workforce longer (and thereby delaying 
their retirement and receipt of Social Security benefits and other funds) or by becoming active 
participants in the newly constructed web of programs and initiatives being erected on their behalf, 
if not at their beckoning.  
Yet even as the senior state developed and deepened in New York, California, and a few 
other select places, it remained clear to the community of federal, state, and local welfare officials 
that the range and depth of services available to older people continued to vary widely, with 
geography, race, gender, and class playing determinative roles. For example, older women 
continued to benefit the least from improvements to Social Security’s old-age insurance program, 
which mostly benefitted older and retired white men. Elderly African-American sharecroppers in 
Mississippi and Louisiana continued to live in impoverished conditions not radically different from 
what previous generations had known. Sufficient access to adequate health care and medical 
insurance remained a flash point for many older people, including relatively better off Social 
Security and private pension recipients, who frequently found that private health insurance plans 
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were meager in their benefits and excessively stringent in their demands. These issues would come 
to a head during the 1960s, when the Kennedy and Johnson administrations would embark upon a 
significant effort to build up federal, state, and local programs designed to assist older Americans 
and provide millions of impoverished elderly people with access to services, care, and income in 
retirement on a grand scale. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The War on Elderly Poverty, 1961-1966 
 
 
Between 1961 and 1973, the senior state simultaneously underwent its most significant 
transformation and its most dramatic expansion. Starting in 1961 and continuing through the late 
1960s and into the early 1970s, social welfare officials at the federal, state, and local level 
collaborated to identify, develop, and sponsor new programs and initiatives designed to promote 
economic security in old age and to promote anti-poverty programs aimed at reaching previously 
neglected and impoverished elderly people. In particular, the Johnson administration unabashedly 
borrowed academic researchers, social workers, and other social welfare experts for its major 
taskforces and made ample use of the latest medical and sociological research in order to inform its 
policy-making process. Though this strategy sometimes produced more proposals than actual 
policy, Johnson administration officials would work to build a national infrastructure capable of 
supporting new supplemental income assistance, access to medical care, social service and 
community programs that reached into less white, less wealthy, and less fortunate places in the 
nation. 
In keeping with this approach, the federal government’s embrace of community and social 
service programs during this period marked a major transformation of the senior state. Prior to the 
1965, the federal government’s initiatives in the realm of old-age policy had been largely confined 
to economic security, with the enactment of Medicare as a continuation of the contributory model of 
social insurance that had begun under the original Social Security Act three decades earlier. This 
limitation came despite the fact that the federal government had sponsored numerous conferences 
that had suggested new directions for social welfare policy for older Americans outside of the model 
created by Social Security. Until 1965, most of these reforms remained at the state and local level, 
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where elected officials in conjunction with social workers, private philanthropies, and 
representatives of private social welfare organizations had worked to develop and build up a new 
model of public and private partnership capable of addressing the needs of older people beyond 
ensuring adequate income in retirement. After 1965, the senior state embraced a threefold approach 
to the problems of older people: first, an emphasis on adequate income to avoid the stigma of 
welfare; second, regular medical care and access to in-patient hospital services; and finally, access 
to new programs designed to improve the education, nutrition, and community integration of older 
people. All three initiatives were united by the desire of the senior state’s architects to ensure that 
older people could retain as much social and economic independence as they wanted, in contrast to 
the traditional poorhouse model of old-age relief that had treated older people as helpless 
dependents and sought to quarantine and control them. 
As important as the developments of the 1960s and the 1970s were to the development of the 
senior state, there were significant limits of the programs created during this period, along with a 
few unintended consequences that would have a more dramatic impact in time. The enactment of 
Medicaid in 1965, for example, released a torrent of federal funds into the lightly regulated nursing 
home industry, and within a few years’ time had stimulated its speedy growth into a major player in 
future federal old age policy debates. Additionally, the enactment of Medicare in 1965 did not 
directly address the issue of providing affordable long-term care, the rising costs of prescription 
drugs, and or the continuing risk that inflation posed to Social Security benefits. During the course 
of the 1960s, government spending on the Vietnam War inflated the value of the U.S. dollar and 
thereby lowered the purchasing power of thousands of older people living on Social Security and 
eroded the ability of that program to provide a basic level of economic security in old age. 
The dramatic expansion of the senior state during the 1960s was partly the result of changes 
that had been building at the local and state level for years, and partly the result of fortuitous 
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circumstances. Beginning in 1961, the chief goal of many federal, state, and local officials was to 
secure the enactment of health insurance via the Social Security system for people over the age of 
65. After the enactment of Medicare in 1965, though, federal and state officials tackled a new 
challenge: ensuring equity in the levels of governmental services and assistance available to older 
people across the nation. These services could (and did) vary significantly on a state-by-state basis. 
While access to health care remained important, officials increasingly believed that it required 
supplementation by additional social and community service programs.  
The development of these services co-existed in uneasy tension with the Johnson 
administration’s War on Poverty.1 This tension stemmed from the fact that Sargent Shriver, the head 
of the Office of Economic Opportunity (the Johnson administration’s primary vehicle for 
conducting the War on Poverty) and his advisers chose to focus their limited resources on 
alleviating urban poverty. They had done this in the belief that government intervention could break 
up a persistent “culture of poverty” with job training programs and new educational opportunities 
for young, predominantly African-American people to become skilled and employable workers.2 
The focus on alleviating poverty in American cities came under harsh criticism from critics across 
the political spectrum in the United States, many of whom believed that the Office of Economic 
Opportunity’s (OEO) methods and vision were misguided or unrealistic. Harsh criticism, in 
particular, came from Congress, where the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging repeatedly tried to 
redirect the OEO to do more about elderly poverty in the United States. Such efforts largely fell flat. 
Eventually, this shortcoming obliged the Johnson administration in 1966 and 1967 to move more 
aggressively to address the issue of elderly poverty.  
          
1 Marjorie Hunter, “Johnson Seeks Aid for Nation's 'Forgotten Fifth',” The New York Times, January 21, 1964. 
2 See Joseph A. Loftus, “Aid to Aged Poor Reported Lagging,” The New York Times, December 22, 1965. 
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Before the War on Poverty 
The election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 offered the distinct possibility 
that efforts to enact health insurance through the Social Security system and to expand the role of 
the federal government in formulating and administering programs on behalf of the nation’s elderly 
population would receive a more receptive hearing than during the Eisenhower years. During the 
1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy and his aides took pains to signal to surviving New Deal and 
Fair Deal policymakers that their counsel would be welcome in a Kennedy White House. For 
example, in order to formulate its social welfare policy goals, the Kennedy campaign relied heavily 
upon long-established experts like Wilbur Cohen, who had first come to Washington in the early 
1930s as a young staff assistant to Edwin Witte on the Committee on Economic Security that had 
produced the original Social Security Act. Cohen had long been cultivated by Theodore Sorensen, 
Kennedy’s chief speechwriter, and had ultimately served as unofficial adviser to Kennedy and his 
staff on social welfare measures for several years before the 1960 presidential campaign.3 As Cohen 
recalled,  
in 1958 Ted Sorensen asked me to work with Mike Feldman in 
developing a program for the Senator on the aged...Mike Feldman and 
I eventually constructed a ten-point program which was called “A Bill 
of Rights for our Elder Citizens” which Senator Kennedy put in the 
Congressional Record on August 19, 1958. This material was used 
repeatedly during the 1960 campaign along with material advocating 
hospital insurance for the aged through Social Security which was 
popularly called Medicare.4  
          
3 For Cohen’s account of his relationship with Sorenson and Kennedy, see Wilbur J. Cohen, recorded interview by 
Charles T. Morrissey, November 11, 1964, pgs. 8-17, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy 
Library, Boston, MA (hereafter “JFKL”).  Additionally, Cohen recalled “President Kennedy was the first president to 
send to Congress a special message on aging and it was significant to me that such a young man could be so concerned 
about the problems of the aging. In all my association I truly believe he was concerned about them. I think his advocacy 
of this program was one which, along with many others, brought him support in areas where people felt this man of 
wealth and intelligence was really concerned about the welfare of people in their communities. So I think this ten-point 
program which Feldman and I developed was very consequential in the unfolding of Kennedy’s philosophy and as a key 
point in the New Frontier proposals.” (Ibid.) 
4 Ibid. 
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Spurred in part by the activities of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Problems of the 
Aged and Aging’s hearings, which had demonstrated an unexpectedly deep level of interest from 
many older Americans, Sorensen had taken an interest in pushing for health care for the elderly and 
in the problems of older Americans more broadly. Soon, statistics and testimonies compiled by the 
Subcommittee began to find their way into the Kennedy campaign’s strategy, as Sorensen 
assembled its domestic policy proposals. 5  On the campaign trail during the Democratic Party 
          
5 See, for example, the Hearing before the Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging, Part 5, held on November 
3, 1959 in Charleston, West Virginia, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers, Presidential Campaign Files, 
1960. Campaigns by State. West Virginia Primary Data, 1960. Aged and aging: Labor and Public welfare, JFKL. 
Kennedy would in May 1960 triumph in the West Virginia Democratic Party primary, a crucial turning point in his 
campaign for the presidency. 
Figure 5. Wilbur Cohen at a forum in 1961. Photo courtesy of the Social Security Administration Archives. 
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primary season, Kennedy repeatedly spoke out in Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin on providing 
medical care for the elderly.6  
In doing so, Kennedy was not only seeking to latch onto an increasingly prominent issue that 
enjoyed growing grassroots interest, but also to attach himself more firmly to the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party which still venerated the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt. Joseph Kennedy’s 
complicated relationship with Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s and the closeness of some 
Kennedy family members to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the 1950s had led Eleanor Roosevelt, 
still a leading light in the Democratic Party’s liberal wing, to publicly express her skepticism of 
John F. Kennedy’s liberal bona fides throughout 1960.7 Realizing that he was unlikely to unify the 
Democratic Party without Eleanor Roosevelt’s support, Kennedy traveled to Hyde Park, New York, 
as a supplicant in August 1960, ostensibly to make a speech commemorating the twentieth-fifth 
anniversary of Social Security’s enactment, but also to make peace with Eleanor Roosevelt and 
secure her endorsement.8 After his speech, Kennedy dined with Roosevelt and won her grudging 
support, though she remained distant for much of the rest of the 1960 campaign.  
In conjunction with the candidate’s visit to Hyde Park, the Kennedy campaign announced a 
23-member “Board of Senior Citizens for Kennedy” on August 26, 1960, in order to “emphasize to 
          
6 See Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. Speeches and the Press. 
Speeches, Statements, and Sections, 1958-1960. Social Security and depressed areas: Medical care for our older 
citizens; and Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. Speeches and the 
Press. Speeches, Statements, and Sections, 1958-1960. Social Security and depressed areas: Three Neglected Groups, 
JFKL. 
7 See, for example, Eleanor Roosevelt to Mary Lasker, August 15th, 1960, in which Roosevelt offered her estimation of 
Kennedy and acknowledged her willingness to support him, provided he continued to work on behalf of causes which 
she had come to embrace (such as the expansion of Social Security) in Allida Black et. al., eds., Eleanor Roosevelt, John 
Kennedy, and the Election of 1960: A Project of the Eleanor Roosevelt Papers (Columbia, S.C.: Model Editions 
Partnership, 2003). Electronic version based on unpublished letters (Accessed September 28, 2016). 
8 Kennedy gave a speech at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, on August 14, 1960 entitled 
“New Frontiers for Our Older Citizens,” which explicitly linked Kennedy’s proposed “New Frontier” with Roosevelt’s 
hallowed New Deal. See Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. 
Speeches and the Press. Speeches, Statements, and Sections, 1958-1960. Social Security and depressed areas: New 
Frontiers for Our Older Citizens, JFKL. See also W.H. Lawrence, “Kennedy Pledges a Drive to Widen Social Security,” 
The New York Times, August 15, 1960. 
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the American people the importance of medical care for older citizens based on the social security 
principle.”9 Created at the behest of the AFL-CIO, the board included liberal luminaries like Oscar 
Ewing, the former head of the Truman-era Federal Security Agency, Representative John Fogarty, 
as well as high-ranking labor representatives like Nelson Cruikshank, James O’Brien, and Charles 
Odell. The board also included Sidney Spector, the chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Problems of the Aged and Aging and an unofficial representative of Senator Patrick McNamara, the 
committee’s influential chairman.10 
 
Figure 6. John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt in New York City, October 11, 1960. 
Photo courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
By welcoming the creation of a “board of senior citizens,” something which no major 
political campaign had hitherto felt the need to do, Kennedy signaled to liberals and to organized 
          
9 Press Release of Senator John F. Kennedy on Senior Citizens for Kennedy, Washington, D.C., August 26, 1960. 
Available at: John F. Kennedy: “Press Release of Senator John F. Kennedy on Senior Citizens for Kennedy, 
Washington, DC,” August 26, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74214 (accessed September 13, 2016); “Forand Aides Picked: Eight to Advise 
Chairman of Senior Citizens for Kennedy,” The New York Times, August 31, 1960. 
10 Ibid. Nelson Cruikshank was head of the AFL-CIO’s Social Security Department, while James O’Brien came from 
the United Steelworkers and Charles Odell from the United Auto Workers. 
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labor his willingness to give them seats at the domestic policy table in his future administration, and 
to also woo traditionally conservative older voters to consider supporting his campaign.11 Satisfied 
that the Kennedy campaign was now in agreement with its stated goal of pushing for the enactment 
of health insurance for older Americans through the Social Security system, the AFL-CIO worked 
vigorously on the campaign trail to build grassroots support for both Kennedy and the proposed 
Medicare legislation sponsored by Congressman Aime J. Forand. 12 In particular, the AFL-CIO 
helped to organize huge rallies of senior citizens in New York City to demonstrate public support 
for Medicare. Tacticians in both the Democratic and Republican parties noted the enthusiastic 
response of many older people to these rallies, which strongly suggested that the potential power of 
seniors as an organized group had been galvanized into action once more by the issue of health care 
insurance. 
After Kennedy’s exceedingly narrow win in the November 1960 election, the AFL-CIO’s 
hope that Medicare’s enactment would soon follow the new president’s inauguration proved to be 
premature. In part, this development owed something to the Kennedy administration’s cautionary 
approach. Kennedy had taken hold of an economy that seemed to be basically sound and in good 
working condition, and popular support for broad social or political reforms was decidedly limited 
in comparison to the atmosphere that had greeted Franklin Roosevelt’s first inauguration a 
generation beforehand. In the words of Joshua Freeman,  
          
11 See also Kennedy’s October 1960 “Statement on Aging” in which he again confirmed his support for enacting 
medical care for the aged via Social Security, and made public a long list of signatories (including Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Wilbur Cohen, Ernest Burgess, Wilma Donahue, and others) who had “endorsed his approach to meeting the problems 
of the Nation’s 16 million senior citizens.” See John F. Kennedy: "Statement on Aging by Senator John F. Kennedy," 
October 12, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25776 (Accessed September 13, 2016). 
12 Emma Harrison, “15,000 at Garden Rally Demand Passage of Forand Health Bill: Aged Cheer Attacks on Foes of 
Insurance Measure – Javits Braves Boos,” The New York Times, May 19, 1960; Damon Stetson, “Reuther Rallies Union 
Pensioners,” The New York Times, August 10th, 1960; “Kennedy Promises More Aid for Aged,” The New York Times, 
September 15, 1960. 
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He [Kennedy] recognized that there were some groups plagued by 
poverty, like the elderly and residents of Appalachia, for whom he 
proposed targeted programs. But he believed that economic growth in 
itself would go a long way toward solving social ills, without the need 
for redistributive measure or major structural changes.13 
 
Even if there were no pressing national crisis like the Great Depression or World War II, social 
welfare experts believed that more direct action was necessary to alleviate the plight of 
impoverished groups in American society. Many were openly dismayed that the highly publicized 
fights over providing medical care for the aged in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration 
had proved to be inconclusive.14 For example, at the 1961 annual meeting of the National Council 
on Aging (NCOA), an organization whose membership largely consisted of voluntary organizations 
involved in services to elderly people, Geneva Mathiasen, the NCOA’s executive director, publicly 
expressed her concern that “many matters of interest and concern to her group” had experienced 
only “limited” or “spotty” progress, including questions of “employment, retirement, health, 
housing, recreation, education, counseling and community organization” for older people.15  
Mathiasen’s concerns were not new; throughout the 1950s, social reformers had repeatedly 
expressed their belief that more action was required in order to deal with the problems of the 
nation’s growing elderly population. Mathiasen’s concerns, though, gained renewed credence from 
the fact that the growth of the nation’s elderly population showed no signs of slowing down or 
reversing. In June 1961, the U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that advances in medical 
knowledge and social provision had led to dramatically higher numbers of people surviving into 
“old age.”16 By the Census Bureau’s count, approximately 16.5 million Americans were aged 65 or 
over, a figure that the Census Bureau estimated had increased by roughly 420,000 each year 
          
13 Freeman, American Empire, 177. 
14 Dorothy B. Barclay, “Problems of the Aged Still Unsolved,” The New York Times, May 1, 1961. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Will Lissner, “65-Plus Age Group Twice 1960 Total,” The New York Times, June 18, 1961. 
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between 1950 and 1960.17 While not all old people faced the prospect of financial insecurity, a 
substantial and growing number of them did so because the costs associated with medical, hospital, 
and long-term care continued to outstrip the capacity of Social Security benefits, private pension 
payments, in-kind assistance from individual families and other sources of financial support to pay 
them. 
 Members of the nascent Kennedy administration were aware of the potential social and 
economic ramifications that might accompany a rising poverty rate for older people. In the spring of 
1961, Abraham Ribicoff, the new Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) appointed a panel of experts to advise him on the federal government’s approach to aging 
policy.18 The creation of the HEW panel a few months after the 1961 White House Conference on 
Aging reflected the belief of some administration officials that the publicity and interest generated 
by the 1961 White House Conference had created an opportunity to press forward on numerous 
policy recommendations that could improve the economic and social status of older people.19  
Like the Eisenhower administration’s Federal Council on Aging before it, the Kennedy-era 
HEW panel emphasized the inadequacy of income maintenance programs to keep older Americans 
from falling into penury.20 Specifically, the HEW panel argued that Social Security’s coverage 
needed to be extended and that earned income restrictions for recipients of old age assistance 
          
17 Ibid. 
18 Donald P. Kent to Anthony Celebrezze, memorandum, August 13, 1962, “March 26-27, 1962, Meeting of Secretary’s 
Panel of Consultants on Aging,” U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Panel of Public Advisors on 
Aging (2) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter “DDEL”). 
19 As Donald P. Kent, a professor at the University of Connecticut and recurrent appointed official in HEW later wrote, 
“unquestionably the overriding issue at the Conference was how to finance medical care. After extensive and at times 
acrimonious debate the Income and Maintenance Section [delegates], to which this issue was assigned, voted in favor of 
a “social security approach” (170 to 99). The Kennedy administration would embrace this overarching goal, but would 
also eventually in 1963 begin to advocate for many of the conference’s other recommendations as part of the 
administration’s developing legislative and policy agenda for older Americans. See Donald P. Kent, “The White House 
Conference in Retrospect,” The Gerontologist 1, no. 1 (March 1961): 4-7. 
20 Donald P. Kent to Anthony Celebrezze, Memorandum, August 13, 1962, “March 26-27, 1962, Meeting of Secretary’s 
Panel of Consultants on Aging,” U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Panel of Public Advisors on 
Aging (2) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
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needed to be lifted in order to encourage older workers to remain in the active labor force longer, 
and thereby delay their need to rely upon Social Security to make up for lost income. As a result, the 
increasing financial pressures placed by a growing number of older Americans on the Social 
Security system would be reduced with limited social and political disruption. State governments 
and voluntary organizations that had traditionally expended considerable sums on behalf of the 
elderly would benefit too, as would individual families supporting elderly members. The panel’s 
embrace of this new approach to Social Security represented a significant shift in how the federal 
government approached the issue of older workers and the Social Security system.  
Specifically, Social Security had been designed by its federal architects to enable some older 
workers to leave the labor force without risking destitution or dependence upon private and public 
support. While this approach had been more justifiable during the sluggish economy of the Great 
Depression, it seemed counterproductive in the economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, when a 
booming postwar economy meant that workforce opportunities were far more plentiful. Improving 
and adapting Social Security to this new economic environment, the approach favored by the 
Eisenhower administration during the 1950s, had produced beneficial results, but those 
improvements had largely been limited to older people who were already qualified to receive Social 
Security benefits. For example, improvements made to Social Security during the course of the 
1950s provided coverage for significantly more workers, but Social Security was still not a 
universal program. Moreover, the strident efforts of Social Security’s administrators during the late 
1940s and early 1950s to keep the program from being lobbed in with welfare programs militated 
against attempts to enact broad scale reforms of Social Security such as the HEW panel desired.  
Perhaps cognizant of the limitations to the existing Social Security system, the HEW panel 
proposed thirty-two new initiatives that aimed to expand federal efforts to assist older Americans. 
For example, paralleling the Kennedy administration’s more famous Peace Corps, the HEW panel 
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proposed the creation of a new “Senior Citizens Service Corps” designed to provide older 
Americans with community service opportunities, provided that such “corps not infringe on other 
Federal programs and compete with the labor force” and that “the corps will be used…in the public 
interest.”21 Other proposals envisioned new efforts to regulate the nursing home industry, enhanced 
funding to train more doctors to provide geriatric care, and finally, serious federal efforts to 
eliminate age-based job discrimination in the workplace. The broad scope of these policy proposals 
was unlike anything the federal government had ever previously recommended on behalf of the 
elderly. 
At the same time, though, the question of where exactly to situate responsibility for these 
new potential efforts on the part of the federal government to assist older Americans remained 
unanswered. Should such responsibilities reside solely within the executive branch, or should 
Congress be somehow involved? And, if these responsibilities were placed solely within the 
executive branch, what department should have the ultimate statutory authority to enforce them? 
Ultimately, the HEW panel recommended that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
should have the responsibility to administer any new aging programs, but that there should also be 
an unspecified “Study Commission to review and evaluate” HEW’s efforts at some future date.22 
 Even as the Kennedy administration debated how best to grapple with these issues, 
congressional Democrats like Senator Patrick McNamara (D-MI) barreled forward in demanding 
swifter action from the administration. On May 15th 1962, President Kennedy, at the behest of 
Senator McNamara and others, submitted a comprehensive set of legislative proposals to Congress 
that outlined an expansive agenda of more federal research and demonstration grant programs in the 
          
21 Donald P. Kent to Anthony Celebrezze, Memorandum, August 13, 1962, “March 26-27, 1962, Meeting of Secretary’s 
Panel of Consultants on Aging,” pg. 8, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Panel of Public Advisors 
on Aging (2) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
22 Ibid., 8. 
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field of aging.23 As Wilbur Cohen observed in his May 1962 testimony before the House Committee 
on Education and Labor,  
[W]e in the Department [of Health, Education, and Welfare] are 
cognizant that most of the work with older people cannot be done on 
the Federal level…instead, programs and services must be conducted 
and offered in the local communities and neighborhoods where the 
older people are living…consequently, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare has been moving vigorously to stimulate and 
guide States, communities, and organizations toward an ever-
widening range of action.24 
 
Herein lay both the greatest strength and weakness of the federal government’s efforts to 
improve the material well-being of older Americans. On the one hand, the financial resources of the 
federal government greatly exceeded that of state or local governments, but federal administrators 
needed the assistance of local officials who were and would likely remain far-better informed about 
the actual social and economic conditions in their communities. Consequently, the Kennedy-era 
HEW, like its Eisenhower-era predecessor, placed great emphasis on building productive working 
relationships with state and local officials, and labored mightily to avoid becoming involved in any 
initiatives or activities which would cause grave offense to them.  
The dependence upon the goodwill of state and local officials also meant that the federal 
government’s effectiveness was ultimately dependent upon officials not directly responsible to it, 
and who could, if they desired, cease to cooperate at any moment. Still, as Cohen observed in his 
testimony, 
Some persons lament what they see as a fragmentation of programs 
and services. They get frustrated because there is not some simple 
solution for all the problems of aging wrapped up in one neat package 
and shipped to them prepaid. Major responsibility for coordination 
          
23 Donald P. Kent to Arthur S. Flemming, May 29, 1962, in Panel of Public Advisors on Aging (3) file, Box 155, Papers 
of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
24  Statement by Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Before the General 
Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, May 15, 1962, 
in Panel of Public Advisors on Aging (3) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
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and provision of community services rests with the States and 
localities. It was for this purpose that the Special Staff on Aging has 
encouraged the formation of State commissions and has stimulated 
these commissions to urge the creation of similar coordinating 
mechanisms in the various committees.25 
 
While Cohen further conceded “our senior citizens are not all right here under the roof of the federal 
government,” he noted that the Kennedy administration was still taking steps to better coordinate 
the federal government’s efforts. In May 1962, the administration authorized the conversion of the 
Federal Council on Aging into a President’s Council on Aging in order to enhance both its visibility 
and its mandate. Unlike the Eisenhower-era Federal Council on Aging, the Kennedy Council on 
Aging was composed primarily of Cabinet members rather than designated staff representatives. 
Furthermore, the administration gave the Council responsibility for providing recommendations to 
the President on aging policy.26 By doing so, the Kennedy administration hoped that the “new 
President’s Council on Aging will rapidly increase its effectiveness in assessing national needs, 
reviewing, and evaluating current Federal programs, coordinating present activities, and initiating 
such policy recommendations as may be indicated.”27 
Amidst the reorganization of the Executive Branch’s efforts to coordinate aging policy, the 
Kennedy administration authorized the creation and implementation of new experimental programs 
and demonstration projects. These projects included “wide-range experiments in the development of 
projects through which older people can employ their energies in serving others and their 
communities through voluntary effort,” “comprehensive information, referral, and counseling 
services in local communities to assist older people with their complex problems of employment, 
          
25  Statement by Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare before the General 
Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, May 15, 1962, 
pgs. 16-17, in Panel of Public Advisors on Aging (3) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
26 Ibid., 17-18. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
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economic dependency, etc.” and “experimental projects in providing part time work.”28 Most of 
these projects – especially the experimental demonstration projects – would grow more substantial 
during the 1960s and into the early 1970s, after the Older Americans Act made additional federal 
funding available.29 In New York City, for example, the federal Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare made grant money available in 1962 to local private community service agencies, 
which in turn organized new recreation and therapeutic centers designed specifically for the city’s 
800,000 senior citizens.30   
If the Eisenhower administration’s efforts had been careful and deliberate to the point of 
motionlessness, the Kennedy administration’s efforts burst forth in rapid succession. More needed 
to be done – and more would be done, if the administration had its way, to promote economic self-
sufficiency among senior citizens, and to ensure that they would remain integrated as active 
members of their local communities rather than isolated and confined to its margins. This was the 
optimistic faith and spirit that guided many of the Kennedy’s administration’s efforts, along with an 
ebullient confidence that the complex problems of aging could, over time and with the application 
of multiple initiatives and efforts, be largely reduced to irrelevance.  
In May 1962, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare hosted a special day-
long program for visiting Japanese Governors. The program was designed to highlight the U.S. 
          
28 Ibid., 22. See also Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Kennedy's Welfare Aim: Services and Rehabilitation Will Be Stressed in 
New Federal Programs,” The New York Times, January 21, 1962. 
29 See Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Needs of the Aged II: Recreation and Community Service Are 2 of the Ingredients of a 
Full Life,” The New York Times, July 15, 1962; “Bills on the Aging Introduced,” The New York Times, January 28, 
1965. 
30 Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Needs of the Aged II: Recreation and Community Service Are 2 of the Ingredients of a Full 
Life,” The New York Times, July 15, 1962; “Study on Aging Set,” The New York Times, May 21, 1961. The growing 
emphasis on rehabilitation and therapy for older people built on the experience of prior Federal-state cooperation on 
these initiatives during the 1950s, which had demonstrated that vocational rehabilitation could successfully retrain older 
workers to re-enter the workforce rather than remaining unemployed and dependent upon old-age pensions. The number 
of rehabilitated older people in these demonstration projects remained small, though. In 1949-1950, for example, only 
931 people over the age of 65 participated; the total population of people over the age of 65 in the U.S. stood at 
11,000,000. See Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Potentialities of Elder Folk Studied in U.S. Conference,” The New York 
Times, August 13, 1950. 
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government’s growing efforts to deal with the rising number of older Americans, and the chosen 
speakers for the day offered a brief but still comprehensive overview of those efforts. In particular, 
Donald P. Kent, a former faculty member at the University of Connecticut’s Institute of 
Gerontology and now the Special Assistant for Aging in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare summarized the government’s approach: 
Our basic philosophy holds that the individual should do for himself 
whatever he can. His second line of defense should be the family, 
followed by the level of Government that is nearest to him. The 
Federal Government only does those things which cannot be done or 
cannot be done as satisfactorily by local or State governments. Yet 
another part of the American philosophy is that the Government 
works in cooperation with other governmental units, with private 
citizens and with voluntary associations.31 
 
The federal government’s programs, Kent continued, shared “certain basic assumptions,” including 
the notion that “all individuals shall have the opportunity to obtain at least a minimum standard of 
shelter, food, and medical care,” and that “the goal of government programs should be to help the 
individual help himself.”32 As his colleague Warren Roudebush observed, though, there was “no 
single pattern of relationships in Federal programs” because there was “no single pattern or 
formula” for “public and private responsibilities in aging.”33 
While the Kennedy administration continued to evaluate possible initiatives it could 
undertake, the issue of financial insecurity among elderly people due to rising medical costs 
remained frustratingly unresolved. This issue had powered the AFL-CIO’s grassroots efforts to 
organize and mobilize significant popular support for the enactment of Medicare. Unfortunately, 
that legislation remained securely bottled up in committee on Capitol Hill, courtesy of Congressman 
          
31 Donald P. Kent, “Federal Programs for the Aged,” May 21, 1962, pg. 6, Special Program for Japanese Governors, 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Panel of Public Advisors on Aging (2) file, Box 155, Papers of 
Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
32 Ibid., 8. 
33 Warren T. Roudebush, “Public and Private Responsibilities in Various Programs for Aging,” May 21, 1962, pg. 11, 
Special Program for Japanese Governors, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Panel of Public 
Advisors on Aging (2) file, Box 155, Papers of Arthur S. Flemming, 1939-1975, DDEL. 
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Wilbur Mills, the powerful chairman of the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee. 
Mills, who had supported the enactment of more modest legislation in the past designed to provide 
health insurance only to indigent older people (rather than the universal coverage which Medicare’s 
supporters sought), remained unwilling to allow the legislation to proceed, for fear that its costs 
might prove detrimental to the overall condition of the Social Security system. 
The Other Americans 
While the Kennedy administration, organized labor, the AMA, and Congressman Mills 
jousted over the fate of Medicare, the publication of Michael Harrington’s The Other America: 
Poverty in the United States in 1962 helped to fix public attention on the multifaceted nature of 
poverty in the United States. Besides the growth of urban poverty, Harrington gave significant 
attention to the increasing impoverishment of older Americans.34 Perhaps no chapter in The Other 
America was more poignant or heartrending than the ironically titled chapter “The Golden Years,” 
in which Harrington claimed that “at least 8,000,000 Americans over sixty-five are poor,” a figure 
which represented approximately half of the entire senior population in the United States. 35 
Skillfully employing data made available by the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on the Problems of the 
Aged and Aging, Harrington emphasized the perilous economic status of many older Americans, 
          
34 See James Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (1994; Harvard University Press, 
2000), 92. Conflicting accounts abound as to whether or not John F. Kennedy or any of his senior advisers actually read 
The Other America; a steadier consensus holds that Dwight MacDonald’s review of The Other America in The New 
Yorker was more widely read, circulated, and digested by key officials (including Kennedy and Theodore Sorenson). 
See Dwight McDonald, “Our Invisible Poor,” January 19, 1963, The New Yorker, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1963/01/19/our-invisible-poor (Accessed September 24, 2016). As MacDonald 
observed in his review, “the least obvious poverty affects our ‘senior citizens’ – those over sixty-five. Mr. Harrington 
estimates that half of them – 8,000,000 – live in poverty, and he thinks they are even more atomized and politically 
helpless than the rest of the Other America…[t]he problem of the aged poor is aggravated by the fact that, unlike the 
Italians or the English, we seem to have little respect for or interest in our ‘senior citizens,’ beyond giving them that 
honorific title, and we don’t include them in family life. If we can afford it, we are likely to send them to nursing 
homes…and if we can’t, which is the case with the poor, they must make do with the resources noted above 
[contributions by relatives, Social Security, and relief].” (Ibid., 16-17). 
35 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (1962; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 
101-102, 105. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s figures, there were approximately16.6 million senior citizens in 
1960, so Harrington’s figure of 8,000,000 would represent nearly half of the entire elder U.S. population. Source for 
Census figures: U.S. Bureau of the Census, National Institute on Aging, Aging in the United States: Past, Present, and 
Future. Source URL: http://www.census.gov/population/international/files/97agewc.pdf (accessed August 17, 2016). 
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especially those for whom Social Security, personal savings, and other financial instruments 
designed to mitigate economic insecurity in old age had proven to be insufficient.36 As Harrington 
delineated the growing concentration of poverty among older Americans, he observed that “it is a 
fact that the problems of the aged are so great that families, probably the majority of them in the 
nation, cannot really deal with them…there is literally no alternative but governmental 
intervention.”  
The Rise and Fall of Medicare, 1961-1963 
Harrington’s words did not fall on deaf ears. By 1962, the Kennedy administration had 
coalesced around Medicare as its preferred solution to the economic problems of the aged. 
Consequently, the Kennedy administration’s response to the question of elderly poverty was to 
redouble its efforts to get Medicare enacted, in the reasonable belief that publicly subsidizing the 
health costs of older people would keep many of them out of poverty and off the public assistance 
rolls.37 In May 1962, Kennedy met with the leadership of the National Council of Senior Citizens 
(NCSC) in a public display of his administration’s support for Medicare, and spoke at an enormous 
          
36 As Harrington observed in the opening chapter of The Other America, “one of the major laws designed to cover 
everyone, rich and poor, was social security. But even here the other Americans suffered discrimination. Over the years 
social security payments have not even provided a subsistence level of life. The middle third have been able to 
supplement the Federal pension through private plans negotiated by unions, through joining medical insurance schemes 
like Blue Cross, and so on. The poor have not been able to do so…Today’s poor, in short, missed the political and social 
gains of the thirties (Harrington, The Other America, 9).  
37 As Robert Ball later recalled, Medicare was born from the ashes of the Truman administration’s defeat in the late 
1940s to enact national health insurance. In an article published thirty years after Medicare’s enactment, Ball 
remembered that “even before the AMA launched its attack, however, the Truman administration had given up on a 
universal health plan and was casting about for something less ambitious that might have a better chance. That is how 
Medicare was born. It was publicly advocated for the first time by a government spokesman when Oscar Ewing, head of 
the Federal Security Agency (later the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and now the Department of Health 
and Human Services), unveiled the plan on February 26, 1952. The idea was to cover all Social Security beneficiaries 
(the elderly, widows, and orphans; persons with disabilities were not yet under Social Security). The Social Security 
program was part of the Federal Security Agency, and we had worked up the plan for Ewing. Initially, it went nowhere. 
President Truman never specifically endorsed the shift from support of universal health insurance to the limited 
Medicare program, but even if he had, he would not have been able to get Congress to consider it. He was within a few 
months of the end of his term, and his would-be successor, Adlai Stevenson, was soon to be overwhelmingly defeated 
by General Dwight Eisenhower.” See Robert M. Ball, “Perspectives on Medicare: What Medicare’s Architects had in 
Mind,” Health Affairs 14, no. 4 (1995): 62-72. For a somewhat different account of the same story, see Edward Annis, 
M.D., “Medicare and the Destruction of Freedom in Medicine: Recollections of Dr. Edward Annis,” Journal of 
American Physicians and Surgeons 13, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 117-119. 
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rally later that same month at Madison Square Garden in New York City on behalf of the measure.38 
Kennedy’s nationally televised speech at Madison Square Garden was supposed to be a dramatic 
high point for this campaign, and the administration as well as the AFL-CIO hoped a strong 
performance by the telegenic Kennedy would strengthen popular support for the campaign to enact 
Medicare. 
 
Figure 7. John F. Kennedy meets with National Council of Senior Citizens members,  
May 26, 1962. Photo courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library. 
  
          
38 The AFL-CIO had been instrumental in the creation of the NCSC after Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential 
race. In fact, the NCSC was the lineal descendant of the Kennedy campaign’s “Senior Citizens for Kennedy” group 
formed after Kennedy’s August 1960 visit to Eleanor Roosevelt at Hyde Park, New York. In order to try and keep the 
momentum of the campaign going after Kennedy’s inauguration, the NCSC had spearheaded highly publicized efforts to 
organize and rally retired union members as well as other interested senior citizens in New York, Florida, and elsewhere 
to support the Kennedy administration’s efforts to enact Medicare. See Natalie Jaffe, “2,646 Over 65 Fill Orchestra’s 
Hall,” The New York Times, May 17, 1963; Natalie Jaffe, “Hundreds Attend Hearing for Aged,” The New York Times, 
January 19, 1964. 
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Unfortunately, though, many viewers found Kennedy’s speech distasteful and beneath the 
dignity of his office. 39  Arthur Krock of the New York Times described it as contributing to 
“misinformation” in the increasingly volatile national debate over Medicare because it ignored 
private, non-governmental efforts to improve access to health care for older people without 
requiring “compulsory” measures.40 Furthermore, Dr. Edward Annis, a Florida surgeon and AMA 
public representative gave an artfully staged rebuttal speech at Madison Square Garden the 
following night that skillfully opposed the proposed Medicare legislation by labeling it as a “cruel 
hoax and delusion.” Dr. Annis argued that Medicare – far from guaranteeing the economic security 
of older people – would instead offer inadequate coverage and threaten the vitality of existing 
private health insurance programs.41 Dr. Annis’s speech received comparatively more favorable 
press coverage, and successfully dented much of the momentum that the administration and the 
AFL-CIO had built in favor of Medicare.  
Several weeks after the Madison Square Garden debacle, the NCSC arranged for hundreds 
of senior citizens to be bused to Capitol Hill as a way to demonstrate continued popular support for 
the proposed Medicare legislation that would be unavoidable for the numerous Congressmen and 
Senators present at the Capitol.42 As the NCSC had hoped, even anti-Medicare representatives felt 
          
39 For Kennedy’s remarks to the NCSC leadership, see Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's 
Office Files. Speech Files. Remarks to National Council of Senior Citizens, 26 May 1962, JFKL. For Kennedy’s efforts 
in 1962 to rally public support for Medicare, I rely here primarily on James Sundquist’s Politics and Policy, 309-311. 
See James Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years, Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1968. 
40 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation: Part of the Record of Medicare 'Misinformation,’” The New York Times, May 22, 
1962. Republican Senator Jacob Javits later blamed Kennedy, claiming that the President’s speech at Madison Square 
Garden had made medical care for the aged a “partisan” issue and that had created “a climate of resentment” which 
prevented enactment of the legislation. See Leonard Ingalls, “Aged Care Defeat Laid to Kennedy,” The New York 
Times, September 24, 1962. 
41 Peter Kihss, “A.M.A. Rebuttal to Kennedy Sees Aged Care 'Hoax': Surgeon Spokesman on TV Says Federal Plan 
Would Not Cover Millions Limited Benefits Cited Senior Citizens' Chief Calls Medical Group's Attack 'Lies and 
Deceptions' A.M.A. Replies to President, Calls Medical Care Plan 'Hoax',” The New York Times, May 22, 1962. 
42 Oral History interview with William Hutton (1966), Social Security Administration Project, pgs. 90-91, Columbia 
Center for Oral History Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York. 
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obliged to meet with the visiting senior citizens, lest they be caught turning away constituents.43 
Such meetings, though, while perhaps mollifying for the senior citizens who had traveled to the 
Capitol, did little to dislodge entrenched congressional opposition to Medicare. 
Ultimately, the combination of Annis’s well-received speech and Kennedy’s lackluster effort 
successfully halted the popular momentum that the administration and the AFL-CIO had labored for 
months to build. As a result, both the Kennedy administration and the AFL-CIO watched as 
Congressman Wilbur Mills continued to sequester the proposed Medicare legislation in the Ways 
and Means Committee. Mills’ successful efforts to block the enactment of Medicare, though, did not 
mean that the issue of rising poverty and economic insecurity for older Americans had disappeared 
from public view. On the contrary, as a lengthy November 1962 article in the New York Times 
revealed, a consensus had emerged among numerous public and private social welfare experts that 
“retirement laws” like Social Security that “were meant to be a blessing” were instead “proving the 
opposite.”44 As if to underscore its point, the Times noted, “poorer people are the bulk of the old – if 
you weren’t poor before you reached your 65th year, you are likely to be so afterward.”45 This broad 
agreement about the rising specter of old age poverty publicly echoed the concerns which Geneva 
Mathiasen and the National Council on the Aging had raised the previous year, and signaled that the 
issue was not going away anytime soon. 
Mindful of the need to keep its allies in the organized labor movement happy, the Kennedy 
administration continued to keep an open channel to the National Council of Senior Citizens, in part 
because Kennedy’s advisors wanted him to give the appearance of actively advocating for 
Medicare, despite the legislative impasse. In truth, though, the struggle for racial justice by the civil 
rights movement in the South had come to occupy far more of the administration’s attention and 
          
43 Ibid., 94. 
44 Arthur Herzog, “Portrait of Our ‘Senior Citizens,’” The New York Times, November 4, 1962. 
45 Ibid. 
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energy by the spring of 1963.46 While Kennedy continued to appeal publicly for action on the issue 
of medical care for the aged, it remained unclear how those appeals would become concrete 
accomplishments.47 In essence, despite all the smoke generated by the Kennedy administration and 
by the NCSC, Medicare could not make it past the hurdles that Congressman Mills had erected in its 
path. 48  In February 1963, Kennedy sent a lengthy Special Message to Congress in which he 
proposed legislation to expand the legal and political benefits afforded to senior citizens.49 After 
reviewing minor, recently enacted legislation such as the Social Security amendments of 1961, 
Kennedy pressed the case once more for the need for hospital insurance through the Social Security 
system for older Americans.50 Alongside hospital insurance, Kennedy outlined several other areas in 
          
46 Kennedy spoke at the second annual convention of the National Council of Senior Citizens on June 13, 1963, two 
days after his televised address to the nation after the desegregation of the University of Alabama in which he called for 
the enactment of a Civil Rights Act, later made law in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson. See Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files. Remarks to National Council of Senior Citizens convention, 
13 June 1963, JFKL. The growing prominence of civil rights as a pressing issue for the administration over the issue of 
federal assistance to needy groups neatly inverted the prediction made in The New York Times in December 1960 that 
the Democratic Party would “skirt civil rights” while “pushing federal-aid programs in Congress.” See Cabell Phillips, 
“Kennedy: The Key Men: Democrats Will Try to Skirt Civil Rights While Pushing Federal-Aid Programs in Congress,” 
The New York Times, December 25, 1960. 
47 “President Appeals for Aged-Care Bill,” The New York Times, April 24, 1963; Marjorie Hunter, “Aged Said to Face 
2nd Class Status,” The New York Times, May 18, 1963. 
48 John D. Morris, “Fight Looms Over Medical Plan: Kennedy Message Stirs Partisans In the Strongly Opposed 
Camps,” The New York Times, February 21, 1961; John D. Morris, “Debate Renewed on Aid to Aged,” The New York 
Times, April 30, 1961; Marjorie Hunter, “Small Unit Runs a Drive For Aged: Medical Care Council Maps Plan for 
Congress Session,” The New York Times, November 19, 1961; Marjorie Hunter, “Debate Rises on Medical Care for 
Aged: President’s Plan Faces Stiff Opposition Although It Appears to Have Strong Public Backing,” The New York 
Times, March 4, 1962; E.W. Kenworthy, “Kennedy Mapped Strategy in 1961,” The New York Times, May 21, 1962; 
Marjorie Hunter, “Sponsors Put Total Attendance for Aged-Care Rallies at 100,000,” The New York Times, May 23, 
1962; John D. Morris, “President Angry: Calls on the Nation to Reverse Decision at the Polls This Fall,” The New York 
Times, July 18, 1962. see also John F. Kennedy: “Statement by the President on the Defeat of the Medical Care Bill,” 
July 17, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8772 (Accessed September 13, 2016). 
49 John F. Kennedy: “Special Message to the Congress on the Needs of the Nation's Senior Citizens,” February 21, 
1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9572 (accessed September 13, 2016). 
50 The Kennedy administration continued the process begun under the Eisenhower administration of signing piecemeal 
amendments to the Social Security Act that gradually broadened and liberalized the program. For example, see John F. 
Kennedy: “Statement by the President Upon Signing the Social Security Amendments of 1961,” June 30, 1961. Online 
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8215 (Accessed September 13, 2016). The 1961 amendments to Social 
Security that Kennedy signed into law “provide[d] new or increased benefits to 4.4 million people, totaling some $800 
million [1961 dollars] in the first year, with the increased costs being met through additional payroll taxes.” See 
“Legislative Summary: Social Security” at https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-
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which he requested swift congressional action. These areas included targeted income tax reductions 
for older people, improved Social Security benefits, increased funding for federal efforts to assist 
older workers remain employed or secure new employment, and finally a new community action 
program designed to assist “State and local agencies and voluntary organizations for planning and 
developing services.”51 However, the press treated the President’s Special Message as a non-affair; 
instead, at Kennedy’s next press conference, the President fielded questions almost exclusively 
devoted to foreign affairs.52  
In addition to the lackadaisical response that greeted the President’s Special Message, the 
President’s Council on Aging, which the administration had organized a year earlier in order to 
demonstrate its commitment to the problems of older Americans, continued to meet irregularly and 
to produce recommendations, but its efforts appeared to be for naught.53 By late October 1963, 
Kennedy’s Council on Aging had churned out numerous reports, it appears that hardly anyone was 
taking heed of them, with the possible exceptions of Theodore Sorensen and Wilbur Cohen.  
Despite this apparent neglect, though, the Council’s work was quietly reviving and drafting 
new recommendations designed to use the power of the federal government to assist older 
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53 See Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Departments and Agencies. Council on 
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Americans that would shape the federal government’s efforts over the course of the next decade. 
Specifically, the Council’s sixteen main recommendations included a broad list of proposals, such 
as improvements to subsidized housing, Social Security, and nursing homes, as well as new 
recommendations designed to prevent age discrimination in the workplace and to assist displaced 
older workers who had become unemployed due to unspecified “economic shifts.”54 The report also 
emphasized how these objectives could be realized by using existing federal laws and mechanisms 
rather than via securing congressional enactment of proposed legislation, an approach that had 
proven to be far more difficult and fruitless than the administration had originally anticipated. The 
Council’s recommendations therefore tended to rely upon powers vested in the President and the 
various Executive Branch agencies.55  
Searching for a Focal Point 
The Council’s report also recognized the claims that Michael Harrington had made in The 
Other America about the persistence of old-age poverty in the United States.56 As Harrington had 
argued, it could not be honestly said in the early 1960s that the Social Security system had achieved 
its true potential of eradicating poverty among older Americans, especially since the poverty rate for 
Americans over the age of 65 still hovered between twenty-five and thirty percent.57  
Recognition of the growing inadequacies of the Social Security system, which Harrington 
had highlighted, was not limited solely to the Kennedy administration. In particular, the Senate’s 
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Special Committee on Aging remained busy building the case for a more sustained federal presence 
in funding and promoting the creation of programs designed to deal with the problems of older 
Americans. Originally, some more liberal members of the Senate’s Democratic caucus had intended 
the Special Committee on Aging to be a tool for publicly applying political pressure on the 
Eisenhower administration during the late 1950s to enact health insurance for the elderly through 
the Social Security system.  
After the end of the Eisenhower administration, the committee held a series of hearings in 
1961 and again in 1962 across the nation that revealed a rising groundswell of concern among older 
Americans, who repeatedly pleaded with committee members for the federal government to address 
both health care and other issues like unemployment.58 As a 1963 Special Committee report argued,  
despite the oft-expressed concern of the Nation as a whole, the 
executive branch of our Government, even through changes of 
administration, has dragged its feet for over a decade and still refuses 
to create an agency that can give full time and attention to the broad 
range of interrelated needs and potentials of older people.59 
 
After the Committee’s nationwide hearings as well as the popular tumult that had surrounded the 
Kennedy administration’s push for the enactment of Medicare, the Senate Special Committee on 
Aging’s members came to believe that there was a sufficient deep reservoir of popular demand for 
more federal action. Accordingly, they began publicly to demand the creation of a new federal 
agency for the sole purpose of addressing the economic and social concerns of older Americans. In 
the words of one Special Committee on Aging report released in early 1963, 
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[t]he experience of the past decade, culminating in the White House 
Conference on Aging in January 1961, has clearly indicated the need 
for a focal point within the Federal Government for providing 
information, guidance, and support to the rapidly growing number of 
agencies and organizations eager to shoulder part of the 
responsibility.60 
 
As conceived by the Senate Special Committee on Aging, this “focal point” agency would 
allow the Federal government to more effectively “share in the responsibility” with individual states 
and local communities. This shared responsibility was necessary, in the view of the Committee, 
because while many of those subnational levels of government had expressed interest in or had 
taken steps towards creating programs for their older residents, their programs and approaches 
remained on the whole “spotty, often inadequately conceived, and generally undernourished.”61  
Moreover, the committee argued that there existed “ample evidence of the desire of the 
States and communities to carry out their vital roles in this partnership,” but that “effective 
performance of their roles…is dependent on effective performance of those functions which are the 
responsibility of the Federal partner.”62 In other words, the committee argued that the time was 
opportune for a “Federal partner” to intervene and assist the states and local communities, lest the 
“variety of approaches and programs developed” multiply beyond any reasonable or recognizable 
limit to organize and coordinate them. All that was lacking was the leadership necessary to bring a 
“Federal partner” into being. 
Of course, as the committee was also aware, there were other factors to consider. The 
Eisenhower and then the Kennedy administrations had each attempted to coordinate the federal 
government’s activities on programs for older Americans. In its report, the committee highlighted 
the real barrier to effective progress: namely, the lack of cooperation among feuding agencies and 
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departments within the Executive Branch. Observing that the task of coordinating federal activities 
had previously been “left up to the coequal agencies involved” and that “no one agency is willing to 
release a shred of its authority to the others,” the committee strongly lambasted the “repeatedly 
undertaken pretense of resolving such difficulties in bringing together the Secretaries of the various 
departments in a Federal Council on Aging or a Presidential Council on Aging” as “hav[ing] been, 
are, and always will be meaningless.”63 “It is absurd,” the committee concluded, “to expect that key 
officials in existing agencies with sufficient authority and prestige to give leadership and continuing 
support to the effort needed to the effort needed can devote attention to such a task.”64 Rather, the 
committee observed, “quite naturally, but unfortunately for the aged, they have other weighty and 
statutory responsibilities which preclude more than occasional and tangential personal involvement 
in the field of aging.”65 
The only solution, therefore, was to create a new agency that would be responsible for 
Federal efforts. Existing programs and initiatives would be reassigned to the new agency, which 
would have the effect of establishing a dedicated office staffed by trained experts who could 
administer programs and coordinate with state and local officials with far less interference from 
other executive branch agencies eager to guard their bureaucratic turf.  
Such a plan, though, met with a studied lack of interest on the part of the Kennedy 
administration. Despite Congressman John Fogarty and Senator Patrick McNamara’s repeated pleas, 
the administration largely ignored them, and offered little or no support to help win passage of 
legislation that would achieve the goal of creating a new federal agency dedicated to the problems 
of older Americans. Instead, the Kennedy administration continued to focus on securing passage of 
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Medicare, a legislative goal that it shared with Fogarty and McNamara, and one that promised to 
win the administration plaudits (and votes).  
Consequently, though Fogarty and McNamara would introduce legislation in Congress in 
1963 to achieve the goal of creating a dedicated federal agency to coordinate efforts with state and 
local governments, that legislation ultimately did not advance beyond Capitol Hill. The failure of 
the Fogarty-McNamara legislation found its complement in the legislative impasse between the 
Kennedy administration and Congressman Wilbur Mills over Medicare. Ultimately, the only victory 
the Kennedy administration could claim by mid-1963 on the legislative front for old-age health 
insurance were a series of minor new amendments to the Social Security Act that were not radically 
different from those enacted during the Eisenhower administration. The battle over Medicare would 
continue well past Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963; so, too, would the efforts of Fogarty 
and McNamara to put the senior state on a firmer footing.66 
From Kennedy to Johnson 
The unlikely sequence of events that catapulted Lyndon Johnson to the presidency in 1963 
would also dramatically reshape the political fortunes of social reformers who sought to use the 
federal government’s wallet and muscle to strengthen and build up a much broader welfare state for 
older Americans. As in so many other areas of American domestic policy, the Johnson 
administration’s efforts to strengthen and build up the senior state between 1964 and 1968 
represented an unprecedented expansion of the federal government’s role in areas of social welfare 
policy that had long been primarily the concern of local and state governments. Before 1964, the 
federal-level senior state resided primarily within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
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and the Social Security Board. At the state and local level, it had been significantly uneven; in some 
states like California and New York, a well-developed apparatus of public and private welfare 
officials had come into being and had pursued the creation of new programs and initiatives designed 
to secure not only the economic but also the social well-being of older people.67  
New York and California were exceptions. Before the renewed emphasis on anti-poverty 
programs in the 1960s, the federal government’s role had been largely limited to providing 
matching funds under Social Security’s old-age assistance program and to ensuring the regular 
payment of Social Security benefits under the program’s old-age insurance program. While these 
expenditures were significant, especially those of the Social Security old-age assistance program 
before reforms in the late 1940s and into the 1950s shifted the balance of enrollees towards its old-
age insurance program, the federal government’s efforts had aimed primarily at enhancing the 
economic security of older people.  
In the 1960s, though, these efforts began to broaden significantly to include not only 
economic security but also the health and social well-being of older people, with federal officials 
frequently turning to state and local officials for inspiration and example. While much of the 
scholarship of this period has traditionally emphasized the Johnson administration’s achievements 
in getting Medicare and Medicaid enacted, these two important laws formed only part of the 
Johnson administration’s legislative agenda for older Americans. In addition to Medicare and 
Medicaid, the Johnson administration secured passage of several other measures, such as the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Older Americans Act, both of which found their way 
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from chicken scratch scribbles on coffee-stained yellow legal pads into the bold, crisp, confident 
legal font of enacted legislation.68 
Securing passage of this broad agenda remained tentative in late 1963. Over Christmas 1963, 
Lyndon Johnson huddled down with his family and chief aides at his ranch in rural Texas. Keenly 
aware that the near-unanimous national goodwill that had been showered upon him in the aftermath 
of President Kennedy’s assassination would not last, Johnson was determined to formulate a 
legislative strategy for the coming congressional session that would show that he did not intend to 
be a mere caretaker president until the 1964 presidential election. He turned to his characteristic 
methods of sly persuasion and domineering coercion in order to ensure that his aides would produce 
a plan for giving form to the still largely nebulous war on poverty that had existed primarily on 
paper for much of the last year of the Kennedy administration.69 The task facing Johnson’s aides 
was therefore to translate words into actionable items. As senior Johnson aide Jack Valenti later 
recalled,  
[d]uring the Christmas holidays at the [LBJ] Ranch in 1963, 
[President Johnson] closeted Kermit Gordon, Walter Heller, Bill 
Moyers and myself to his little guest house…and he said, “We’re 
going to abolish poverty in this country, and I’m going to lock this 
door and you guys can’t come out until you bring me a plan to do just 
that…So we labored and we labored and we came out. We didn’t have 
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the details but we had a cause, and we had a plan, and we had a name, 
“The War on Poverty.”70 
 
While Johnson took such unusual steps to compel his aides to devise a more coherent plan to 
tackle poverty in the United States, the War on Poverty really began to take a more concrete form 
with the public release of the 1964 Economic Report of the President in late January 1964.71 The 
Economic Report conceded the difficulties inherent in defining both “poverty” and “the poor,” but 
ultimately argued that while “measurement of poverty is not simple, either conceptually or in 
practice,” by the poor “we mean those who are not now maintaining a decent standard of living – 
those whose basic needs exceed their means to satisfy them.”72 Insofar as establishing what exactly 
a “decent standard of living” was, the Economic Report relied upon statistics provided by the Social 
Security Administration which defined a “low-cost budget for a nonfarm family of four…in 1962 to 
have been $3,955 [approximately $31,657 in 2016 dollars].”73 After taking these statistics as well as 
various other sources into account, the Report concluded that the actual poverty line stood at 
roughly $3,000 in annual money income, or approximately $60 per week (both figures in 1962 
dollars). Using this metric to define the poor and poverty, the Economic Report concluded that 
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approximately “one-third of all poor families are headed by a person over 65, and almost one-half of 
all families headed by such a person are poor.”74  
In response to the Economic Report’s findings, the Johnson administration proposed the 
enactment of a broad tax cut, which it hoped would stimulate further economic growth sufficient to 
raise impoverished families out of poverty. While this policy solution promised to lower taxes on 
the nation’s upper and middle classes, it had less to offer older people living on fixed incomes who 
already paid a low amount of federal income tax. Additionally, the Economic Report stressed the 
importance of enacting health insurance through Social Security as “the first order of business” for 
the aged, but did not offer much substance in terms of what the second, third, and subsequent terms 
would be. 75 Prior to 1964, the pattern of previous administrations had been to broaden Social 
Security’s old age insurance provisions. But these moves to strengthen Social Security had limits. 
The old-age insurance system’s actuarial math was based on the principle that benefits paid out 
should be correlated to earnings contributed into the system. As a result, millions of elderly people – 
especially elderly women – who had not “worked” in the sense of participating in compensated 
employment remained unprotected by Social Security’s old age insurance system.  
Furthermore, while Social Security’s old-age assistance program remained in operation, it 
still varied widely from state-to-state, with some states paying benefits as high as $95 per month 
(1962 dollars) and others dispensing far less (in some states, the figure was as low as $37 per 
month).76 While conceding that there were potentially other sources of monetary support such as 
private pensions and private in-kind income transfers within and between families, the Economic 
Report argued that “families with a history of low earnings are also likely to have little of such 
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supplementary income” and that these alternative sources of support would be insufficient for most 
poorer families.77 
Despite recognizing these limitations, the Economic Report ultimately concluded that “high 
employment and vigorous economic growth are still of major importance for this group,” though it 
did not explain how achieving high employment and sustained economic growth would lead to a 
reduction in poverty for older people, especially those who were not able to return to the active 
workforce. The Report did highlight the need for “continued long-run improvement of social 
insurance benefits, along with expanded programs to cover hospital-related costs for the aged” and 
“augmented construction of housing to meet the particular needs of the aged” as “necessary steps in 
a continuing campaign against poverty.” Overall, though, it was not radically different in substance 
(save for its embrace of Medicare) from the policy proposals that had been tossed around 
Washington since the Truman-era National Conference on Aging. 
 “Our Society Can Well Afford the Funds Involved” 
While the Johnson administration’s public commitment to eradicating poverty was a historic 
breakthrough, on the issue of elderly poverty, it remained committed to strengthening the hybrid 
federal-state approach that had developed during the course of the previous decade.78 This cautious 
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approach reflected the administration’s desire to build on issues for which there was already a broad 
political consensus rather than risk alienating potential allies. Evidence of the relatively 
uncontroversial nature of using the federal government’s vast toolbox to address the issue of elderly 
poverty had presented itself in January 1964 during a hearing convened by the U.S. Senate’s Special 
Committee on Aging in which multiple public and private welfare officials repeatedly pleaded for 
an increased federal role in provisioning services for the elderly. While acknowledging that the 
federal government had not remained entirely aloof from the needs of state and local welfare 
agencies, federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare officials pointed out that more 
action could be taken. In the words of Dr. Ellen Winston, the U.S. Commissioner of Welfare and a 
former North Carolina state welfare official, 
[t]he Federal Government has done and is now doing much to assist 
States and localities with respect to the aging. We have a strong 
pattern of relationships from the Office of Aging to State and local 
groups. We have reached a point, however, where further significant 
advances require new legislation and grants-in-aid. Several bills are 
now before Congress which could provide stimulus to an advance by 
States and localities along a broad front. Our society can well afford 
the funds involved.79 
 
Dr. Winston further testified that the federal government had established contacts with the thirty-
seven states that had statewide commissions or committees on aging as well as the more than eight 
hundred cities and counties that had similarly established planning and coordinating committees on 
aging. However, as she stressed in her testimony, only twenty-eight states “have an appropriation, 
but the range in this appropriation is very great, from really a token contribution on the part of the 
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State to a sufficient appropriation to have a reasonable staff,” an issue that also bedeviled numerous 
local-level committees dedicated to addressing the issues of older people.80 
In essence, despite the growing number of state and local level governments that had begun 
to provide services to the elderly, the fact remained, in the words of Dr. Winston, that “the 
availability of services to the elderly is spread unevenly throughout the country. More plans and 
programs are on paper than in practice.” 81  Dr. Winston’s testimony neatly encapsulated the 
approach that the Johnson administration would undertake in its war against elderly poverty over the 
course of the next several years. Working in partnership with existing state and local agencies, the 
federal government would try to bolster these lower-level offices, and would seek to equalize the 
availability of services throughout the nation by setting up new agencies in state or localities that 
desired them. Sustained economic prosperity would underwrite these efforts; all that was required 
on the part of the federal government was for Congress to appropriate the necessary funds.82  
As Dr. Winston had argued in her testimony, the most helpful role that the federal 
government could play in the realm of old-age economic and social support would be to provide 
more ample funding to the states and localities which lacked sufficient monies to maintain their own 
state and local agencies.83 Testifying after Dr. Winston before the assembled senators, William 
Fitch, the Executive Director of the AARP, echoed many of her observations, and stressed the need 
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for Congress to enact the proposed Older Americans Act, a reworked version of the legislation 
originally proposed by Congressman Fogarty and Senator McNamara that had met with lukewarm 
support by the Kennedy administration in 1963.84 Echoing President Johnson’s recent declaration of 
an unconditional war against poverty in his January 1964 State of the Union Address, Fitch 
connected the nascent War on Poverty to the AARP’s efforts to promote voluntary self-sufficiency 
among senior citizens: 
The Older Americans Act…offers great promise of assistance in the 
development of new or improved programs to help older persons 
through grants for community planning and services for training, 
through research or training project grants. The bill would also 
establish…an operating agency to be designated as the 
“Administration for Aging”…[that] would separate the programs on 
aging out of the welfare setting in which they are presently 
considered. It is urgent that, as we are asked to “pursue poverty 
wherever it exists,” we must distinguish between the elderly who are 
independent and self-sufficient and those who are in need of public 
welfare.85 
 
As Fitch continued, “the Older Americans Act makes possible a balanced program in aging to 
enable our older people to secure equal opportunity, to the full and free enjoyment of income, 
health, housing, employment, and the pursuit of meaningful activity.”86 Aside from his support for 
the Older Americans Act, Fitch’s testimony also suggested how the AARP and other similarly-
minded voluntary organizations viewed themselves as essential actors in the emerging relationship 
between federal, state, and local officials to deal with the problems of older Americans. While 
conceding that government at all levels had an important role to play, Fitch noted that 
[i]t is not possible [n]or would it be desirable to separate the 
responsibility of the Federal, State, and community services from the 
role of older persons themselves. Each has a vital part to play and the 
need for a coordinated approach is the challenge to every force 
working in the best interest of older persons…I pledge to your 
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committee the support of our members in implementing the findings 
of your committee and in the creation of programs that will place the 
needs of older Americans in proper perspective to make the later years 
truly a period of reward and achievement.87 
 
Fitch and Winston’s respective testimonies found a receptive audience with the Senate’s Special 
Committee on Aging. When the Committee released its report in September 1964 on the need for 
“establishing and expanding public and private services for our senior citizens,” it placed the 
“enactment of an authorization to provide financial assistance for statewide and community 
planning and coordination of programs in the field of aging” as its top recommendation, and urged 
the enactment of the Older Americans Act.88 
That recommendation, though, like the other fourteen that the Committee eventually made, 
proceeded to languish. The Johnson administration remained uninterested in rocking the boat until 
after the November 1964 presidential election, and even a relatively uncontroversial law like the 
Older Americans Act remained a low legislative priority. The Older Americans Act as proposed in 
1963 therefore died a quiet death, though it was clear that a broad consensus of private and public 
welfare officials would support similar legislation if it was reintroduced in the new Congress set to 
convene in January 1965.89 
A few weeks before the November 1964 election, Johnson aide Frederick Panzer was busy 
preparing a memorandum documenting the administration’s “accomplishments in the field of aging 
since 22 November 1963.”90 The list of accomplishments Panzer collected, though, was relatively 
thin and perfunctory, and amounted to page or two at best of minor Social Security amendments and 
          
87 Ibid., 41-42. 
88 Senate Special Committee on Aging, Services for Senior Citizens – Recommendations and Comment: A Report by the 
Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, Together with Minority and Individual Views, September 11, 1964, 
pg. 2. 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S. Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. 
89 See Senate Special Committee on Aging, Major Federal Legislative and Executive Actions Affecting Senior Citizens, 
1963-1964: A Staff Report Prepared for the Special Committee on Aging. 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., October 1964, U.S. 
Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. 
90 “Accomplishments in the Field of Aging Since 22 November 1963,” October 12, 1964, Box 521, Office Files of 
Frederick Panzer, LBJL. 
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other related legislation. In light of this relatively slender record, Panzer drew attention in the 
memorandum to the still largely untouched list of objectives that the 1961 White House Conference 
on Aging had assembled and not too subtly hinted that, if the President or the Democratic Party 
were in need of campaign issues for the 1964 election, the White House Conference on Aging’s 
recommendations might prove to be a good starting point.91  
Eager to distinguish themselves from the Eisenhower administration’s record (one internal 
memorandum described the Eisenhower years as a period when “the Government [was] lying down 
on the job”), Johnson administration officials took stock of the nearly twenty recommendations 
made by the 1961 White House Conference on Aging. Viewed as a whole, the recommendations 
were broad, wide-ranging, even ambitious: the federal government could help senior citizens to 
secure the “right to freedom from want in old age” by encouraging the development of sufficient 
health insurance coverage and Social Security, old-age assistance, and other pension programs 
capable of “provid[ing] adequate minimum income in old age related to changing economic 
conditions.92 Other, more prosaic recommendations emphasized the need to guarantee the elderly 
“the right to a fair share of the community’s recreational, educational, and medical resources” as 
well as “the right to live with dignity.”93 
But there was another reason for the administration’s growing concern with the elderly. As a 
1964 Department of Health Education and Welfare Research Division report argued in language 
reminiscent of The Other America, “the old and the frail have also been bypassed – given enough of 
the fruits of progress to prolong their lives, but deprived of opportunities to fill the added years with 
          
91 Mark Sheehan, “Senior Citizens” – Speech Section, May 28, 1964, Box 521, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, LBJL. 
92 “The Rights of Senior Citizens and Major Recommendations of the White House Conference on Aging,” [n.d.] Box 
521, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, LBJL. 
93 Ibid., 2-3. 
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satisfactions…having no real role in the modern economy, all these people enjoy few of its 
assets.”94  
In other words, the federal government could help to carve out a “real role in the modern 
economy” for older people, and if it so chose, the 1961 White House Conference on Aging’s 
recommendations offered a blueprint to do so. As the same HEW report optimistically concluded, 
the last several years have witnessed emphasis on Federal legislation to help people overcome 
social, health, educational, and other problems which keep them from becoming self-sufficient…all 
of these Federal activities are designed to help communities develop coordinated programs, using 
their local social institutions to supplement and reinforce the effort individuals can make to find 
their way into the mainstream of American life.95 
The message was clear: now was the time to act. The effort to alleviate poverty, especially 
among the “old and frail” had languished for too long. By undertaking methods both novel and 
known, the Johnson administration could launch a full-scale assault on elderly poverty in the United 
States. The necessary resources were present to do so. The question remained how best to achieve 
this goal. Assuming that legislation providing medical care for the elderly was enacted into law, 
what other areas of life for older Americans should the government place its emphasis upon? Issues 
like housing, guaranteed basic income security, as well as fair and equitable access to the workplace 
all seemed to be equally compelling options, and as 1964 and 1965 unfolded, it became clear that 
the administration meant to take on all of them in some fashion or another. 
Senator Barry Goldwater’s overwhelming defeat in the 1964 presidential election handed 
liberals within the Democratic Party a working majority on Capitol Hill, and the Johnson 
          
94 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Converging Social Trends, Emerging Social Problems, n.d. 
[1963/1964?], Welfare Administration, Division of Research, pg. 18, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 
95 Ibid., 68. 
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administration was determined to utilize this rare window of opportunity. The ability of 
Congressman Wilbur Mills and other conservative southern Democrats to block the administration’s 
way was, at least for the moment, halted.  As a supreme micromanager, Johnson took an interest in 
nearly every domestic policy initiative of his administration. Perhaps no issue in 1964 and 1965 – 
aside from civil rights – occupied as privileged a position on the President’s crowded schedule as 
the struggle to enact medical care for older Americans. As Johnson aide Jack Valenti recalled, 
Johnson had once exclaimed that 
“I’m going to make Harry Truman’s dream come true. Old folks are 
not going to be barred from a doctor’s office or a hospital because 
they don’t have any money for medical attention. They are never 
again going to have to be sick and hurt and cry alone. It’s a 
goddamned crime,” he said, “we’re never going to have that happen 
again in this country. When this bill is passed, I’m going to 
Independence, [Missouri] and I’m going to sign it in Harry Truman’s 
presence.” He did exactly that.96 
 
Of course, Medicare did not begin or end with Johnson’s personal desire to make former President 
Harry Truman happy. The enactment of Medicare in 1965 represented a long-stalled and partial 
triumph for political liberals that they passionately savored in light of the AMA’s hitherto successful 
efforts to block any such legislation. 
          
96 Mark K. Updegrove, Indomitable Will: LBJ in the Presidency. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 161. Originally 
cited in Robert L. Hardesty, The Johnson Years: The Difference He Made. (Austin: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 
1993), 20. 
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Figure 8. Lyndon Johnson (l) and Harry S. Truman (r) after Johnson signed Medicare into 
law. Lady Bird Johnson (obscured), Hubert Humphrey, and Bess Truman stand in the 
background. Photo courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. 
While Medicare was probably the most important piece of social legislation enacted in the 
United States since the original Social Security Act in 1935, it represented but one piece of an 
emerging policy agenda that the Johnson administration believed was necessary to buttress the 
economic and health security of older Americans. This emerging policy agenda had its origins in the 
efforts of transplanted officials from the organized labor movement like Charles Odell and James 
O’Brien, who had served on the 1960 Kennedy campaign’s “Board of Senior Citizens for 
Kennedy.” This reliance on organized labor as a source of ideas for social policy was perfectly in 
keeping for the Johnson administration.97 In the case of the “Board of Senior Citizens for Kennedy,” 
its eventual evolution into the National Council of Senior Citizens, an AFL-CIO aligned and funded 
organization was done primarily for one reason: to educate and persuade senior citizens to support 
the enactment of Medicare. The enactment of Medicare thereby presented something of a quandary 
          
97 As Joshua Freeman has observed, “organized labor played a central role in the Great Society. Unions enthusiastically 
endorsed Johnson in 1964 and lobbied hard for his legislative program. Labor officials even helped draft some Great 
Society proposals and in several instances left their posts to take positions in the Johnson administration.” See Freeman, 
American Empire, 213. For contemporary coverage, see “War on Poverty Pressed by Labor,” The New York Times, 
February 23, 1964. 
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for both the National Council of Senior Citizens and the Johnson administration, since that 
crowning legislative victory also took off the table an issue which had singlehandedly come to 
dominate discussions at the local, state, and federal levels of government over how to assist older 
Americans. 
The OEO and the War on Elderly Poverty 
 The future direction of federal initiatives to assist the aged was also opaque, courtesy of the 
administration’s War on Poverty, a major initiative that had begun under highly improvised 
circumstances. Reflecting Johnson’s preference for speedy implementation and action, the 
bureaucratic contours of the War on Poverty came together quickly over the early months of 1964.98 
James C. Gaither, a former Special Assistant to President Johnson, remembered that “OEO was set 
up really without a program, [but with] a very ambitious goal, and a charter to go out and innovate 
and experiment and see if somehow we could provide an opportunity and give people a chance to 
escape poverty” 99  As Gaither further observed, the OEO’s ambitious mandate of eliminating 
poverty immediately confronted a major philosophical issue: namely, what, in fact, was poverty? 
Who were the poor, and how they best be helped? Broadly speaking, Johnson and his aides were 
deeply influenced by broadly shared ideas about poverty in the 1960s, which held that  
poverty...once thought of as largely a problem of exploitation at the 
workplace, increasingly had come to be seen as an issue of economic 
and social marginalization, of exclusion from work…Lyndon Johnson 
          
98 As Martha J. Bailey and Nicolas J. Duquette observe, “in the seven weeks between Kennedy’s assassination and 
Johnson’s State of the Union debut, the ‘War on Poverty’ grew from a small, academic pilot program of the CEA 
[Council of Economic Advisers] to a core agenda of Johnson’s presidency. Martha J. Bailey and Nicolas J. Duquette, 
“How Johnson Fought the War on Poverty: The Economics and Politics of Funding at the Office of Economic 
Opportunity,” pg. 4, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 19860, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
January 2014. 
99 Mark K. Updegrove, Indomitable Will: LBJ in the Presidency. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 151. Originally 
cited in Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010 
[1996]. For contemporary coverage of the War on Poverty, see Marjorie Hunter, “To Help the Poor,” The New York 
Times, January 19, 1964. 
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believed that the plight of the poor could be and should be 
ameliorated, without taking anything away from those better off.100 
 
This conceptual abstraction of poverty worked reasonably well at first in what the historian Randall 
Woods has labeled the “Johnsonian world,” in which “enemies were abstract – disease, ignorance, 
racism – [and] not concrete – economic royalists, segregationists, doctors, the ‘Upper Ten’, radical 
immigrants.”101  
This nebulous concept of poverty would create problems as the War on Poverty progressed, 
as critics on both the right and left of the administration questioned the effectiveness of its methods 
and the rationale behind its assumptions. Rather than untangle the full ideological dimensions of 
poverty in America, the Johnson administration instead opted to bolster existing social services 
infrastructure and to fund the creation of new initiatives. Indeed, Johnson’s main ideological 
contribution to the War on Poverty, now taking shape as the newly formed Office of Economic 
Opportunity, or OEO, was his insistence that “there be no doles”, and newly appointed OEO 
director Sargent Shriver concurred in this belief. Shriver rushed to put together a working staff for 
the new agency, a process both helped and hindered by its newness.   
Strikingly, the OEO was designed mainly to bypass the established infrastructure of social 
workers and welfare administrators and to work directly with local communities in the hope that its 
initiatives would not get caught in the thicket of local politics.102 The 1964 Economic Opportunity 
Act, which authorized and funded the OEO, thereby “allowed tremendous federal discretionary 
          
100 Freeman, American Empire, 202. G. Calvin MacKenzie and Robert Weisbrot observe that the federal government 
handled the issue of poverty “not as an agent of the American people responding to their demands, but as an 
independent force seeking to solve problems that its experts had identified and to which they had applied the tools of 
modern analysis.” (MacKenzie and Weisbrot, The Liberal Hour, 97). 
101 Woods, Prisoners of Hope, 10. 
102 Ibid., 4. As Martha Bailey and Nicolas Duquette note, “in contrast to state governors, local government had no power 
in the original EOA [Economic Opportunity Act].” (Ibid., 7). As Landon Storrs has pointed out, bypassing local and 
state officials eventually exacted a heavy toll on the ability of OEO to successfully prosecute the War on Poverty. In 
particular, Elizabeth Wickenden (or “Wicky” to her close friends), a longtime social welfare policy consultant and 
confidante of Johnson, Cohen, and other key Great Society players “correctly predicted that OEO’s bypassing of local 
and state authorities would provoke a political backlash.” (Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New 
Deal Left, 250). Lyndon Johnson later lamented that “I should have listened to Wicky.” (Ibid., 250). 
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power over a meaningful amount of resources.”103 However, bypassing groups with a vested interest 
in their states and communities helped strengthen opposition to the War on Poverty as an 
unwarranted intrusion by the federal government into affairs beyond its constitutional purview. 
 In contrast to the OEO’s modus operandi, the model of partnership between all different 
levels of government that had come to mark the development and administration of government 
programs for older Americans ensured that, unlike the Community Action Programs (CAP) 
sponsored by the OEO, it did not suddenly disrupt pre-existing patterns of power and patronage in 
local governments.104 Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago may have viewed the OEO’s community 
action agencies as unwelcome meddlers in his political machine, but his highest city-level 
administrator for aging affairs was perhaps the most faithful and cooperative local official between 
New York and California that the Johnson administration could rely upon.105 
Many of these local officials had established working relationships with local philanthropic 
and private social welfare organizations as part of long-standing historical pattern of public-private 
cooperation that had preceded the enactment of Social Security in 1935. After the enactment of 
Social Security, the need to administer federal funds at the state-level had led many individual states 
to create state agencies, whose primary bailiwick remained the monthly disbursement of Social 
Security benefits as well as applicable state-based public assistance funds.  
          
103 Martha J. Bailey and Nicolas J. Duquette, “How Johnson Fought the War on Poverty: The Economics and Politics of 
Funding at the Office of Economic Opportunity,” pgs. 9-10, January 2014, NBER Working Paper Series, Working 
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The expansion of Social Security during the 1940s and 1950s had expanded the size and 
scope of these agencies as more categories of workers became eligible for coverage under Social 
Security, and had the effect of “encourage[ing] state agencies to accept responsibility for providing 
or securing specific social services required by the needy aged.”106 Working in conjunction with 
these state level agencies were national welfare organizations like the American Public Welfare 
Association (APWA), that aimed to help those agencies develop a more robust set of social and 
community services designed to ensure satisfactory attention to the needs of older people.107 These 
needs were both economic and non-economic. In the words of the APWA,  
in the future, public welfare will be increasingly concerned with a 
large number of people who are not in need of public assistance, such 
as beneficiaries of an adequate old age and survivors insurance or 
private insurance benefit...public welfare has a responsible role to 
assume in the provision of services to older people throughout the 
community having social service needs which may or may not include 
economic want.108 
 
The APWA’s words reflected an evolving consensus in the nation’s social welfare community. The 
needs of older people were no longer “simple and static;” rather, they were growing and dynamic. 
“Public assistance administration must not accept the belief that old people are always self-
sufficient and that therefore…they do not need help in resolving social, economic, and 
psychological problems.”109  
These changing sentiments about the needs of older people in American society strongly 
undergirded and militated in favor of an expanding role for policymakers at all levels – local, state, 
and eventually federal – and the need to develop and expand social services for the elderly. Public 
and private welfare officials labored mightily to use the resources of the state to put in place new 
          
106  American Public Welfare Association, “Aging – Public Welfare’s Role,” February 1960, Online Archive of 
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agencies, services, and initiatives that would replace or supplement the supporting roles traditionally 
played by families or by active employment in the labor force. As the National Council on the 
Aging (a daughter organization formed by members of the private National Social Welfare 
Assembly) noted in a 1962 report,  
[o]ne of the major personal and social problems of today is emerging 
from the number of years people spend in retirement without a work 
schedule to utilize the greater proportion of their time and without 
means to participate fully in the life of the community. Both the 
individual and society have yet to understand the significance of this 
situation and the enormous toll resulting from the community’s failure 
to utilize the potential of its older people.110 
 
It was this “potential of…older people” that the National Council on the Aging (NCOA), in 
conjunction with other public and private welfare institutions, sought to direct into well-defined, 
socially useful functions like volunteer work.111 In doing so, the NCOA sought to mitigate the large-
scale effects of population shifts and changes in employment patterns, both of which it and other 
like-minded organizations such as APWA believed to be responsible for the worsening social and 
economic conditions faced by older Americans in many communities.  
While neither the NCOA nor APWA sought to rewind the clock back to a more rural, less 
industrial past in which older people supposedly enjoyed higher social status, both believed firmly 
that solutions to the problems of older Americans could be discerned through careful research in the 
nation’s leading universities and then applied and implemented by policymakers throughout the 
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country. It was a fundamentally optimistic approach to the problems of older Americans, and 
NCOA embraced this approach with gusto. In the organization’s words, 
NCOA must continue to exercise leadership by helping the young to 
understand and prepare for the later years; to promote sound relations 
among the four generations…It must continue to work with others to 
develop healthy attitudes on the part of the public towards 
aging…[and] to create…a climate in which age itself will be looked 
upon as a natural phenomenon, not as an economic, physical, and 
social disaster.112 
 
A public-private infrastructure was already in place at the local and state levels and ready to receive 
funding for new programs and initiatives and to help federal officials identify new areas of concern. 
Thus, unlike many of the OEO’s antipoverty initiatives, some of the infrastructure needed for 
coordinated effort between local, state, and federal government already existed for some of the 
programs designed to assist older Americans. It existed in cities like New York and Chicago, and in 
some states like North Carolina and California, but it remained woefully underdeveloped in other 
places.  
The administration’s approach therefore aimed to strengthen anti-poverty initiatives for the 
elderly where they already existed, and to scale successful local-level programs like subsidized 
public housing and access to social and rehabilitative services to the national level, all while 
promoting new demonstration and experimental projects in communities throughout the nation. In 
other words, the administration had committed itself to a hugely ambitious agenda, one that sought 
to enmesh the federal government in social welfare policymaking for older people to an extent that 
exceeded the expansion of the federal government’s role that had taken place during the New Deal. 
 This expansion of infrastructure at the state and local level before the advent of the Great 
Society drew its strength in part by changing ideas about the relative capacity of older people to 
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remain productive workers and participants in the social life of their communities. Thirty years 
earlier, the Social Security Act had been enacted in order to promote the economic independence of 
older people by removing them as a financial burden upon either their families or their communities. 
In practice, though, it had frequently fallen short of this goal, mostly because its benefits had not 
kept pace with inflation and the rising cost of living.  
Moreover, the inadequacy of Social Security had, during the postwar years, created a 
vacuum that was filled by private social welfare agencies eager to reassert their traditional role as 
the keystone of the American social welfare system, a role that they had lost due to the Great 
Depression. The resurgence of local and state-based assistance had created growing disparities in 
the levels of assistance that older people could expect to receive, with wealthier states like New 
York and California more willing to fund state-level government assistance programs that were 
considerably more slender in places like Louisiana and Mississippi.  
The challenge facing the Johnson administration, therefore, was how to square the 
President’s insistence that there be no new “doles” created with the need to assist desperately 
impoverished communities that in some cases lacked even the semblance of a social welfare 
infrastructure. Rehabilitative and social service programs thereby provided a solution to this 
conundrum, because they were not simply another form of cash assistance like the old-age 
assistance payments made by Social Security or by individual state pension systems such as those of 
California or Colorado. Instead, the programs that the Johnson administration’s war on elderly 
poverty favored were ones that promoted the creation of employment opportunities, especially for 
younger members of traditionally disadvantaged communities.  
Manpower for Medicare 
While the enactment of Medicare in 1965 and its subsequent implementation in 1966 had the 
salutary effect of subsidizing the medical costs of many older Americans and thereby helped to keep 
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many of them out of near-certain poverty and off federal, state, and local public assistance rolls, it 
also had another, less well-known, consequence. In effect, by making it possible for older 
Americans to purchase and afford more medical care, the law led to a steadily growing demand for 
sufficient health care professionals to meet the heightened demand for medical care among the 
elderly.113 In July 1966, just a few weeks after Medicare went into effect, Dr. George A. Silver, a 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, wrote to HEW Secretary John Gardner 
with regard to the need for a “long term health manpower program.”114 In his letter, Silver noted 
“while a policy discussion is still under way as to priorities and programs for long term alleviation 
of the health manpower shortage…an immediate effort to have a definite impact can be 
proposed.” 115  In particular, Silver wrote that tabulations provided by the American Hospital 
Association showed that there was “a uniform grave shortage in the area of professional nurses: half 
of the demand overall…according to this about 100,000 people are required to meet the most urgent 
need; 50,000 professional nurses, country wide are needed.”116  
In response to this manpower shortage, Silver recommended that the administration act as 
quickly as possible by formally directing “the Public Health Service [to] undertake a program…of 
financing recruitment and refresher courses…for professional nurses and medical technologists 
          
113 During the first year of Medicare’s operation, Johnson administration officials operated on educated guesswork to 
predict how Medicare would reshape the demand for medical services. As Dr. Philip R. Lee, the Assistant Secretary for 
Health and Scientific Affairs in HEW observed in a December 17th, 1966 memorandum to Joseph Califano, “health 
manpower shortages in extended care facilities and nursing homes are particularly acute. The present expanded health 
manpower program should, however, help meet the most urgent needs. The added demand for beds and services due to 
Medicare is difficult to estimate accurately. There will be about 70,000 Medicare beneficiaries in extended care facilities 
at any given time.” See Philip R. Lee to Joseph Califano, “Memorandum: Report of the Task Force on Nursing Homes 
and Other Institutions for the Care of the Elderly,” December 17, 1966, in Box 67, Office Files of Douglass Cater, 
LBJL. 
114 George A. Silver, M.D. to John Gardner via Dr. Philip R. Lee, July 19, 1966, “A Program for Rapid Production of 
Needed Health Workers in Medical Care Institutions” in Box 19, Office Files of Douglass Cater, LBJL. 
115 Ibid. 
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estimated to draw 25,000 to 30,000 qualified people back into the field.”117 In addition, Silver 
recommended that the federal government should disburse $45 million in funds (approximately 
$334 million in 2016 dollars) to provide “practical nursing training, particularly in States designated 
as having the greater need.” 118  These funds to provide for additional nursing training would 
represent a mere expansion of an existing arrangement between the American Hospital Association 
and the Johnson administration.119  
Besides these two major funding initiatives to support the training and recruitment of new 
health care professionals, Silver proposed four additional minor ones, which totaled $13.5 million 
(1966 dollars) and 14,500 new nurses’ aides, orderlies, laboratory assistants, medical record aides, 
and additional dietitian aides. Effectively, Silver recommended a broad spectrum of all the different 
types of workers who would be necessary to meet the increased demand for medical care.120 While 
Silver acknowledged that adequately funding all of these proposals might be a challenge, he urged 
Gardner to take advantage of the ample funds already allocated by Congress. In particular, Congress 
had attached significant funding to several pieces of legislation, including the Manpower 
Development and Training Act ($400 million in 1966 dollars), the Vocational Education Act ($200 
million in 1966 dollars), as well as funds scheduled to be allocated to the Office of Economic 
Opportunity ($88 million in 1966 dollars).121 
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120 Ibid., 3-4. 
121 Ibid., 7. 
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 Originally, Silver’s letter to Gardner had come after a frenzied exchange of letters between 
Sargent Shriver, the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and Douglass Cater, a 
Special Assistant to President Johnson. Shriver had written to Cater at the end of May 1966 in an 
administratively confidential memorandum to highlight what he believed were the most effective 
ways to create jobs for the various impoverished constituencies that were now within the OEO’s 
bailiwick. 122  In particular, Shriver stressed to Cater the need for new public employment 
opportunities for the impoverished that “develop meaningful jobs with advancement potential for 
persons seeking economic opportunities” and which would simultaneously “expand services in 
areas of public need through the innovative use of non-professional personnel.”123 Significantly, 
Shriver argued “one may think of the many ‘new careers’ (e.g., home health aides) that can be 
developed in the health field in response to the growing public needs arising from the Medicare 
program” as an example of this virtuous cycle, lest the connection between Medicare and OEO’s 
efforts be lost.124 Shriver reasoned that the enactment of Medicare and the consequently heightened 
demand for trained health care professionals presented a perfect opportunity to wage both the war 
on poverty and the fight for better health care. As he further noted in his letter to Cater, “the special 
capabilities of public employment” included  
…[the] ability to practice nondiscriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices without fear of economic consequences…to provide an 
entry-point into the mainstream of economic participation for the 
poor. This involves a temporarily sheltered and supportive work 
environment within which the poor can develop and prove their ability 
to earn an adequate income, [and]…to expand badly needed services 
in the public sector in those areas in which highly trained professional 
personnel are in short supply.125 
 
          
122 Sargent Shriver to Douglass S. Cater, May 31, 1966, in Box 19, Office Files of Douglass Cater, LBJL. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., 1. 
125 Ibid. 
 303 
 
While Shriver conceded in the memorandum that “it is not expected that all of the long-term 
unemployed will want public employment jobs” he underscored that “others both within and outside 
the labor force will find these jobs attractive as they will represent a means of upward mobility for 
them.” 126  Shriver ended his memorandum by observing that “the estimated cost of a public 
employment program for 180,000 people is $720 million (1966 dollars).”127 Perhaps realizing that 
OEO was unlikely to receive that level of funding, Shriver conceded that “we believe…that a 
program having considerable impact could be started at one-fourth to one-third the 180,000 
level…at levels of 45,000-60,000, the program would cost from $180-$240 million (1966 
dollars).”128 
The Older Americans Act 
  Shriver’s concession did not deter congressional critics of the War on Poverty, who 
increasingly believed that the OEO had a far too narrow conception of poverty, and that its efforts 
were therefore ignoring impoverished communities that deserved more attention. Such concerns 
bolstered the efforts by congressional Democrats to enact new legislation that would specifically 
address the issue of elderly poverty, an issue that Michael Harrington and others had helped to 
resuscitate as a public concern during the early 1960s. Picking up on this groundswell of interest, a 
May 1965 article in the New York Times stated “this is the age of the aged,” and intoned that  
[t]he most visible group of Americans today is the aged…there are 
more than 18,000,000 men and women in the United States who are 
65 years old or older…Eight hundred persons a day are added to the 
separate, the often frightening world of the aged. The aged have no 
economic status. The aged have no household status...And their 
special problem is survival in a society that finds their minds and 
bodies superfluous.129 
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Before taking readers on a tour through the potential trail of horrors that old age seemingly had to 
offer them, though, the Times drew attention to the efforts of Congressman John Fogarty (D-RI) to 
temper the seemingly harsh attitude of American society towards elderly people by enacting the 
Older Americans Act. Reflecting on previous attempts to enact the Older Americans Act, Fogarty 
commented that 
I’ve been involved in legislation for the aging for the past 14 years 
here in the House. We’ve got a President’s Council on Aging; we’ve 
got an Office of Aging in the Health, Education and Welfare 
Department; we’ve got a mountain of paper on old people and 
somehow we haven’t been able to bring the mountain of paper to the 
old people. Maybe this bill [the Older Americans Act] will do it. I 
hope so. Because the whole problem of aging is something that 
shouldn’t be a problem.130 
 
Of course, neither Fogarty nor his Senate co-sponsor Patrick McNamara of Michigan believed that 
the “whole problem of aging” would be changed by the passage of a single law, but their proposed 
legislation nevertheless aimed high in its stated goals. Similar to the 1964 Economic Opportunity 
Act’s funding for programs primarily designed to assist unemployed young men, the Older 
Americans Act proposed the authorization of “$13,000,000 in grants to the states for community 
planning, demonstration programs and the training of personnel.” 131  As Congressman Fogarty 
added, the bill’s declaration of objectives for older Americans included federal assurances of “an 
adequate income,” “the best possible physical and mental health,” “suitable housing,” and 
“opportunity for employment with age discrimination.”132  
Sensing the power of the popular groundswell that had helped carry Medicare over the finish 
line, the Johnson administration eventually acquiesced to the Older Americans Act, and Johnson 
          
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
 305 
 
signed it into law in July 1965.133 Despite the broad promises made by the legislation’s objectives, 
the amount of funding allocated to the new law made accomplishing those objectives a tall order. 
Given the fact that there were 18,000,000 people who were aged 65 years and over in the United 
States in 1965, that meant that the federal government was theoretically proposing to spend $0.72 
(approximately $5.50 in 2016 dollars) per person over the age of 65 to help achieve the goals of the 
Older Americans Act.  
Even in victory, though, the Older Americans Act was thin gruel compared to what its 
congressional backers had hoped for before its passage. 134  For example, instead of creating a 
cabinet-level agency dedicated to promoting the welfare of older Americans, the Older Americans 
Act instead provided for a new, sub-Cabinet Administration on Aging, and charged it with the 
mundane task of making grants to various state programs designed to assist older Americans.135 The 
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Administration on Aging was provided with an appropriation of roughly $8 million (1967 dollars) 
and had just eight-seven employees; by contrast, the Welfare Administration, which administered 
Aid to the Blind, Old Age Assistance, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
programs was granted an appropriation approaching $4.5 billion (1967 dollars) and had over 1,300 
employees.136 
In other words, the Older Americans Act was a drop in the bucket, especially when 
compared to federal expenditures on long-standing programs like Social Security’s old-age 
assistance program. Even though the new Administration on Aging was off to a slow start, the law 
had some underlying potential. The Older Americans Act’s architects had intended the new law to 
fund “community planning and coordination of programs” and to support “demonstrations of 
programs or activities which are particularly valuable in carrying out such purposes [of the Act].”137 
These activities included, among other things, assisting older people to “secure equal opportunity to 
the full and free enjoyment of…an adequate income in retirement,” “the best physical and mental 
health…without regard to economic status,” affordable housing, and finally increased employment 
opportunities. This broad set of goals that would likely take far more funding and personnel than 
Congress had thus far been willing to grant to the Administration on Aging.138  
In essence, though, the Older Americans Act committed the federal government to improve 
the lives of elderly people by amplifying the ongoing efforts of state and local governments to do so. 
While the law appeared to herald a new era in the federal government’s efforts to combat the myriad 
number of social and economic problems facing older people, it was also clear to federal 
policymakers that the success of such efforts relied heavily upon the existing infrastructure built by 
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state and local officials. The Johnson administration admitted as much. As HEW Secretary John 
Gardner affirmed in a May 1966 to state officials, “you know better than anyone else that the 
enactment of Federal programs – for aging, health, education, or any social endeavor – does not 
mean a lessened responsibility on the part of the States or local communities or the many 
nongovernment institutions and agencies.”139 Gardner further observed that 
[w]e provide the resources. It’s your responsibility to use them. The 
Federal Government can’t bring about the final result in 
Washington…Our programs won’t work unless there is real vitality at 
the State and local end of the partnership – and that’s where you come 
in.140 
 
While Gardner conceded that although there had been a significant legislative expansion of federal 
responsibility on behalf of older Americans, the success of those programs still fundamentally rested 
upon the willingness of state and local officials to participate.  
In New York and California, state officials welcomed the added assistance from the federal 
government in dealing with their growing welfare rolls by shifting older recipients away from 
receipt of public assistance funds and towards rehabilitation for work or compensated community 
service projects where possible. 141  Their rationale for doing so was straightforward. As an 
inducement to state and local officials, the Older Americans Act provided federal officials with a 
powerful tool: namely, millions of dollars’ worth of federal money ready to be disbursed starting 
immediately in 1965, with more funds to be made available by future appropriations every year for 
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the next seven years.142 Ultimately, the law aimed to foster and support the creation of state and 
local community-level plans and programs for the aging rather than to create a new, centralized 
federal agency that catered solely to the needs of the aged. Congress had initially considered that 
latter option, sought by Senator McNamara and Congressman Fogarty, but ultimately rejected it 
because of underlying concerns that such an agency could overreach into affairs that were the 
domain of individual states and local communities.  
The largely decentralized framework erected by the Older Americans Act, though, quietly 
redounded in its favor. Essentially, by keeping the emphasis on state and local level plans, the law 
successfully supplemented existing state and local activities, programs, and initiatives and provided 
new federal seed monies for previously unfunded demonstrations and experimental projects that 
could conceivably improve the lives of older people. This formulation enjoyed support not only 
from organized labor, senior citizen advocacy groups, but also from a nationwide coalition of 
private welfare and state and local officials throughout the country. Indeed, the funding provided by 
the Older Americans Act eventually spurred the creation of new state-level plans in every American 
state and territory (save for American Samoa) over the course of the next five years, with most plans 
brought into being within the first year of the Act’s existence.143 In addition, the state plans created 
by the law offered the means to cement the nascent alliance between welfare officials at all levels of 
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government with the growing number of private organizations like the National Council of Senior 
Citizens that promoted the expansion of government assistance to older Americans.144 
The skillful ability of the 1964 Johnson campaign to turn the issue of protecting Social 
Security into an effective cudgel against Barry Goldwater did not go unnoticed by other politicians 
in Washington, many whom suddenly became more attentive to the plight of older Americans. In 
June 1965, the Senate Special Committee on Aging held hearings investigating the War on 
Poverty’s relationship to alleviating elderly poverty, and several members of the committee alleged 
that the Office of Economic Opportunity had neglected older Americans in favor of other 
impoverished groups.145 From the very beginning of the hearings, the assembled senators made 
clear their belief that “OEO programs can do far more than presently in behalf of the Nation’s 
elderly poor.” 146   A long list of representatives from the growing number of old-age groups 
(including the NCSC and the AARP) largely concurred with that assessment. John W. Edelman, a 
longtime labor union organizer and now NCSC president, observed that  
most of the OEO programs lean heavily toward the concept of 
education and training as instruments of breaking the cycle of poverty 
– hence the emphasis on youth. For most persons aged 65 and over, 
preparation for jobs other than short-term, on-the-job training would 
be unrealistic…the National Council of Senior Citizens wishes 
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America to undertake vital new programs to fight poverty among the 
Nation’s youth – but we must fight more aggressively to defeat 
poverty among the aged. We cannot fight half the battle. If we do – 
we may lose the whole war.147 
 
Other leaders in the field of old-age advocacy echoed his criticism. Geneva Mathiasen, the 
Executive Director of the National Council on Aging (NCOA), stated her organization had received 
“correspondence and personal inquiries…from those people who are concerned with the problems 
of older people at the local level…because of the lack of interest shown by the local office of 
economic opportunity organization [OEO] in the needs of the elderly poor.”148 
After several more witnesses echoed the points made by Edelman and Mathiasen, Sargent 
Shriver, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, testified before the committee, 
admitting “none of us at the headquarters of the war against poverty is satisfied with what we are 
now doing for the benefit of the aged.” He blamed the agency’s shortcomings on a variety of 
factors, including the lack of “concrete, specific programs or suggestions about how we can carry 
the war on poverty effectively to the aged.”149 Defending his agency’s work up to that point, Shriver 
pleaded “we have believed that in setting up a war against poverty Congress wanted us to work on 
the most disadvantaged, the poorest people, in our Nation, not to take the easy ones, you might say, 
the relatively easy ones, but to work on the worst.”150 When pressed by senators as to why OEO had 
not worked to develop partnerships with state and local agencies that assisted the elderly poor, 
Shriver could offer no compelling answer. Instead, he blamed Congress for failing to insert a 
mandate in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 requiring the allocation of funds to programs 
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dealing with the elderly poor, an argument that, while true, did little to alleviate Congress’s 
concerns about the OEO.151  
In truth, while the Office of Economic Opportunity had already funded some programs for 
the elderly such as the Foster Grandparents Program, which offered older people the opportunity to 
serve as mentors for poor children in select cities like New York and Chicago, its efforts were 
designed primarily to help impoverished urban communities escape the “cycle of poverty” by 
offering vocational education and training to unemployed, working age youths. 152  This 
programmatic emphasis was obvious to observant state and local welfare officials. As Garson 
Meyer, the chairman of New York’s advisory committee for its state-level Office for the Aging 
wrote in response to congressional inquiries about the relationship between the OEO’s antipoverty 
efforts and New York’s initiatives: “although many communities [in New York State] are engaged 
in other phases of the antipoverty program, or are providing programs and services for the elderly 
through the State and community-aided programs, there is, almost without exception, no 
involvement of the older population in these antipoverty programs.”153 
The senators gathered at the 1965 OEO hearings were not terribly pleased with Shriver’s 
answers. During the subsequent testimonies of other witnesses who followed Shriver, they 
repeatedly highlighted the Older Americans Act as a necessary corrective to OEO’s emphasis on 
youth unemployment and poverty.154 In a final report published a year after the hearings, the Special 
Committee on Aging lambasted the Office of Economic Opportunity for its paltry efforts, and 
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approvingly quoted Geneva Mathiasen’s testimony on the need for the war on poverty’s programs to 
relieve the poverty of both the young and the old:  
[W]e are well aware of the needs of children and youth. But we 
believe a government must show concern for the needs of all its 
people, and that older people who are spending the closing years of 
their lives in poverty deserve their fair share of the funds allotted to 
the elimination of poverty deserve their fare of the funds allotted to 
the elimination of poverty in our country.155 
 
Rebuking Shriver, the committee emphasized in its findings that “the war on poverty can only be 
successful to the extent that it succeeds in lifting the elderly out of poverty” and that “when it passed 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964…Congress intended that the programs authorized benefit 
the elderly as well as other age groups.”156 The committee urged that a “high-level position or 
positions” be established with the Office of Economic Opportunity in order to “assure adequate 
consideration of the needs of the elderly in conducting the war on poverty” and that OEO “develop 
to their full potential the elderly-oriented programs which it has already begun.”157 However, there 
were only four OEO’s elderly-oriented programs: the Foster Grandparents, Medicare Alert, Project 
Green Thumb, and Home Health Aides. The committee further urged that OEO fund more 
community action programs oriented around the needs of the elderly, including employment 
programs, nutrition programs, housing programs, and senior centers.158 
 Despite the Special Committee on Aging’s disapproval, though, OEO’s activities to combat 
elderly poverty remained limited throughout 1965 and 1966.159 As an internal OEO task force report 
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concluded in August 1965, the agency had hitherto devoted insufficient staff and resources to 
combatting elderly poverty.160 The OEO task force ultimately argued that, despite the important 
limitations of funding, staff resources, and competing federal authorities, “much can be done for the 
older poor” under the existing Economic Opportunity Act legislation. 161  The task force 
recommended that “consideration be given to establishing a program for a neighborhood senior 
corps paralleling the neighborhood youth corps” which would “provide part-time work 
opportunities” and “would not be competitive with youth for available jobs.”162 In particular, the 
task force report argued that “the passage of Medicare will result in greater utilization of a variety of 
health services and add to existing shortages of personnel,” and that this shortage represented a 
tremendous opportunity for the OEO to fill with a “senior health corps.”163  
Essentially, the proposed senior health corps would solve two problems at once: it would 
alleviate elderly poverty through public employment while filling a critical manpower need which 
the enactment of the Johnson administration’s health program had greatly augmented. As the task 
force report noted, “this [program] offers unusual opportunities for the middle-aged and older poor 
and others…many could qualify with short-term on-the-job training…educational prerequisites will 
not be an obstacle in most situations” with the additional bonuses that “discrimination based on race 
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has been substantially overcome in these services [and] opportunities for employment will be 
available everywhere – rural and urban.”164  
Jobs for the Elderly? 
As presented by the OEO task force, the proposed senior health corps was a solution that 
sounded almost too good to be true. The refusal on the part of some southern hospitals and primary 
care providers to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to be eligible for financial 
reimbursement from Medicare for services rendered meant that there was a distinct possibility that 
elderly African-Americans would be unable to receive better medical care or hospitalization in 
formerly all-white southern hospitals, thus subverting the ability of the Civil Rights Act to 
desegregate American medicine. In addition, in order to circumvent complaints about federal 
interference in local affairs, the OEO task force proposed that the senior health corps be “sponsored 
or operated by a Community Action Agency, a Visiting Nurse Association, a Public Health or 
Welfare Agency, a Hospital” – i.e., not directly by the federal government, though it highlighted 
that “close collaboration with [the] Social Security Administration, Public Health Service…would 
be necessary in planning and implementing this project.”165  
But the proposed senior health corps never made it past the initial proposal stage. It was not 
until 1966 that Johnson administration officials, concerned about the growing blowback to the War 
on Poverty, decided to formulate a strategy to develop policies aimed at alleviating elderly poverty. 
These new efforts also proved necessary because the OEO, despite Sargent Shriver’s pledges to 
Congress in 1965 and again in 1966, remained more firmly committed to youth programs than those 
that favored the elderly. 166  As disorganized as its beginnings had been, the OEO’s guiding 
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philosophy had eventually coalesced around the belief that expending limited federal funds on youth 
programs was a more effective way to break “the cycle of poverty” rather than programs for the 
elderly, who presumably would remain largely mired in poverty due to limited employment 
opportunities, public assistance, and personal resources. 
 
Figure 9. Sargent Shriver (l) and Lyndon Johnson, March 1965. Photo courtesy of the 
Lyndon B. Johnson Library. 
These suspicions were confirmed when Shriver, testifying once more before a Senate panel 
in late January 1966, “conceded that there was very little his poverty agency could do to help the 
elderly poor” and instead “recommended expanded Medicare and larger direct cash payments under 
Social Security to ‘reach the majority of older people who need more money and need it now’ to 
live ‘in decency and dignity.” 167  For his part, Shriver blamed external factors for the OEO’s 
          
combat elderly poverty, his agency did not deserve Congressional censure for its limited efforts to deal with elderly 
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shortcomings in dealing with the elderly poor, and singled out the lack of interest on the part of 
local communities in “problems and programs involving the elderly poor” as well as the fact that 
two-thirds of elderly poor people over the age of 65 were “women, almost half of whom had never 
worked before” and who possessed low educational levels that prevented them from effectively 
competing for employment opportunities. In other words, the OEO’s lack of engagement with the 
problem of elderly poverty was not caused by internal factors at the OEO; nor would the OEO be 
willing to expend much of its limited resources to tackle the issue.168 
While Shriver was right to point out that employment opportunities for older women were 
starkly limited, his arguments to explain the OEO’s lack of success in combatting elderly poverty 
were a bit too self-exculpatory. They overlooked the fact that there were local communities that 
were interested in dealing with the problems of the elderly poor; New York City, southern 
California, and Florida offered plenty of examples to counter Shriver’s statements. Shriver also did 
not take into account the possibility of working in conjunction with the newly-created 
Administration on Aging, which had been authorized by Congress to award $17.5 million in 
appropriations to “states and public and private nonprofit organizations to develop programs for the 
aged and to train personnel to teach the aged new skills,” a broad mandate which had the potential 
to mesh well with OEO’s commitment to local community participation in its programs.169 
Still, Shriver had a point that expanding Medicare and raising the amount of direct cash 
payments under Social Security had the potential to be more effective in combatting elderly poverty 
than any individual program sponsored by the OEO, given the OEO’s limited resources and 
personnel. As Wilbur Cohen, the Under Secretary of HEW, observed in an August 1965 interview 
with the New York Times, U.S. poverty rolls “could be reduced by 25 to 33 percent through Social 
          
168 Ibid. 
169 Robert B. Semple, Jr., “President Signs Bill on Elderly,” The New York Times, July 15, 1965. 
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Security by raising benefits for the aged and disabled,” though Cohen believed that even with 
sustained economic growth to fund such increases, elderly poverty would not be fully eradicated.170 
Rather, Cohen argued that any such increases in Medicare and Social Security would require 
supplementation by “broad programs of education, the elimination of discrimination in employment, 
rehabilitation of the disabled, counseling, and other measures.”171 
 Instead of trying to prod the OEO or Shriver, other Johnson administration officials during 
the course of 1966 increasingly realized, in the words of one confidential memo, that “there is a 
need for a program designed specifically to employ the skills of the Nation’s elderly…a program 
which does not tap these skills on the basis of need or income level alone.” 172  Additionally, 
administration officials were also moving to bolster other existing federal efforts to alleviate elderly 
poverty, a subject that took on increasing urgency as the Older Americans Act and Medicare were 
being implemented throughout the nation in 1965 and 1966.  By May 1966, nearly a year after the 
enactment of the Older Americans Act, thirty-one states launched new programs with the support of 
grants of the Administration on Aging. In some instances, these programs strengthened existing 
programs. In New York, for example, funds disbursed by the Older Americans Act would 
eventually enable New York City to increase funding for roughly three hundred separate programs 
for aging city residents. Smooth administration of these programs, in turn, fell upon almost two 
hundred “private and voluntary health, welfare, and leisure-time agencies.”173 In New Jersey, state 
officials took advantage of the newly available federal funds to add badly needed personnel to its 
Division of Aging, in preparation for the development of a new state-wide plan for older citizens.174 
          
170 Joseph A. Loftus, “Economic Growth Cuts List of Poor,” The New York Times, August 22, 1965. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Older Americans Community Service Program, n.d.. [1966?], in Box 362, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. See 
also John Herbers, “U.S. to Hire Aged to Help Children,” The New York Times, August 29th, 1965. 
173 “City to Set Up Office to Help the Elderly,” The New York Times, September 9, 1968. 
174 “N.J. Governor Promises 8-Point Human Resources Effort: Gov. Hughes Augments Prior Achievements,” The New 
Pittsburgh Courier, October 23, 1965. 
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As the state’s governor described it, the New Jersey plan aimed to “encourage…the establishment 
of local community councils to aid the elderly in a broad spectrum of new programs… [including] 
how to obtain the fullest benefits for older citizens under the new Federal Housing Act.”   
 The Johnson administration also launched the first-ever presidential task force dedicated to 
exploring the lightly regulated private nursing home industry. 175  The administration’s renewed 
emphasis on elderly antipoverty programs reflected a growing unease among senior officials that 
public opinion was curdling against the Great Society, and that some visible demonstration of the 
Great Society’s commitment to alleviating poverty along a color-blind basis was necessary. As 
Henry Owen, a senior State Department official wrote to Bill Moyers in May 1966: 
I was struck, in the Lou Harris poll, by the fact that the sharpest drop 
in administration popularity was in the suburbs…I suppose most of 
this is Vietnam and fear of inflation, but maybe there is also the 
concern expressed by Senator Barkley’s constituent: “What have you 
done for me lately?” Perhaps people in the suburbs feel that the main 
thrust of administration policy (the war on poverty, civil rights, etc.) is 
now addressed to the urban poor, and that they are on the outside 
looking in.176 
 
As Owen wondered, “could new initiatives dramatize the administration’s concern with issues that 
worry people in the suburbs?” Owens suggested that the administration focus on health-related 
issues, given that “most families have seen members struck down by heart disease or cancer; people 
in the suburbs, being less oppressed by poverty, probably have more time to worry about this than 
most…any administration which could hold out the prospect of action to reduce this toll would be 
viewed with favor.”177 If the administration emphasized health-related programs, Owens believed 
          
175 “Memorandum,” October 28, 1966, in White House Central Files, Subject File, EX FG 600 / Task Force / Natural 
Beauty, Box 366 in LBJL. 
176 Henry Owen to Bill Moyers, May 25, 1966 in Box 16, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX Health 4-1 
11/22/63. Underlining in original. 
177 Ibid. Underlining in original. 
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that it “would help to dramatize the fact that the administration’s Great Society programs are 
designed to help all the people, not just the under-privileged.”178 
Demonstrating that the Great Society’s programs were helping a wide rather than narrow 
cross-section of Americans constituency seemed to be a tricky proposition, given the increasingly 
dramatized efforts of the OEO’s community action programs in organizing impoverished African-
American communities in many of the nation’s cities, but the administration’s allies were happy to 
suggest ways to do so. In June 1966, the National Council of Senior Citizens’ (NCSC) leadership 
wrote to Robert Hardesty, a White House speechwriter, to report on the mail it had been receiving 
from older Americans.179 In particular, the NCSC reported that its incoming mail had revealed three 
major categories of problems: income maintenance, inability to participate in society, and health. To 
combat these problems, the NCSC recommended that the Johnson administration undertake three 
steps posthaste. In particular, the NCSC argued that it should first “continue to strengthen the Social 
Security system” and raise its benefits to a level that would “end poverty among the elderly;” 
second, that it fund more preventive care for older people as a way to relieve hospital space 
limitations; and finally, that it should “utilize a series of on-going programs (and initiate new ones 
as soon as possible)” which will use the wasted skills of older Americans.”180 
The NCSC’s recommendations overlapped with internal data collected by the administration 
about the OEO’s programs for the elderly poor. As limited as OEO’s efforts to combat elderly 
poverty had been, administration officials were aware that “the experience in the [OEO’s] Foster 
Grandparent Program has shown that there have been 8 applicants for every position available.” 
This level of popular demand suggested that there was a sizable reservoir of potential older workers 
for part-time employment or service opportunities, should the Federal Government be able to devise 
          
178 Ibid. 
179 Lawrence O. Houston to Robert Hardesty, June 1, 1966, in Box 13, Personal Papers of Robert Hardesty, LBJL. 
180 Ibid. Underlining in original. 
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one in conjunction with existing public and private welfare agencies.181 Moreover, by expanding 
employment opportunities for the elderly, the Johnson administration hoped to relieve pressure on 
the Social Security system and the private sector to provide increased employment opportunities. 
Despite years of rhetoric from N.A.M. and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about internal efforts by 
American industry to retain older workers, Labor Department statistics told a different story. As one 
Johnson administration Task Force report noted, “there has been an average of 850,000 people 45 
and over unemployed in recent months…older workers are only 5 percent of ‘new hires’ but 
account for 27 percent of all unemployed.” 182  Johnson administration officials estimated that 
expanding the OEO’s programs could potentially provide up to 100,000 older people with part-time 
employment. While that would not solve the problem of unemployment among older workers, it 
offered the possibility of “increas[ing] the emphasis given to the needs of the elderly poor under 
OEO programs…present OEO programs for the elderly poor have provided employment for only a 
comparatively few thousand persons.”183 
Conclusion 
The debate over the OEO’s role in alleviating elderly poverty would continue to bedevil the 
Johnson administration, despite its otherwise highly impressive legislative record on domestic 
policy issues for older Americans. In a span of a few months during 1965, the administration had 
successfully broken a legislative logjam that had prevented the enactment of Medicare, and had then 
successfully implemented Medicare over the course of the following year with the assistance of the 
Social Security Administration. In doing so, it had partially fulfilled the aspirations of New Deal 
liberals that extended back for over three decades. Triumph though it was, Medicare was only one 
          
181 Older Americans Community Service Program, n.d.. [1966?], in Box 362, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. See 
also John Herbers, “U.S. to Hire Aged to Help Children,” The New York Times, August 29th, 1965. 
182 “Summary of Proposals: Employment Opportunities,” Task Force on Older Americans Report, n.d.. [1966?], in Box 
362, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. 
183 Ibid. 
 
 321 
 
piece of a much larger legislative agenda that social reformers both within and outside of the 
administration successfully enacted into law. The passage of the Older Americans Act in July 1965 
had indicated that congressional advocates wanted the federal government to take a more active role 
in providing adequate funding to social services provided to older Americans. The Johnson 
administration, though, was considerably less sanguine about the Administration on Aging created 
by the Older Americans Act for this purpose, preferring instead to direct such efforts through other 
existing channels such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In light of the 
administration’s opposition, congressional advocates placed a tighter scrutiny on the newly created 
Office of Economic Opportunity, which they believed did not place sufficient emphasis on the 
problem of elderly poverty.  
Responding to this scrutiny, the Johnson administration began to ramp up internal efforts in 
1966 to nudge the OEO towards addressing elderly poverty, both as a way to bolster the fledgling 
agency’s popular support and as a way to expand the breadth of federal initiatives to ameliorate 
poverty among older Americans. Increasingly, the administration was beginning to realize that the 
problem of elderly poverty was not simply the product of inadequate income and unavailable 
medical care. Rather, it was linked to inadequate community and social services as well.  
This realization led the administration to acquiesce to the Older Americans Act, but not to 
fully embrace it. Some officials within the administration, most notably, Wilbur Cohen, the HEW 
Under-Secretary, believed that the administration needed to advocate a more aggressive agenda to 
tackle a broader range of issues like employment discrimination, prescription drug prices, and the 
growing private nursing home industry. Already, major states like New York and California had 
begun to address some of these concerns, especially employment discrimination, but these efforts 
still varied widely from state to state. The administration would turn more fully to these subjects 
after Medicare’s successful implementation in mid-1966. Until that time, though, most of the 
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administration’s energies remained focused on a smooth roll out of Medicare, including its efforts to 
ensure the full desegregation of southern hospitals and nursing homes. 
Starting in late 1966 and extending into 1967, the administration would devote more time 
and attention to supplementing Social Security and Medicare with additional programs and 
initiatives for older Americans. This pivot had its origins in the administration’s numerous task 
forces, which were largely composed of external experts borrowed from academia and government 
think tanks.  Over the course of the preceding three years, these task forces had examined a broad 
range of issues, including private pension reform, consumer protection, the nursing home industry, 
income maintenance, and other needs of older Americans, and had produced numerous reports 
proposing and explaining new initiatives which the administration could undertake.184 Most of these 
initiatives would fail to progress beyond the proposal stage, but as the administration sought to 
identify and enact new domestic policy goals after the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, it 
leaned upon the accumulated proposals to articulate its vision for a continuing activist government 
on behalf of older Americans, especially those who remained mired in poverty. 
 By 1966, the Johnson administration could boast a record of domestic policy achievements 
that rivaled the New Deal. The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, in particular, were savored by 
administration officials eager to bask in the overwhelming acclaim that the new legislation enjoyed, 
save for the opposition of the American Medical Association and far right-wing groups who 
believed that the administration had taken the nation one further step down the road to serfdom. The 
variety of advocacy groups that had successfully organized and mobilized elderly people to push for 
Medicare also celebrated, with the National Council of Senior Citizens cheering the loudest.  
          
184 For more on the Johnson administration’s use of task forces to drive policy formulation, see Nancy Smith Kegan, 
“Presidential Task Force Operation during the Johnson Administration.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, no. 2 
(1985): 320-29.  
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In particular, Medicare would also help to set the stage for the next phase of the senior 
state’s development. As part of the process of implementing Medicare, the Social Security 
Administration had worked in conjunction with the Office of Economic Opportunity to locate nearly 
500,000 senior citizens throughout the nation and enroll them in Medicare.185 This initiative, titled 
“Medicare Alert” had made obvious that the problems of the elderly were not limited solely to 
access to medical care or hospitalization; rather, as a report sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy 
(D-MA) observed, there was a gaping chasm between the provision of social and community 
services and the ability of older people to access them.186 
Figuring out how to fill this chasm would occupy a more significant portion of the Johnson 
administration’s time between 1966 and 1968 than it had during the previous two years, when the 
administration focused firmly on securing the enactment of Medicare. Even before the enactment of 
Medicare, though, voices outside the Johnson administration on Capitol Hill had lobbied hard for a 
more comprehensive approach to the problems of the elderly that envisioned Medicare as part of a 
larger, more ambitious agenda. Senator Patrick McNamara (D-MI) and Congressman John Fogarty 
(D-RI) were the chief proponents of this broader approach, and their ambitions found partial 
realization in the enactment of the Older Americans Act.  
However, the administration kept the Older Americans Act at a distance, and the law’s 
promise of providing more federal funds, supporting new research into the problems of older 
Americans, and setting up a new coordinating mechanism for future federal and state collaboration 
in this policy area remained largely neglected during its early years. Additionally, the administration 
          
185 “U.S. Will Alert the Elderly to Their Medicare Rights,” The New York Times, December 28, 1965; John Kifner, 
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York Times, February 21, 1966. The Medicare Alert program, in turn, also led to a “Medicaid Alert” program designed 
to enroll people eligible to receive Medicaid. See “City to Conduct Medicaid Drive With Welfare Recipients’ Help,” 
The New York Times, December 12, 1966. 
186 “Senate Unit Asks Corps of Elderly,” The New York Times, November 6, 1966; “$1.2 Million is Awarded to Locate 
Elderly Poor,” The New York Times, March 9, 1967. 
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displayed lukewarm enthusiasm for more unconventional proposals to create public employment 
opportunities for older people. This reluctance stemmed partly from the expenses involved, and 
partly because of the administration’s fear of the potential objections that private employers and 
organized labor might raise to such proposals. The administration ultimately chose to sidestep the 
issue and opted instead to copy the statewide efforts of New York and California to ban age-based 
discrimination in private employment. 187  The course that it chose aimed to avoid unnecessary 
confrontations with an increasingly skeptical Congress, but at the price of enacting legislation that 
produced limited results.188 
Instead, the administration preferred to work through existing bureaucratic mechanisms like 
HEW and to prod the OEO to take a more active role in combatting elderly poverty through 
sponsorship of community action programs primarily designed to meet the needs of older 
Americans. In light of OEO’s reluctance to do more, and the competing needs and other needy 
constituencies that HEW also had to serve, the Johnson administration began to embrace the Older 
Americans Act after 1966 along with a more aggressive expansion of Social Security as its preferred 
way of dealing with the issue of elderly poverty.189  
Starting in late 1966, the administration began to prioritize issues related to elderly poverty, 
and to invite outside opinion from academic experts, professional gerontologists, social workers, as 
well as state and local welfare officials to help it devise anti-poverty programs specifically designed 
          
187 The calls for a new public employment option were particularly strongest from the political left, with the Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) leading the charge. In January 1967, the ADA called for new tax increases to fund a new 
guaranteed annual income program and the creation of five million new public service jobs. As the New York Times 
observed, the ADA’s 1967 proposals outdid “its own 20-year record of espousing liberal causes” and “went far beyond 
anything proposed by the President.” See Marjorie Hunter, “A.D.A. For Tax Rise to Pay for Gains,” The New York 
Times, January 5, 1967. 
188 See Joseph A. Loftus, “Congress Passes Poverty Program with New Curbs,” The New York Times, October 21, 1966. 
In 1966, Congress had extended the antipoverty program, but with significantly less funding and more supervision than 
it had in the program’s original authorization legislation, and specifically provided funding for new O.E.O. staff 
members to tackle the problems of the elderly poor. 
189 See “Text of the President's Economic Report Outlining Nation's Gains and Problems: The Future: Growing Need Is 
Seen for Public Action to Improve the Quality of Life,” The New York Times, January 17, 1969. 
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for the elderly. These new programs would emphasize access to additional sources of income, health 
care, improved nutrition, and access to institutions that were capable of preventing them from 
becoming socially isolated. Work to bolster these efforts would accelerate after 1966, and the senior 
state’s development would continue to accelerate as the federal government refocused some of its 
antipoverty efforts in conjunction with its partners at the local and state level and in the private 
sector. 
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CHAPTER V 
Entitled But No Longer Pitied, 1966-1975 
 
By 1966, the senior state had begun to enter a new phase in its development. During the 
previous thirty years, federal efforts to ensure economic security in old-age had gradually evolved 
from a Social Security-centered model whose cornerstone lay in contributory social insurance on a 
national scale. This model had only come into partial fruition by the late 1940s. Instead, other actors 
such as private employers, voluntary social welfare organizations, and state and local governments, 
had tried to fill the gap left by an incomplete Social Security system. While a proliferating number 
of employer-sponsored private pension systems offered a stable source of retirement income for 
some older Americans, a universal solution to the problem of old-age economic security remained 
stubbornly elusive. As a new public-private hybrid welfare state began to take shape during the 
postwar years, local and state officials found to their dismay that concentrated levels of poverty 
among older people continued to persist, and had in fact begun to rise once more to levels not seen 
since the depths of the Great Depression.  
The failure to enact national health insurance in the late 1940s and during the 1950s had 
further exacerbated this issue. As economist Dora L. Costa has pointed out, between 1960 and 1965, 
“state and local expenditures on medical assistance for the aged rose by more than 1000 percent.”1 It 
was not too surprising, then, that state and local governments eagerly supported Medicare in the 
years leading up to its enactment in 1965. While medical assistance for the elderly had become an 
increasingly large portion of many state and local budgets before the enactment of Medicare, after 
the enactment of Medicare, the costs associated with providing social and community services 
          
1 U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Welfare Expenditures under Public Programs in the United States, 1929-
66, by Ida C. Merriam and Alfred M. Skolnik. Prepared by the Office of Research and Statistics. Research Report No. 
25, 207-209 (Tables 2-1 and 2-2), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), quoted in Dora L. 
Costa, The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 177. 
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became a more significant budget item on more than one state and city budget. Social welfare 
advocates thereafter began to press for more federal assistance in this area as a way to alleviate the 
fiscal strains faced by many communities. In response, the Johnson administration and Congress 
responded at first by attempting to redirect the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to spend 
more of its funds and devote more of its time to the problems of the elderly poor. 
These attempts produced mixed results. Consequently, the Johnson administration turned to 
its task forces of outside experts in order to devise new strategy for the administration to follow as it 
tackled the multitude of interrelated issues associated with elderly poverty. As part of its search for 
a new path forward, the Johnson administration began to more fully embrace the framework of 
federal, state, and local cooperation laid out in the Older Americans Act. It did so because the law 
offered an existing structure for federal, state, and local welfare officials to work together to identify 
and fund social and community service programs that could improve the lives of older people 
without doing so in a demeaning fashion to recipients of government assistance or that threatened to 
usurp local prerogatives.2 Though the programs sponsored by the law and the OEO were not on the 
same fiscal scale as either Social Security or Medicare, they demonstrated a new level of 
commitment on the part of the federal government to try and equalize the level of public assistance 
provided at the local level to older Americans, and to make it possible for more states and localities 
to provide services that otherwise might have gone unsupported.3 
          
2 New programs at the state level increasingly sought to provide “aid for the aging in their homes,” with an emphasis on 
assisting the elderly who still sought to live independently rather than as members of public or private old-age 
institutions, a marked shift from prior years when qualification for public assistance had been more directly tied to 
institutionalization. See Peter Kihss, “Aid for the Aging in Their Homes Is Pushed in State Programs: Projects 
Described,” The New York Times, November 19, 1967; “New Apartments for the Elderly Avoid ‘Nursing Home’ 
Approach,” The New York Times, January 14, 1962. 
3 Funding from the Older Americans Act made possible the creation in 1968-1969 of a unified New York City office to 
deal solely with the issues of the elderly, thereby separating senior citizens from other recipients of public assistance. 
The new office replaced the ad hoc arrangements that had previously existed across numerous city departments and 
agencies and the nearly 200 private and voluntary agencies in New York that operated programs for the city’s elderly 
residents. See “City to Set Up Office To Help the Elderly,” The New York Times, September 9, 1968. 
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Additionally, the Johnson administration aggressively raised Social Security benefit levels, 
in part to compensate for Vietnam War-related inflation, and in part as an antipoverty measure that 
did not require the creation of a new governmental program, a necessity after the 1966 
congressional midterm elections decimated the progressive working majority that the Johnson 
administration had enjoyed on Capitol Hill after the landslide Democratic electoral victory in the 
1964 presidential election. The Johnson administration’s emphasis on improving social and 
community services and its push to raise Social Security benefit levels would be extended by the 
Nixon administration, which would work with a Democratic Congress after 1969 to build on the 
newly expanded foundation for federal, state, and local cooperation on social welfare services for 
older Americans that had been bequeathed to it. The Nixon administration’s ideological emphasis 
on “New Federalism” (effectively a devolution of power from the central government back to the 
states) meant that it experienced little difficulty in embracing the Johnson administration’s adapted 
approach to dealing with the issue of elderly poverty or the continuing effort to shore up existing 
federal and state mechanisms for providing economic and health security in old age. This bipartisan 
commitment helped to further solidify the senior state as an essential function of government, albeit 
in a haphazard fashion. 
Perhaps the greatest boost to the senior state after the enactment of Medicare came out of the 
failure of the Nixon administration to secure enactment of its Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which 
it had first proposed in August 1969 as a form of universal guaranteed annual income designed to 
replace the patchwork of categorical assistance programs that had evolved since the New Deal era. 
FAP had some antecedents in the Johnson administration, which had likewise weighed the virtues of 
simplifying the nation’s increasingly complex, chaotic, and duplicative social welfare system but 
had opted against doing so. But the Nixon administration soon found that FAP engendered fierce 
opposition from both the political left and right, whose opposition ultimately doomed it to failure.  
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Instead, the Nixon administration was able to salvage the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program from the wreckage of FAP. Like FAP, the SSI program proposed a new level of 
guaranteed annual income, albeit limited solely to selected categories of recipients, the most 
prominent of whom were elderly people. Unlike FAP, though, the SSI program secured easy 
passage in Congress. Taken together with other major improvements to the existing Social Security 
system that significantly raised benefits, the triumph of the SSI program signaled an unlikely 
culmination of efforts by liberal reformers and old-age advocacy groups during the course of the 
previous decade to broaden and deepen the level of federal commitment to the welfare of the 
nation’s elderly population.4  
Moreover, despite the Nixon administration’s demonstrated hostility towards the OEO and 
traditional welfare programs, it acquiesced to three significant amendments to the Older Americans 
Act between 1969 and 1974, which broadened the original legislation enacted in 1965 and steered 
significant new sums of federal funds into the programs supported by the now amended law.5 The 
successful enactment of these amendments put into place the last major piece of the postwar senior 
state, with the federal government and the states acting in concert to financially support and sustain 
          
4 In 1972, Congress authorized (and Richard Nixon acceded to) legislation that raised Social Security benefits by 20 
percent and “adopted automatic cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security benefits,” thus restoring the purchasing 
power of Social Security benefits that had been eroded by the federal government’s inflationary rates of spending during 
the prior decade. See Costa, Evolution of Retirement, 178. 
5 Specifically, in 1969, a series of amendments to the Older Americans Act “provided grants for model demonstration 
projects and the Foster Grandparents and Retired Senior Volunteer Programs.” In 1972, “new Title VII [was] created 
under the Older Americans Act authorizing funds for a national nutrition program for the elderly”; in 1973, the “Older 
Americans Act Comprehensive Services Amendments established Area Agencies on Aging. The amendments added a 
new Title V, which authorized grants to local community agencies for multi-purpose senior centers, and created the 
Community Service Employment grant program for low-income persons age 55 and older, administered by the 
Department of Labor.” Finally, in 1974, Congress enacted “Title XX of the Social Security Amendments authorized 
grants to states for social services. These programs included protective services, homemaker services, transportation 
services, adult day care services, training for employment, information and referral, nutrition assistance, and health 
support. Older Americans Act amendments added transportation under Title III model projects.” See U.S. 
Administration on Aging website, “Historical Evolution of Programs for Older Americans,” U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services. Source URL: https://aoa.acl.gov/aoa_programs/oaa/resources/History.aspx (accessed April 1, 2017). 
By 1972, the Older Americans Act had already been appropriated $157 million; the Nixon administration proposed 
raising this sum by another $100 million as part of a “comprehensive strategy for helping older Americans.” See also 
Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon Asks a Rise in Aid to Elderly,” The New York Times, March 24, 1972. 
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community and social service programs and initiatives that were frequently anti-poverty programs 
with a respectable veneer on them, so as to avoid incurring the wrath of old-age advocacy groups 
(and senior citizens themselves) that did not want to be stigmatized as welfare recipients. 6 As 
Lyndon Johnson remarked in a February 1968 ceremony inaugurating a new program of community 
service programs for older Americans: 
In March, more than 17 million older citizens will receive a Social 
Security increase of some 13 percent. When the benefit checks go out, 
another 1 million Americans will be lifted above the poverty line--a 
goal that we are working toward. Medicare--that for many, many 
years was not seriously considered and after it was considered and 
passed, many said would not work at all--is now flourishing…But 
beyond all of this, we all have another goal. That goal is to guarantee 
to every older American not only security, but the pride of being able 
to be active and being able to be productive.7 
 
The three core components of the senior state – economic security, health security, and, finally, 
social and community service provisions – had come together by 1975 into a formidable juggernaut, 
one which, aside from defense spending, accounted for an increasingly prominent part of the federal 
government’s overall expenditures, and one that dwarfed other, much more high profile and 
increasingly controversial social assistance programs such as the AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children).  
In sum, while the overall War on Poverty declared in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson and headed 
by Sargent Shriver and the OEO may have produced mixed results, the more subdued war on 
elderly poverty waged by lower level officials within the Johnson and Nixon administrations, as 
well as by select members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, proved to be far more 
successful at institutionalizing mechanisms for the alleviation of poverty for many of the nation’s 
          
6 See for example, “Dignity Stressed in Pleas for Aged: ' Handouts' Are Criticized at Hearing in Newark,” The New York 
Times, July 11, 1965. 
7 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at a Ceremony Inaugurating a Program of Community Service Projects for Older 
Americans,” February 15, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29373 (accessed April 1, 2017). 
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elderly. Nevertheless, this result did not appear likely in 1965-6, when the Johnson administration’s 
actions seemed to be lagging at best, and the overall direction of the War on Poverty seemed to have 
more critics than supporters.8 
The Johnson Administration, Older Americans, and the War on Poverty 
 At a meeting in early September 1966 to discuss the administration’s agenda for older 
Americans, a host of senior administration officials, including Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, 
HEW Secretary John Gardner, OEO head Sargent Shriver, as well as senior Johnson aides Douglass 
Cater and Joseph Califano, examined the options before them.9 After concluding that federal health 
programs for the aged like Medicare were adequate, the assembled officials then proceeded to look 
at the Older Americans Act to see how it could be better utilized. A quick review of the legislation 
revealed that while it “provide[d] a statutory base for the development and initiation of programs 
aimed at offering an opportunity for a more meaningful life to the elderly,” no “clearly defined 
programs” had been developed.10  
Instead, “insufficient appropriations, lack of imagination, and internal differences” had led to 
federal inaction. The assembled group agreed that “consideration should be given” to new 
approaches to “improve the life of the elderly,” that included removal of “restrictions on continued 
employment of the aged,” reducing the “negative impact of social security and private retirement 
plans on the disposition to work,” and utilizing the elderly “in community service projects” such as 
the Foster Grandparents program, beautification, and “services for the elderly by the elderly.”11 
Moving quickly to begin the process of translating these proposals into policy, Califano sent a 
confidential memo in late September 1966 to HEW Secretary John Gardner, the recently appointed 
          
8 See Joseph A. Loftus, “Aid to Aged Reported Lagging,” The New York Times, December 22, 1965. 
9 Agenda: Older Americans, September 8, 1966, in Box 355, Office Files of James C. Gaither, LBJL. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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chairman of the administration’s Task Force on Older Americans, to urge him to pursue an 
ambitious, four part agenda that included “ways to expand employment opportunities for the 
aged…ways to improve the life of the elderly…ways to improve housing for the elderly…[and to] 
examine present division of responsibilities among Federal agencies for programs for the aged,” and 
to return his findings within a month’s time.12 
 The sudden seriousness of the administration in its approach to elderly poverty could be seen 
in the lineup of the Task Force’s members. Unlike some other administration task forces, the Task 
Force on Older Americans featured a broad representation of federal departments; Califano 
explicitly requested that Gardner choose “the finest possible talent on this Task Force,” given the 
administration’s “deep concern for the problems facing older persons in our society.”13 Working 
quickly to respond to Califano’s command, Gardner and the rest of his task force pored over 
existing administration achievements and actions as well as unrealized ideas, plans, and proposals 
which had languished for some time. In its subsequent recommendations to Califano, the task force 
urged as one of its top priorities that the administration consider “[f]ederal aid…to communities for 
the employment of older people in public service activities on a part-time basis with public and 
private nonprofit organizations.” 14  That proposal immediately led to an interagency turf war 
between HEW and the Department of Labor, both of which wanted administrative control over the 
proposed program. Refereeing in the conflict between HEW and Labor, Phillip S. Hughes, the 
Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, argued that the program be placed within HEW, but 
          
12 Joseph Califano to John W. Gardner, September 21, 1966, in Box 90, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. 
13 Ibid. The members included Wilbur Cohen from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, W. Willard Wirtz 
from the Department of Labor, and other mid to senior level officials within the administration. 
14 Phillip S. Hughes to Joseph Califano, November 26, 1966, in Box 90, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. 
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that it be limited to a “demonstration project” rather than made into a full-scale “new categorical 
program of HEW.”15  
 The task force’s other proposals similarly ran into bureaucratic domain conflicts elsewhere. 
As a contemporaneous internal administration report noted, the Task Force’s proposals would  
[p]rovide for administrative and/or legislative modification of existing 
people-oriented programs in order to achieve a better accommodation 
of services and facilities to the needs of the elderly. However, the 
unavoidable proliferation of responsibility for such programs among 
several Federal agencies requires extraordinary measures to assure 
adequate coordination and the adaptation of all programs to the 
changing needs of all population groups.16 
 
In late November 1966, a few weeks after a midterm election that had been disastrous for the 
administration and its liberal congressional allies, officials within the Johnson administration began 
to pivot on the federal government’s approach to old-age policy and to try and carry out the task 
force’s recommendations. Prior to this moment, the administration’s efforts to enhance federal 
programs and initiatives on behalf of impoverished older Americans had largely been centered on 
Medicare (i.e., its enactment and subsequent efforts to ensure adequate access to health care for 
senior citizens). As the testimony of multiple private welfare agency leaders and experts during 
congressional hearings in 1965 had made clear, though, the Office of Economic Opportunity had not 
placed much emphasis on efforts to combat elderly poverty, an outcome which reflected the 
strategic decision made by OEO head Sargent Shriver and his staff that youth unemployment – 
especially in America’s cities – was a far more pressing issue and better use of the federal 
government’s funds.17 
          
15 Ibid. 
16 “Report on Task Force on Older Americans,” November 7, 1966, in Box 90, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL. 
17 Nathan Glazer, “To Produce a Creative Disorder: The Grand Design of the Poverty Program,” The New York Times, 
February 27, 1966. 
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Even before the electoral shellacking which the Democratic Party suffered in 1966, 
President Johnson had made clear his intent to seek significant increases in Social Security.18 In the 
aftermath of political backlash, this objective took on higher priority as the administration began to 
refocus on less controversial policy items that could attract bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. 
Writing to senior aide Joseph Califano in late November 1966, HEW official Wilbur Cohen sent a 
memo detailing a proposed “Older Americans Opportunity Program of 1967,” that compiled many 
of the recommendations made by the Task Force on Older Americans chaired by HEW Secretary 
John Gardner a few months beforehand.19  
The recommendations, broadly speaking, called upon the federal government to eliminate 
age discrimination in employment, expand employment and community service opportunities for 
older people, and to augment the Older Americans Act with additional funding sufficiently adequate 
to fund the Act’s already authorized community service, training, and planning grant programs.20  In 
addition to the already extant high priorities of securing an “adequate income and medical care” for 
older Americans, the task force explicitly recommended that there be “a broad objective of national 
policy for older Americans,” which would ensure that every older person have “available means 
which provide opportunities for useful work in the economy…access to community services and 
facilities…[and] a broader choice of housing and living arrangements.”21 Ultimately, the task force 
argued that there was “a critical need for public policy to create more positive economic and social 
roles for older people in our Nation.”22  
          
18 “President Renews Vow to Seek Rise in Social Security,” The New York Times, June 4, 1966; “President Asks More 
Social Security,” The New York Times, April 10, 1966. The Democratic Party lost 47 seats in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and 3 seats in the U.S. Senate, with most of the losses concentrated in the party’s northern wing. 
19 Wilbur J. Cohen to Joseph A. Califano, November 29, 1966, “Memorandum, Subject: Task Force Report on Older 
Americans,” in Box 61, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJL. 
20 Ibid. Wilbur J. Cohen to Joseph A. Califano, November 29, 1966, “Memorandum, Subject: Task Force Report on 
Older Americans,” in Box 61, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJL. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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 In order to make this new public policy real, the task force urged the Johnson administration 
to undertake nine major expansions of existing federal programs or legislation, including the 
Economic Opportunity Act (“to increase the numbers of middle aged and elderly poor who are 
either served by or employed in the varied programs under the Act”), the Manpower, Development 
and Training Act, and the Older Americans Act. 23  The total projected cost of these 
recommendations stood at $97 million, and notably did not include any recommendations to 
increase Social Security benefits or to build more features into the recently implemented Medicare 
program. Rather, the recommendations collected the disparate elements from existing administration 
initiatives and attempted to repackage them as a more coherent program, which it labeled as “The 
Older Americans Opportunity Program of 1967.” 
 The Older Americans Opportunity Program represented an attempt to expand the normal 
ambit of the federal government’s activities on behalf of older Americans. As an earlier internal 
administration report on the Task Force on Older Americans had noted, there was a “need for public 
policy that will create opportunity to the elderly for more positive economic and social 
roles…generally, these proposals provide for administrative and/or legislative modification of 
existing people-oriented programs in order to achieve a better accommodation of services and 
facilities to the needs of the elderly.” 24  However, the report cautioned that “the unavoidable 
proliferation of responsibility for such problems among several Federal agencies requires 
extraordinary measures to assure adequate coordination and the adaptation of all programs to the 
changing needs of all population groups” and therefore recommended a “revitalization of the 
          
23 Ibid., 2. 
24 “Report on Task Force on Older Americans,” Health and Welfare Division (G. Barlous), November 7, 1966, in Box 
61, Office Files of Joseph Califano, LBJL. 
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President’s Council on Aging and a strong staff input by HEW’s Administration on Aging…[to] 
serve this purpose for the aged clientele.”25 
 Besides pointing out the need for “adequate coordination” and a more dedicated agency or 
group within the Executive Branch to advocate for programs for older Americans, the report also 
highlighted other problems with the task force’s recommendations, starting with the “general 
absence of a precise, age-related definition of the target group – Older Americans…this absence is 
most crucial within the context of ‘employment opportunities.’” 26  Proposed federal efforts to 
combat age discrimination received particular censure: “the alleged costs stemming from 
institutional requirements… [and] employer reluctance to comply could render the enforcement 
aspects of this proposal infeasible.”27 Other efforts like the proposed older workers employment 
referral services were derided as “unnecessary” or “inadvisable.”28 Not all of the proposed measures 
received such condemnation, though. The proposed expansion of rent supplement programs and 
nutritional services for older people were rated as “essential,” a recommendation which would help 
lay the groundwork for their survival and incorporation into the federal government’s apparatus. 
Despite the mounting criticism on both the political left and right of the administration for its 
handling of the Vietnam War and of domestic unrest in many of America’s cities, President 
Johnson’s aides pressed forward with the administration’s agenda for older Americans. The mid-
term congressional elections of 1966 had robbed the President of the progressive working majority 
which he had been able to use to get Medicare, the Voting Rights Act, and other long-delayed 
legislation through the usual congressional gauntlet of committee hearings, votes, and backroom 
wheeling and dealing. Starting in January 1967, a newly re-energized and considerably less 
          
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Ibid., 3-4. 
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progressive congressional majority would take their seats in the House and Senate chambers and 
wield the gavels once more, and not a few of those gavels were bound to be aimed like battering 
rams at the Great Society.  
Against these worsened odds for legislative success, though, the Johnson administration 
advanced an aggressive policy agenda on behalf of the elderly. In late January 1967, Johnson sent a 
comprehensive message to Congress outlining an ambitious agenda of new initiatives for the federal 
government to undertake in the coming Congressional session. 29  Unlike President Kennedy’s 
similarly lengthy message in 1963 which had emphasized the need to enact Medicare, Johnson’s 
1967 message focused primarily on the need to secure an adequate level of income support for older 
Americans.30 Johnson’s message met with wide support in the press, with even Life magazine going 
out of its way to praise the President, noting that “Lyndon Johnson is at his best when he is talking 
about ways to help people out of misery…his message on older Americans sent to the Congress last 
week was moving, and in a year when he will have to curtail many dreams…there was a convincing 
simplicity in the language of his statement.”31  
Included in the many goals laid out in the message were concrete proposals to dramatically 
increase Social Security benefits by twenty percent, raise minimum public assistance standards 
across the fifty states, significantly overhaul the federal tax code in order to lower the effective tax 
rate on millions of senior citizens, and finally “a proposal to prohibit discrimination in employment 
because of age.”32 Speaking to the press at a briefing about the message, HEW Secretary John 
          
29 Lyndon B. Johnson: “Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Americans,” January 23, 1967. 
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28139 (Accessed November 18, 2016). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hugh Sidey, “A blueprint based on deep feeling,” February 3, 1967, Life; Max Frankel, “New White House Spirit,” 
The New York Times, February 1, 1967; both in Box 109, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX SP 2-
3/1967/WE 1/Children & Youth, 2/8/67 Back Up Material VI, LBJL. 
32 “Background Briefing: Message on Older Americans,” January 23, 1967, in Box 109, White House Central Files, 
Subject Files, EX SP 2-3/1967/WE 1/Children & Youth, 2/8/67 Back Up Material VI, LBJL. 
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Gardner emphasized the scope of the recommendations made in the President’s message, noting that 
“this breadth and variety reflects very strongly our conviction that the problems of older Americans 
are extremely complex and will have to be tackled from a lot of different angles.”33 
Within a week of dispatching the message on older Americans, the Johnson administration 
reached out to its allies in the labor movement – especially the leadership of the AFL-CIO – to 
attract the attention and support of union rank-and-file members. Administration officials also 
reached out to friendly journalists to try and drum up extended, favorable coverage of the 
President’s message.34 Their efforts were successful. The New York Times praised it, and positively 
editorialized that “the elderly do need some kind of intelligent help” from the federal government.35 
Peering deeper into the presidential message, though, revealed that the type of help which the 
federal government was now prepared to offer to older people suggested a mixture of new and old 
approaches to elderly poverty. On the one hand, the President had called for a significant 20 percent 
increase in Social Security benefits levels as well as a major overhaul of the existing public 
assistance programs that would “bring the levels of public assistance for all the States at least up to 
the minimum levels those States themselves provide should be paid,” an explicit recognition that the 
fragmented character of Social Security’s Old-Age Assistance program as well as other existing 
federal, state, and local initiatives had either exacerbated or created disparities in publicly supported 
income maintenance from state to state.36  
  
          
33 Ibid. 
34 Robert E. Kintner to Joseph Alsop, January 23, 1967, in Box 109, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX SP 2-
3/1967/WE 1/Children & Youth, 2/8/67 Back Up Material VI, LBJL. 
35 Robert B. Semple, Jr., “New Help for the 18,457,000 of US Who Are Old,” The New York Times, February 5, 1967. 
36 “Background Briefing: Message on Older Americans,” January 23, 1967, in Box 15, Personal Papers of Harry 
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Moving Away from Great Society Liberalism 
On the other hand, the President’s proposals would also for the first time “require the States 
to use the Federal provisions to encourage older Americans who are on welfare to become trained 
and get jobs, and get off welfare” and would completely overhaul “Federal tax provisions relating to 
older Americans” in order to lower the overall amount of taxes paid by most elderly people. These 
two proposals – the first, a requirement that individual states shift older people off of welfare rolls 
and back into the workforce, and the second, a substantial reduction in taxes collected rather than 
funds expended on behalf of older people – represented the contours of a new federal approach to 
resolving economic insecurity in old age, and one which would pick up greater steam in the future. 
The proposed tax cut for senior citizens only suggested just how far the administration how 
come in its embrace of what Michael Harrington had derisively labelled “reactionary 
Keynesianism.”37 Three years earlier, the Johnson administration had pressed a large reduction in 
tax rates through Congress despite strong objections at the time, and had presented them as 
necessary to stimulate economic growth. Now, the administration recommended targeted tax cuts as 
a faster and more expedient way to assist older Americans than the frustratingly slow pace of the 
OEO. Evidence of the administration’s displeasure with OEO’s efforts came during the press 
briefing announcing the tax cuts when senior Johnson administration officials publicly directed “the 
appropriate people in the government, most notably the Director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, to encourage older Americans…to join in the variety of programs available to provide 
services to our fellowman.”38  
The second proposal, to get older Americans “off welfare,” also struck a different public 
tone than the administration had ever previously expressed. While HEW Under Secretary Wilbur 
          
37 For Harrington quote, see Allen Matusow, The Unraveling of America, 53. 
38 “Background Briefing: Message on Older Americans,” January 23, 1967, in Box 15, Personal Papers of Harry 
McPherson, LBJL. 
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Cohen emphasized that “this package that the President is recommending is the most historical since 
the original law [referring to the 1935 enactment of the Social Security Act]…It is not only the 
largest in dollars, but I also want to point out that it is the most significant because it has the effect 
of taking 1.4 million people out of poverty. It is the largest single anti-poverty program that has yet 
been developed”, it was difficult not to interpret his statement as an implicit rebuke of both Sargent 
Shriver and the OEO. 39  By raising Social Security benefit levels, Cohen emphasized that the 
Johnson administration’s overarching goal was to “eliminate overnight 200,000 aged people from 
welfare rolls. They will be transferred, in other words. They will drop their welfare and they will 
pick up their Social Security,” a move which, Cohen argued, would result in substantial savings for 
the States providing old age assistance payments. 
While Johnson administration officials were unwilling to expressly admit it, the proposals 
unveiled in January 1967 signified just how inadequate the administration’s efforts to combat 
elderly poverty had been. While the enactment of Medicare in 1965 had represented a tremendous 
step forward, it had become clear that subsidizing the medical and hospitalization bills of people 
over the age of 65 was insufficient to deal with the other economic issues faced by older people, 
such as increasingly unaffordable housing, limited access to gainful employment, or social 
integration into the urban and rural communities in which so many of them lived.  
Recognizing that OEO’s efforts to deal with these other problems had, at best, been limited, 
the Johnson administration decided in January 1967 to focus on broad gauge improvements. OEO’s 
Foster Grandparents program might only reach a few thousand elderly people, but improvements to 
Social Security would reach many more. The still-debated senior volunteer corps might reach a few 
thousand more, but tax cuts would reach millions, and would do so without getting caught in the 
bureaucratic tripwires which had ensnared and ultimately strangled dozens of other proposals to 
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alleviate the economic and social problems of older people. By embracing these fiscal tools, 
moreover, the Johnson administration was also rejecting the experimental initiatives which the OEO 
had embraced to deal with elderly poverty. Notably, the administration did not announce 
significantly increased funding or new programs to supplement OEO’s already existing slate; 
instead, it retreated back to methods which were mostly tried and true: expansion of Social Security 
and targeted tax cuts.  
Senior administration officials like Douglass Cater began to take a more in-depth interest in 
the administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty. In particular, they began to more critically 
examine the role that the OEO played in fighting elderly poverty. While the administration could 
boast substantial achievements, such as the enactment of Medicare and the expansion of Social 
Security in 1961 and again in 1965, its other legislative accomplishments were considerably more 
modest. The promise of the Older Americans Act remained largely unfulfilled. Efforts via the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to create rent supplement programs that 
would allow senior citizens to continue to rent good housing showed encouraging signs of success, 
but overall the administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty had remained fragmented and 
tenuously connected to the OEO and the War on Poverty.40 
Eager to change this state of affairs, Cater began the process of reaching out to private 
voluntary organizations to help the administration advance a more comprehensive domestic policy 
agenda on behalf of older Americans.41 Rushing to take advantage of this new openness on the part 
of the Johnson administration, the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC) advocated once 
more for the creation of a senior volunteers corps, a proposal that the Department of Labor as well 
          
40 See Michael Stern to S. Douglass Cater, “Memorandum,” January 19, 1967 in Box 3, President’s Appointment File 
[Diary Back-Up], 1/1/64-1/31/64, LBJL. 
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as HEW had been fighting over since the fall of 1966.42 As proposed by the NCSC, the senior 
volunteer corps would consist of a “comprehensive volunteer program to identify individual needs 
among the older poor.”43 In order to accomplish this goal, the NCSC proposed creating “part-time 
employment for the elderly poor and volunteer community where a large potential of recruits exists 
through the membership of the well-established, affiliated clubs of the National Council of Senior 
Citizens.”44 Essentially, the program aimed to provide employment to a small number of senior 
citizens (approximately 2,000) to “locate and identify the needs of 2,000,000 elderly poor,” an 
ambitious goal but one which built on the success of Project Medicare Alert, a surprisingly 
successful program hastily assembled by the Johnson administration that had hired several thousand 
volunteers to enroll senior citizens in Medicare during the year between its enactment in 1965 and 
its formal launch in 1966.45  
Like Project Medicare Alert, the proposed senior volunteer corps would locate and assist 
elderly poor people and put them in contact with public welfare agencies so that they could register 
and qualify for government assistance. As an additional benefit, the senior corps would also greatly 
improve the OEO’s lackluster record combatting elderly poverty; by the NCSC’s reckoning, “in 
spite of their disproportionately high numbers among the poor – one in five – the elderly poor 
remain the least visible and the least served by OEO...it is the feeling of the National Council of 
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Senior Citizens…that not enough has been done to meet the needs of the elderly poor.” 46 
Positioning itself as the organization best suited to meet these needs, the NCSC emphasized that its 
2,000 affiliated clubs “have benefited from the organizations democratically-governed structure 
assuring autonomy of older people in harmony with the national interest,” perhaps harkening back 
to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act’s original legislative aim of promoting “maximum feasible 
participation” by poor people.47 
Even as the administration continued to debate the merits of the NCSC’s proposed plan, 
similar initiatives were being rapidly implemented. In March 1967, in conjunction with the OEO, 
the National Council on Aging launched Project FIND, a new program designed to reach “the 
friendless, isolated needy and disabled” (per its name).48 Project FIND employed older men and 
women to go “door-to-door and farm-to-farm” to help locate impoverished elderly people and to 
educate them about the “kind of health and welfare services…available to them.”49 Project FIND 
was the brainchild of Jack Ossofsky, an OEO official, who expressed his hope that “based on the 
experiences of FIND, some community services may be revised and senior centers may be 
established to meet the health, educational and recreational need of the elderly.”50  
In essence, by using the elderly to help the elderly, Project FIND aimed to solve two 
problems at once. It would provide a limited number of employment opportunities for some older 
Americans, and in so doing it would allow local, state, and federal welfare officials to locate 
thousands of elderly people who might benefit from the growing number of programs designed to 
lift them out of poverty. Project FIND’s reach was limited by both its small size and limited funds – 
even the OEO expected that it would at most reach 200,000 people out of an estimated total 
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population of 5.3 million elderly people living below the poverty line – but as Mr. Ossofsky’s 
statement to the New York Times had hinted, officials in OEO and elsewhere hoped that it would be 
an important first step in the right direction. 
Meanwhile, the administration, in conjunction with the AFL-CIO, sought to drum up support 
for other measures designed to alleviate elderly poverty. AFL-CIO sponsored rallies featured a 
filmed talk of President Johnson stressing the need to raise Social Security payments by 20%, “with 
a minimum of at least $150 a month for retired couples and $100 for individuals with 25 years of 
coverage” that would, by the estimate of the Social Security Administration, lift “1,400,000 
citizens” out of poverty within a year’s time.51 Unlike the few millions of dollars given to OEO for 
Project FIND, the administration’s proposals to expand Social Security amounted to roughly $4.1 
billion, a figure which Johnson took pains to remind the press was “nearly five times greater than 
the major increase in 1950 and almost six times greater than the increase of 1961.”52 
The administration’s renewed interest in elderly poverty may have been stimulated by 
mounting evidence that, despite the hopes of Medicare’s architects that that program would provide 
a new baseline of economic security for older Americans, the problem of old-age poverty had 
proven to be significantly more intractable than it had first appeared to be. In part, the dramatic 
contrast between the massive amount of spending for the war in Vietnam and the relatively lower 
amount of funds being expended on behalf of the Great Society’s domestic programs had also 
unexpectedly propelled the issue of old-age poverty back to the front pages of the nation’s 
newspapers. Congressional hearings held in May 1967, for example, had revealed that the rising 
costs of prescription drugs had created another widening financial gyre that many senior citizens 
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were falling into; it would not be the last time that the Senate would hear about older people having 
to choose between “having enough to eat and getting the medicine they need.”53  
While declining to criticize the administration’s spending priorities, HEW Secretary John 
Gardner echoed similar sentiments during his testimony before a House subcommittee hearing in 
early May 1967. Speaking to the assembled congressmen, Gardner pressed the administration’s case 
for a series of amendments to the Older Americans Act to help combat the “many and varied” 
problems faced by older people.54 As Gardner observed, “the problems faced by older people today 
are many and varied: low income, poor housing; inadequate access to medical, health, and other 
community facilities; and a separation from…the rest of our mobile, work-oriented, youth-centered 
society.”55 In response to these problems, Gardner argued that  
[w]e must meet these needs in an interrelated way. Health services 
must be buttressed by adequate housing, and adequate housing 
assured through income security. And there must be educational, 
recreational, and community services that afford substance and 
meaning to life for the older person, his neighbors, and his 
community.56 
 
In order to “meet these needs in an interrelated way,” Gardner argued that the proposed Older 
Americans Act Amendments of 1967 would greatly assist in this task by providing for an extension 
of the grant provisions of the original Older Americans Act of 1965, and by increasing the amount 
of authorized funding available to carry out the grant programs which operated under the original 
law. Such increases were necessary, Gardner stated, “to continue the constructive action by all 
levels of government and voluntary organizations that has taken place during the first nineteen 
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months of the program.”57 As Gardner further explained, the funding provided by the legislation had 
made possible a fruitful collaboration between the federal government and local institutions 
throughout the country, and had assisted “the States in their responsibilities to meet and stimulate 
community action.”58 In other words, the legislation was supporting successful community action 
programs, and enjoyed support and cooperation from the local government officials and private 
voluntary organizations that possessed the power to make or break the efficacy of such programs. 
Speaking before the NCSC two weeks later, Gardner reiterated the case he had made before 
Congress for the expansion of the Older Americans Act. In colorful prose, Gardner explained the 
administration’s philosophical approach to the problems of older Americans: 
People love to talk about the good old days when every family “took 
care of its own” aged members. But an honest account of the good old 
days would have to include reference to the number of old folks who, 
in the phrase of the times, went “over the hill to the poorhouse.” It 
would have to include reference to the large number of old people 
who were, in fact, unwilling and unhappy mendicants in their own 
family. In the good old days we had the gift of hypocrisy and we 
could close our eyes to uncomfortable facts.59 
 
Condemning these “good old days,” Gardner argued that “if we’re not going to be hypocritical 
about these things, then we must admit that we still have much to accomplish…we like to think that 
we’ve broken the ancient and universal link between age and poverty, but we haven’t.”60  
It was therefore necessary, Gardner argued, that Social Security and other programs for the 
elderly be improved: “Social Security was designed to be our first line of defense against poverty. 
That line has become shockingly thin…We all know that in spite of social security, one-half of our 
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older people have incomes below or near the poverty line – close to 10 million people.”61 Imploring 
the assembled NCSC members, Gardner plainly stated “we need your involvement and participation 
– at the national level and in every community.”62 Gardner’s words came at an opportune time, and 
helped to build the administration’s case for its agenda by reinserting the issue of elderly poverty 
back into general circulation. Sign of the growing interest in elderly poverty cropped up in 
prominent places: in early June 1967, for example, the New York Times reported that “inflation and 
the failure of pensions to keep pace with rising pay are causing such deterioration in the living 
standards of retired persons that at least half exist below the poverty line.63  
After receiving signals from Capitol Hill that the administration’s proposed Older 
Americans Act Amendments legislation would find minimal opposition, Gardner and the 
administration pressed ahead.64 While not nearly as high-profile as the enactment of Medicare two 
years earlier, the amendments signified the success of the administration’s low-key, incremental 
approach to using the power of the federal government to address economic insecurity in old age. 
Despite the lack of flair, this quiet approach to policy enactment represented “a very major attack on 
the problems of poverty in our older group,” in the words of Wilbur Cohen.65 As Cohen explained 
during a 1967 press briefing, “this package that the President is recommending is the most historical 
since the original [Social Security] law…it is the most significant because it has the effect of taking 
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1.4 million people out of poverty. It is the largest single anti-poverty program that has yet been 
developed.”66  
Cohen’s words suggested that administration had not yet given up on the War on Poverty. 
Rather, it was belatedly taking the advice of liberal critics such as economist Leon Keyserling that it 
was more likely to win both popular backing and congressional approval for social welfare 
legislation that built on successful past track records (i.e., Social Security). That the proposed 
improvements to Social Security did not challenge either local political autonomy or existing 
arrangements of racial power was not overtly stated by Wilbur Cohen or others, but an increasingly 
weary Johnson administration was probably eager to shift the focus of the War on Poverty away 
from OEO and its controversial community action programs that had attracted intense criticism in 
the press and from some local politicians who viewed the agency as an unwelcome interloper. 
By mid-July 1967, Cohen could happily report to Johnson that “we are doing very well” and 
that “Chairman Mills has been most cooperative” with regards to the administration’s pending 
Social Security legislation, which proposed that Social Security benefits be increased by 13% but 
also authorized “a much stronger program to encourage assistance recipients to become independent 
through work and training.”67 Cohen noted that “it will be a big and comprehensive bill,” and 
assured Johnson that “I am confident that it will be a bill you will be very proud of and want to take 
credit for in 1968,” a not so subtle nudge to the president’s still unresolved plans for the 1968 
presidential election.68  
As it turned out, Johnson ended up signing legislation that authorized a 20% rise in Social 
Security benefits, far higher than the 13% figure that Cohen had cited in his earlier report to the 
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President.69 Additionally, Johnson signed the Older Americans Act Amendments in July 1967, thus 
realizing the goal set in motion the previous fall by Joseph Califano. The new amendments 
authorized $43 million in new federal spending (approximately $300 million in 2017 dollars) and 
funded the creation of hundreds of new research, community, and pilot projects throughout the 
nation “to improve the quality of life for their aged [populations].”70 These community projects 
included “the establishment of centers for senior citizens for recreation, education, and counseling 
activities,” that built on the long-established success of such centers in combatting elderly loneliness 
and forging safe, communal spaces for older people in municipalities like New York City.71 
Alongside efforts to improve employment opportunities for older workers as well as 
individuals already in retirement, other proposals circulating within the Johnson administration 
envisioned a further bolstering of the Older Americans Act to launch new initiatives in the areas of 
leisure, education, and community service for older Americans. These proposals, while modest in 
individual funding and size, collectively suggested a new comprehensive federal approach to the 
problems of older Americans that did not view them simply as sickly wards of the state. Rather, the 
new approach shepherded by Califano, Cohen, and Gardner emphasized the potential productivity 
of older Americans as an untapped source of manpower that, if properly utilized, could do a 
tremendous amount of good in communities throughout the nation, regardless of race or socio-
economic background.  
Not content to rest on their laurels after the successful enactment of the 1967 Older 
Americans Act Amendments, administration officials continued to quietly prod the various task 
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forces examining the problems of older Americans to devise proposals for short and long term 
policy solutions that went beyond Social Security and Medicare. The newest administration Task 
Force on Older Americans, for example, was advised that the Johnson’s administration’s primary 
concern “is with the opportunities which are available to retired persons during the 10, 15, or 20 
years of productive life which they have after retirement…this is becoming increasingly important 
as life expectancies increase and retirement ages are lowered.”72 In particular, the Task Force was 
urged to “look at the abilities and disabilities of older persons” as well as the “steps which the 
Federal Government should take to increase the opportunities” available for older persons.73  
Besides lobbying the Task Force, Joseph Califano urged HEW Secretary John W. Gardner to 
begin preparing “a detailed outline of new initiatives which might be proposed in 1968 for Older 
Americans,” and suggested items such as better health care for the elderly, educational programs for 
the elderly, improved health and safety standards in public housing projects for the elderly and 
finally the growth of the underdeveloped Senior Centers program originally created by enactment of 
the Older Americans Act in 1965.74 Other memoranda dispatched by Califano to Gardner urged the 
“development of model systems providing comprehensive social, medical, and rehabilitative 
services for the elderly,” preferably using “existing authorities” rather than by creating new ones.75 
The American Community Services Force  
Increasingly, key Johnson administration officials began in 1967 through 1968 to coalesce 
around a proposed American Community Services Force (ACSF), which, as gerontologist Robert H. 
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Binstock, the chairman of the administration’s 1968 Task Force on Older Americans observed, “will 
emphasize its service function, not its employment function” in the hope that it would not be 
rejected as a kind of degrading dole for older people.76 Binstock argued that “the ACSF not only 
holds more potential for actually helping people, but also is likely to be more politically sounds for 
meeting Great Society goals.”77 In essence, the ACSF was a service program loosely modeled in 
part on the Peace Corps and billed as “an innovative program for providing older persons with a 
genuine opportunity to make constructive contributions to community and national life while 
earning adequate income.”78 The ambitions which the Task Force attached to the proposed ACSF 
were expansive. If all went according to plan, the ACSF would “create a manpower force, 
ultimately comparable in scale and priority to our defense forces that can take its place in American 
life as a basic resource for meeting the critical personnel shortages facing all major human service 
institutions and agencies.”79  
Ultimately, the proposed ACSF would be a “nationwide confederation of community 
programs,” suggesting the Johnson administration’s continuing commitment to a locally based 
efforts to mitigate elderly poverty, albeit in a way that echoed but did not directly use the now 
controversial “community action program” model employed by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity.80 If the goal of achieving a “major improvement in the effectiveness and operations of 
social service provision” was to be met, the ACSF would have to consist of “a new, locally-
incorporate nonprofit organization which would function as a major resource in its community for 
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providing human services,” with those services to be provided by trained and compensated staff.81 
In addition, the “national ACSF would have special mechanisms to ensure participation and 
protection for disadvantaged groups in each community,” with “long-run funding [to] come mostly 
from coordination of resources already available through existing federal grant programs.”82 
Examined as a whole, the proposed ACSF effectively promised to accomplish two 
objectives: first, it would distance the Johnson administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty at 
the local, community-level away from the OEO’s now racially-tinged community action program. 
Secondly, it would indirectly create new employment opportunities for older, unemployed workers 
with otherwise limited options. It did not propose to create jobs via direct hiring by the federal 
government; rather, by using the middleman of “community programs” funded by “existing federal 
grant programs,” it would camouflage such efforts, so as to steer carefully around arousing concerns 
that the ACSF was little more than a dole or unwarranted charity for old people with limited 
capacity to be productive workers. In order to avoid doing so, the ACSF “would give many persons 
who are at the height of their productivity and maturity a dignified opportunity to work side-by-side 
with Americans of all ages and backgrounds, in contributing high-quality, widely-respected, and 
critically-needed public services.”83 What exactly this meant remained undisclosed; it was far more 
important that the program present “dignified opportunities” if it was to be politically viable as 
public backlash to the War on Poverty continued to mount throughout 1967 and 1968. 
While the ACSF’s backers had high aspirations for the proposed program, it actually 
represented a truncated version of a public employment proposal that had been circulating within 
the administration for nearly two years. In late October 1966, administration officials had debated 
whether or not to push for a more aggressive public program designed to provide employment for 
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older workers between the ages of 45 and 64.84 This unnamed and unrealized program would have 
offered full-time employment for 
[a]ll men and women who are heads of households, who have been 
unemployed for long periods (a half year or more) or who are in the 
lowest income farm groups, and who are not enrolled in MDTA 
[Manpower and Development Training Act of 1962] or other remedial 
programs would be offered employment in constructive public 
projects operated by local, state, or federal agencies.85 
 
The estimated cost for the proposed mass public employment of these older workers was 
substantial, with a range of $225 to $700 million annually (1966 dollars), depending on the wage 
rate and the number of people re-employed. Depending on the final cost, the program would have 
potentially represented between four to ten percent of the entire federal budget; for the sake of 
comparison, the U.S. spent approximately $747 million on defense expenditures during the 1966-
1967 fiscal year.86  
Despite the high price tag associated with such a program, there remained a case to be made 
for it: “the principal immediate victims of advancing technology and the shifting occupational 
pattern are the unemployed whose ages range from 45 to 64…they have the least education, the 
fewest skills of a transferrable nature, and they often reside in the regions of least economic 
development potential…for many, a decade or two remain before hope of ‘retirement’ on Social 
Security.” 87  Continuing in the same vein, “the government now has an impressive number of 
economic development, anti-poverty, and manpower development programs, some of which include 
direct public employment of youth and adults,” but “older workers are not benefitting at rates 
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anywhere near their proportionate share of need.”88 If implemented as proposed, the program would 
open up new employment opportunities for both rural and urban workers, and would build on the 
limited success achieved by earlier initiatives to retrain workers which had been carried out under 
the provisions of the Public Works Acceleration Act signed by President Kennedy in 1962.89 
At the same time, the fact that these programs were so disparate and fragmented across 
numerous agencies in the federal government made it much more difficult for them not to get lost in 
the mix. In 1965, the original Older Americans Act had authorized the creation of an Administration 
on Aging (AoA) for precisely this purpose of supervising the federal government’s initiatives, but 
most of the existing Executive Branch departments and agencies seemed far more committed to 
advancing their own programs rather than to surrendering valuable policy turf or limited funds to 
the AoA.90  
There had been a similar pattern of resistance to the creation of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), that some administration officials had questioned the need for, but unlike the 
AoA, the OEO enjoyed the direct support of President Johnson as well as a high-profile, well-
connected leader in Sargent Shriver, the former director of the Peace Corps. AoA, on the other hand, 
was led by William Bechill, a well-meaning social worker and public servant who was largely 
unknown outside of select governmental circles in California, where he had formerly been 
employed in that state’s large public welfare apparatus.91 In addition to being an outsider to national 
politics, Bechill did not enjoy the strong support of organized labor, which had pushed instead for 
Charles Odell or James O’Brien, both of whom had strong links to the AFL-CIO’s leadership. 
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Unlike the attention he gave to the OEO, Johnson appears to have barely paid any attention to the 
AoA; likewise, most of his senior aides frequently seemed to be indifferent or passively hostile to 
the AoA’s very existence. 
Such bureaucratic indifference helped ensure that the AoA’s efforts to impose some sort of 
order or coherence to the federal government’s approach to aging policy would be a thankless task 
for all those involved. The mid-level staff in the well-established Departments of Labor and Health, 
Education, and Welfare – the two departments whose turf was most threatened by the existence of 
the AoA – largely sidelined the AoA in favor of pursuing their own agency plans. No attempt to 
correct this willful construction of administrative silos was made for the first two years of the AoA’s 
existence. The death of Senator Patrick V. McNamara, the main senatorial sponsor of the Older 
Americans Act, in April 1966 accelerated the AoA’s plunge into irrelevancy. Without any powerful 
voice to speak on its behalf, the conversation about old-age poverty and economic insecurity in the 
Johnson administration remained firmly welded to fickle swings of senior-level administrative favor 
or disfavor. 
It was not until after the successful implementation of Medicare in 1966 that the Johnson 
administration turned its attention more fully to investigating how the Older Americans Act could 
be used in a more effective manner to address elderly poverty. Johnson administration officials, 
many of whom were eager to seize an opportunity to demonstrate the Great Society’s commitment 
to older Americans, began to swiftly integrate the AoA into domestic policy initiatives which the 
administration was already pursuing. In short order, its staff members soon found themselves posted 
to various Johnson administration task forces on older Americans, nursing home reform, income 
maintenance, among others.92 In particular, William Bechill, the AoA’s commissioner, was placed 
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on nearly every administration task force that could conceivably recommend policy proposals for 
older Americans, which left him little time to actually administer the AoA and help steer it among 
the rocky shoals of the federal bureaucracy.93 
While the Johnson administration at times seemed to equate the proliferation of presidential 
task forces with concrete policy achievements, by 1967 the administration decided to begin utilizing 
the AoA more fully. As a 1967 confidential executive memo outlined, the Johnson administration 
planned to increase the AoA’s staffing by a third, and to nearly triple its dedicated budgetary 
appropriations by 1970. 94  Such a prediction, of course, assumed that either the Johnson 
administration (or some other similarly-inclined administration) would still be in power by 1970 to 
ensure that the AoA’s funding and staff were increased, but it is still indicative of the way in which, 
by 1967, the Johnson administration had come to embrace an agency which had largely been foisted 
upon it by Congress. Moreover, the executive memo suggested why the AoA was now being 
embraced: namely, the ability to use it to allocate state grants for “community planning, services, 
and training,” activities which might have been performed by the OEO, had that agency not already 
under heavy fire and in growing disrepute among elected officials and the general public. However 
belatedly, the Johnson administration was coming to endorse a method for providing assistance 
which it had tried to avoid when it had launched the War on Poverty three years earlier in 1964. 
Indeed, even as other administration anti-poverty initiatives faltered, the Johnson 
administration’s plans for new programs and initiatives on behalf of older Americans showed no 
signs of slowing down. By September 1967, the administration had identified a list of policy 
priorities for older Americans that it would pursue during the upcoming congressional session. The 
administration opted to push for the expansion of “comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative 
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facilities and services for the aged” as well as a nonspecific “expansion of grant programs under the 
Older Americans Act” as its highest priorities.95 The previously much debated Older Americans 
Community Service program occupied the lowest place on the list of the administration’s priority 
proposals, buried beneath increased federal funds for “university based institutes of gerontology” 
and “elimination of environmental and architectural barriers to the handicapped and elderly.”96  
The administration’s priorities reflected a continuing shift towards local-level programs and 
demonstration projects rather than a grand, unified vision of national programs. The proposed 
“comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative facilities and services for the aged,” for example, 
sought to establish model systems of comprehensive community, social, medical, and rehabilitative 
services for the elderly by “coordinating existing community facilities and services, adding limited 
construction and modest program development where necessary.”97 The administration hoped that 
these model systems would offer a workable solution to the “inadequate” number of facilities and 
services for the aged and chronically ill throughout the country, a situation which it termed “an 
urgent necessity.”98  
By funding the construction of experimental newly enhanced facilities which incorporated 
“innovative approaches to both design of facilities and development of programs,” the Johnson 
administration then hoped to successfully promote these models as “capable of extension to other 
communities.”99 At its heart, this proposal emphasized local government and community efforts at 
the forefront, with the federal government playing a background role as a facilitator to coordinate 
existing community facilities and services without subsuming those roles. Ultimately, the Johnson 
administration hoped that this system of federal-local cooperation and coordination to improve 
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services could be extended nationwide, and would “enable all older Americans to have access to 
facilities and services which will sustain independent living.”100 
Shifting Gears 
This new direction in federal policy suggested that the Johnson administration had, for the 
most part, decided to channel its efforts into low-profile, local-level efforts rather than high-stakes 
and controversial national legislation like Medicare. By quietly funding grant programs under the 
Older Americans Act and other related pieces of legislation, the Johnson administration aimed to 
give the federal government the means to support the growth of a social service infrastructure in 
communities throughout the country, and to thereby build on the existing framework of state and 
local welfare agencies. In the case of programs funded under the provisions of the Older Americans 
Act, the federal government would fund up to 75% of a project’s cost on a continuing basis; as an 
internal administration report noted, “continuing support is necessary since the communities do not 
have sufficient financial resources to maintain these services without assistance” and would help 
achieve “the goal of readily available services for older people at the community level.”101 
At a November 1967 meeting, top Cabinet officials pondered new programs for older 
Americans.102 The meeting had its origins in a highly confidential “eyes only” memorandum that 
Joseph Califano had sent to HEW Secretary John Gardner three months earlier in August 1967, in 
which Califano subtly suggested to Gardner that 
It would be helpful if you would submit…a detailed outline of new 
initiatives which might be proposed in 1968 for Older Americans. 
Consideration should be given to items such as better health care for 
the elderly…educational programs for the elderly…health and safety 
standard in public housing projects for the elderly and in housing 
occupied by public assistance recipients…expansion of the Senior 
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Centers program. Furthermore, you are encouraged to add any other 
proposal which you feel is worthy of consideration.103 
 
In response, Gardner submitted a list of fifteen proposals, with the highest priority placed on 
“comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative facilities and services for the aged,” which an internal 
report summarized as a “specialized CAP [Community Action Program]-type agency similar to that 
proposed under juvenile delinquency bill” on a pilot basis with modest funding from the federal 
government to see if there was sufficient support to sustain it. 104  Additionally, Gardner 
recommended that funding be made available to provide better training to nursing home 
administrators and overall increased support to the Older Americans Act’s grant-making 
program.105 
While none of these recommendations had the broad, dramatic sweep of Medicare or Social 
Security, the administration’s determination to try and rework the community action program 
suggested that it was searching for a way to relaunch and reframe the War on Poverty, and to do so 
in a way that would elicit public support rather than derision and condemnation. As HEW’s senior 
leadership was well-aware, the nation’s facilities and services for the aged and chronically ill were 
“inadequate in number and distribution throughout the country, inadequately staffed where they 
exist, and poorly coordinated.”106 To remedy this situation, the administration therefore proposed 
the establishment “at the local level [of] a coordinating agency which can receive and disburse 
private and public funds from local and State governments and also act as a conduit for Federal 
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funds.” 107  The establishment of this new, local-level coordinating agency would “tie together 
existing community facilities and services, and add necessary elements where lacking.”108  
In other words, the administration seemed to have finally recognized that it would have to 
work with state and local officials if it wanted its reboot of the War on Poverty’s Community Action 
Program to succeed, but the modest amounts of funding (approximately $10 million in 1969 dollars) 
and support (a 3-5 year initially funded lifespan for the agency) allocated to this new initiative 
suggested that the administration had accepted more limited achievements instead of the broad 
abolition of poverty it had sought nearly four years earlier when Johnson had declared an 
“unconditional war against poverty.”109 
At the same time, while the administration may have backed off of its embrace of the War 
on Poverty in order to more fully pursue the Vietnam War, its more limited domestic policy 
ambitions still contained hints of its former and broader ambitions. John Gardner’s 1967 proposal to 
remake the nation’s facilities and services for senior citizens explicitly aspired to “enable all older 
Americans to have access to facilities and services which will sustain independent living; assure that 
each elderly person receives the right care, at the right place, at the right time; provide better and 
more appropriate social, medical, and rehabilitative facilities and services for the elderly; and reduce 
the cost of services to the elderly and the community by the use of appropriate alternatives to 
institutional care.” 110 As Gardner and other Johnson administration officials recognized, “many 
agencies public and private, business and labor, will need to be involved to make the program 
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work,” but that it was a program which only the federal government with its broad national reach 
could tackle with at least a modicum of hope for success.111 
Moreover, such an expansion of federal activity on behalf of older Americans at the local 
level would also finally give a semblance of purpose to the AoA, which had occupied a kind of 
legislative limbo somewhere in between what its congressional sponsors had intended for it and the 
chaotic mess which the Johnson administration had left it in. 112 The breadth of programs and 
agencies involved was formidable, and the administration’s determination to convert the Older 
Americans Act via legislative amendments into a much more significant piece of legislation than it 
had been when it was enacted in 1965 was increasingly obvious.113 
By mid-December 1967, the Johnson administration had assembled its list of legislative and 
budgetary items that it would use to advance its agenda on behalf of older Americans in 1968. 
Gardner’s original list of fifteen items had been narrowed down to five, but still retained key 
proposals to “expand demonstration program especially for nutrition (no means test), transportation 
services, and rehabilitation centers,” with the stipulation that “most of these items should be directed 
toward low income and minority-group elderly.” At the same time, the administration’s more 
cautious instincts were also vividly on display. The same memo identifying the administration’s top 
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five policy priorities for older Americans also cautioned that while the proposals “give expression to 
a Federal-State partnership role which focuses attention on the problems of the elderly,” it was 
understood that such expression was made “without committing us, at this time, to a permanent 
large-scale categorical program of services.”114  
In essence, the administration had decided to take a more experimental approach to the 
problem of old-age poverty by supporting existing state and local level programs as well as a few 
demonstration projects, the latter of which it hoped would renew interest in using the federal 
government’s tools and resources to ameliorate poverty. 115 Behind closed doors, administration 
officials hoped that this limited policy agenda would permit “a general introduction of the idea 
during 1968, for the purpose of orienting that nation to a vision of the future, in which American life 
is characterized by a full scale mobilization of human resources for service to one’s fellow man,” a 
sentiment that remained largely confined to the private memoranda circulated internally among 
Johnson aides.116 
That such sentiments were largely not acted upon reflected both on the limited ambit for 
movement that the administration now possessed, but it also suggested mounting difficulties within 
the administration itself over how best to proceed. The Bureau of the Budget, in particular, was 
increasingly pugnacious in its confrontations with HEW and other departments over how to 
alleviate poverty among older Americans. In a confidential memo to James Gaither, a Special 
Assistant to President Johnson, Irving Lewis of the Bureau of the Budget bluntly stated that  
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[w]e recommend against most of the specific HEW legislative 
proposals for 1968. In essence, they would add up to an 
Administration commitment to a permanent categorical program of 
services for the elderly. Such a program is not needed and could be a 
budgetary nightmare. The Administration should be stimulating and 
promoting the development and expansion of programs by public and 
private agencies – providing “glue” money through HEW – not 
proliferating new grant programs…We recommend instead a more 
tightly targeted program with two objectives.”117 
 
Lewis argued that the Administration would be most likely to succeed if it “strengthen[ed] the 
ability of State agencies on aging” with enhanced funding that would permit them to “survey and 
plan comprehensively and continuously for the needs of the elderly, utilizing ‘glue’ money from 
HEW to plug gaps in existing efforts and demonstrate new approaches” and to “give programs for 
older Americans an opportunity to become better established in local communities” by extending 
the lifespan of subsidizing grants made to such programs under the provisions of the Older 
Americans Act.118  
In other words, the Bureau was recommending that the administration permanently back 
away from the more aggressive proposals made by Gardner and others to expand the direct role of 
the federal government in addressing the needs of the elderly poor. Instead, the Bureau was urging 
that the federal government buttress its indirect role by supporting existing state, local, and private 
agencies concerned with the problems of the elderly poor. In the Bureau’s view, such an approach 
would allow the federal government to avoid duplicating and possibly rendering redundant the 
efforts of state, local, and private agencies, and would also leave the federal government with a freer 
hand to decrease or withdraw from this policy area as needed. 
Ultimately, the infighting between the Bureau, HEW, and the Department of Labor over the 
administration’s priorities delayed the kind of broad, sweeping action that John Gardner and Joseph 
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Califano had hoped for. One by one, HEW’s recommendations – whether they were for a 
comprehensive senior community service program, comprehensive work centers for older people, or 
sponsoring the construction of multi-purpose senior centers – met with the same unforgiving 
response by the Bureau: “we oppose.”119 The Bureau could not be dislodged from its insistent and 
oft-repeated position that the broad initiatives proposed by other executive branch agencies would 
commit the administration to “another permanent categorical grant program of vague and unformed 
purpose and content,” which the Bureau feared would not pass muster in an increasingly skeptical 
Congress.120 
Despite the Bureau’s opposition, Wilbur Cohen, who had replaced John Gardner as 
Secretary of HEW in early 1968, was determined to press forward with his list of proposed actions 
that the administration could take. In order to do so, Cohen turned to the recommendations made by 
the administration’s Task Force on Older Americans.121 As originally proposed, the main objective 
of the Task Force was, in Joseph Califano’s words, to “take a look at ‘second career’ opportunities 
for retired persons during the 10, 15, or 20 years of productive life after retirement.” 122 
Consequently, the Task Force’s main recommendations emphasized expanding employment 
opportunities to retired persons as well as stronger action to address the income needs of older 
Americans.123 Specifically, the Task Force recommended that the Johnson administration press for a 
“federal retirement supplement to guarantee a minimum annual income” as well as stronger 
regulation of private pensions and “expanded training programs for older workers.”124 
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In early October 1968, after exchanging correspondence with Califano, Cohen had readied 
his list of new initiatives to assist older Americans.125 As Cohen wrote in one of his memos to 
Califano, the main priorities were to strengthen Social Security and Medicare. “The most far-
reaching and significant proposals are those made with respect to improvement of the Social 
Security cash benefit program and Medicare,” Cohen wrote, though he also added that “one of our 
national goals for older people should be the building of a national network of opportunities and 
services to enhance their participation in community life.”126 In order to build this network, Cohen 
argued that the administration continue availing itself of the recently strengthened Older Americans 
Act.  
Continuing in that vein, Cohen proposed a “Bill of Rights for Older Americans” that offered 
up a grand vision of the federal government using its vast resources to nearly singlehandedly resolve 
the problems facing older Americans, ranging from providing adequate retirement income and 
extending Medicare to cover the cost of prescription drugs to improving housing programs and 
employment opportunities for older Americans. Many of these proposals had been debated within 
the various parts of the Johnson administration for years. Cohen’s proposal therefore represented the 
latest attempt to tie them together as a comprehensive plan. Strikingly, the assembled items were 
projected to cost the federal government at best a marginal amount of money, with some prominent 
exceptions such as raising Social Security benefits and expanding Medicare’s range. The costs for 
those two items, though, were considerable. Expanding Medicare to include prescription drugs 
would cost the federal government an additional $300 million per year (1968 dollars), and raising 
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Social Security’s benefits level would require raising payroll taxes or taking money from elsewhere 
in the federal government, neither of which were particularly attractive options.127 
 Aside from Social Security and Medicare, though, Cohen pressed for a dramatic expansion 
of the Older Americans Act. Observing that during the past three years the federal government had 
already begun funding over eight hundred local programs in communities scattered throughout the 
nation, Cohen argued that significant increases to the Older Americans Act would “enable States 
and communities to improve and expand projects in such areas as community planning, senior 
centers, homemaker services, special transportation services, recreation and leisure time, in-service 
training, and counseling services,” – essentially, a wish list of local, anti-poverty programs. 128 
Cohen pegged the proposed amount to be expended to fund such increases at a range between $37 
and $50 million (1968 dollars), a significant sum but one that still stood at roughly one-tenth of the 
amount proposed for expanding Medicare. 
 Taken together, Cohen’s proposals embraced a vision of vigorous, activist government 
working on behalf of the nation’s elderly, and providing them with opportunities to contribute to 
society which dwarfed the possibilities on offer by private voluntary organizations as well as state 
and local governments. For Cohen, the elderly were not merely sickly pensioners; rather, they had 
the potential to be a vast reservoir of manpower that the nation could call upon to help solve other 
pressing social problems. For example, Cohen envisioned a dramatic enlargement of the Foster 
Grandparents Program, a hitherto small program which matched isolated, elderly people with 
abandoned or neglected children in hospitals, orphanages, and other institutions. Cohen proposed 
that the Foster Grandparents program be subsumed under the “Service Roles in Retirement” 
program first established by the Older Americans Act three years earlier. As he wrote in a memo to 
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Joseph Califano, “there is substantial evidence that large numbers of older people living in 
retirement are capable and interested in contributing their skills and services to various areas of 
community betterment and services,” and, ideally, the Service Roles in Retirement program would 
“meet the tremendous needs that exist in this area.” 129  In other words, enlarging the Older 
Americans Act with an expanded Service Roles in Retirement program would create a virtuous 
cycle in which retired, older people would assist at-risk younger people under the benevolent 
leadership of the federal government as well as other public and private welfare agencies. 
 Even as Cohen was making his case to Califano for a broad, sweeping use of federal power 
on behalf of older Americans, other voices within the administration were registering their dissent 
over some of the more far-reaching reforms which Cohen and others had proposed for years. 
Internal reviews of Cohen’s list of proposals suggested that it would face strong headwinds from the 
Bureau of the Budget. The proposed increases in Social Security benefits were considered to be 
“relatively harmless,” but other initiatives, such as HEW’s proposal to require individual states to 
establish and maintain health and safety standards for rental housing occupied by recipients of 
Social Security’s Old Age Assistance program were rejected because of the “impossibility of 
enforcing such standards.”130 Major proposals such as expanding Medicare to include prescription 
drug coverage were ruled out as too expensive or too inefficient; placing older workers in 
manpower training programs received particular censure as “administratively inefficient,” possibly 
to the point of undermining the effectiveness of the federal government’s entire manpower training 
program system.131 Expanding the Older Americans Act, even in a manner more limited than the 
one prescribed by Cohen, was placed as a “lower priority” than improving Social Security, partly 
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because some of the suggested improvements to the Older Americans Act like constructing senior 
citizen centers as part of the Model Cities program would likely bring additional, undesirable 
criticism of the Model Cities program.132 
 In sum, the Johnson administration’s efforts ultimately reinforced both existing programs 
like Social Security, while also opening up new avenues in how the federal government engaged 
with the issue of elderly poverty. Earlier, the federal government’s efforts had been limited largely 
to economic security for older people, with the fight over Social Security’s old age insurance versus 
its old age assistance program occupying much of the time and energy of federal policymakers 
between 1935 and 1965. After 1965, the federal government’s purview broadened considerably to 
include health security programs like Medicare and Medicaid but also initiatives that had been 
pioneered at the local and state level, such as legislation to ban discrimination on the basis of age in 
the workplace and increased federal funding for affordable housing, community health centers, and 
other antipoverty initiatives.  
 As a result of the Johnson administration’s efforts, the working relationships forged between 
federal, state, and local welfare officials working on issues related to older Americans were greatly 
strengthened, as were the linkages between government, academia, and private social welfare 
organizations. The senior state, which had existed in an uneven and loosely organized form before 
the 1960s would become more formally structured, as the federal government began to fund and 
administer social services, rehabilitative programs, and other services that it had previously not 
played a significant role in before. The senior state thereby came to embrace not just economic 
security but also other types of security for older people which would have been unlikely just a 
decade beforehand. After the end of the Johnson administration in January 1969, the Nixon 
administration – not infrequently at the behest of congressional Democrats – would build upon and 
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reinforce the federal government’s commitments in this new arena, even as it began the process of 
rolling back other facets of the public welfare state and the War on Poverty’s community action 
program.  
From Johnson to Nixon 
 While largely disdainful of the War on Poverty’s efforts to ameliorate poverty among 
African-Americans, the Nixon administration showed itself quite willing to accommodate and 
expand upon the Great Society’s efforts to reduce poverty among older, whiter Americans. 133 
Notably, Nixon had on the campaign trail in 1968 included older Americans as part of “an entire 
generation of forgotten Americans.”134 While such rhetoric represented an attempt on Nixon’s part 
to capture the ideological language that Franklin Roosevelt and other political liberals had once 
placed at the center of the New Deal’s promise of collective economic security, there was 
considerable evidence available to support Nixon’s claim. The enactment of Medicare in 1965 
militated against claims that older Americans had been “forgotten” by the rest of American society, 
but the incomplete record of the Johnson administration on issues related to strengthening economic 
security for older Americans meant that there remained much work still to be done.135 As William 
Oriol, the Staff Director for the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, observed at a 1970 
academic conference of gerontologists, “Americans have not yet fully decided what they think life 
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should be like for our aging and aged population” and asked “what do we really want for our aged 
and aging population, now and in the future?”136 Data from the newly-released 1970 Census lent 
statistical credence to Oriol’s observation about the improved but still fragile social and economic 
condition of many of the nation’s older citizens. The 1970 Census found that the proportion of the 
elderly had reached 9.9% of the overall U.S. population (up from 8.1% in 1950 and 9.2% in 1960) 
and that the number of elderly people numbered well over 20,000,000.137 At the same time, 1970 
Census’s data also vividly displayed how the overall economic status of the elderly had improved 
between 1960 and 1970: by 1970, 33% of all older women were living alone and still maintaining 
economically independent households; in 1960, that proportion had stood at only 25% (the number 
of elderly men in a comparable position had only slightly improved from 13% in 1960 to 16% in 
1970).138 
However, before the release of the Census’s report, there remained clear evidence that the 
problem of poverty and economic insecurity in old age remained far from solved.139 As the New 
York Times reported in June 1969, nearly half a million elderly residents of New York City still 
lived below the poverty line, and city welfare officials were increasingly concerned about the 
emergence of “senior power groups” that had already begun to wring increased benefits such as 
“half fare for the elderly on the city transit system” from New York’s Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority.140 Such rumblings were matched elsewhere in cities like Chicago, San Francisco, and 
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Boston, where local officials were becoming increasingly cognizant of “senior power” groups’ 
ability to persuade and petition for improvements to publicly provided services (including 
discounted access to public transportation).141  
Unlike during the Great Depression, when the combination of unemployment and 
catastrophic failure of many banks (and consequently the loss of personal savings) had helped 
radicalize older Americans and propel them into organizations like the Townsend Movement, in the 
late 1960s, rising inflation and eroding personal purchasing power had led many retired people to 
become significantly more politically active and organized than they previously had been.142 With 
only limited access to the labor market, older people organized in order to exert pressure on elected 
officials to find ways to reduce their costs of living, whether via access to subsidized public 
transportation, recreation, nutrition, or tax relief.143 It was no coincidence that Margaret Kuhn’s 
Gray Panthers organization was founded in 1970, or that in New York State alone, some 500 cities, 
towns, and villages (including New York City) adopted laws reducing property tax laws for the 
elderly in the five year period from 1965 to 1970.144 
The grassroots efforts by older Americans to demand improved government services stood 
in stark contrast to the continuing confusion, duplication, and incoherence which seemed to mark 
federal programs and initiatives. The high hopes during the Great Society that the Older Americans 
Act might one day serve as a centerpiece for a truly comprehensive federal effort to assist older 
Americans increasingly were not fulfilled. As New York Senator Charles E. Goodell would admit 
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during a 1970 meeting with some of his older constituents, all the expenditures authorized by 
Congress under the Older Americans Act in 1965 through 1970 would have been sufficient to 
finance the cost of the Vietnam War for less than two days.145  
Further evidence of the relative paltriness of federal efforts emerged during a series of 
hearings convened by Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey in October 1969, which revealed 
that there was a “worsening retirement income crisis” in the United States because of a lack of 
“positive comprehensive action” on the part of lawmakers in Washington and elsewhere. 146 
Testifying before the committee, Jack Ossofsky, the Project Director for Project FIND and the 
Deputy Director for the National Council on the Aging, observed that “almost two-thirds of the 
elderly couples” which Project FIND had identified “fell below the 1966 Social Security 
Administration poverty index level…what we have found indicates that many older poor people live 
below the poverty line and, secondly, that with increasing age there is a decrease in the income 
available to the people involved.”147 Other speakers at the same Senate hearings expressed their 
agreement with Ossofsky and Project FIND’s conclusions. Speaking on behalf of retired auto 
workers in Detroit, Olga Madar, a UAW executive board member, bluntly told the committee that 
“we cannot do a darn thing until we get a basic annual income for all people and let’s start with the 
group that has been hurt the most, as Project FIND has found out, and let’s start with the seniors.”148 
Echoing Madar, Beverly Diamond, a social welfare consultant in New York, identified the source of 
the problem as a lack of clearly defined policy at the national level: 
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The compelling fact is that we lack an over-all, consistent approach, a 
comprehensive plan, a national commitment to implement it. We have 
no established priorities to tackle the most critical needs, no realistic 
appropriations, no orderly steps to assure effectiveness and continuity. 
Instead we have spastic response by the [federal] Government to 
pressure, piece-meal approaches, too little, reaching too few. These 
sporadic responses to crisis, at best result in tokenism, at worst, in 
waste.149 
 
Despite the significant limits to federal assistance for the aging which the 1969 U.S. Senate 
hearings had exposed, public perception of the status of the elderly had markedly improved with the 
passage of Medicare and other legislation designed to buttress the economic security of older 
people. In a sign of just how much the rhetoric used to describe older Americans had changed since 
the Great Depression, the 1970 Census’s report on them described them in upbeat tones as “a vast 
untapped natural resource” and pondered “how we use this vast potential is one of the great 
questions facing American society in the remaining decades of the 20th century.”150 
The situation in 1969 was therefore a mixed one. The economic security of millions of older, 
middle-class Americans had undoubtedly improved thanks to the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid, and the increase in Social Security benefit levels put into place during the last two years 
of the Johnson administration had healed some of the wounds that inflationary spending had 
inflicted. At the same time, millions of poorer older Americans – especially those living in decaying 
inner cities and rural communities – remained at or below the official poverty line. Given both the 
growing proportion of older Americans relative to the size of the general population, it is hard to say 
whether the incoming Nixon administration’s efforts were primarily guided by political calculations 
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or by genuine concern for older Americans; in all likelihood a combination of the two factors was 
responsible. As Joshua Freeman has written, 
Nixon entered the White House without much of a mandate, having 
been elected with a minority of the popular vote after a campaign in 
which he largely mouthed generalities…Nixon hoped to win over 
some traditionally Democratic constituencies to ensure his reelection 
and rebuild the Republicans as a national majority party. To woo 
them, he supported the core New Deal economic and social programs 
from which they benefitted, even as he took conservative positions on 
other issues.151 
 
Nixon’s efforts to woo older Americans by showering attention and money on them were 
readily apparent in his repeated messages to Congress demanding more legislative action on their 
behalf.152 While Nixon was not known for his deep interest in domestic policy – like his predecessor 
John F. Kennedy, he was primarily concerned with foreign policy – his domestic policy legacy for 
older Americans was quite enviable in light of developments in later years.153 As Joshua Freeman 
has pointed out, 
During Nixon’s first term, Social Security old-age benefits went up 52 
percent, with future benefits indexed to the cost of living, a huge 
structural change. The federal government also took over from the 
states supplementary, needs-based income guarantees for the elderly, 
blind, and disabled. Elderly Americans, who once made up a major 
component of the poor, all but ceased living in poverty.154 
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Despite the President’s rhetoric during the 1968 campaign criticizing the Great Society for 
excessive spending and misplaced priorities, the Nixon administration would retain and bolster the 
strong working relationship that the Johnson administration had helped to build with the voluntary 
sector and individual state welfare agencies in the realm of aging policy.155 
The Nixon Administration and Older Americans 
 Nixon’s embrace of this issue owed much to the personnel whom he had installed to 
administer and supervise federal policies for older people. Primarily, he turned to several surviving 
veterans of the Eisenhower administration to organize and execute a domestic policy agenda 
designed to appeal to the hearts and votes of older Americans, and to do so in a way that would 
quell concerns about overt partisanship on the part of the administration.156 To this end, he invited 
Bertha Adkins, a former HEW Under-Secretary, and Arthur Flemming, a former HEW Secretary, to 
take up posts within the administration, as well as other former members of the Eisenhower 
administration.157  This coterie of moderate, centrist Republicans thereafter held the vital levers of 
power, with Nixon largely content to defer to them. Adkins, in particular, proved to be a diligent 
and valuable foot soldier. In 1969, Nixon appointed her to a newly-created Presidential Task Force 
on the Aging, and charged the Task Force with the overall responsibility of “determin[ing] how best 
to achieve for the elderly maximum security, dignity, and independence” by “apprais[ing] the 
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effectiveness of present programs affecting the aging” and finally “suggest[ing] how such programs 
might be improved.”158  
Nixon’s creation of a new Task Force on Aging within his administration seemed peculiar 
given the fact that the Johnson administration had sponsored a similar task force only a few years 
prior, and the recommendations and findings of those task forces had only been partially 
implemented. It became apparent over time that while Nixon was largely content to sign off on 
continued improvements to the programs for the elderly which the Johnson administration had 
initiated, he also desired to put his own stamp on them, and thereby earn some measure of credit 
from older voters.159 The reason for the new task force came therefore less from deep intellectual 
engagement than from the need not to be caught flatfooted by either congressional Democrats or 
watchful national old age advocacy groups, both of whom closely monitored the administration’s 
actions. Democrats in Congress, in particular, were especially eager to take a leading role in 
determining the course of federal policy on this subject, just as they had ten years prior in prodding 
the Eisenhower administration to take action on the question of health insurance for the elderly. In 
March 1969, the U.S. Senate’s Special Committee on Aging had released a lengthy report that had 
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thoroughly lambasted the inadequacy of the federal government’s efforts for older Americans, and 
which proposed a wide range of initiatives to more thoroughly address the issue.160  
In response, the Nixon-appointed Task Force conceded that “the [federal] government 
should act with and on behalf of the elderly much more vigorously than it currently does,”161 but 
instead of endorsing the programs desired by Senate Democrats, the Task Force offered twenty-four 
recommendations in a broad range of areas, starting with the urgent need to reorganize and 
coordinate the federal government’s activities, and dutifully presented its report to President Nixon 
in February 1970. The Task Force’s Report clearly echoed the President’s campaign rhetoric and 
labeled elderly Americans as “the silent majority” that risked being overlooked in the rising student 
and youth discontent which had arisen over the Vietnam War, and emphasized the need for the 
administration to improve its solicitation of the needs of older Americans.162 
In addition to the Task Force’s efforts, the administration began undertaking the necessary 
planning for a second White House Conference on Aging, which it scheduled to be held in 1971, ten 
years after the first one that had convened in the last days of the Eisenhower administration. Like its 
1961 predecessor, the 1971 White House Conference on Aging brought together an enormous cross-
section of experts, elected officials, and private citizens to prepare and propose policy 
recommendations for the administration. 163 Administration officials like HEW Secretary Arthur 
Flemming hoped and believed that the conference would allow the federal government to 
fundamentally reorganize and rationalize its increasingly fragmented and incoherent approach to 
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1971 White House Conference on Aging,” n.d., 1971/1972 Kirkpatrick Memorial Conference proceedings, Ball State 
University, Muncie, Indiana (source URL: http://libx.bsu.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/KPatrickMem/id/1588). 
 378 
 
dealing with the problems of older Americans. As a confidential list of talking point questions 
prepared by the Administration on Aging for use in conjunction with congressional hearings stated,  
We hope [that] the White House Conference will give us 
recommendations or proposals from which we can formulate a broad, 
comprehensive, systematic policy or set of policies with respect to the 
older population…What we mean by Toward a National Policy on 
Aging, then, is the identification of the elements from which we may 
develop comprehensive, explicit policies as to how American society 
should adapt itself to the presence of larger and larger numbers of 
retired people living into advanced years.164 
 
Yet for all the publicity the administration tried to generate in the press, the conference 
ultimately seemed to be much ado about nothing, despite high hopes that it might produce some 
important breakthrough, much as the 1961 conference had helped galvanize support for 
Medicare.165 Specifically, the 1971 conference organizers hoped that it would allow the federal 
government to “pinpoint more realistically and comprehensively the actions needed to solve these 
problems [of the aged] and to move toward the development of an achievable national policy on 
aging,” a high-minded goal which had eluded the federal government for nearly forty years.166  
President Nixon, in his remarks to the assembled conference delegates, made publicly 
known his wish that the conference endorse H.R. 1, the administration’s controversial bill designed 
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to transform the nation’s welfare system by moving towards a universal basic income and away 
from the patchwork system of categorical federal aid programs which had accumulated since the 
New Deal.167 H.R. 1 was not originally intended to primarily benefit older Americans, but it did 
offer important reforms like making Social Security benefits inflation-proof and raising the amount 
of annual income that Social Security recipients were permitted to earn without risking a 
commensurate reduction in their existing benefit payments.  
In the end, though, the 1971 White House Conference failed to achieve the lofty goals of its 
organizers. While it was followed by some increased funding to the Administration on Aging as 
well as other Executive Branch agencies with programs designed to help the elderly (such as the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Housing and Urban Development), it was not 
clear if this increase was a result of the conference or if the administration was simply planning on 
making such increases anyway as the 1972 presidential election year approached. 
Even if the conference did not produce much in the way of tangible results, it did reinforce 
the existing federal and state relationship in combatting the economic insecurity faced by many 
older Americans. As Ray Swartz, a Nixon administration official who was involved in the 
conference’s planning later recalled, the 1972 conference had once more reaffirmed the primacy of 
state and local governments in actually dealing with the issue of old age poverty.168 The Nixon 
administration had placed great emphasis on the need to devolve power from a supposedly out-of-
control federal government back to the states, and the conference turned out to be an excellent 
forum to showcase this objective.  
Swartz further recalled that “the government views the conference process as the community 
being the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end of conference activity…therefore, the 
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thrust of programs now being planned and getting under way, whether they are out of the 
Administration on Aging … or some other federal program, is at the community level.”169 While 
some administration officials (in particular, Arthur Flemming and Bertha Adkins) had hoped that 
the conference would lead to a “real philosophy of aging” or a “real national policy [on aging],” the 
conference ended up reinforcing state and local level plans and policies as the best way to address 
the tremendously varied needs of older Americans – in essence, that there could not be a “one size 
fits all” national solution to the economic, social, and psychological needs of the elderly 
population.170 
To some extent, this failure to find a new or more coherent way to shape old age policy in 
the United States represented a crucial missed opportunity to break free from the cage of categorical 
assistance to which old age policy at the federal level was increasingly relegated. Rather than being 
linked to broader attempts to reinsert it as part of a broader program to provide economic security to 
the entire American family, the 1971 White House conference reinforced existing, fragmented 
efforts that frequently duplicated each other. As John B. Martin, then serving as the head of the 
Administration on Aging observed, old age policy had been limited to a kind of “crash survival 
program” focused largely on immediate concerns. Instead, Martin believed that what was really 
needed was “clear, specific, long- and short-range goals and a program for reaching these goals,” a 
set of objectives that the conference had spectacularly failed to produce.171 
The Failure of FAP and the Politics of Old-Age Economic Security 
The Nixon administration’s growing focus on older Americans during this time period came 
in the wake of its failure to secure the enactment of its proposed Family Assistance Program (FAP) 
          
169 Ibid,, 39. 
170 John B. Martin, United States Commissioner on Aging, “The 1971 White House Conference on Aging,” n.d., 26-27. 
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in 1969.172 As proposed, FAP was a broad, sweeping reform of the unwieldly accumulation of 
federal social welfare programs that the Nixon administration had inherited from its collective 
predecessors. Briefly summarized, FAP promised to remake such programs in a way that hewed 
much closer to the guaranteed annual income model which liberal economists like Leon Keyserling 
had advocated during the Great Society’s heyday, and in order to do so, it proposed to scrapping 
“categorical” aid programs and implement a “universal income supplement program financed and 
administered by the Federal government, making payments based on income needs to all members 
of the population.”173 Effectively, “needs-based” assistance programs like the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) would no longer be subject to means testing, and would be merged 
with other assistance programs like Social Security’s Old Age Assistance program, whose levels of 
assistance had by the 1970s become highly variable due to the ability of states to determine how 
much they wished to contribute to such payments. Respecting the popularity of Social Security’s 
old-age social insurance system, the Nixon administration pledged to leave it untouched by the 
proposed FAP legislation.174 
Despite President Nixon’s rhetoric on the subject of welfare programs, his administration 
unexpectedly embraced these proposed reforms of the nation’s income maintenance programs. 
Nixon’s unconventional embrace of FAP came as a surprise to his political allies and opponents, 
most of whom greeted the proposal with tepid support at best. 175  However, while the Nixon 
administration explored the problems facing elderly people, it did so in part because of 
governmental competition from the U.S. Senate’s Special Committee on the Problems of the Aging. 
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Founded in the late 1950s by Senator Patrick McNamara, the committee had been 
responsible for dramatically focusing the nation’s attention on the rising medical costs and increased 
poverty among older people in the years immediately before the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965.176 The Committee had also emerged as a crucial meeting point between senators 
and emissaries from local and state governments, as well as voluntary organizations like the AARP, 
and its hearings had frequently helped to identify and propose legislation to address the issues faced 
by older Americans. By the late 1960s, the committee remained firmly in the hands of congressional 
Democrats, many of whom were openly suspicious of the Nixon administration’s motives for 
embracing domestic policy initiatives like old age assistance that had hitherto been the heart and 
hearth of the Democratic Party.177  
In order to ensure that the Nixon administration would not be able to steal its thunder, the 
committee began to produce numerous reports documenting the federal government’s shortcomings 
in the area of old-age policy, and frequently used these reports to publicly castigate the Nixon 
administration’s efforts, much as it had during the 1960s to highlight the meager efforts of Sargent 
Shriver’s Office of Economic Opportunity to address elderly poverty.178 Senator Russell Long (D-
LA), in particular, emerged as one of the Nixon administration’s harshest critics, and repeatedly 
railed against the administration’s proposed guaranteed annual income program throughout 1971.179 
Long, now the powerful chairman of the Senate’s Finance Committee, condemned the proposals as 
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leading to “a permanent welfare subculture,” and vowed to do everything he could to prevent its 
enactment.180  
Long proved to be good to his word. In November 1971, he publicly declared that “elderly 
Americans could already be enjoying increased Social Security benefits if it were not for the ‘ill-
advised welfare expansion proposed by the President.’”181 Long’s colleagues on the Senate Finance 
Committee followed his lead. Senator Wallace Bennett (R-UT) addressed the conference as well, 
and pointedly noted in his statement that “Senator Long and I – indeed, the full [Senate Finance] 
committee – share a common desire to establish reasonable minimum income levels for the aged, 
blind, and disabled under welfare and for those dependent upon Social Security.”182 In other words, 
both Long and Bennett had re-emphasized their support for public assistance, but only along 
categorical lines. Their endorsement of aid to the elderly and other groups therefore rejected the 
guaranteed, universal approach which FAP had proposed. 
At first, the Nixon administration refused to back down. In March 1972, Nixon sent a 
lengthy message to Congress asking for significantly improved funding for federal programs to help 
the elderly, and reaffirmed his support for the controversial welfare reforms which both Senators 
Long and Bennett had rejected the previous fall.183 In his message, the President sent a lengthy list 
of recommendations, many of which derived from either the administration’s Task Force on older 
Americans or the 1971 White House Conference on Aging. Notably, Nixon identified numerous 
legislative initiatives included in his message as deserving of the “highest priority on this year’s 
Congressional agenda” because “it is the elderly who have the best reason to be impatient” rather 
than what he derided as “the impatience of youth,” a reference perhaps to the student anti-war 
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movement.184 Nixon urged the Congress to “stop treating older Americans as a burden and to start 
treating them as a resource,” and argued instead for the need to “fight the many forces which can 
cause older persons to feel dependent or isolated” and to “provide…continuing opportunities for 
them to be self-reliant and involved.”185  
Perhaps more surprisingly, Nixon urged Congress to significantly increase Social Security 
benefits, make the program inflation proof, and to “establish a floor under the income of older 
Americans for the first time.”186 In fact, Nixon identified the protection of the “income position of 
older Americans” as his highest priority, and alongside his proposed expansion of Social Security, 
he embraced even further “the role played by private pension plans,” which he argued should 
receive “tax deductions to encourage their expansion, requiring the vesting of pensions, and 
protecting the investments which have been made in these funds.” 187  Had this measure been 
submitted by the Johnson administration instead, scarcely a word of it would have needed to be 
changed.188  
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The striking similarity of the approach taken by the Johnson and then Nixon administrations 
on the issue of old age economic security suggested just how deeply the bipartisan consensus on the 
parameters of the senior state had become, despite periodic attempts by administrations on both 
sides of the aisle to reform its chaotic development and lack of coordination. Increasingly, it seemed 
as though a tacit acceptance of the fragmented character of the senior state had emerged as the 
defining consensus of the federal government’s efforts to address old age poverty, with a decided 
emphasis on sending the issue back to the states and local communities if at all possible.  
In the end, Nixon got only part of what he had originally asked for in his message to 
Congress. In July 1972, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted to expand and 
extend the 1965 Older Americans Act, and flooded the long-beleaguered law with $1.5 billion in 
appropriations, a sum that easily dwarfed anything it had previously received, even during the 
heyday of the Great Society.189 The Senate followed suit in October 1972, voting unanimously to 
approve the House’s dramatic monetary improvements to the Older Americans Act, and Nixon 
signed the final legislation in late October 1972, right before Election Day.190 
Nevertheless, the legislation Nixon signed bore little relation to the far-reaching reforms 
originally proposed under the aegis of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP).191 In place of FAP, Nixon 
signed an omnibus piece of legislation that reinforced Social Security and Medicare and also created 
a new program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI).192  While Nixon expressed his “great 
pleasure” in signing the significantly modified H.R. 1 bill that the Senate had sent back to him, in 
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truth, the new legislation consisted mostly of halfway measures that had been debated for years.193 It 
did create a basic income program, but that program was strictly limited to selected categories of 
recipients. Furthermore, while SSI was designed to replace and equalize state-level programs of aid 
to the aged, blind, and disabled, it was paid for out of general tax revenues rather than Social 
Security’s trust funds, a violation of the social insurance model that the original architects of Social 
Security had so strenuously favored as a way to win lasting popular support and acceptance.194 
In its own strange way, though, the SSI program fulfilled long-standing calls for expanded 
action by the federal government to assist older Americans. Extending back to the first days of the 
Nixon administration – and further still, into the heyday of the Great Society – an emergent 
consensus had held that both the voluntary and governmental sectors were necessary to alleviate the 
problems of older Americans, but that the federal government was not pulling its weight.195 In the 
aftermath of the highly politicized and racially charged controversy surrounding the War on 
Poverty’s focus on minority youth unemployment in America’s cities, the Nixon administration 
recognized that the political ground had shifted more strongly in favor of using the federal 
government’s resources to benefit older, white citizens rather than younger, black ones.196 President 
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Nixon had alluded to this shift in his opening remarks to the 1971 White House Conference on 
Aging, when he had noted that  
[i]n recent years all of us know a gulf has been opening between older 
Americans and the rest of our people. This gulf is the product of a 
great social revolution which has weakened the traditional bonds of 
family, neighborhood, and community. For millions of older 
Americans, the result has been a growing sense of isolation and 
insecurity. We have to change that.197 
 
While promoting intergenerational connection was not the highest domestic priority for the 
Nixon administration, Nixon and conservative southern Democrats like Russell Long could find 
common ground on the subject of using the federal government’s resources to reduce poverty 
among older Americans. Despite his emergence as a stalwart critic of the nation’s public welfare 
system, Long, like many other southerners on Capitol Hill, had long favored improvements to 
Social Security’s old age assistance program because it effectively subsidized the meager monthly 
payments made by many poorer southern and western states to older people using the federal 
government’s general tax revenues. 198  As the powerful chairman of the Senate’s Finance 
Committee, Long could not be easily disregarded by the Nixon administration, which he had 
frequently lambasted as being too willing to support the expansion of welfare for comparatively 
unworthy recipients. 
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By contrast, expanding Social Security’s old age assistance program once more presented 
the administration with a proposal that was likely to win the support of Senator Long and his like-
minded colleagues in Congress. Nixon’s own Task Force on the Aging had endorsed the principle 
that “restructuring and refinancing Old Age Assistance is imperative” and had only endorsed “the 
Family Assistance Act as it applies to the elderly,” a careful qualifier that revealed how the issue of 
elderly poverty remained divorced and separate from broader discussions of poverty and welfare in 
the United States.199  
In further defiance of the Nixon administration, the Senate authorized additional spending 
under the Older Americans Act in February 1973, thus daring Nixon to again veto a piece of 
legislation that was both badly needed and sure to provoke significant popular discontent against the 
administration should the President refuse to sign it into law. When Nixon had previously vetoed the 
additional funds for the Older Americans Act, he had done so on the grounds that “the range of 
narrow, categorical service programs” like the Older Americans Act “would seriously interfere with 
our efforts to develop coordinated services for older persons.”200 Ultimately, the administration 
would successfully pare back Congress’s proposed February 1973 bill to $551.6 million in 
expenditures for programs under the Older Americans Act, rather than the $2 billion which 
Congress had originally sought, before Nixon signed the bill into law.201 
Gray Panthers and Senior Power 
Despite the administration’s legislative victory over Congress, the nascent “senior power” 
movement that had had its first, unorganized stirrings in major cities like New York and 
Philadelphia were now being harnessed by established old-age advocacy groups to advance a more 
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ambitious agenda. In June 1973, approximately 3,000 elderly citizens, “many wearing oversized 
‘Senior Power’ buttons” gathered on the steps of the Capitol building to “petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”202 Nelson Cruikshank, now the president of the National Council of 
Senior Citizens, had helped to organize the dramatic display of disgruntled senior citizens, who, like 
a previous generation of older activists during the fight over Medicare in the early 1960s, proceeded 
to roam the halls of Congress to cajole anyone who happened to be in their offices that day. 
Cruikshank had organized the rally because he believed that the Nixon administration had largely 
disregarded and ignored the findings of the White House Conference on Aging in 1971. In his 
words, “that conference was billed as the basis for developing programs for the seventies for older 
Americans…but what do we see in fact – serious budget cutbacks, increases in Medicare costs and a 
housing moratorium.”203  
While Cruikshank was likely speaking out in part due to partisan reasons – he had long been 
affiliated with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and had been the head of the AFL-CIO’s 
Social Security Department – the presence of thousands of elderly protestors suggested that his 
criticisms of the Nixon administration carried a fair amount of popular heft. Elderly poverty clearly 
remained a persistent problem in the United States, especially in cities like New York, where 
newspaper stories of impoverished elderly people stealing food from supermarkets or trapped in 
decaying tenement buildings abounded. 204  Despite the enactment of SSI as part of the Social 
Security system and increases in Social Security social insurance benefit levels, elderly poverty 
rates remained frustratingly stable, at least at first. Slowly, though, old age assistance caseloads 
began to drop as fewer elderly people filed for public assistance.205  
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In New York, city officials were particularly keen to move elderly residents off public 
assistance. Mayor John Lindsay’s administration contracted with the private Community Council of 
New York to help it find and register elderly people who were otherwise eligible for SSI but had not 
yet enrolled in the program.  As Lindsay stated, “we know that many elderly have lived in desperate 
poverty rather than apply for old age assistance…the stigma of applying for welfare should be 
greatly reduced by the transfer of income assistance to the Social Security Administration.”206 
Lindsay’s words neatly encapsulated how “Social Security” had become a semantically and 
ideologically separate realm of public assistance from “welfare” over the course of the previous 
thirty years, and the placement of SSI (which was not radically different from the long-established 
Old Age Assistance title of Social Security) under the rubric of Social Security probably represented 
an attempt to overcome the fear of many older Americans that they would be grouped together with 
socially stigmatized “welfare” recipients. The improvements to Social Security benefit levels and 
the creation of SSI therefore represented an attempt to simultaneously move older people off of 
local and state public assistance rolls by offering them significant improvements to Social Security 
and the provisions of SSI, and to do so in a way that would encourage their cooperation rather than 
resistance.207 
In the end, despite the 1970 Census’s description of older people as “untapped natural 
resource,” the policy prospects at the federal level were considerably less promising than they had 
been only fifteen years beforehand. In her testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Aging 
in July 1974, influential Michigan Rep. Martha W. Griffiths skeptically noted that  
[i]n our efforts to help the aged, we often have acted more on the urge 
to do good than on the basis of hard facts. Before we act, we should 
know the characteristics of who will benefit, by how much they will 
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benefit, who will pay, and how much it will cost. Otherwise, we may 
again – as we have in the past – spend many millions, yet see that only 
a few dollars trickle down to the persons we intend to aid.208 
 
While Griffiths had been a supporter of expanded Social Security benefits as well as Great Society 
initiatives to improve the lives of older Americans, she concluded her testimony by urging the 
assembled senators to devote more attention to the needs of “non-aged persons.” 209  Despite 
Griffiths’ suggestion that Congress devote more time to welfare reform and health care, the 
generous increases in Social Security which Nixon had signed into law only a few years previously 
had only arrested but not completely halted the powerful forces of inflation that had eroded the 
purchasing power of millions of older Americans. As an Administration on Aging staff background 
paper noted in the fall of 1974, “over 3.5 million persons 65 and over – over 17% of the total 
population 65 and over – have incomes below the poverty level.”210 
While the Nixon administration had achieved notable successes in expanding Social Security 
and creating SSI, its inability to persuade Congress to adopt the FAP would come back to haunt 
future efforts to impose rational order upon the nation’s complicated and fragmented public social 
welfare system. By the time Richard Nixon left office in 1974, it was becoming clear that rising 
inflation and faltering economic growth would likely challenge future efforts to improve public 
social welfare programs, including Social Security, Medicare, and the broad suite of lesser programs 
created to assist older people. 211 Despite the Nixon administration’s efforts, old age economic 
insecurity continued to be a pressing issue in communities throughout the country. As one New 
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York City welfare official noted in March 1974, “fifty or sixty or even a hundred dollars a month 
isn’t enough for [old] people to live on…what they need is a guaranteed income, special housing 
and elimination of the rip offs of old people like the high prices of drugs.”212 
Why Survive? The Changing Political Calculus of Old-Age Security, 1975-1980 
The continuing struggles of many older people received further amplification in 1975, when 
the publisher Harper & Row released Why Survive? Being Old In America, a jeremiad authored by 
Dr. Robert Neil Butler, a renowned gerontologist. Clocking in at nearly 500 pages in length, Why 
Survive? offered its readers a stinging critique of the federal government’s efforts to provide true 
economic security for older Americans. In language reminiscent of Michael Harrington’s The Other 
America, Butler pointedly argued that “old age in America is often a tragedy…the truth is that we 
cannot promise a decent existence for those elderly now alive.”213 While conceding that Social 
Security and Medicare had helped to alleviate elderly poverty, Butler forcefully condemned the 
federal government for not doing enough; in his words, the task of alleviating elderly poverty “has 
not been finished and the efforts do not match the needs.”214 
Despite its dense, forbidding prose, Why Survive? received wide acclaim the year it was 
published, and won the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction in 1975. While the book likely 
benefitted from increasingly skeptical post-Watergate attitudes towards public institutions like the 
federal government, its criticisms could not be so easily dismissed, given Butler’s record as the first 
director of the National Institute of Aging. Why Survive? captured public attention and focused it on 
the problem of poverty in old age, but offered little in the way of solutions, other than to decry past 
efforts as inadequate. While the numerous criticisms made by Butler in Why Survive? were not 
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new, the mere fact that they had persisted for forty years after the enactment of Social Security and 
ten years after the enactment of Medicare suggested just how incomplete and partial the foundations 
of the senior state remained, despite the efforts of two generations of dedicated efforts among social 
reformers, union leaders, and public welfare officials to eliminate economic insecurity in old age. 
A weakening national economy during the mid-1970s and higher than expected costs of 
Medicare helped to erode the assumptions of economic growth that had guided the modest 
expansion of federal social welfare programs during the postwar era. Instead of searching for ways 
to expand existing programs or to enact new ones, federal officials began to look at ways to pare 
back existing programs. This shift began not with Ronald Reagan, but with the Carter administration 
during the late 1970s. Throughout his administration, Jimmy Carter took pains to rhetorically and 
programmatically distance himself from the legacy of the New Deal.215 As William Leuchtenburg 
has observed: 
Jimmy Carter had won office by capitalizing on distrust of the 
government leviathan that had emerged in the Roosevelt era, and as 
chief executive he self-consciously acted out the role of a man with 
different perception of power from FDR’s.216 
 
Carter’s rejection of the New Deal was not simply a matter of how he perceived power; rather, his 
spurning of the Democratic Party’s twentieth-century patron saint was far more substantive. In his 
1978 State of the Union address to the Congress, Carter pointedly observed that  
[g]overnment cannot solve our problems, it can't set our goals, it 
cannot define our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty or 
provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or 
cure illiteracy or provide energy. And government cannot mandate 
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goodness. Only a true partnership between government and the people 
can ever hope to reach these goals.217 
 
Carter’s administration bore out his belief that government spending had become excessive. 
Tellingly, after his presidency Carter recalled that “my main political problem was with the so-
called liberal wing of the Democratic Party. I went into office demanding deregulation of the private 
enterprise system, and balancing budgets and…cutting back on some of the excessive social 
programs that I thought were overly costly. This was my biggest political problem when I was in 
office.”218 
 Carter’s recollection matched up with the experience of Joseph Califano in the Carter 
administration.  Califano, who had served as Lyndon Johnson’s top domestic policy aide, later 
served as Carter’s Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare until he was 
summarily dismissed by Carter in 1979. Before his dismissal, Califano had been one of the key 
architects of the Carter administration’s policies for older Americans. In July 1978, Califano 
testified on the subject of “U.S. Policy for the Aging” before the Senate Special Committee on 
Aging. In his remarks, Califano painted a dire picture for the assembled senators by highlighting 
four distinct factors, which he argued could eventually prove to be problematic: longer life 
expectancies, a growing population of older Americans (a “senior boom”), earlier retirement, and a 
decrease in the number of active workers.219  
When these four factors were combined, Califano noted that they had “a significant impact 
on the federal budget…[p]rograms for the elderly are claiming an increasing share of our 
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resources.”220 In practical terms, the federal government was spending $112 billion (1978 dollars) or 
“5 per cent of the gross national product and 24 per cent of the federal budget for fiscal year 1978,” 
an amount that Califano emphasized would only continue to grow in the future.221 Though Califano 
stated that “these figures are subject to the hazards that afflict all estimates…I cite them not to 
alarm, simply to inform,” the dire fiscal picture painted by Califano earlier in his testimony belied 
this qualifying statement.222 In light of this “fiscal pressure,” Califano urged his listeners to face the 
facts and “make sure it has the capacity to meet future obligations.”223 
While Califano’s message was not a new one – fiscal conservatives had long decried Social 
Security, Medicare, and other senior state programs as being far too expensive and far too 
ineffective at achieving the goal of providing true economic security in old age – the messenger was 
what made it remarkable. Califano had in many respects been Lyndon Johnson’s right hand man 
during the Great Society, and the Johnson administration had shown only limited concern about 
fiscal pressures; if anything, it had happily disregarded them for a time in order to try and 
simultaneously fund the Great Society’s programs and a generous personal income tax reduction at 
home as well as the conflict in Vietnam.  
That a message stressing the dangers of domestic programs should come from a faithful 
soldier of the Great Society was noteworthy, for it signaled the evolving consensus within the 
Democratic Party. As Califano would later concede in an interview ahead of his participation at a 
1985 conference marking the twentieth anniversary of the Great Society, the fatal flaw of the Great 
Society was that “the Government simply got into too many nooks and crannies in American 
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life.” 224  The Carter administration had come into power without the support of much of the 
traditional New Deal coalition, and Carter himself had remained disdainful of the New Deal’s 
ideological heritage of embracing government as a shield for guaranteeing the economic security of 
average Americans. Because he was a Carter administration official, Califano’s words provided a 
bipartisan imprimatur to criticism of programs like Social Security and Medicare. Such criticism 
had once been largely confined to the political right. Now, a bona fide liberal Democrat had latched 
onto formerly partisan critiques of the New Deal and the Great Society’s institutional heritage. In 
doing so, Califano and the Carter administration would pave the way for more strident attacks on 
these programs in future years.  
This was surely not Califano’s intention; as a faithful public servant and loyal Democrat, he 
probably hoped that attempts to reform the federal government’s domestic programs could be made 
that would prevent a painful fiscal reckoning in the future if government spending were not 
curtailed. For example, in his 1978 remarks before the Senate, Califano had underlined the 
unexpectedly high costs of Medicare and Medicaid, which had not been foreseen in 1965 when 
those programs were originally enacted. He did not wish to see these programs repealed; rather, in 
his testimony to the Senate Special Committee on Aging, he stated that “we must build a more 
rational, comprehensive, efficient and human system for delivering health services.”225 
In light of these growing fiscal pressures, as well as the unlikelihood that the Carter 
administration would either propose the creation of expensive new programs or request increased 
funding for existing ones to help older Americans, Califano seemed to suggest that American 
families would, by and large, be expected to pick up the slack.226 As he observed in his testimony, 
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Many people contend that the American family is disintegrating or that it no longer cares for its 
elderly members. The reality is, I believe the opposite…Too often in the past we have designed our 
programs for the elderly with the individual in mind but not the family unit. We have failed to tap 
the strength of the family in caring for the elderly. We need to establish programs that help families 
care for their aged members.227 
While Califano concluded by stating that “a healthy and growing economy” was necessary 
“to accommodate generously the needs of rising numbers of older citizens,” his argument that 
American families needed to take a more active role in providing care and support to their oldest 
members represented a repudiation of much of the thinking which had guided the New Deal’s 
architects and their intellectual heirs in both political parties. For decades, Social Security and other 
programs had existed and been supported because of their role in preventing exactly what Califano 
was proposing – i.e., allowing some of the most vulnerable members of the American family from 
falling into penury, and truly becoming a financial burden on their families and their communities, 
as had been the case during the years of the urban poorhouse and the county poor farm. In an age of 
stagflation and economic crisis, the Carter administration had chosen to jettison the New Deal’s 
ideological commitment to broad collective economic security through the apparatus of the federal 
government. 
Nor was Califano the only veteran of the Johnson administration to criticize the existing 
arrangement of federal spending on programs for the elderly. Joining him was Robert H. Binstock, 
an academic expert from Brandeis University who had served as the executive director of the 
Johnson administration’s Task Force on Older Americans. Writing in the pages of the prominent 
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weekly magazine National Journal, Binstock asserted that the federal government’s considerable 
spending on programs for older Americans had failed to accomplish much: 
The remarkably large proportion of federal spending that is devoted to 
programs for the elderly is becoming well known…What has not been 
emphasized sufficiently, however, is the extent to which the current 
expenditures of $112 billion on programs for the aging represents an 
indictment of the American style of domestic public policy. One 
might expect that if the federal government allocates one-quarter of its 
budget to a particular target population of 23 million citizens, then 
that population’s economic, health, and social problems would be 
substantially alleviated. Yet, that is not the case.228 
 
As Binstock further observed, “our current agenda of public programs toward the aging is truly 
incredible for it includes virtually every aspect of human existence,” with the federal government 
alone responsible for 134 programs designated for older people.229 The Older Americans Act, while 
still slender in size compared to Social Security and Medicare, accounted for $500 million in federal 
spending by 1978, and had fostered the creation of a “national network on aging anchored by 600 
area agencies on aging.”230 The national network on aging also included 1,000 senior centers, 9,000 
nutrition programs for elderly people, “as well as research and education programs,” most of which, 
Binstock concluded, “would not exist or would be devoting their attention and efforts to matters 
other than aging.”231 
Despite his praise of the federal government’s efforts to bolster the social and economic 
security of older Americans, Binstock qualified his judgment, observing that “these positive features 
of the Older Americans Act go hand-in-hand with a series of weaknesses,” including his assertion 
that “the extensive range of programmatic responsibilities has been elaborated without much sense 
of priority…consequently, the small amount of available funds is distributed relatively thinly among 
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many objectives and is far from sufficient to make a substantial impact on any given problem.”232 
More bitingly, Binstock argued that “the programmatic agenda and the bureaucratic network have 
been developed with sufficient fanfare to create a cruel illusion that a variety of problems can 
eventually be solved through funding and implementation under the Older Americans Act.”233 
In other words, the Older Americans Act, despite its good intentions, had helped spawn a 
fragmented and dysfunctional national network of agencies designed to help older people, and this 
network had proven to be only modestly successful, given its sparse funding. Binstock therefore 
concluded that while “the Administration on Aging and a number of other agencies scattered 
throughout the federal government…are doing what they can to deal with an extensive agenda of 
social service and facility needs of older persons…the number of people these agencies can help is 
limited, given meager funding, lack of priorities, and cumbersome mechanisms for program 
implementation.”234 Instead of effectively tackling the problems of older people, Binstock argued, 
these programs were instead a form of window-dressing, “enacted and implemented by public 
officials in a fashion likely to solve the problems of public officials.”235 
In addition to castigating the officials responsible for the enactment and administration of 
the federal government’s programs, Binstock advanced the argument that these programs served to 
shelter elected officials from the wrath of old age advocacy groups, whose membership “represent 
an implied electoral force that politicians are not eager to alienate.”236 The Carter administration’s 
war on “excessive social programs” marked an emerging sea change in American attitudes towards 
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the infrastructure of federal programs which had been constructed a few years earlier. As Robert B. 
Hudson, a professor of social welfare at Brandeis University observed in 1978,  
the aging, long a favored social-welfare constituency in the United 
States, are in the early stages of being confronted with a series of 
obstacles which may put their favored status – and its concomitant 
material and symbolic benefits – in jeopardy. Rapidly rising public 
policy costs for meeting the needs of an aging population, a nascent 
but growing reassessment of policy benefits directed toward the 
elderly, and competitive pressures from other social-welfare 
constituencies are now threatening two of the aging’s longstanding 
political resources – their singular legitimacy and their political utility 
to other actors in the policy process.237 
 
Hudson predicted that the “rapidly rising public policy costs” would increasingly give way to 
“competitive and cost-based pressures,” with the ultimate effect “being to produce a more inclusive 
and zero-sum politics of aging.”238 Put differently, Hudson was arguing that federal programs for 
the aging would soon be subjected to more stringent criticism, and that any new or costly policy 
initiatives would face determined opposition. The forty years between the passage of the Social 
Security Act in 1935 and the Carter administration had witnessed a haphazard movement in the 
direction of new and more expanded federal programs on behalf of the elderly; now, as was the case 
for other public assistance programs, the politics of old-age economic security had shifted more 
towards cost-cutting rather than program development. This development was partially attributable 
to the cost overruns associated with Medicare, which had caused the costs associated with that 
program to balloon to levels which had not been predicted by its architects. 
But the primary culprit was the end of the sustained economic prosperity that had existed 
since the end of World War II. The expansion of Social Security after 1945, the enactment of 
Medicare, the Older Americans Act, and the creation of the SSI program had all been underwritten 
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by the assumption that economic growth would allow the federal government to fulfill its promises 
to America’s older citizens. Taken together, these laws had also spurred the growth of a vast 
infrastructure of local and state offices and agencies designed to deal with the economic and social 
problems of the elderly. Collectively, they formed the senior state, a development of governmental 
power in twentieth century America that, dispersed broadly throughout the nation thanks to its 
emphasis on local administration and increasingly generous federal funding, proved to be far more 
resilient and better disguised than other public assistance programs. This distribution of power, 
while lending the senior state significant strength, also made it susceptible to duplication, 
fragmentation, and, ultimately, incoherence. 
Additionally, the senior state had also benefitted from the near-monolithic racial background 
of its core constituency. Extending as far back as the original Social Security Act in 1935, older 
white middle-class people had been the most significant beneficiaries of the senior state, which 
effectively transferred significant sums of national wealth into specialized government assistance 
programs that tended to benefited them. As Ira Katznelson has highlighted, life expectancy rates 
during this period differed significantly between whites and African-Americans. In 1947, for 
example, whites could expect to live an average of eleven years longer than African-Americans.239 
By 1975, this gap had narrowed somewhat, but the average life expectancy of African-American 
men remained 63.7 years – old enough to qualify for early retirement under Social Security’s rules, 
but not old enough to qualify for full retirement benefits. In contrast, the average life expectancy for 
white men in 1975 stood at 69.5 years – long enough to take advantage of Social Security’s full 
retirement age, then pegged at 67 years of age.240  
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This racial disparity remained an increasingly sore point for minority elderly advocacy 
groups. As Hobart C. Jackson, the director of the National Caucus on the Black Aged bitterly 
complained in 1973, “nothing of a substantive nature of any consequence” had been accomplished 
for many elderly African-Americans, despite the significant new amounts of federal funding that 
had been poured into the senior state.241 Instead, Jackson claimed that elderly African-Americans 
lived in a situation of “multiple jeopardy” because of their age, race, and poverty, and pointed out 
that one-third of elderly African-Americans lived at or below the federal poverty level, whereas 
24.6% of the overall elderly population (including all racial groups) lived at or below the federal 
poverty level.242 
Jackson’s criticisms highlighted one of the less obvious elements crucial to the success of 
the senior state. Beginning with the struggle for Social Security and old-age pensions in the 1930s, 
reformers had sought to create a form of retirement security that would preserve the “dignity” of 
male white workers by preventing them from becoming financial dependents upon either their 
families or their local communities, and to thereby ease the transition to retirement from the active 
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“Poverty in America: Trends and Explanations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 47-68. 
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work force and the social role of family breadwinner. The Townsend Movement had seized upon 
this impulse and broadened it to include both men and women, though with implicit understanding 
that the most deserving of the nation’s elderly population were its native-born, white, Protestant 
members.  
In its initial design and operation, Social Security had replicated some of these assumptions 
by privileging the labor of some selected categories of predominantly white male workers, and the 
postwar flood of private pensions implemented in numerous industries had further reinforced this 
orientation. The expansion of social and community services in select localities like New York and 
southern California had advanced under the aegis of private and public welfare agencies there, but 
the enactment of the Older Americans Act and its subsequent expansions during the late 1960s and 
into the mid-1970s had helped to separate anti-poverty programs for the elderly from the far more 
controversial efforts of the Office of Economic Opportunity and longer-established “welfare” units 
such as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children.  
In effect, the federal government, in conjunction with state and local governments, 
consciously worked to camouflage and disguise these programs and thereby distinguish them from 
“welfare.” This artificial distinction allowed politicians and old-age advocacy groups, as well as 
senior citizens themselves, to accept them while avoiding the stigma of receiving “handouts” or 
being on a “dole,” and to do so in a way that did not seriously threaten to upset the existing balance 
of political power and distribution of wealth in American society. 
The different results that the senior state produced – despite the efforts during the War on 
Poverty to broaden assistance to elderly minorities – was evident by the early 1970s, as Hobart 
Jackson’s criticisms suggested. Elderly white poverty had significantly declined during this period, 
so much so that the county poorhouse or poor farm became a distant if not entirely forgotten 
memory in many white communities, especially in the new suburban housing developments of the 
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postwar era. As thin and stretched as the nation’s social safety net for the elderly sometimes was, it 
had largely succeeded in assuring a modicum of economic security for many older white, middle-
class Americans, but this success had been implicitly predicated upon active federal assistance and 
assured economic growth.  
By the mid-1970s, economic growth could no longer be assured, and programs for the 
elderly, even those for middle-class, white people, began to experience the kind of political censure 
and opprobrium once reserved for the Civil War veterans’ pensions and for the state level old-age 
pension movements that had cropped up in many western states during the 1930s and 1940s. That 
Social Security and Medicare were designed to function like contributory, social insurance 
programs became a programmatic distinction that was increasingly lost in the fray as anti-statist 
conservatives directed their ire at federal welfare programs. While overt challenges to the stability 
of either Medicare or Social Security proved to be too politically dangerous – as Ronald Reagan 
learned in 1981 when his proposals to “reform” Social Security spurred a furious public backlash – 
the less well-known local and state programs inaugurated under the Older Americans Act remained 
far better shielded because of their relative anonymity and because of the vested stake so many local 
communities had in their continued existence. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Between the Great Depression and the onset of the new protracted economic crisis of the 
mid-1970s, the relationship between the government – federal, state, and local – and older 
Americans underwent a dramatic transformation. Brought together by an unlikely and at times 
unwieldy coalition of public officials, representatives of the organized labor movement, and 
specialized academic experts, government at all levels of the United States sought to provide social 
and economic support to older Americans sufficient to raise them out of poverty. In doing so, public 
officials assumed a primary role in a field of social welfare policy which had previously been 
considered the exclusive realm of either individual families, private voluntary organizations, or 
other parts of American civil society. The creation of this new governmental role was haphazard and 
subject to bitter, conflicting arguments over what the proper role of government should be in this 
area, but ultimately it produced a stable and lasting outcome by the 1970s, namely, a significant 
expansion of federal social welfare activities, programs, and initiatives on behalf of older 
Americans, which I have collectively labeled the “senior state.” 
Viewed from the vantage point of the 1920s, the creation of the senior state over the course 
of the next forty years could not have been foreseen, save for a handful of marginal advocates like 
Abraham Epstein who believed that the United States needed to develop an old-age pension system 
if it was to take its place as duly modern society. Epstein’s belief – really, his hope – ran against 
powerful currents in American society, which militated against the enactment of any such system. 
As Theda Skocpol has shown, the United States developed a de facto old age pension system in the 
five decades following the end of the Civil War, as national and state Republican politicians in the 
victorious northern states successfully joined hands with various Union veterans’ organizations to 
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expand previously modest veteran pensions into a much broader mechanism for federal old-age 
relief and support than had been the original intent of those pensions.
The belief that public old-age pensions were susceptible to corruption, whether political or 
moral, was coupled with an increasing emphasis by Progressive thinkers on the virtues of old-age 
social insurance, whereby workers helped to fund their own future needs as retirees no longer 
actively participating in the workforce. This model of old-age provision, which was modeled on 
private commercial insurance concepts, enjoyed growing popularity among Progressive academics 
and politicians, who wanted to eradicate old-age poverty without running the risk of bankrupting 
local, state, or federal governments with overly generous, non-contributory pensions derived from 
general revenue streams that, unlike the Civil War veterans’ pensions, might prove impossible to 
repeal or curtail once enacted. 
 This debate over the merits of old-age pensions versus old age insurance remained largely 
confined to more progressive political circles in the United States during the 1920s. By contrast, 
many corporate leaders and their allies in elected government and the legal system viewed both old-
age pensions and old-age insurance as abhorrent and an unjustified usurpation by government of 
functions which it was not entitled to undertake, and which could, if left unchecked, threaten the 
ability of corporations to govern their internal affairs as they saw fit. While some of these 
corporations embraced a model of corporate welfare that was at times unabashedly paternalistic in 
how it viewed the plight of older workers, that paternalism was grounded in the belief that relations 
between employers and employees should be marked by a genial reciprocity and immune from 
external intrusion by third party actors, be it government or labor unions. While many corporate 
leaders embraced old-age pensions as part of their collective responsibility to their workers, these 
pensions reached only a fraction of the overall population, and even then they were usually 
insufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living. Many older people – especially those who 
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could not fall back on agricultural employment to sustain them – continued to rely on a mixture of 
savings and assistance from either their kinship networks or voluntary organizations like mutual aid 
societies or religious institutions. Those who could not found themselves with few options for 
survival, and this fragile, insecure network of assistance ensured that county poor farms and city 
poorhouses remained busy in the United States well into the twentieth century. 
 The Great Depression upset this existing balance of affairs, and helped to radically redefine 
understandings of old-age poverty and economic insecurity in the United States. The catastrophic 
spread of unemployment between 1929 and 1933 led to an unprecedented strain on existing 
channels of public and private relief, and the collapse of the stock market and subsequent failure of 
banks throughout the nation had essentially wiped out the savings of thousands of people, a point 
underscored by Franklin Roosevelt in his first inaugural address. Because unemployment was so 
widespread – and because the collapse of so many banks triggered crippling ripple effects on the 
economic life of numerous communities – it became increasingly implausible to argue that 
unemployment and poverty in old age were merely the fault of lackadaisical individuals. 
Recognizing the need to provide some kind of emergency assistance to the growing number of 
impoverished elderly people within their borders, individual States – including previously reluctant 
states like New York – now embraced old-age pensions as both a needed measure to sustain 
individuals who through no fault of their own had become impoverished and who had little prospect 
of competing for employment against younger workers. 
 The level of support provided by these newly created state-level pensions, though, was 
frequently inadequate, and such pensions varied from state to state. Moreover, as late as 1932, only 
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seventeen of the forty-eight states had enacted pensions, though that number rose to thirty by 1935.1 
As the Depression worsened, it remained an open question whether the states which had enacted 
old-age pensions would continue to have either the revenues or the political resolve sufficient to 
adequately fund the pension obligations they had legally committed themselves to. With traditional 
sources of assistance either desiccated or in the process of collapse, and new sources of assistance 
largely unequal to the burden being placed upon them, the way forward remained unclear for 
Americans of all ages, though older Americans arguably had fewer options than most. The election 
of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 brought with it hope that the Depression might soon be lifted, 
provided that the instruments necessary for the well-functioning of the nation’s economy be restored 
to good working order. As the Roosevelt administration worked to tackle these issues, though, the 
issue of alleviating old-age poverty remained largely unaddressed, despite some Congressional 
efforts to compel action. 
 The administration hoped that Social Security’s old-age assistance program would remain a 
temporary feature of the law, at least until the old-age insurance system was fully operational, after 
which time the old-age assistance program would diminish over time as more and more younger 
workers shifted into the old-age insurance system once they retired from the workforce. This 
gradual approach, though, while highly pleasing to state officials who could now call upon a much 
larger source of monetary support to augment existing state-level pensions, did not fully extinguish 
the popular discontent which had fueled the Townsend Movement to national prominence. Right up 
to the period of America’s entry into World War II in 1941, the Townsend Movement and other 
like-minded groups continued to agitate for the repeal of Social Security and the institution of a 
more generous universal old-age pension system, and the continuing implicit threat of popular 
          
1  See U.S. Social Security Administration, “Historical Background and Development of Social Security,” Social 
Security Administration website, source URL: https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (accessed January 17, 
2017). 
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support for a newer, better organized version of the Townsend Movement helped the Roosevelt 
administration to persuade Congress in 1939 to enact the first of numerous amendments to the 
Social Security Act which were designed to accelerate the operation of the old-age insurance system 
and increase the amount of benefits to be paid out under the old-age insurance system. 
 The appeal of the Townsend Movement and other similar groups in California and Colorado 
was temporarily dampened by the wartime mobilization of the American economy, which had 
commenced in earnest well before formal American entry into World War II. The tightening labor 
market, fueled by rapidly increasing defense spending, helped to drive national unemployment back 
down to levels not seen since before the onset of the Great Depression. Many older Americans 
benefitted from this tightening labor market, which allowed them to either continue working or to 
find new employment opportunities. The effect of the improving economy on the old-age pension 
movement was reflected by the significantly diminished stature of the Townsend Movement and 
other similar groups, which found that their central demand for a guaranteed old-age pension now 
enjoyed at best a middling amount of support on the national level. At the state level, efforts 
continued in California and Colorado to enact broader state-level old-age pensions, with mixed 
results to show for it. 
 The breathtaking productivity of the American economy during World War II, only 
temporarily lessened the popular support that had been essential to groups advocating a broader old-
age pension system in the United States. Mindful that the war would sooner or later end and that 
significant reforms of the American social welfare state were still required, the Roosevelt 
administration had commissioned the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), a small 
government agency, to undertake a study of needed measures in order to build on the still half-
complete foundations laid by the Social Security Act. As the nation recovered economically from 
the Depression, its zeal for the sort of broad experimentation which the New Deal embodied, 
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including the Social Security Act, began to wane, and between 1938 and 1942, a Congress that had 
been amenable to the Roosevelt administration was gradually replaced with a more skeptical one 
that was eager to hold the line on any further social policy experiments. Watching the political 
winds shift, and still dependent upon Southern Democrats for their support of measures needed to 
fight World War II, the Roosevelt administration effectively sidelined the NRPB, and with it the 
hope that Social Security might be broadened and expanded along the lines of the Beveridge Plan 
then taking shape in the United Kingdom. 
 In addition to recharging business interests in the United States, World War II also greatly 
amplified the overall membership strength of many labor unions, as workers flooded into factories 
across the nation. Despite growing membership numbers, unions were unable to press for increased 
wages, having vowed not to strike for the duration of the war. Instead, modifications made to the 
federal tax code beginning in 1942 encouraged private employers to supplement wages with other 
fringe benefits tied to employment, such as health insurance and private pensions. After the end of 
World War II, a wave of strikes by unions to demand increased wages met with fierce counter-
resistance on the part of corporate interests, who successfully pushed the Taft-Hartley Act through 
Congress in 1947. Taft-Hartley restricted numerous union activities and made it easier for hostile 
employers to hinder union organizing efforts. A bitter, protracted conflict between numerous labor 
unions and major corporate employers like General Motors during the late 1940s resulted in the 
development of new collective bargaining agreements that fueled the growth of private health and 
economic security benefits tied to private employment, which in turn served as a template for other 
industries. 
 The growth of a private welfare state was also made possible by the failure of the Truman 
administration to revive a New Deal-style reform agenda for socially progressive legislation. 
Despite the valiant efforts of Truman administration officials, efforts to secure enactment of national 
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health insurance failed due to the implacable opposition of the American Medical Association 
(AMA) and various business groups, which conducted a highly successful public relations campaign 
that persuaded many Americans that national health insurance represented an unjustified expansion 
of the federal government’s power which would inevitably pave the way to Soviet-style statism in 
the United States. 
 After the failure to enact national health insurance, officials within the Truman 
administration as well as outside experts in organized labor and academia began working on a new 
legislative proposal designed to enact universal health insurance, but only for older Americans, in 
the hope that such a program would meet with a less hostile response from the AMA and from the 
general public and would therefore stand a better chance of being enacted.  
Enactment of any sort of national health insurance plan, though, was forestalled by the 
election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952; despite his latter-day reputation as a 
political moderate, Eisenhower was a self-described political conservative who remained obdurately 
opposed to the enactment of national health insurance until near the end of his administration, when 
he begrudgingly acquiesced to the enactment of the Kerr-Mills Act. Kerr-Mills provided some 
federal funding to individual state programs designed to assist indigent elderly people in need of 
medical assistance, but it was not universally available to all senior citizens. Quiet backroom 
attempts by senior Eisenhower administration officials like Marion Folsom to persuade private 
commercial insurers to offer health insurance plans geared towards older people were rejected by 
those insurers as unprofitable ventures, even after the Eisenhower administration offered to “re-
insure” such plans in order to safeguard against possible losses by private insurers.2 
          
2  Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Health Program,” January 31, 
1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10399 (Accessed January 18, 2017). 
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While the Eisenhower administration did battle with congressional Democrats over the fate 
of numerous health insurance proposals, it proved more willing to sign important amendments to the 
Social Security Act into law. These amendments expanded the categories of workers covered by the 
Act, raised monthly benefit payments, and ultimately strengthened the old age insurance system’s 
finances while helping to halt and reverse the growth of Social Security’s old age assistance 
program, an ostensibly temporary Depression-era measure that had continued to survive well past its 
intended termination thanks to the support of southern Democrats. 
These developments at the national level, a gradual expansion of Social Security coupled 
with an impasse over national health insurance, intensified the pressures on state and local officials 
to deal with a growing and frequently financially insecure cohort of older Americans. Localities like 
New York City, which had perhaps the largest single concentration of older people within its 
borders by virtue of being the nation’s largest city, resorted to public-private partnerships with 
philanthropic organizations based in the city. Other places such as California witnessed the re-
ignition of old battles over improved state-level old age pensions.  
By the late 1950s, a new alternative to both of these approaches had appeared in southern 
California. The American Association of Retired Persons (A.A.R.P.), a private voluntary 
organization founded by Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus, a former high school principal in Los Angeles, 
was the first major national organization to offer a low-cost health insurance plan open to older 
Americans without requiring a prior medical examination. This innovative plan, along with a mail-
in prescription drug service, attracted a membership that quickly swelled into the hundreds of 
thousands as older Americans flocked to the A.A.R.P. The nascent organization also benefitted from 
close ties to the Eisenhower administration and support from the American Medical Association, 
both of which were eager to demonstrate that legislation to provide health insurance for older 
Americans via the Social Security system was an unnecessary expenditure of public funds. 
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 The rise of the A.A.R.P. was complemented by an emerging partnership between public 
officials and academic experts to examine the living and economic conditions of older Americans. 
In case studies throughout the nation, academic researchers demonstrated that many of the existing 
assumptions about the lives and needs of older Americans were either outdated or unwarranted, and 
argued that a new, proactive approach on the part of local communities could help remedy a 
significant portion of the social and economic problems faced by older people.  
Similarly, new biomedical and social science research demonstrated that many older people 
could remain productive members of society, but that many lacked the opportunity to do so. 
Beginning in New York, Ann Arbor, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, local officials implemented new 
social service programs in conjunction with local academic and social welfare experts, a process 
that depended upon an infusion of funds from private sources and state aid. By and large, these 
programs offered assistance to older people that was designed to help them find affordable housing, 
enjoy access to continuing education and vocational training opportunities, or to serve as volunteers 
in their communities. Many of these programs were relatively small in nature, but they frequently 
enjoyed support from local officials, labor unions, and religious institutions, most of whom saw 
them as expression of the local community’s capacity to serve the needs of vulnerable citizens.  
The gradual emergence of these local and state level programs and the sudden appearance of 
the A.A.R.P. during the 1950s augured a new direction for policy initiatives designed to assist older 
Americans. These efforts also enjoyed an unexpected boost from the federal government. In 1950 
and again in 1961, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had hosted national conferences 
ostensibly dedicated to examining the problems of older Americans. Hovering over both 
conferences, though, was the issue of providing health insurance for older people, an issue which 
increasingly became the prime objective of many reformers during this period.  
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More importantly, at both conferences, federal officials worked painstakingly to assemble an 
array of experts from a wide variety of disciplines at each conference, in essence helping to 
construct a new defined community of experts who could then exchange knowledge and expertise.  
These experts, in turn, produced new proposals for areas in which the federal, state, and local 
governments could cooperate, and while many of these proposals did not get enacted into law, their 
very existence marked the emergence of a new, coherent body of experts upon whom federal 
officials would draw from during the course of the 1960s and into the 1970s in order to evaluate 
existing federal programs for the elderly and to devise new ones as needed. 
For the moment, the election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 suggested that it 
might be possible to break the federal impasse over national health insurance which had solidified 
over the course of the previous decade and a half. The Kennedy administration worked closely to 
cultivate senior citizens as a voting bloc during the 1960 campaign and after its narrow electoral 
victory, numerous labor and social welfare experts were placed into important domestic policy 
positions throughout the new administration. Persuaded by the AFL-CIO that supporting the 
enactment of health insurance for senior citizens via the Social Security system could broaden his 
appeal to older voters, Kennedy publicly committed himself in 1960 to the enactment of Medicare, 
and consequently his administration lobbied hard for the passage of Medicare repeatedly between 
1961 and 1963.  
These efforts were largely in vain. Congressional opposition, especially that of Rep. Wilbur 
Mills, the powerful Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, withstood the attempts by 
both the Kennedy administration and organized labor (including the National Council of Senior 
Citizens, an AFL-CIO funded group whose main purpose was to advocate for the enactment of 
Medicare). It was not until after Kennedy’s assassination, and Lyndon Johnson’s sweeping victory 
in 1964, that the Kennedy-Johnson administration could count on a working legislative majority that 
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was amenable to the passage of Medicare. Even with healthy congressional majorities, though, the 
Johnson administration withstood the wrath of the American Medical Association (AMA) and its 
congressional supporters. In order to placate the AMA, the Johnson administration and its coalition 
of allies (including the American Hospital Association and Blue Cross & Blue Shield) embraced a 
compromise solution that folded existing federal health care legislation (the Kerr-Mills Act) along 
with new legislation designed to provide universal health care insurance to all Americans over the 
age of 65. The new legislation was explicitly modeled on Social Security’s contributory old age 
insurance model, and ultimately proved largely satisfactory to the complex and conflicting demands 
of the various groups involved in its enactment.3 
While the years-long fight to enact Medicare had dominated much of the political agenda at 
the national level, it also had the effect of galvanizing broader interest in the problems of older 
Americans. The publication of Michael Harrington’s The Other America, as well as numerous 
newspaper stories and investigations revealed just how financially precarious the lives of many 
older people remained, despite the gradual improvement of the Social Security system and the 
proliferation of private pension systems since the end of World War II. While the living standards of 
some older Americans had undoubtedly been improved by these changes, for many others – 
especially minority older Americans and older Americans in more rural, agricultural communities – 
these improvements were less pronounced  
The growing attention that rising old age poverty attracted during the early 1960s helped to 
justify the enactment of Medicare, and it also helped spur congressional interest in new initiatives 
besides Medicare to arrest rising poverty rates among older Americans. Through a series of well-
publicized hearings and investigations, congressional committees – especially the U.S. Senate’s 
Special Committee on Aging – helped bring to light the manifold economic problems which 
          
3 Julian E. Zelizer, “How Medicare Was Made,” The New Yorker, February 15, 2015. 
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confronted many older people, which included not only access to affordable health care, but also 
inadequate housing, insufficient employment opportunities, and growing social isolation. Existing 
state and local programs – especially in New York City – had been able to assist many older people, 
but as repeated hearings made clear, such efforts were not enough. Congress in 1965 therefore 
enacted legislation designed to provide additional federal funding to state and local level agencies, 
with the intention that such funding would be used to support existing community social service 
programs and to promote the creation of new ones. Additionally, Congress directed that a new 
government agency, the Administration on Aging, be created in order to coordinate and monitor 
federal involvement in these state and local programs, and to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information and new initiatives at the federal level. The Congress also attempted to apply pressure 
on the newly-created Office of Economic Opportunity, the Johnson administration’s hastily 
assembled lead agency in the War on Poverty, to do more to combat elderly poverty. 
Unfortunately, Congressional efforts to cajole the Office of Economic Opportunity to take a 
more proactive stance in battling elderly poverty proved largely for naught for two reasons. First, 
the key decision-makers within the Office of Economic Opportunity had decided to direct their 
efforts on breaking the “cycle of poverty,” which they not unreasonably believed to be most acute in 
urban communities throughout the nation. They therefore directed their time and energies to 
supporting vocational training and local Community Action Agencies with the intention of 
empowering traditionally disempowered poor and working-class people. More often than not, 
though, the “poor” whom the OEO tried to assist were young people, in the belief that helping 
young people acquire the skills and training necessary to participate in a competitive labor market 
would enable them to escape from poverty and set them on the path to upward economic mobility. 
This conception of the “poor,” therefore had less to offer the elderly poor, whom OEO officials 
assumed received sufficient assistance from existing government agencies like the Social Security 
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Administration and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the predecessor of the 
present-day Department of Health and Human Services). 
Secondly, the OEO’s belated efforts in the late 1960s to support local-level initiatives aimed 
at eradicating poverty met with significant backlash from increasingly well-organized senior 
citizens’ lobbying groups, who feared that OEO’s involvement in such programs would taint them 
as being a form of undesirable welfare. Frustrated with the OEO’s slow progress in addressing 
elderly poverty, the Johnson administration began to explore alternative methods for using the 
federal government’s resources to develop programs oriented around the needs of older people. The 
Administration on Aging, which had been created in part to serve this purpose, remained largely on 
the bureaucratic sidelines as various Executive Branch departments – including the Departments of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development – jousted for control 
of the administration’s agenda on this issue. Eventually, much of the agenda fell into the hands of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  
Beginning in 1967, the administration successfully launched a renewed push to enact a broad 
agenda on behalf of older Americans, which included significantly increased funding to federal-
state programs originally supported by the Older Americans Act of 1965, additional improvements 
to the Social Security Act, and the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, which attempted to replicate state-level laws against age discrimination at the national level. 
Taken together, these laws greatly enhanced the role of the federal government in supporting a wide 
variety of programs for older Americans, many of which effectively functioned as de facto anti-
poverty programs in local communities by providing part-time employment and social service 
opportunities to older Americans that would otherwise have been unavailable.  On the whole, these 
programs were designed to re-integrate senior citizens into their local communities by providing 
them with socially desirable functions that allowed them to assist other at-risk individuals (as in the 
 418 
 
case of the Foster Grandparents Program, whereby elderly people served as mentors and surrogate 
family to neighborhood children). For the most part, however, these programs did not tackle a lot of 
the systemic, root causes of elderly poverty, but rather sought to act as palliatives. 
Alongside these new programs, the Johnson administration also convened multiple task 
forces in 1966 and 1968 to examine the issue of income maintenance. These Task Forces helped 
drive the administration’s push to increase Social Security and public assistance benefits, and also 
suggested that the administration’s receptiveness to growing demands on both the political left and 
right that the government institute a universal, guaranteed income program in lieu of the patchwork 
of existing aid programs which provided assistance largely on a categorical basis. The growing 
movement behind the guaranteed income program, though, would receive an unexpected boost of 
support from the frequently unorthodox administration of Richard Nixon, who succeeded Johnson 
as President in 1969. In August 1969, Nixon proposed replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program, along with a host of other welfare programs, with a new guaranteed 
basic annual income program that would make federal assistance more uniform throughout the 
country.4 Nixon’s proposal, the Family Assistance Program (FAP) – originally authored by Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan – ran into stiff resistance from Congress and advocacy groups on both the 
political left and the right who remained unpersuaded that FAP represented a better model than the 
existing social welfare system framework. Attempts to enact FAP in 1970 and again in 1972 failed 
due to this opposition. 
While the Nixon administration pressed for the enactment of FAP, it embraced federal 
support for Great Society-era initiatives for older Americans. The administration conducted 
vigorous outreach to older Americans, and also revived the template for federal-state cooperation on 
          
4  Richard Nixon: “Special Message to the Congress on Reform of the Nation's Welfare System,” August 11, 
1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2194 (accessed January 19, 2017). 
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issues related to older Americans which the 1961 White House Conference on Aging had helped to 
set. By skillfully employing many of the veterans of the Eisenhower administration, the Nixon 
administration worked diligently to improve and support the existing infrastructure of federal 
programs for older people, even as it worked to erode other anti-poverty programs which had been 
created as part of the Great Society. After the failure of the Nixon administration to secure the 
enactment of FAP, Nixon ultimately signed into law major improvements to Social Security, 
including the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a new means-based 
program that supplemented Social Security’s old-age assistance program.5  
SSI represented a partial enactment of FAP, and its helped to further solidify the patchwork 
infrastructure of government programs and initiatives which had been erected over the course of the 
previous forty years. Its reaffirmed the willingness of federal officials to support programs designed 
to improve the economic security of older Americans as well as their lack of enthusiasm to do the 
same on a universal basis for all Americans. This commitment would wax and wane at times after 
the mid-1970s, when the relatively stable period of postwar economic growth that had made the 
bipartisan enlargement of the American welfare state politically plausible began to fade.  
In its stead, a new bipartisan coalition began to emerge which prized paring back the 
programs of the American welfare state, including programs for the elderly, which were 
increasingly deemed to be an unreasonable burden upon the federal government. Attempts to act on 
these criticisms were not always successful, as Ronald Reagan’s failed attempt to significantly 
reduce Social Security benefits in 1981 revealed. Yet a new ethos had emerged by the mid-1980s, 
which argued that government programs for the elderly were essentially assistance bestowed upon 
          
5 Richard Nixon: “Statement on Signing the Social Security Amendments of 1972,” October 30, 1972. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3673 
(accessed January 20, 2017). 
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an “undeserving” group, a stark reversal from the assumptions that guided the creation and 
extension of such programs for the previous half century. 
 Yet, because of the manner of its creation and the practical demands associated with its 
administration, the senior state proved to be surprisingly resilient, despite the rise to power of a 
postwar conservative movement in the United States whose appeal has been predicated in part on 
anti-statist rhetoric and actions. In particular, the senior state drew its strength from several core 
factors. First, while it was largely funded by the federal government, much of its administration has 
been done at the state and local levels. This design has helped to inoculate it from anti-statist 
political criticism and to confer legitimacy upon it in the eyes of state and local politicians whose 
willingness to participate in federal-led initiatives could not necessarily be assumed, a fact borne out 
by the far less successful experience of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s Community Action 
Program during the heyday of the Great Society. Unlike the anti-poverty initiatives launched as part 
of the senior state, the OEO’s Community Action Program’s community action agencies frequently 
lacked institutional support at the state and local level sufficient to buttress it from criticisms, and its 
direct threat to established local sachems ensured that once federal support was removed, both the 
OEO and the Community Action Program’s days would be numbered. 
 By contrast, the senior state’s anti-poverty initiatives were considerably lower profile, and 
did not seek to displace or directly challenge existing configurations of power in a way that would 
threaten local politicians or pose a threat to existing economic conditions. Instead, the senior state’s 
programs increasingly aimed to replicate functions which might have performed privately by 
individual families, that is to say, outside of the realm of market relations. While these functions had 
traditionally not been performed by the federal government, local officials welcomed them as a way 
to amplify limited financial resources.  
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In fact, the key to the success of the senior state has been its ability to neatly sidestep the 
political and social tension between popular demands for local political autonomy and the ability of 
the federal government to formulate workable national solutions to pressing social and economic 
problems in American society. As Barry Karl observed over thirty years ago in The Uneasy State, 
“Americans have had a peculiar problem when it comes to identifying themselves as a nation,” and 
this problem owes much to the tension in American life between the competing forces of 
nationalism and localism as well as the impasse between the “autonomous individual” and the need 
for collective action to resolve systemic social issues.6  
Instead of beginning as a federal initiative, the senior state arose gradually, organically, and 
in disparate pieces throughout the United States, and did so in a manner and at a pace largely 
dictated by local and state officials. It began in localities like New York City and California where 
the numerous problems created by inadequate existing social safety nets meant that local officials, 
usually in conjunction with funding assistance from private philanthropic organizations, were 
obliged to respond first, and to devise policy solutions in areas as varied as housing, regular medical 
care, employment assistance, and access to long-term assisted living facilities for the significant 
number of senior citizens who lived there. Local officials, working in conjunction with a growing 
network of private social welfare experts and philanthropic organizations, developed experimental 
solutions in order to try and resolve the social and economic problems of older Americans. Some of 
these solutions, like subsidizing public housing for the elderly and enacting legal protections to 
prevent discrimination in the workplace against older workers, eventually percolated upwards to the 
national level as federal officials searched for solutions that would be both constitutional and 
          
6 Barry Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 1-
6. 
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financially feasible, given limited staff expertise in many federal agencies and modest funding 
allocated by Congress. 
The senior state owed its origins to more than just the needs of local and state officials trying 
to make adaptations to the range of municipal services offered to their older citizens. It also came 
into being because of larger societal changes in the United States that were unique to the post-World 
War II era. The mass suburbanization of the American population during the postwar era and the 
continued out-migration of younger people from rural areas of the American South, the Great 
Plains, and New England meant that numerous rural and urban communities were facing the 
prospect of a dwindling local population as well as a correspondingly declining number of younger 
workers capable of supporting both a growing older population’s needs and other necessary 
governmental services. This redistribution of population and economic resources meant that local 
and state officials who in other circumstances or contexts might have been suspicious of or might 
have rejected any federal role in setting social welfare policy were far more receptive to it, 
especially if participation in federal programs or initiatives included eligibility for federal funds 
without necessarily being subject to federal oversight.  
For this reason, Social Security’s noncontributory old-age assistance program proved to be 
remarkably popular among southern Democrats who were otherwise deeply skeptical that any 
expansion of the federal government’s power might impinge upon the existing social and economic 
structure of the American South, despite the fact that it was originally intended to only be a 
temporary, Depression-era measure to bolster the meager financial support that many individual 
states provided to their older citizens. Instead, southern Democrats happily supported the program, 
which provided matching federal funds that generously supplemented comparatively meager state 
pensions for older people. In many instances, Social Security’s old age assistance program was 
erected on top of existing state level pension programs, thus providing those programs with a flush 
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new source of guaranteed support, which helped to endear the program to traditionally impoverished 
agricultural Southern states that hitherto had only been able to appropriate limited funding to their 
state pensions. Additionally, the de-centralized administration of Social Security’s old-age 
assistance program meant that southern states like Louisiana and Mississippi could shape it largely 
according to their own racial prerogatives, which frequently meant that older whites benefitted from 
the program more than older African-Americans did.7 In effect, Social Security’s old-age assistance 
program became a prime means of support for older, impoverished white people in many Southern 
states, which helped to win it lasting support among both elected officials and the public.  
It was not until the late 1940s and into the early 1950s that this imbalance by design in favor 
of Social Security’s old-age assistance program rather than its old-age insurance program began to 
be corrected, but that only came after southern Democrats found themselves temporarily shut out of 
power during the years of unified Republican control of the White House and Congress between 
1953 and 1955 and thus unable to prevent the expansion and shoring up of Social Security’s old-age 
insurance program. 
It was not just Southern Democrats, though, who stood to benefit from an expanded federal 
role in providing relief to older people. Key western states like California and Colorado were 
subject to a long-running battle during the 1930s and 1940s between old-age pension advocacy 
groups like the Townsend Movement and their opponents, with the balance of power frequently 
seesawing between each side. As discussed in chapters two and three, state level pensions were 
frequently enacted one year, only to be repealed the next, a cycle which helped to keep sustain and 
          
7 See Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 42-47. 
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amplify popular fears elsewhere that the American polity might be overtly susceptible to the appeals 
of unscrupulous demagogues.8  
The prospect of more generous pensions being enacted by individual states also led the 
National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to begrudgingly 
embrace the expansion of Social Security’s old-age insurance program as a more responsible and 
less costly alternative. Essentially, the business community believed that it faced a choice between 
higher pensions paid for out of general revenue streams (and therefore higher taxes) or 
improvements to the part of Social Security which required workers to contribute to their own 
retirement security. Fearful of inflation and higher taxes to support a broader welfare state than 
already existed, the business community chose to throw its support behind Social Security’s old age 
insurance provisions, thus validating and protecting it from its opponents. Likewise, the Eisenhower 
administration dutifully supported expansions to the Social Security program, which placed its old-
age insurance rather than its old-age assistance program at its core, a stark reversal from the 
programmatic evolution which had taken place in the twenty decades since Social Security was first 
enacted in 1935. 
These expansions of Social Security’s old age insurance program were welcomed by local 
officials in urban localities like Chicago and New York, which had historically received at best a 
modest amount of support from Social Security’s old-age assistance program, despite the fact that 
the old-age assistance program was financed out of more general revenues. In these cities, as well as 
in other areas with a large population of industrial workers, local officials continued to lobby for 
further improvements to Social Security. However, expanded eligibility and benefits under the 
Social Security old-age assistance program, while helpful to many older people, did not necessarily 
benefit all older people, especially those individuals who had not contributed into Social Security 
          
8 See chapter 2, 51-52 and chapter 3, 24-26. 
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either because they had not “worked” (as was the case with many older women) or because they 
were not included in the classes of workers eligible to receive benefits from Social Security. For 
these older people, who faced diminished prospects of access to the workforce (usually due to a 
combination of lack of formal education or relevant prior experience), local officials found that 
more efforts on the part of government were needed in order to prevent relief rolls from swelling up 
with older people. 
The growth of these programs and services designed to meet the needs of older Americans 
without resorting to more dramatic solutions like the creation of a public jobs program for older 
people represented a curious compromise: a broadening range of services and programs were 
enacted in order to assist older people, programs that might have been far more controversial had 
they been enacted in order to benefit other groups of people within American society. Many of the 
programs enacted to assist older Americans tended to benefit a constituency that remained both 
whiter and poorer than the country as a whole. While other programs such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) were tarred as a form of support to a racially undeserving group, 
programs designed to assist the elderly enjoyed a much happier fate. For example, even after the 
slow dissolution of the OEO had begun in 1969, its decidedly modest anti-poverty programs for the 
elderly were folded back into other existing executive branch agencies such as the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. While many of these programs were financed out of general tax 
revenues, a key sore point in many of the critiques surrounding other War on Poverty programs as 
well as the AFDC program, no such critique attached itself to government programs for the elderly. 
Rather, such programs enjoyed the cozy insulation provided not just by an increasingly vocal 
lobby on their behalf (chiefly the AARP), but also by a healthy bipartisan consensus that viewed 
them as essential to the well-functioning of local communities. This consensus had its origins in the 
enactment of the original Social Security Act, but its development accelerated between the end of 
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World War II and the 1960s. Experts on the problems of aging and older Americans formed a nexus 
of academic research and investigation at the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan 
and other leading universities, and the collective output of these individuals helped to legitimate 
government programs for the elderly. Not infrequently, many of these researchers moved back and 
forth between the academy and various levels of government, and working with elected officials 
they were able to develop policies that could be tailored to local communities and funded from a 
mixture of public and private sources. This close relationship between policymakers and academic 
experts helped to ensure that the programs of the senior state enjoyed a social legitimacy – even 
prestige – that other social welfare programs were not able to acquire. 
In sum, the combination of these distinct factors: bipartisan support at the local, state, and 
federal levels of government, sustained academic interest and research, and backing from organized 
labor, which helped to make the emergence of the senior state possible, and which protected its 
programs from the strong anti-statist currents of American politics. While relatively modest in 
comparison to the benefits and programs provided by other industrialized nations to their older 
population, the protections extended by the American state to older Americans are markedly more 
generous than those afforded other categories of needy people in the United States. The 
development of the senior state, even in the face of historical hostility to both assistance programs 
and to the active, in-depth involvement by the federal government in local and state social welfare 
matters, is a mark of the success of the unlikely coalition of social welfare experts, elected officials, 
and organized labor leaders who brought it into being. Even when the economic conditions that had 
supported its expansion began to disappear, the relatively low-profile, indirect nature of assistance 
ensured that it would survive, even as other government programs did not. 
The significance of the senior state in postwar American history lies in how it allowed 
federal, state, and local officials to provide needed public assistance to the elderly, and to do so in a 
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way that successfully camouflaged the true nature of that assistance by placing it within the confines 
of community service and part-time employment programs. Taken together with the broad 
expansions to Social Security between 1939 and 1973 and the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, 
the amount of federal action on behalf of the nation’s elderly population was all the more 
impressive, given the relatively small percentage of Americans over the age of 65 during the period 
between 1930 and 1970 as a portion of the overall national population.9 It also reflected a significant 
evolution in how the federal, state, and local governments had dealt with the issue of providing 
support (economic and otherwise) to older people. The poorhouse and the county poor farm system 
that predated the New Deal had been predicated upon a dual mission of uplift and deterrence, and in 
that spirit, the few old-age pension laws that had existed before the Great Depression and the New 
Deal had provided fairly minimal levels of assistance, and even that assistance was usually 
predicated upon continued individual family contributions to the upkeep and maintenance of elderly 
family members.  
Within the framework of this system, many elderly effectively became dependent wards. As 
Hendrik Hartog’s study of wills and inheritances in New Jersey during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century suggests, elderly people who were able to went to significant lengths to try and 
guarantee their continued economic independence, and did so by entering into formal and informal 
contractual relationships with friends and family members to effectively trade care in their old age 
for compensation from their estates upon their decease.10 In essence, those elderly people who could 
afford to swap financial assets for some modicum of security did so, while others who could not 
found themselves confronted with far less attractive options. 
          
9 In 1930, Americans aged 65 years or older constituted 5.4% of the total U.S. population; by 1970, this figure had risen 
to 9.9% of the total U.S. population. See U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century: Census 2000 
Special Reports, by Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, Figure 2-4, Percent Distribution of the Total Population by Age: 
1900 to 2000, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 56. 
10 See Hendrik Hartog, Someday All This Will Be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
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The growth and development of the senior state during the course of the twentieth century 
significantly revised this formulation. The economic security, health security, and necessary social 
services for many elderly people were gradually shifted away from individual families and 
localities, and the financial risks and costs of old-age were subsidized instead by the general 
population in the form of both specialized payroll taxes and general revenues. This shift released 
many but not all elderly individuals and their families from the concerns that had dogged earlier 
generations of older people in the United States, and as the nation’s elderly population grew during 
the course of the twentieth century (thanks to decreased child and infant mortality rates, improved 
nutrition, and increased availability of higher quality medical care), so too did these programs.  
However, not all elderly people benefitted from the development of the senior state’s three 
core components of economic security, health security, and social service provisions. From its very 
beginnings, older white men in certain employment categories tended to be the greatest 
beneficiaries, despite the fact that older women (due to increased longevity and less participation in 
formal compensated employment) were generally in greater need of assistance in old-age. Along 
racial lines, whites tended to benefit far more than non-whites, given the significant disparities in 
life expectancies for white men and women versus, respectively, that of black men and women 
during much of the twentieth century.  
The development of community and social services also helped to replicate and reinforce 
existing racial disparities in wealth into old-age. Wealthier, middle-class suburban communities in 
postwar America that could afford to support community and social programs for older residents 
benefitted from the significant expansion of the Older Americans Act in the late 1960s and into the 
early 1970s that directed tens of millions of new federal appropriations into these programs, 
frequently in the form of subsidies, but programs that served less wealthy rural and urban elderly 
populations were not always as fortunate. In New York City, the combination of a concentrated 
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elderly population and a local labor movement that was remained strong enough to organize and 
mobilize older people ensured that local government services for the elderly remained robust, but 
the same could not be said for less-fortunate cities like Detroit and St. Louis. 
Consequently, as the senior state was developing, it attracted less unwelcome attention and 
organized political opposition than did other public assistance programs or initiatives. Compared to 
the racial polarized politics that ultimately doomed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), for example, the largely gradual, quiet 
expansion of government services to the elderly that marked the development of the senior state 
proceeded in a natural, organic manner that usually enjoyed the enthusiastic support of key players 
like state and local governments and private voluntary organizations that exercised significant 
power and influence within America’s widely dispersed system of government. If anything, the 
architects of the senior state took advantage of anti-welfare animus to build the case for enhanced 
government services for the elderly. The public and private pension crisis of the late 1940s helped 
fuel demands for changes to the Social Security system that ultimately shifted that system away 
from its originally more popular old-age noncontributory assistance program and towards its old-age 
contributory social insurance program. Other potentially worthy social initiatives for other age 
groups, such as proposed universal health care for infants and young children, were not enacted or 
were delayed for decades.11  
          
11 For example, as both former Johnson senior assistant Joseph A. Califano and former Social Security Commissioner 
Robert M. Ball independently recalled, Medicare was merely the opening salvo in the long-standing fight to enact 
national health insurance. As Robert M. Ball remembered, “we all saw insurance for the elderly as a fallback position, 
which we advocated solely because it seemed to have the best chance politically…we expected Medicare to be the first 
step toward universal national health insurance, perhaps with ‘Kiddicare’ [federal insurance for children] as the next 
step.” Robert M. Ball, “Perspectives on Medicare: What Medicare’s Architects Had In Mind,” Health Affairs 14, no. 4 
(Winter 1995): 62-72. Cited in Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), 33. Likewise, in April and May 1968, economist Eveline Burns HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen had 
unsuccessfully advanced the case for a comprehensive prenatal care program. See Alan Dickerson, Health Security For 
All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 135. See also 
Colin Gordon’s discussion in Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 108-109. 
 430 
 
Essentially, in the forty years between the enactment of Social Security and the mid-1970s, 
the hopes and hard work of social reformers to build a public social welfare state in the United 
States that would modernize and humanize how the nation provided assistance and aid became 
increasingly channeled into the development of a lopsided welfare system that offered a modicum of 
protection against the vicissitudes of old age, but did so in a fragmented and incomplete manner. 
Driving this change was the need for the nation to provide at least some minimal measure of support 
and assistance to older people that would clearly mark that assistance as not a form of welfare or 
government handout, but which could also be reconciled with the nation’s historic reluctance to 
concentrate power in the national government or to engage in the public redistribution of wealth to 
support needy individuals or groups.  
The senior state that took shape starting in the 1930s reflected this ambivalence by rationing 
assistance to older Americans along racial and gender lines in order to stave off the possibility of 
more radical or far-reaching reforms. Curious among government programs, Social Security 
enjoyed limited popular or elite support at the time of its inception; only the insistence of the 
Roosevelt administration and a mixture of congressional fear of the Townsend Movement and 
desire by southern Democrats for financial assistance supporting otherwise negligible southern state 
old-age assistance programs enabled the Social Security Act to clear otherwise unfavorable odds. 
The passage of the Social Security Act, and subsequent attempts to amend and expand it, generated 
fierce opposition from much but not all of the nation’s business community, which successfully 
sought to limit the expansion and improvement of the Social Security system throughout the 1940s.  
This pause in the development of Social Security merely shifted the burden of providing old-
age public assistance back to individual states and local communities, a development that virtually 
guaranteed continued inequality in the provision of that assistance. The growth of a private welfare 
state during the immediate post-World War II years and into the 1950s siphoned off a significant 
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amount of popular support for the continued expansion of the senior state by ensuring that an 
employment-centered model of social provision would continue to exist and compete with the social 
provision offered by the public welfare system. It was only when public methods to support older 
Americans once more entered into a crisis during the late 1940s and into the 1950s due to 
inadequate benefits paid by the old-age insurance system that public support for expanding the 
senior state at the national level became a pressing issue once more.  
By this point, though, a growing body of academic literature as well as practical 
programmatic administrative experience by local and state officials had begun to redefine the 
economic and social problems associated with growing old in the United States. Popularized by 
Michael Harrington and other social commentators, this new orientation in public assistance for 
older people insisted upon a more multi-dimensional conception of the lived experience of elderly 
people in the United States that could not be solved simply by improving access to sufficient income 
in retirement (though that continued to be a goal for social reformers throughout this period).  
Instead, this new, growing body of social science research emphasized the need for 
improved medical care and nutrition by arguing that the effects of biological aging could be arrested 
under the right circumstances, thereby enabling older people to remain active participants in the 
workforce, and by extension, lessening the need for them to become economically dependent upon 
public assistance. The steadily increasing overall population of older people in the United States, as 
well as the fact that older people were a proportionately rising portion of the overall general 
population, spurred popular and elite fears that the elderly would become a permanently expensive 
burden upon limited state and local welfare resources that would limit or prevent public assistance 
from being directed to other deserving recipients.12  
          
12 In 1920, the proportion of people aged 65 years or older stood at 4.7% of the overall U.S. population. By 1970, this 
figure had more than doubled and stood at 9.9% of the overall U.S. population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 
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Therefore, starting in the 1940s and gradually picking up speed in the subsequent two 
decades, reformers and old-age advocacy groups pushed for the enactment of new government 
programs designed to assist older people in living active, independent lives, rather than easing them 
out of the workforce and thereby rendering them dependent upon either public or private assistance. 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, a distinctive social policy network of local, state, and federal 
officials had emerged that aimed to use state power and resources to build a comprehensive welfare 
state for older people. The enactment of Medicare/Medicaid in 1965 and subsequent amendments to 
Social Security throughout the 1960s further bolstered the senior state.  
This state-building process reached its culmination during the War on Poverty in the 1960s 
and continued into the 1970s as the Nixon administration ratified and expanded initiatives begun by 
the Johnson administration to combat elderly poverty. The senior state thereby brought together 
social welfare officials at all levels of government, private voluntary organization representatives, 
and academic experts into a new, unified effort to build an infrastructure capable of dealing with the 
myriad needs of older people. The outpouring of national legislation, including Medicare, the Older 
Americans Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, during the 1960s to deal with these 
needs, along with subsequent legislative amendments to these laws, represented the culmination of 
these efforts. By the mid-1970s, the federal government had assumed a new, permanent role as an 
essential partner to state and local governments in supporting the nation’s growing elderly 
population, and that shift represented a reversal of traditional concerns about enlarging the reach of 
the national state’s power in American society.  
          
Demographic Trends in the 20th Century: Census 2000 Special Reports, by Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, pg. 56, 
Figure 2-4, Percent Distribution of the Total Population by Age: 1900 to 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). Accessed at U.S. Census Bureau website 
(source URL: https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf, April 5, 2017). In terms of absolute population, in 
1920 there were 4.9 million people aged 65 years or older in the United States (out of a total population of 106.5 
million). By 1970, there were 20.1 million people aged 65 years or older in the United States (out of a total population 
of 205.1 million). See: Ibid., 60. 
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In supplying federal assistance with minimal disruption to local and state autonomy, the 
senior state was able to win the support of traditionally wary local and state officials, and by 
demonstrating the ability of government to be a force for promoting improved economic and social 
security in old age, the senior state secured the crucial backing of New Deal and Great Society 
social reformers who remained eager to improve public assistance without encouraging increased 
individual dependence upon limited state resources. These two elements enabled the senior state to 
become an essential part of the day-to-day life of millions of older people and hundreds of 
communities in the United States, and to ward off subsequent attempts to repeal it. The creation and 
continued existence of the senior state during this period signified that public assistance for the 
elderly had become socially acceptable and politically legitimate in American society, especially 
when compared to the wide-scale popular resistance that had greeted earlier reform efforts in the 
twentieth century to institutionalize a permanent role for the American state in the provision of old 
age assistance. 
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